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Abstract
In States and Markets Susan Strange identified a source of structural power 
called the knowledge structure. This thesis sets out to do two things. First it tries to work 
out the logical consequences of the notion that knowledge is a source of structural power. 
Second, it tries to test Strange’s model for its explanatory power, by using it to construct 
historical narrative on the development of tekhne, sophia, and nous in antiquity.
On the question of the logical consequences for international political theory of 
the notion of ‘knowledge as power’, I argue that it radically undermines many of 
Strange’s own assumptions about the nature of science, technology and ideology. The 
reason for this is that her assumptions derive from a discourse which has traditionally 
legitimised itself by excluding power from talk about its constitution. When Strange 
supplements the notion of knowledge-as-truth with the notion of knowledge-as-power, 
she obliges us to reconsider the Socratic question of knowledge-as-virtue, because we are 
confronted with our own agency.
That is why I have chosen the ancient world for a case study to test the 
explanatory power of Strange’s multi-faceted model of the global political economy. By 
putting her model to work as a means to assimilate the wealth of archaeological and 
philological scholarship in this field, its heuristic value is demonstrated. It traces the first 
structuration of knowledge back to primary and secondary state formation in the Near 
East. Then it analyses the Iliad and the Odyssey as orally preserved norms for managing 
the values of security, wealth, freedom and justice in the wake of the collapse of bronze- 
age civilisation in the Mediterranean. It then accounts for the discovery of secular 
consciousness as the result of a novel interface between the oral and the written. The 
narrative culminates with the mediation of a communal crisis over the values of security, 
wealth, freedom and justice by Solon, which initiated the transformation of Prometheus 
from the crafty trickster depicted by Hesiod into the democratic revolutionary 
characterised by Aeschylus.
The thesis concludes with a theory of contribution based upon four points of 
consensus identified within the literature of International Political Economy.
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1: Introduction
This thesis is exactly what it says in the title. It is a supplement to States 
and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, by Susan 
Strange.
By supplement, I partly mean an offering which seeks to help preserve 
and promote the status of States and Markets both amongst scholars of 
international studies generally and amongst those within the IPE fraternity who 
are already familiar with Susan Strange’s work. It deliberately focuses upon 
States and Markets in order to legitimate the view that it is worthy of being 
considered as a suitable basis for doctoral research. It attempts to provide support 
to those who have argued that States and Markets is Strange’s defining book, 
one about which the rest of her work revolves1. It also seeks to persuade those 
who might be tempted to overlook States and Markets as merely an introductory 
student text to think again, for to overlook the book on such grounds would be to 
forget a crucial point about the life and work of Susan Strange.
The point is this: Susan Strange was a great international relations 
theorist but refused to package herself as such . Like many other IR scholars of 
her generation, Susan Strange was often to be found thinking her hardest when 
engaged in communication with her students. This is something to remember and 
commemorate in an epoch which has imposed profound structural incentives to 
alienate research from education in the university. For Susan Strange, pedagogy 
was an integral part of her research. She embodied Humboldt’s ideal of the 
university as a site dedicated to the inseparability of research and teaching. Her 
students experienced this. Word got around. And this is why so many new 
students began to flock to her WPE courses at the LSE from all comers of the 
globe. That is why States and Markets deserves the status of a classic text which 
will always demand further reading. States and Markets is Strange’s defining
1 Christopher May, An Annotated Bibliography o f Susan Strange’s Academic Publications 1949- 
1999 (Third Edition, Bristol, UWE, 2001), p.24).
2 Ronen Palan, ‘Susan Strange 1923-1998: a great international relations theorist’, RIPE, 6:2 
Summer 1999, p. 122.
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book, around which the rest of her work revolves, precisely because she took the 
thought of her students just as seriously, if not more seriously, than the thought 
of her peers. This was yet another expression of her general iconoclasm which so 
many people found appealing but which other colleagues sometimes found 
trying. Her most important theoretical work was thus quietly hidden, with an 
ironic touch of humour that she perhaps knew the doyens of high theory would 
be sure to miss, under the cover of an ‘introductory textbook’. But now that a 
second wave of very accomplished IPE introductory textbooks have found their 
way onto the reading lists, States and Markets has been liberated from its former 
role and is due for reappraisal. A window of opportunity has opened to adjust the 
way in which States and Markets has conventionally been read. This supplement 
to States and Markets is intended as a contribution to the promotion of such a 
reappraisal.
However, Susan Strange was interested in people who were interested in 
thinking for themselves in creative debate with others, not in attracting disciples 
or acolytes . Therefore, this thesis aims to honour that memory by trying to 
supplement States and Markets in a second sense. This thesis deconstructs the 
text of States and Markets, and then applies the findings of this deconstruction to 
the reading and writing of historical narrative on the structuration o f knowledge 
in early antiquity.
The deconstruction takes place in chapter two. By deconstruction I mean 
nothing more than a very close reading which takes a text apart and puts it back 
together agaiin in order to know it intimately4. The motive behind this is a 
creative one based on the principle that the author never achieves full control 
over his or her text. A live text cannot achieve closure in the sense that it is never 
really a finished piece of work, always a piece of work in progress. And given
3 This point comei across very strongly, along with the point above about the unity of pedagogy 
and research in her approach to the academic profession, in ‘I Never Meant to Be An Academic’, 
in Authority and Markets: Susan Strange’s Writings on International Political Economy, edited 
by Roger Tooze & Christopher May. This article was originally published in J.Kruzel & J.N. 
Rosenau (eds), Joimeys Through World Politics.
4 Of course I am avare that many scholars have articulated much more sophisticated conceptions 
of deconstruction ihan outlined here. I comfort myself in the knowledge that Derrida deliberately 
laid countless elephant traps for those seeking to set themselves up as authorities on the correct or 
incorrect applicatbn of his work.
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that the text is just a snapshot of thought in process, there is always something 
going on within it which is just beyond the author’s reach, at the margins of his 
or her attention during the moments in which it was written. Therefore, when 
taking the text apart and putting it back together again, it is often worth paying 
special attention to minor metaphors, allegories, disparate contradictions and 
countless other marginal details which might reveal things in the text that other, 
more cursory readings, would not have revealed. Chapter two does precisely this 
and in the process begins to focus on the reasoning which led to the development 
of her conception of the ‘knowledge structure’.
Three major themes emerge from our deconstruction of the way Strange 
attempts to unify the concepts of science, ideology and technology into a 
coherent subject of study in her thought about the world political economy of 
knowledge. Firstly, a dramatic tension becomes evident between the realist or 
instrumental conceptions of knowledge depicted in chapter six, and the more 
utopian side of Susan Strange which comes out so strongly in her desert island 
stories, and where she leaves it to her castaways to mediate between the values 
of security, wealth, freedom and justice. Secondly, a dramatic tension becomes 
evident between the dispassionate vision of a globally commodified knowledge 
structure sketched out in the latter half of chapter six and the passionate 
commitment in chapter two to the value of curiosity and wonder or the pursuit 
and love of knowledge as an end in itself. Thirdly, a critical appreciation of the 
historical contingency of our conceptions of science, ideology and technology 
becomes evident. The concepts we conventionally use to represent knowledge 
vacillate within the text. When words shift their meaning with increased velocity 
like it is often an indicator that a significant change in the structure of knowledge 
is taking place. And indeed, of the four primary structures of the world political 
economy Strange identified, she believed that it was the knowledge structure that 
was currently undergoing the most ‘rapid and bewildering’ change5.
It is these three themes which drive and inspire the construction o f a 
historical narrative about the structuration of knowledge in early antiquity in
5 Susan Strange, States and Markets, p.l 13 & 132.
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chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis. Our traditional assumptions about the semantic 
relations between the concepts of science, ideology and technology were forged 
when the modem university was sponsored and venerated primarily as a national 
institution for the production and reproduction of knowledge within the cultural 
life of the nation-state. But now these semantic relations are frequently being 
restructured in a world political economy where The Retreat o f  the State is just 
as evident inside the walls of the university as it is outside the walls of the 
university.
As Susan Strange argued, this radical change will require an equally 
radical revision of realist assumptions about the nature of international relations6. 
The very founding idea of the university within which IR as a discipline is 
sustained is a shipwreck, and some serious desert island thinking will have to be 
done by its remaining survivors. If it is true that the university is going to be 
driven by a mix of sticks and carrots through a combined but uneven process of 
transformation from a national institution into something which has to think 
much more like a cross between a TNC and an NGO, what kind of a community 
do we want this to be and what purposes should it have in mind? If Rival States 
and Rival Firms are now increasingly looking toward the ‘knowledge-based 
economy’ in their pursuit of security and wealth, what room for manoeuvre does 
the university still have within the limits of the possible to reproduce the values 
of freedom and justice? And if  the meanings of science, ideology and technology 
are in flux now that knowledge as a national public good provided for by state 
taxation is being challenged by a neo-liberal model of knowledge as a bundle of 
capital or consumer goods developed and reproduced for valorization within a 
global marketplace, what are the prospects for maintaining our passionate 
commitment to Strange’s fifth value of wonder? And if the prospects for 
upholding Strange’s fifth value are not great, does this mean that for the time
6 Ibid, p. 133.
7 Slaughter & Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial 
University. Slaughter & Leslie, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, State, and 
Higher Education. Peter Jarvis, Universities and Corporate Universities. Bill Readings, The 
University in Ruins. Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace.
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being we can forget about the notion of the epistemic community as a potential
o
source of enlightened agency in world affairs?
This thesis does not attempt to answer these difficult questions, but it 
does set out to historicize them. A few words of explanation for the giant leaps 
into history that take place in chapters 3 ,4  and 5 may be useful here.
Susan Strange’s regular emphasis upon the need to cultivate a historical 
perspective on all the major questions of IPE was mainly inspired by her friend 
and colleague, Robert Cox. Back in 1986, some two years before the publication 
of States and Markets, Strange decided to devote an entire seminar to student 
discussion over what was arguably Cox’s first seminal article, namely ‘Social 
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’9. 
Amongst other things, this article argued that a consciousness of the past is the 
key ingredient which helps to distinguish the problem-solving theory of 
positivist variants of realism from critical theory, which seeks to protect and 
nurture reasoned grounds for hope that humanity retains an ability to transcend 
our existing world order. Two years later, in States and Markets, Strange argued 
that there was no way that the contemporary international political economy can 
be understood ‘without making some effort to dig back to its roots, to peer 
behind the curtain of passing time to what went before’10. She argued that it was 
evident in the history of thought that perceptions of the past ‘always have a 
powerful influence on perceptions of present problems and future solutions’. She 
also argued that the spell of the past stretches back ‘not hundreds, but thousands 
of years’ and that history should thus not be too narrowly or parochially be 
conceived in terms of space or time11.
These arguments turned out to be more prophetic than either Robert Cox 
or Susan Strange could possibly have imagined, when the wall between Western
8 This thesis does not explicitly juxtapose Strange’s conception of knowledge structure with 
Haas’ notion of epistemic community. Susan Strange’s relationship with regime theory is a 
complex one (more complex at any rate that one might surmise through a cursory reading of 
Cave Hie Dragones!) and is best dealt with as a study in its own right.
9 Originally published by Millennium, vol. 10, no.2 (Summer 1981).
10 States and Markets, p. 18.
11 Ibid, p.lS-19.
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and Eastern Europe fell and the Cold War drew to a close, whereupon several 
scholars within IR attempted to supply the inevitable surge in demand for 
interpretations of the historical significance of world events. Depressingly, some 
scholars were willing to dredge up very narrow and parochial conceptions of 
history in their rush to construct a compelling perspective with some pretension 
to foreknowledge of the likely problems and solutions facing the ‘New World 
Order’.
Robert Cox responded by proposing a counter discourse which would
apply his historical conception of Critical Theory to the re-emergence of the term 
10‘civilization’ . Combating the nascent hegemony of the new ‘culture based
realism’ and working toward a civilizational pluralism that can bring a halt to the
follies of global hegemonic oppression, Cox argued, will involve critical IPE in a
comparative historical study of civilization formation, including research into
11past evidence of cross-fertilisation and coexistence .
Partly inspired by the work of Cox and Strange, younger scholars began 
to join in and develop the call to historicise IPE. Amin and Palan, for example 
called for research which seeks to place current issues in the world political 
economy in historical perspective14. They also refine this call and argue for 
certain criteria of historiographical judgement. For example this research, they 
argue, should eschew an approach which sees history merely as a quarry from 
which fundamental abstract laws of human nature and behaviour can be derived. 
Furthermore, historical grand narratives which assume there is some teleology 
which history must follow are also rejected. Rather, Amin and Palan call for 
narratives built upon the hypothesis that history proceeds through a process of 
multiple determinations. The historical turn which IPE requires, Amin and Palan 
argue, would involve narratives which use the study of the past to bring a human 
dynamic to the contemporary distinction between structure and agency, drawing
12 Cox already had an angle on civilizational perspectives before Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ (Foreign Affairs, vol.72, no.3,1993), but this article and Huntington’s subsequent 
book clearly gave Cox’s interest in civilizations added impetus.
13 See chapters 8, 9 & 10 in The Political Economy o f a Plural World. Also ‘Civilizations in 
World Political Economy’, in New Political Economy, vol.l, no.2, 1996, pp. 141-156.
14 Amin & Palan, ‘Editorial: the need to historicise IPE’, Review o f International Political 
Economy, vol.3, no.2, Summer 1996, p.209-215.
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out the way societies evolve and change through the interactions which are 
taking place now, and which have taken place for millennia, between ‘agents in 
institutions’ and institutions in agents’.
In a subsequent article in the Review o f  International Political Economy 
Amoore Et A1 have tried to explore and develop Amin and Palan’s conceptions 
of what it might mean to address what they call the historical deficit in IPE15. 
They argued that our efforts to historicize IPE should move beyond a banal 
consensus that we should simply ‘add history and stir’. Picking up on Amin and 
Palan’s agenda for an IPE historiography which highlights the dynamic interplay 
between structure and agency, Amoore Et A1 use Collingwood to advocate an 
emphasis upon the historicity of knowledge. By this they mean an ontological 
and epistemological priority on human consciousness: the idea of history being 
composed of countless reflective or purposive acts, as well as the unconscious or 
routine acts of timeless tradition. Historical enquiry under the banner o f IPE 
should thus not just seek out what agents o f the past did within the given 
structures of the possible, but also what they thought they were doing when they 
did it, including reflections upon their structural circumstances. It should also 
assimilate, Amoore Et A1 argue, the point made by E.H. Carr, inspired by Croce, 
that the historian is part of history, existing at a point in time which will 
determine the questions and methods that he carries into his study of the past. 
Finally, Amoore Et A1 express a normative preference for historical enquiry in 
IPE which focuses upon the conditions of transformative and emancipatory 
moments in historical experience.
Gathering together all the findings generated by our deconstruction of 
States and Markets then, plus those generated within the debate about the need to 
historicize IPE, we now have a unique package of questions and parameters to 
carry behind the curtain of the present to guide us in our exploration of the past.
The first question is: where to start? Given that the concept of civilization 
has re-emerged in hegemonic discourse and given that we are serious about
15 Amoore, Dodgson, Germain, Gills, Langley & Watson, ‘Paths to a historicized international 
political economy’, Review o f International Political Economy, vol.7, no.l, pp.53-71.
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wishing to historicize IPE, we naturally have to start our historical narrative with 
the original causes of the emergence of civilization itself. This commences in 
chapter 3, entitled tekhne, which is a transliteration of an ancient Greek concept 
of knowledge used to denote an art, skill, or craft. Susan Strange’s metaphor of 
the shipwreck and the desert island are used as a vehicle to beach IPE upon the 
origins of human complexity and structuration in antiquity. Her analytical 
framework of production, finance, security and knowledge is applied to help 
explain the process of primary state formation in Mesopotamia and Egypt. The 
structuration of knowledge during primary state formation is traced through 
sectoral studies of the development of craftsmanship in pottery, metallurgy, and 
writing.
In the account of early writing, a special emphasis is placed upon the 
archaeological discovery of its development as an economic or planning tool for 
the organization of complexity and as an instrument for the formation of 
property relations. This emphasis is important to the development of Strange’s 
conception of the knowledge structure because of the dominant logocentric 
principle in the social sciences that writing was invented to represent speech. To 
reformulate an early point of Derrida’s in Strangean terms, this logocentric 
principle is a major obstacle to understanding how knowledge interacts with 
security, production and finance. As the art of writing began to disseminate itself 
through all areas of the scribal mind, it is argued, human consciousness gradually 
became interiorised. With the arrival of the scribal priest, paradoxically, we find 
the first hints of a secularised consciousness which, in crisis situations, is capable 
of reflective or purposive acts such as those presented in the fictional tale of 
Sinuhe. Out of the art of writing the soliloquy begins to supplement the divine 
word and we begin to see the antecedents of history as Amoore Et A1 conceive it.
Chapter 3 then moves on to utilize Strange’s concept o f secondary 
structures to marshal archaeological and philological accounts of secondary state 
formation and the dissemination of civilization to Anatolia, Syria-Palestine and 
the Mediterranean. The secondary structures of trade and transport are seen as 
crucial here. This is where the beauty of Strange’s heuristic framework begins to 
pull ahead significantly against alternatives such as the one proffered by Michael
12
Mann, or indeed against core-periphery theory, which some archaeologists have 
also tried to apply to the ancient world. Her conception of primary and secondary 
structures can help us to investigate the dialectic between primary and secondary 
state formation in an empirical manner.
Partly in order to avoid the charge o f wishing to re-inscribe a teleological 
grand narrative of human progress, and also because the dynamics of collapse 
are an important subject for world society to contemplate in their own right, 
Strange’s framework is then used to assimilate various accounts of the onset of a 
severe contraction of complexity in the structures of everyday life in the 
Mediterranean, commonly known as a ‘Dark Age’, from about 1100 to 600 BC. 
This phase in the history of western civilization tends to resurface whenever it 
needs to seriously contemplate its own mortality, for example during the 20 
years crisis that spawned the thought of Spengler and Toynbee. But we need to 
update these early 20th century Cassandra’s with work that has improved our 
knowledge of this particular collapse considerably. My account uses Strange’s 
framework to organise the work of those who have suggested social causes 
rather than those that look to natural causes such as meteorites, volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes and the like. In a nutshell the argument is that the 
theocratic kingship mode of deliberation and mediation was simply not up to the 
job of regulating the greatly increased complexity of civilization in the late 
Bronze Age, particularly when it came to decision making between father-son- 
brother god-kings over crisis situations to do with inter-theocratic governance. In 
other words the texts which cry out to us lamenting the collapse at the time are 
perfectly right. It was the gods that had failed.
Towards the end of chapter 3 there is also a digression on the question of 
how the early construction of gender relations was intertwined with the 
structuration of knowledge. As civilization developed there was an erosion of 
female power over knowledge with the movement of its arts, skills and crafts 
from village production to city workshops. The gradual descent of reproductive 
exchange into the institution of female slavery, where property in the ancient 
mind is often conceived as property in women was also, it is argued, a significant 
factor in the early gendering of knowledge. This digression is, o f course,
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important in its own right, in a world where we are all obliged to re-evaluate 
male and female identities. But it is also partly driven by the need to prepare 
some ground for the following chapter, where Homer’s depiction of a conflict 
over property in women is portrayed as an orally preserved vehicle for normative 
mediation over the values of security, wealth, freedom and justice! Portraying 
the Iliad and the Odyssey as texts about the conscious mediation of security, 
wealth, freedom and justice would have looked a bit odd without first tackling 
the question of gender. Perhaps I should also warn that this digression kicks off 
with some old anglo-saxon words. Originally this too was partly inspired by 
Strange who, whenever confronted with the question of gender, was not one for 
the use of euphemistic academic jargon. I tried to ensure that it cannot come 
across as merely a gratuitous attempt to cause offence. But I must nevertheless 
take full responsibility for the way I have tried to use these old words to get 
straight to the point.
Chapter 4 is entitled sophia, which is a transliteration of an ancient Greek 
concept of knowledge used to denote the art, skill or craft of excellence in the 
pursuit of human values. Here our historical investigation into Susan Strange’s 
concept of knowledge structure naturally begins to focus, as I have already 
intimated, upon the normative values of security, wealth, freedom and justice as 
outlined in States and Markets. The songs of Homer have traditionally been 
regarded as the foundation stone of Western civilization, and when the sophists
tliin Athens began to pioneer the idea of higher education and research in the 5 
century BC the study of sophia in music and tragedy lay at the very core of the 
curriculum. The reason for this, chapter 4 argues, is that Homer’s songs were 
seen as an orally preserved means to knowledge about the mediation of the 
values of security, wealth, freedom and justice. Susan Strange’ conception of 
knowledge structure also includes the means of human communication and the 
means of human memory or mnemonics. For this reason chapter 4 pays special 
attention to the work of people like Eric Havelock, Walter Ong and Jack Goody, 
who have done so much to enhance our understanding of how the transformation 
from oral to written means of communication and mnemonics has a propensity to 
restructure human consciousness.
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The theme of oral and written means of communication and mnemonics 
persists in chapter 5, entitled philosophia, which is a transliteration of an ancient 
Greek concept for the value of wonder, curiosity and the love of knowledge. This 
chapter then, is an attempt to historicize Strange’s fifth value. It is an attempt to 
resolve the dramatic tension in Strange’s conception of knowledge structure 
identified in the deconstruction of States and Markets in chapter 2 by formally 
adding it to her intrinsic value order of security, wealth, freedom and justice. It 
tries to show how the dissemination of writing emancipated curiosity and 
wonder, and then demonstrate how philosophia actually began to have an impact 
upon the Athenian regulation of security, wealth, freedom and justice under the 
mediation of ‘Solon the lawgiver’. Our study o f the songs of Solon is the study 
of the formation of a political will which forms the normative origins of the 
concept of democracy in antiquity. This is perhaps the crowning glory of Susan 
Strange’s particular approach to structural power. When Strange recognised 
structures she also immediately recognised the role of human agency within 
structure. There may be a limited choice of actions but there is still choice, and 
the history of these choices reinforces some structural elements while 
undermining others16. The reforms of Solon also mark the point of a human 
choice which initiated the transformation of Prometheus from the crafty trickster 
depicted in Hesiod to the democratic revolutionary depicted in Aeschylus. The 
god of curiosity and wonder was thus promoted within the Olympian pantheon 
of higher values, just as my historical narrative promotes Strange’s fifth value 
into her intrinsic value order.
16 Christopher May, ‘A New Way of Seeing?: A Critical Evaluation of the Work of Susan 
Strange’, a paper presented at the IPEG workshop: ‘Engaging with the work of Susan Strange’, 
Nottingham Trent University, Clifton Campus, Nottingham, November 3rd 2001, pg.7.
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2: Reading States And Markets
(1.1) Desert Island Story
'It was a dark and stormy night. A ship was steaming laboriously 
through mountainous seas whipped by gale force winds. Suddenly there 
is a terrific explosion amidships. All the lights go out. Whatever the 
cause, it has wrecked the power system. On board there is panic. People 
rush about in all directions, shouting and screaming and bumping into 
one another. Everyone is trying to get to the lifeboats.'1
These are the opening sentences of States and Markets, by Susan Strange. Her 
book begins with a story about the survivors of a shipwreck who escape upon three 
lifeboats to a desert island and set up three different types of communities. One is a 
fortress society based upon a realist model, one is communistic based upon an idealist 
model, and the third is a market society based upon an economic model. On the third 
page, Strange invites us all to join in and finish the story. On the sixth page she writes:
'It is all up to the reader. My stories are like Lego, the little Danish- 
made building blocks that fit together in endless variation to make 
whatever you will. Like toys, you can learn something from them if you 
do not take them very seriously.'
When someone tells us not to take them too seriously, that is the time to prick up our 
ears and listen carefully to what they are saying. There are things afoot upon Strange's 
desert island that are more interesting than Lego.
On page three of the book, Strange writes that all stories tell us something about 
their author. If all stories tell us something about their author, was it not extraordinary 
that of all the stories available to choose from to begin a book about political economy, 
she chose one about a terrible shipwreck? Where on earth did this dramatic image 
spring from, and why? In the world at large shipwrecks can be horrific accidents, but in 
the world of writing there can be no such thing as an accident because the author has 
made it happen there on the page in black and white. Behind storytelling there are 
always reasons, and we are always at liberty to speculate about them.
1 Susan Strange, States And Markets (London, Pinter, 1988), p.l. From here on all page 
references to this particular book shall appear within the text itself rather than in footnote format.
16
This chapter seeks out the cause of the terrible explosion amidships which 
prompted Strange to write such an unconventional opening to a textbook about the 
international political economy. Our hypothesis is that the striking image of the 
shipwreck is no mere accident. It found its way onto the opening paragraph because 
there is an explosion to be found at the heart of Strange's book. On board States And 
Markets there is panic. People rush about in all directions, shouting and screaming and 
bumping into one another. Everyone tries to find the lifeboats...
We shall return to Strange's desert island story. But let us begin with a brief 
summary of States and Markets, in order to fix the co-ordinates of the wreck within the 
book as a whole.
(1.2) A Selective Summary Of States And Markets
After the prologue and a few preparatory remarks about the nature of theory, 
Strange makes it clear that what her book is attempting to do is to suggest a way to 
synthesize the study of Politics, Economics and International Relations. A few words of 
explanation about the motive behind this may be useful.
Strange was one of a small band of scholars who became disenchanted with the 
way that the study of the world political economy during the 20th century has evolved 
into three separate disciplines. The reasons for this disenchantment are many and 
complex. For the sake of brevity two major reasons will be noted here.
First of all it has been argued that the polity and the economy overlap each 
other and influence each other in ways that social theory has failed to understand 
because of its disciplinary academic structure. It has been argued that the relationships 
between politics and economics have become poorly understood because of an 
academic division of labour where the study of the state has tended to become the 
preserve of Political Theory and the analysis of markets the domain of Economics.
If this were the only reason for the disenchantment then it could be interpreted 
as a simple call for the return of political economy to its 19th century roots. The second 
motive makes things a bit more complicated, for it has to do with the way the Academy 
has responded to the career of nationalism throughout the 20th century, which did not 
turn out quite how the 19th century political economists had hoped. The Liberals had
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predicted that with the development of free trade and political democracy the 
burgeoning nationalisms of the 19th century would mature into a brotherhood of 
nations, whilst the Marxists were confident that with revolution the nation-state would 
wither away. They didn’t and it didn't, as the First world War proved2. Undaunted by 
this setback, the Academy gave birth to a new discipline called International Relations3. 
Thus it came to pass that there were three academic disciplines in the study of the world 
political economy, each reacting to the phenomenon of nationalism and the nation-state 
in a slightly different way, according to their brief.
Those who took up the study of International Relations had perhaps the most 
difficult brief to master. As a discipline bom into a period of 'never again' euphoria that 
often follows wars, it was originally intended that International Relations should help 
foster peace between nations. Under overwhelming pressure of circumstance, however, 
this never again euphoria mutated into a resolve to never again be caught napping 
thinking utopian thoughts4. 'So, history has treated our discipline and its high hopes 
with contempt? Very well then. We are finished with high hopes. From now on we shall 
see the world as it is, not as the Utopians would like it to be. We shall take the world as 
we find it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions within 
which they are organised, as the given framework for action'5. Almost a whole 
generation of professional scholars collectively began to either label themselves or 
consent to themselves being labelled as 'realists'. And the telos of this realism was that 
the question of nationalism and the nation-state should be rewarded with the profound 
respect that it had so destmctively earned.
By the time Susan Strange was sitting down to write States and Markets things 
had moved on, and many people had been suggesting for years that Realism was 
becoming an unrealistic response to contemporary realities. To be sure, they reasoned,
2 For the rise and fall of early Liberal cosmopolitanism see Isaiah Berlin, 'The Bent Twig: On 
Nationalism', in The Crooked Timber O f Humanity. As far as Marxism is concerned, after the 
break up of the Second International the Bolsheviks arguably kept their brand of cosmopolitanism 
alive for a while. But they fell into line too with the defeat of Trotsky and the rise of'socialism in 
one country1. See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Disarmed. George Orwell's Homage To 
Catalonia provides an eye-witness account of just how empty the rhetoric of internationalism had 
become for the Soviet Union by the time of the Spanish civil war.
3 The word 'Academy* here is used as a general term to denote the universities and higher 
education colleges characteristic of modernity.
4 E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis is the classic work usually cited to highlight this mutation.
5 See Robert Cox on 'problem solving theory1 in: 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory1, Millennium, Vol.10, no.2, Summer 1981, pp.126-55.
18
in its early days the discipline of International Relations had taken some hard knocks. 
But time marches on. The past compels us to nothing. Perhaps it was time for 
International Relations to exorcise some of the worst of its traumas?
Often this argument manifested itself in attention drawn to the fact that the 
sovereign independence of the nation-state depends upon at least two supplements, 
namely dependency and interdependency. Perhaps, it was argued, there was a need for 
International Relations to focus more attention upon these variables of international 
politics too.
It is only a small step from here to the conclusion that domestic politics and 
economics (that is to say those relations that exist within the confines of the nation­
state) both interact with international society. So perhaps it was inevitable that sooner 
or later people like Susan Strange would attempt to rewire the study of Politics, 
Economics, and International Relations in order to form an integrated circuit, a coherent 
whole6. On the one hand we have relations between politics and economics. On the 
other hand we have relations between the domestic and the international. What about a 
discipline that attempts to synthesise the lot, assimilating our 20th century experience of 
the nation-state system (carefully documented by International Relations) into our 19th 
century models of political economy? This is the discipline which Susan Strange and 
her colleagues were attempting to found. States And Markets was written as part of a 
contribution to its founding.
Strange was also sensitive to the demands for a 'normative approach' that 
became increasingly insistent in the field of international political theory over the past
6 For the sake of brevity the account here has been simplified. Even during the heyday of classical 
Liberalism and Marxism there was always an undercurrent of Mercantilism and this tradition 
persists in the development of IPE (see for example Robert Gilpin, in The Political Economy o f  
International Relations). For a more comprehensive accounts of the development of IPE see: 
Martin Staniland, What Is Political Economy?', also Roger Tooze, Perspectives and Theory: a 
Consumers' Guide', in Paths to International Political Economy, edited by Susan Strange; Roger 
Tooze, 'In Search Of Political Economy1, Political Studies (1984) XXXII, p.637-646. The classic 
article citied is Susan Strange, 'International Economics and International Relations: A Case of 
Mutual Neglect', International Affairs 46 no.2 April 1970. Another is: Richard Cooper, The 
Economics o f Interdependence (New York, McGraw Hill, 1968). Useful surveys are: Craig 
Murphy & Douglas Nelson, ‘International Political Economy: A tale of two heterodoxies’, British 
Journal o f  Politics and International Relations, vol.3, October 2001, pp.393-412; Peter 
Katzenstein & Robert Keohane & Stephen Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study of 
World Politics’, International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn 1998, pp.645-685; Robert Denemark 
& Robert O’Brien, ‘Contesting the Canon: international political economy at UK and US 
universities’, Review o f International Political Economy, 4:1, Spring 1997, pp.214-238.
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couple of decades and which were also, in part, a concomitant reaction against the telos 
of Realism7. Strange begins her attempted synthesis of Politics, Economics and 
International Relations by trying to identify some of the basic values which human 
beings seek through social organisation. A typology of four basic human values' are 
listed, namely: wealth, security, freedom and justice (p. 17). Each society, she asserted, 
provides some measure of each of these human values, however unequally they may be 
shared amongst their members. Thus all societies have to produce wealth for their 
citizens. All societies have to provide some form of security from harm, pain, or 
misfortune. Likewise, all societies are built around some conception of freedom and 
justice, however questionable these conceptions of freedom and justice may be to us.
The next step Strange makes is to argue that different societies, while producing 
some of each of these four values, give a different order of priority to them. Societies 
thus differ from each other in the proportions of each value that they achieve for their 
subjects. Each system of political economy will manifest a different mix in the 
proportional weight given to the aforementioned values of wealth, security, freedom 
and justice. What decides the nature of the mix, Strange argued, are questions of power. 
Who has the power to make key decisions over the relative merits of different values 
and organise society accordingly? From what sources are these decisive powers 
derived? And for whose ends are these decisions made, or who benefits? In this way, 
Strange aimed to marry positivist and normative trends in social theory.
Strange then makes a distinction between two types of power in any given 
political economy: structural power and relational power:
Relational power is the power of A to get B to do something that they 
would not otherwise do. Structural power on the other hand is the power 
to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy 
within which other states or agents have to operate.' (p.24)
7 'The belief that we should firmly and unequivocally bring values back into the analysis of 
international political economy is now shared by many scholars in the field.' Susan Strange, 
'Structures, Values and Risk in the Study of the International Political Economy1, in Perspectives 
On Political Economy, Edited by R.J. Barry Jones. A seminal example of the trend which Strange 
was responding to is Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. A later sample 
is: Mark Hoffman, 'Normative Approaches', in International Relations: A Handbook o f Current 
Theory, Edited by Margot Light and A.G.R. Groom. Subsequent invaluable surveys are provided 
by Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches and his subsequent 
Sovereignty, Rights and Justice.
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By 'structure1 Strange means something within which things can happen and changes 
take place without affecting the structure itself. So for example, we could say that a 
businessman who has the power to determine the management structure of a company 
has structural power. Whilst a line manager whose task is to work within that given 
management structure only has relational power, he only has power over people 'down 
the line', within the overall structure of the firm. Having made this distinction, Strange 
argued that it was structural rather than relational power that was becoming more 
crucial in determining outcomes in the world political economy, and for this reason it 
was to the analysis of structural power that she dedicated the four main chapters of her 
book.
The next part of Strange's argument is that structural power in the world 
political economy is to be found not in a single structure but in 'four separate 
distinguishable but related structures (p.26). Unlike some varieties of Marxism or 
Liberalism, which tend to see the structure of production and exchange as being the 
universal source of structural power in the political economy, the Strangeian approach 
admits that one structure may be dominant in a particular case, but denies that any one 
structure is dominant universally over space and time. No one power structure is always 
already more important than the other three. These four interacting sources of primary 
structural power are the security structure, the production structure, the financial 
structure, and the knowledge structure.
Strange defines the security structure as the framework of power created via the 
provision of security to people from common dangers to their well being, such as 
human violence or the threat of violence. Such security, Strange argues, is one of the 
most basic human needs. In return for the supply of security, its benefactors derive 
power over those whom they allegedly protect. The protected will be willing to sacrifice 
a certain amount of wealth, justice, status and freedom for their protection. The relative 
desire for security in humans produces a proportional will to domination by anybody 
who possesses the means to provide it. The analysis of the security structure, Strange 
implies, is the traditional habitat of Realist theories of international politics.
The production structure, Strange argues, is the structure by which wealth is 
produced and distributed in a political economy. It is the sum of all the arrangements 
determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what method and on what 
terms. Those who control the means of production and distribution of goods and
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services are in a position of structural power. They determine what wealth is produced, 
how wealth is produced, under what terms wealth is produced and how that wealth is 
distributed. The relative desire for wealth produces in humans a proportional will to 
domination by those who control the means by which it is created and divided. The 
analysis of relations of production, Strange implies, is the traditional habitat of classical 
liberal theories of political economy, together with Liberalism's rebellious offshoot, 
Marxism.
The financial structure Strange defines as the sum of all arrangements 
governing the availability of credit, plus all the factors determining the terms on which 
different currencies are exchanged. Strange justifies the concept of the financial 
structure, to be considered as separate and distinct from the notion of the production 
structure, by arguing that credit and money are signifiers of wealth regulated by 
authorities that are largely independent of those who control the production of wealth 
itself. Indeed the very value of paper money and credit is that they are signifiers and 
have no inherent wealth value in themselves. They are just scraps of paper, or pixels on 
computer screens, and thus exist independently of real wealth. Credit can thus be 
created when authorities want to expand demand, or be made to disappear when they 
want to constrain it. It can also be much more readily and rapidly exchanged than real 
wealth.
Lastly, Strange presents as a legitimate area of study within the boundaries of 
political economy a source of structural power which she calls the knowledge structure. 
The power derived from the knowledge structure, Strange argues, is the one that has 
been most overlooked and underrated. It is no less important than the other three 
sources of power in international political economy, but it is much less well understood. 
Analysis of the knowledge structure is thus far less advanced and has far more yawning 
gaps waiting to be filled than analyses of the other structures (p.l 15). For Strange, the 
knowledge structure comprises the relations under which knowledge is produced, how it 
is stored, and who communicates it, by what means, to whom and on what terms. It 
includes what is believed and generally accepted as understood. People with power in 
the knowledge structure are those who are in a position to determine what knowledge 
should be produced, are engaged in the accumulation of more of it, entrusted with its 
storage and reproduction, and in control of the channels by which it is communicated 
(p.l 15 & 117). Strange thought that scholars in Philosophy, Psychology and Linguistics 
had a better grasp of some of the concepts necessary to an understanding of power
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derived from the knowledge structure by virtue of the fact that they have been grappling 
with them for much longer than students of International Relations, Politics or 
Economics.
Most citations of States And Markets tend to focus upon the four primary 
structures of power in the world political economy summarised above. But there is a 
third part of Strange's book, sometimes overlooked, where she turns her attention to 
what she calls the 'secondary power structures'. One reason why this part of States And 
Markets has drawn less attention is precisely because of the secondary status prescribed 
for the 'secondary power structures'. The 'primary power structures' are naturally the 
ones that tend to draw our attention in the narrative. Another reason may be the rather 
open-ended list of secondary power structures that Strange envisages. Strange devoted 
the four chapters of part three to transport, trade, energy and welfare. But she cautions 
that her choice:
'is a bit arbitrary in that it would be equally logical to include some 
other secondary structures. For instance, there would be a chapter on 
international law, except that there is no lack of good descriptive and 
analytical works by specialists in the field. There could also be a chapter 
on the world food system... But this too has an extensive literature.'
(p.135)
Arbitrary and open-ended lists can be disconcerting for readers, because it means that 
they are being asked to think for themselves. If we want to know about the power 
structures of international law or of food, we are simply expected to put States And 
Markets down and conduct our own trawl through the specialist literature. Nor is there 
any attempt to produce a prescribed list. What other secondary power structures could 
there be? We are left stranded with a pretty strong hint that her list is not meant to be 
exclusive.
It would seem admissible to ask what the reasoning process was that enabled 
Strange to distinguish her primary power structures from her secondary power 
structures. To my knowledge the criteria for the distinction between primary and 
secondary structures were never made explicit in a rigorous fashion, but her brief 
introduction to part three does describe the nature of the hierarchy in the following way:
'The common feature of secondary structures is firstly that, although 
they are frameworks within which choices are made on the basis of 
value preferences, they are also secondary to the primary structures of
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security, production, finance and knowledge, which play a large part in 
shaping the secondary structures', (p. 135)
The secondary structures are important in their own right, but dependant in the sense 
that they are shaped by the four primary structures. One way to try to understand the 
distinction Strange was making would be to trace the career of 'welfare' in the evolution 
of her thought, because the question of whether the structure for the provision of 
welfare is primary or secondary would appear to be one that Strange had some trouble 
with herself8. In an article published back in 1986, welfare is one of the primary power 
structures9. By 1988, with the publication of States And Markets, we find that welfare 
has been relegated to a secondary status.
The shift from the former to the latter status of welfare can partly be explained 
by the prevailing intellectual climate of the times. In the early eighties many western 
national welfare systems were still generally taken for granted, the Marshall Plan was 
still seen as a paradigm example of aid as power, and recent calls for a new 
international economic order culminating in The Brandt Report had lent a certain 
legitimacy to those who took international welfare seriously. In such an environment it 
would have seemed appropriate to see welfare as a primary source of structural power 
'because it is politically important and sensitive'10. But as the eighties wore on it became 
increasingly clear, both on the left of the political spectrum as well as the right, just 
how dependant welfare was upon developments in the production structure, the security 
structure, the financial structure and the knowledge structure. The chapter devoted to 
welfare in States And Markets reflects this intellectual demotion with just about every 
sentence.
The other three chapters of part three are devoted to transport, trade and energy. 
As with welfare, Strange tried to show how these secondary structures were defined and 
shaped according to the imperatives determined by her four primary structures. 
However, we now intend to abandon our summary of States And Markets and recall the 
curious image of the shipwreck.
(1.3) Political Economy On The Verge Of Deconstruction
8 For this point I am grateful for a verbal suggestion from Eric Helleiner.
9 Strange, 'Structures, Values and Risk in the Study of the International Political Economy1, in 
R.J. Barry Jones, Perspectives On Political Economy, p.217-18.
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States And Markets made no great claims for itself. It was subtitled ’An 
Introduction to International Political Economy'. The blurb on the flyleaf advertises its 
contents 'as an ideal introductory text'. This humble objective is reinforced in the 
opening lines of chapter one, where the book identifies itself as an 'unconventional 
textbook'. Furthermore, the general style of address adopted throughout the book evokes 
the kind of discourse one might expect between scholar and student rather than the 
scholar amongst peers.
Some eight years after publication, Strange felt it necessary to reinforce the 
point that States And Markets had not been written with any pretension to setting the 
world alight with knowledge about knowledge. She declares that the book was targeted 
for a particular audience with very specific aims and objectives in mind:
'States and Markets was expressly written for the graduate students I 
was used to teaching at the London School of Economics. They came 
from a variety of cultural, linguistic and disciplinary backgrounds and 
their time for absorbing new ideas was limited. My conscious aim was 
to help them develop their own ideas by providing a framework which 
constructively joined Politics to Economics in a transnational context. It 
was an anti-text-book text for master's students. '*1
This reflection came in response to an article by Chris May, within which States and 
Markets enjoyed the sort of critical appraisal that one might expect for a major 
contribution to international political theory, as if it were her 'defining book, one about 
which the rest of her work revolves'12. Amongst other things, May argued that the 
inclusion of knowledge as one of the primary variables of structural power in the study 
of international political economy would be an important step forward, but opens a 
Tandora's box' of theoretical questions that Strange has not attempted to answer.
Strange's response was that States and Markets had not been written to be read 
as if it were a major theoretical treatise. Her response to May suggests someone who
10 Ibid.
11 Susan Strange, 'A Reply to Chris May, Global Society, vol.10, No.3, (1996) pp.303-5. In reply 
to Chris May, 'Strange Fruit: Susan Strange's theory of Structural Power in the International 
Political Economy, Global Society, Vol.10, No.2 (1996), pp. 167-189.
12 Christopher May, 'Strange Fruit: Susan Strange's theory of Structural Power in the International 
Political Economy, Global Society, Vol.10, No.2 (1996), pp.167-189. Mays quote regarding the 
status of States and Markets within her work as a whole is from Christopher May & Margaret 
Law, An Annotated Bibliography o f Susan Strange's Academic Writings on International
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has become mildly impatient with those who will insist upon giving her 
‘unconventional textbook’ more time than she thinks it deserves. After all, the text 
merely:
'aimed to introduce the basic values of security, wealth, justice and 
freedom - but with minimal ideological bias, giving implicit priority 
neither to the objectives of economic growth (wealth creation) nor to 
order (stability and security from war). And it aimed to be short enough 
not to overburden the limited time available during a one year course.
Thus, it was not possible to go too far into the philosophical 
implications of subjective perceptions in the belief system and the 
prevailing value-preferences that were, I argued, one part of the 
knowledge structure.'13
To find higher level analyses of the role of knowledge as a source of structural power in 
the world political economy, to find scholarship produced by Strange that envisages 
knowledge as a primary source of structural power intended for consumption by peers 
rather than consumption by students, Chris May was advised to consult her later works, 
namely Rival States, Rival Firms, and then The Retreat o f the State.
But what if Christopher May was on to something? What if States And Markets 
turns out to mean more than what Susan Strange actually meant to say? What if a text 
that masquerades as an ‘unconventional textbook’ can somehow manage to hit the nail 
on the head and fire the imagination in a way that the more rarefied texts fail to do? 
What is partly at stake here is the status that we attach to communication between 
scholar and student versus the status we attach to the communication between scholar 
and scholar in the reproduction of knowledge. Perhaps, just perhaps, there are 
exceptional circumstances where it may be appropriate for the latter to doff his cap to 
the former?
In the first paragraph of States And Markets we are presented with a terrific 
explosion amidships. The premise of this thesis is that there is also an explosion hidden 
in the middle of States And Markets. In chapter six, Strange presents as a legitimate area 
of study within the boundaries of IPE a source of power which she calls the knowledge 
structure. This structure is of equal importance, Strange argues, to the security structure, 
the production structure and the financial structure in the world political economy. By 
trying to graft onto IPE an awareness of knowledge as power, by making it of equal
Political Economy 1949-1995 (Department of International Studies at Nottingham Trent 
University, Nottingham, 1996).
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status to production, security and finance, Strange has taken a fateful step. The addition 
of knowledge to the analysis of power means that States And Markets, currently 
subtitled 'An Introduction to International Political Economy', might be more accurately 
subtitled: 'An Introduction to the Deconstruction of International Political Economy'.
The authorities are bound to demand an inquiry into the matter. Who was 
responsible for this terrible explosion? Was it Jacques Derrida, that infamous old villain 
of deconstruction? No, it could not have been Derrida this time. For nowhere can his 
entry be found in the ship's register, the bibliography, so he could not have been on 
board ship at the time. What about Baudrillard, Barthes, Foucault, Habermas, Popper, 
Cherry, Innis, Hamelink, Jervis, Melody, Mulkay, O'Brien, Sauvant, Smith, Bell, 
Stonier or Williams? All these names are mentioned in her bibliography, have written 
about knowledge as power, and must therefore share some of the responsibility for what 
happened. But as usual in this sort of inquiry, there is always a need for a scapegoat, 
one person upon whom the great and the good can pin the majority of the blame. The 
members of the inquiry take a traditional attitude about this. In their wisdom they 
decide that Strange is ultimately the person who has to be made responsible. She was 
the author supposed to have been in charge of the book at the time it was written.
Back on board ship in the midst of the disaster members of the crew may come 
along and try to calm people down. After all, they might say, the belief that knowledge 
is power is hardly new or controversial. It was the desire for power and the thirst for 
knowledge about power that gave rise to scholarly tomes about politics and economics 
in the first place. And anyway ordinary people in their everyday wisdom have always 
recognised that knowledge is power (p.l 15). But amidst such appeals for calm:
'The deck begins slowly to tilt to one side. The explosion must have tom 
a whole in the side. Panic gets worse. Some of the lifeboats, clumsily 
handled, get stuck in the davits.' (p.l)
The inquiry must also discover why the lifeboats got stuck in those davits. If you should 
ever ask a political economist about the question of knowledge as power, you may see 
him pause for a second whilst he tries to assess exactly what this means for him and his 
discipline; then he invariably scrambles into one of three available lifeboats: science;
13 Ibid.
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ideology; or technology14. Science is the word that offers rescue for those who do not 
want to have to think too much about the question of epistemology. Ideology is the 
word that offers rescue for those who do not want to think too much about what is 
other. Technology is the word that offers rescue for those who do not want to have to 
think too much about a world of gadgets that have become too complex to comprehend.
People are not generally encouraged to think of science, ideology and 
technology as being part of the same structure called knowledge. The question of 
knowledge is too huge, so people usually prefer to apply the strategy of divide and rule. 
The question of knowledge is thus broken down by difference: science is different from 
ideology; ideology is different from technology; and technology is different from 
science. The stability of definition of these three words relies upon their differences 
from each other. But Strange's notion of knowledge structure throws the three words 
back together in a way which challenges us to see these differences as relationships. As 
long as questions about knowledge as power are dealt with in an ad hoc fashion, the 
relationships between the three concepts do not seem to matter very much. They remain 
just differences upon which we rely to guide us away from having to think too much 
about the question of knowledge as power. But once Strange starts to glue them 
together into a knowledge structure, their relations become unstable and States And 
Markets totters over the verge of deconstruction. Let us examine the text carefully to 
see what is meant by this assertion.
(1.4) Science and Ideology
As far as the disciplines of Economics, Politics and International Relations are 
concerned, of the three concepts commonly found to deal with the question of 
knowledge, science appears to be the appellation which they aspire to have applied to 
themselves. Science is apparently what they would most like to be. Scientific 
knowledge is held to be special and privileged in some way, so there is quite a lot at 
stake in the game of classifying what is science from what is non-science. Where 
science is held to be privileged it is generally assumed that there is some kind of
14 People sometimes jump into a fourth lifeboat called 'information'. But usually this word is used 
to theorize about the transformation of knowledge under the impact of a new technology, such as 
the computer, or the fibre optic cable. Here we shall therefore assume that 'information' falls 
under the category of'technology*.
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epistemology or method which grounds it as a superior form of knowledge in terms of 
truth.
In contrast, ideology is the appellation of knowledge which social theorists least 
aspire to have applied to themselves. Like halitosis, ideology is what the other person 
has15. It is a word for the object to be examined, not for the subject who is doing the 
examining. Ideological knowledge is held to be underprivileged in some way, and thus 
there is a lot at stake in determining what is ideology from what is not ideology. Where 
ideology is held to be underprivileged it is usually deemed to be knowledge which has 
no epistemology, no method which grounds its claim to the superior status of truth. 
Often this is held to be because it comprises subjective values which properly belong to 
the private individual and thus lie beyond the reach of reason, epistemology or method. 
Ideology is therefore congenitally prone to mere opinion, prejudice, error, or even the 
barefaced lie.
Between the play of these two opposites there can be found a certain amount of 
vacillation. There are some, for example, who like to challenge the privileged status of 
science and treat it as an ideology16. Then there are those who try to strip ideology of 
some of its pejorative connotations, and prefer to use it as a descriptive term which 
recognises all knowledge to be in some sense ideological, part of a 'total ideology'17. 
Then there are those who try to characterise their own ideology as an instrument or 
sometimes even as a science of political struggle18. Despite this confusion we may 
observe that the hierarchical relationship between the two words remains dominant. No 
matter how hard many people try to change the terminology, in the general economy of 
understanding science remains the privileged and ideology the underprivileged 
knowledge. The acid test is the label people are prepared to tolerate being applied to 
themselves. For example, there are economic, political or social 'Science Departments'
15 Terry Eagleton, Ideology, p.2.
16 For example: Stanley Aronowitz, Science As Power, Claude Alvares, 'Science', in The 
Development Dictionary edited by Wolfgang Sachs.
17 Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia is probably the most influential text which inspired the 
notion of ideology as the 'sociology of knowledge'. This approach has often been called 
'relativism' by its critics. A robust defence can be found in Barnes and Bloor, 'Relativism, 
Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge', in Rationality and Relativism edited by Hollis and 
Lukes.
18 Lenin's What Is To Be Done? contains the classic example of this. But Antonio Gramsci's 
theory of hegemony in the Prison Notebooks is perhaps the authority which the 'ideology as 
weapon of political straggle' genre would be prepared to identify with nowadays.
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in abundance, but it would be hard for even the most die-hard adherent of the sociology 
of knowledge to find an ’Ideology Department' anywhere19.
Let us now observe how the hierarchical tension between science and ideology 
works itself into Strange’s prose. In States and Markets, science makes its first 
appearance upon page eleven (under the heading Theory in social science'), where a 
distinction is drawn between the natural and the social sciences. The natural sciences 
may aspire to predict whereas the social sciences should not try to do so. According to 
Strange, Economics is the social science which has most notably aspired to predict: 'But 
its record of success is so abysmal that it should make all those who seek to emulate the 
economists and to borrow from them try something else'. Strange follows Popper by 
noting that to try to predict in society can become much the same as trying to prescribe, 
which should be a matter of public choice and not left to 'irresponsible academic 
theorists'20. Then we are informed that many problems of social science stem from an 
'inferiority complex' towards the natural scientists and that political economists have an 
inferiority complex with regard to the 'the apparent rigour of economic 'science'. Rigour 
(for the benefit of those unaccustomed to the rhetoric of Economics) is the word that 
economists often like to substitute for epistemology. Upon page twelve we are told that 
the title 'social science' is only justifiably used to remind us that although our subject 
lies closer to our emotions than 'the origin of rocks or the composition of molecules' we 
must nevertheless 'still try to preserve a 'scientific' attitude to our studies'.
Something rather alarming happens to science between page eleven and twelve 
of States And Markets. For no apparent reason, it starts to appear within inverted 
commas, as if to denote that Strange no longer trusts it entirely. Strange wants us to 
preserve the 'scientific' attitude in our studies, but in the same sentence she always 
already places the word under suspicion by marking it out. Nor is this an isolated event, 
for it happens again upon page sixteen where the social 'scientist' also becomes a 
suspect. A brief survey of chapter one reveals the use of these inverted commas to be 
quite consistent. They occur whenever she wants to draw attention to a word's 
contingency, its value context, or its dubious use by others. In philosophy this kind of 
thing might be called putting 'science' under erasure, where a word is used to
19 One wonders how successful Sidney and Beatrice would have been if they had tried to found 
the 'London School of Economics and Political Ideology1.
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demonstrate its normal function within a narrative but at the same time is singled out for 
special observation and confined between two davit-like marks21. But why has Strange 
chosen to do this to science? What lies between page eleven and twelve that has made 
her put science under erasure?
Turning the page from eleven to twelve and from twelve back to eleven, it 
would appear that the two culprits who have conceived the inverted commas around 
science are value judgements and risk assessments. The full sentence that straddles 
pages eleven and twelve reads:
'He or she [the theorist] need not necessarily apply theory to policy­
making, since policy-making necessarily involves value judgements and 
risk assessments that are exogenous to theory and that are better made 
by practical policy-makers than by irresponsible academic theorists.'
It is important to make sure that Strange's attitude towards value and risk is not 
misconstrued here. She was not trying to say that they are exogenous in the sense that 
they are not important. Quite the contrary. Otherwise the 'four basic human values' of 
wealth, security, freedom and justice would not have been at the core of her analysis of 
power in world society. What she does argue for is an awareness of values in order to 
avoid the risk of ideological contamination of scientific theory. Thus, in an article 
published before States And Markets, Strange argues that the consideration of values is:
'necessary to avoid the snare of ideology...The main aim, in my opinion, 
is to make the study of international political economy value-sensitive, 
not to make it value-laden.'22
The world exogenous to science is envisaged as one driven by ideological conflict 
between values. The task of social theory, as Strange conceives it, is that of trying to 
establish an 'epistemological break' between science and ideology23. The critique of 
existing theories is that they do not, in Strange's opinion, make this break:
20 Karl Popper, The Poverty o f Historicism. Note the subtle difference in meaning between the 
words prediction (speech), and prescription (writing), that opens up upon page 11 of States And 
Markets.
21 Except that of course in philosophy the erasure is marked out more clearly by the placement of 
a cross.
22 Susan Strange 'Structures, Values and Risk in the Study of the International Political 
Economy1, op cit, p.210.
23 Strange acknowledges her debt to Althusserian Marxism on p.216, Ibid.
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'all we have, so far, are competing doctrines-sets of normative ideas 
about the goals to which state policy should be directed and how 
politics and economics (or more accurately, states and markets) ought to 
be related to one another. This is enough to satisfy ideologues who have 
already made up their minds.' (p. 16)
But it does not satisfy Susan Strange the social scientist, so she sets off in search of a 
structural analysis that 'breaks down the dividing walls between the ideologues' (p. 17). 
She wants a framework of analysis for the diagnosis of the human condition 'as it is', 
with value and risk left out, which opens up room for choice. Value and risk become 
exogenous matters for policy makers who are in control of the levers of power because:
'the choices are subjective. Each individual must decide for himself or 
herself; and those at the top in any society will seldom agree with those 
at the bottom of the heap about the most desirable goals, in terms of 
values, of public policy and social and economic arrangements.
Moreover, even the possibility of reaching agreement as a result of 
logical, rational argument among those who regard themselves as 
impartial bystanders is an illusion. Argument and reason are not going 
to settle differences of view. For each of us carries from his or her birth 
- or rather perhaps from the moment of conception and the fusion of 
genes - a temperamental predisposition in favour of certain values and a 
corresponding antipathy to certain of their opposites. Culture, education 
and personal experience may cause us to suppress or to modify - even, 
very occasionally, to change our innate predispositions or antipathies.
But in my experience argument seldom does'.24
The sudden conception of those inverted commas around science at the turn of page 
eleven to twelve can thus be explained. It is an example of what we might call 'ideology 
critique coming home to roost'. Strange has become sceptical about the claims of social 
science because she believes she has found an area where rational argument is an 
illusion and where reason can never hope to settle things. This discovery is deeply 
shocking, but we may still 'try to preserve a 'scientific' attitude' by expelling the 
monstrosity beyond the boundaries of 'science', which the inverted commas now 
represent. From now on, science will have to accept quotation marks because it cannot 
do without the exogenous other called ideology, where the idols of passions, emotions, 
goals, values, risks, culture, education and genes have to be banished.
The relationship between science and ideology thus becomes one of subject and 
object. There is no point in science talking to ideology because rational argument with 
it is an illusion and no amount of reasoning with it can ever hope to settle anything. But 
science retains the right to talk about ideology, because it has made an epistemological
24 Ibid, p.212. Alistair Macintyre called this ethical position 'emotivism'. See After Virtue.
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break from it which grounds its subjectivity. Social science may talk about ideology 
because that is part of its business: to become value-sensitive, unlike ideology, whose 
business is to stay value-laden.
This is how in the very same chapter Strange finds it valid to isolate four basic 
human values of wealth, security, freedom and justice as being objective and self- 
evident. Drawing from the values held dear by the disciplines she is trying to weave 
together, an intrinsic value order is proposed in which values lose their emotive content 
and become scientific, like 'the origin of rocks or the composition of molecules'. Thus 
the basic human values are like:
'the chemical elements of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen.
Combined in different proportions they will give quite different 
chemical compounds.' (p. 17)
Within this intrinsic value order there is freedom for societies to choose the value mix 
that they want, but there is a degree of trade-off between them. The choice of wealth, 
for example, will be made at the expense of some sacrifice injustice. That's life. These 
truths are self-evident. They make up part of our objective reality. The arrangements 
that each society decides to make 'are not divinely ordained' but are the outcome of 
human decisions. The basic natural chemical elements of wealth, security, freedom and 
justice with which a society makes up these arrangements are divinely ordained, 
however, and there is nothing we can do about it. They are fixed by nature as the eternal 
sources of value which determine our being25.
Cave! hie dragones. Value judgements and risk assessments, having been made 
exogenous to Strange's structural method of analysis upon page eleven to twelve, have 
hidden themselves like stowaways within chapter six. According to the very first 
paragraph of chapter six, the knowledge structure comprehends what is believed and the 
moral conclusions and principles derived from these beliefs (p.l 15). Value and risk, our 
two trouble-makers, are not prepared to remain excluded and threaten to explode 
Strange's intrinsic value order. Little can stop them from carrying out this threat because 
argument and reason have already been ruled out: 'for each of us carries from his or her 
birth, or rather perhaps from the moment of conception and the fusion of genes, a
25 My interpretation of Strange's 'intrinsic value order' is indebted to William Connolly's study of 
'intrinsic moral orders', in The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection On The Politics O f Morality.
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temperamental predisposition in favour of certain values and a corresponding personal 
antipathy to certain of their opposites'.
We can only watch with grim resignation as the catastrophe of chapter six 
unfolds. First we learn that deciding who has power in the knowledge structure can only 
be a matter of subjective value judgement (p.l 16). Then comes the revelation that basic 
human values can change over time and that societies may redirect themselves toward 
new goals (p.l 16). Just in case the full significance of this had escaped us, next we are 
given a concrete historical example in the transition from medieval Christendom to the 
modem scientific state. This example finds security, wealth, freedom and justice not to 
be natural elements like hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen after all. They are 
values with a genealogy suspiciously linked to the development of states and markets 
(p. 119-23). In other words they are a social construction and not part of any intrinsic 
value order. Finally we are told that science, far from being in the business of trying to 
establish an epistemological break from ideology, is actually responsible for most of its 
production (p. 123-25). Strange's structural analysis of knowledge in chapter six has thus 
blown a hole through her reason for structural analysis in the first place.
Science, being stuck in the davit-like commas upon page twelve, cannot escape 
the sinking ship. If everyone on board had been prepared for this sort of emergency, the 
scientific lifeboat might not have got stuck in the davits. Alas they were not:
'Well aware of my own limitations, I have made no reference in the 
course of this brief survey of the knowledge structures of the 
international political economy to the active debates conducted by 
philosophers, especially in Europe, on the nature of knowledge, or the 
relation between power and communication systems or on the role of 
ideology in defining the goals of knowledge and thus determining in 
some degree the findings of social science. Such debates are not on the 
whole conducted in a language easily understood by me or, I imagine, 
by most of my readers, (p. 132)
Strange reveals with uncanny accuracy the wisdom and the tragedy of western thought. 
Philosophy becomes a forgotten old sea chest full of mouldy manuscripts from a bygone 
era, each with a cautionary tale to tell about the folly of knowledge. This chest is still 
lying around somewhere, but lies unopened. Apparently, it has a history that goes back 
at least to 'Nietzsche, Hegel and Weber, and some would say to Plato and Aristotle'. 
Other authors like Habermas, Foucault, Popper and Lukacs are also mentioned, but 
these old men appear unable, Strange suggests, to write in a language easily understood 
by most of her readers. The quaint notion of philosophy as the eternal conversation of
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humanity where all ages speak on equal terms is thus rendered obsolete. Strange turns 
this wrinkly ideal into an ironic reproach with the remark that philosophy contains only 
'debates that remain largely unresolved'.
(1.5) Ideology and Technology
Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the distinction between ideology 
and science in States And Markets is a stable one if we compare and contrast its theory 
of knowledge structure with its epistemology. What does appear to remain consistent 
about the use of the word ideology, however, is that it is an appellation of knowledge 
which has to do with ideas of value, needs, ends or goals. These perceived values, 
needs, ends or goals may or may not be valid ones and we may or may not hold them in 
common. But there is little doubt as far as Strange's text is concerned that everybody 
has them. This definition of ideology would therefore seem to stand a fair chance of 
getting away safely from its davits, and into our consciousness, well before States And 
Markets sinks back into the bookshelf from whence it came.
In contrast technology is an appellation of knowledge used to define the 
instruments, tools and skills that people use to fulfil these values, needs, ends or goals. 
Technology may thus be distinguished from ideology by the separation of means from 
ends. Technology is the material means by which we achieve ideological ends. We 
could argue for ever and a day about ends, but if we were to come to some sort of 
consensus about them the question of fulfilment would become a technical one of the 
most efficient or rational means. Thus if technology is defined as know-how', ideology 
might be defined as know-why'. As is the case with science and ideology, the 
relationship between ideology and technology is meant to be a hierarchical one. But in 
this case ideology is supposed to be top dog. Technology is the supplement to ideology. 
Means are supposed to serve ends.
In the play between these two opposites can there be found a good deal of 
vacillation. There are people, for example, who have turned this hierarchy on its head 
by saying that the ideological ends of society are determined by its technological 
means26. Then there are those who argue that technological change has made ideology
26 This is one possible reading of Marx's 'materialist conception of history, the classic source for 
which may be found in his preface to A Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy. After 
so many battles of exegesis there is little point in trying to find 'the true Marx', but this has been
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obsolete, so that what used to lead to ideological conflict over values, goals or ends 
have become technological problems for which professional experts can offer technical 
solutions27. Then there are those who characterise modem technology as the dominant 
ideology of western society. They say that what used to be thought of as means have 
taken over and become ends in themselves. And thus, they argue, our know-how has 
overcome our ability to know-why, possibly with disastrous consequences28. Amid this 
confusion we may observe that the basically hierarchical relationship between the two 
words remains dominant. No matter how scholarly the reputation of those who question 
this hierarchy, in the general economy of understanding ideologies comprise the ends of 
society and technology the means.
Let us trace the hierarchical tension between ideology and technology as it 
works itself into Strange's prose. If we scour States And Markets for references to 
technology we find that it makes its debut appearance upon page nine. The reader is 
told that he may decide that technological change is going too fast and needs to be 
slowed down because it has become a major threat to the human condition29. Or he may 
look forward to a brave new world in which technology solves many of the problems of 
the human condition. It is up to the reader to choose what to think. Along with science 
and ideology, technology makes its second appearance upon page eleven. In a section 
which is supposed to be dedicated to positive assumptions about theory, Strange 
suddenly turns negative about the term 'information revolution'. To show that this term 
is not good theory Strange postulates a distinction between technological and social 
change:
one of the most influential interpretations. A robust defence of this 'technological determinist' 
reading can be found in Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory o f History, and in Heilbroner, Do Machines 
Make History?' in Technology and Culture, edited by M. Kranzenberg and W.H. Davenport.
27 This is the 'end of ideology thesis'. See: Daniel Bell, The End o f Ideology’, or Robert Lane, 'The 
Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society1, American Sociological Review, 31 
(1966), p.644-60. Alistair Macintyre tried to call a halt to such talk with: 'The End of the End of 
Ideology1, in Against The Self Images O f The Age. He failed, because the end of ideology thesis 
has been recycled many times since the heady sixties in various permutations. Francis Fukuyama's 
notion of'The End of History?' The National Interest, Volume 16, Summer 1989, is a more recent 
example.
28 This approach is characteristic in diverse ways of: Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society; 
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man; Ivan Illich, Tools For Conviviality; and the early 
Habermas in Toward A Rational Society and Legitimation Crisis.
29 Strange actually writes because small is beautiful'. But this is clearly a rather flippant reference 
to E.F. Schumacher's argument that current technological developments have become a threat to 
the human condition. See his Small Is Beautiful, chapter 10.
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While it notes rapid technological change, it does not postulate a clear 
causal connection, supported by logic or evidence, between that 
technological change and social change - change in political or 
economic relationships so great as to result in a redistribution of power 
and/or wealth.' (p.l 1)
Strange is taking a swipe here at a popular form of social commentary sometimes 
pejoratively called futurology, which may be defined as the practice of making 
extravagant claims about the likely social impact of a new technology. Strange is 
dubious about the changes heralded by the term 'information revolution', and suspects 
they are just novel technological means of striving for the old-fashioned social ends of 
security, wealth, freedom and justice. Technology may change, but as far as Strange can 
see the basic ends of society remain the same, or change by some logic independent of 
technology.
Ostensibly this brief aside over the term 'information revolution' exists on page 
eleven simply to provide an example of poor social theory which is descriptive, in 
contrast with good theory which tries to explain a puzzle or a paradox. But a closer 
reading reveals that Strange returns frequently to the theme of 'information revolution' 
later on, in chapter six. At the beginning of her chapter on the knowledge structure a list 
of authors are cited (O'Brien, 1983; Stonier, 1983; Bell, 1974; Wriston, 1986) who all 
suggest there are revolutionary implications behind rapid changes in information 
technologies such as 'sophisticated computer systems', 'orbital earth satellites', 
'electronic data flows' and the 'digitalisation of language'. Strange elaborates upon the 
point she made earlier on page eleven:
'Yet much of the informed explanations of these technical changes, 
astonishing and almost miraculous as they seem, do not go beyond 
telling us what the technology is doing and how it is done. They assert 
that we are in the midst of a 'revolution' but do not explain in what ways 
this revolution is going to change human relations, how it is going to 
shift power or redirect the efforts of human societies to new goals.'
(p.l 16)
This is what would demonstrate a revolution 'in the sense in which the term is 
commonly used in social science'. Strange notes that at the moment opinions differ. 
Some argue that changes in information technologies are shifting power relationships 
and redirecting societies to new goals. Others argue that the 'system itself has not 
fundamentally changed' (p.l 17). Strange herself declares an open mind. She 'does not 
claim to know for sure who is right'. But she does claim that clear thinking about the 
debate will be helped by the structural analysis suggested in her book.
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As we read further it becomes increasingly clear that although she thinks the 
term ’information revolution' reflects poor theory, those who have used it have made a 
deep impression upon her. In fact, there are some grounds for suspicion that these are 
the very people who have persuaded her to dedicate a whole chapter to knowledge and 
give it equal status to the chapters on security, production and finance. Strange does not 
appear to like the term 'information revolution' much, but there seems to be something 
about it which makes it almost impossible to put down:
'What is debatable today is whether... changes of a political character 
(i.e. affecting the who-gets-what and the locus of power and the 
allocation of values) are taking place as a result of what is loosely 
described as the 'information revolution'; or whether, after all, these 
changes are only technological, and therefore of the same order and 
moving in the same direction as those that have characterised the last 
two hundred years.' (p. 123)
What appears to be at stake in her curiously persistent interest in the term 'information 
revolution' is partly the relationship between ideology and technology. A part of Strange 
seems to want to keep technology out of politics and defend the traditional claim that 
technology is an apolitical force, which can be used for good or evil depending on who 
is in control. Changes in technology which are 'only technological' are those which 
follow from the pursuit of values, so that technological means serve ideological ends. 
Technology is different to ideology in that it is value-neutral, and thus cannot by itself 
engender 'changes of a political character':
'Structural analysis suggests that technological changes do not 
necessarily change power structures. They do so only if accompanied by 
changes in the basic belief systems which underpin or support the 
political and economic arrangements acceptable to society.' (p. 123)
But paradoxically States And Markets reveals another side to Strange, who seems to be 
wondering aloud if technological means have actually become ideological ends. We do 
not have to look very hard to find a counter-discourse in States And Markets that turns 
the pursuit of technological means into an end in itself.
In chapter two, entitled 'power in the world economy', we are informed that 
over the past four or five decades we have been living in a Tiigh technology age'. Our 
means are elevated to a position in our culture whereby they begin to define the age in
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which we live. Technology has become ’high’ as opposed to 'low' because modem 
societies have leamt to esteem its gifts highly as means to power:
'the knowledge most sought after for the acquisition of relational power 
and to reinforce other kinds of structural power (i.e. in security matters, 
in production and in finance) is technology.' (p.31)
Technology is thus sought after as a means to achieve given values in security, 
production and finance. However, in a move redolent of Adomo and Horkheimer's 
Dialectic o f Enlightenment, the concept of power has been added to the relationship 
between ideology and technology. To achieve ends in a high technology age requires 
technological means of power over others who might have competitive ends (i.e. 
ideologies) at heart. What is interesting here is that the traditional distinction between 
ideology and technology is still in place; technology is still sought 'for the acquisition 
of ends. Nevertheless, an elementary politics of technology has already started to take 
shape. Certain new technologies which many deem to be totally innocent of any 
ideological content are beginning to look quite political:
'The advanced technologies of new materials, new products, new 
systems of changing plants and animals, new systems of collecting, 
storing and retrieving information - all these open doors to both 
structural power and relational power.' (p.31)
Technology as a source of domination. On page eleven Strange has criticised those who 
use the term 'information revolution' yet do not show a clear causal connection between 
technological change and social change. On page thirty one she makes it quite clear that 
she thinks this causal connection is power. In chapters three, four and five, Strange 
intimates how various technologies are put to work as means to power. In chapter three, 
on security, she makes the obvious but necessary point that technology can be a means 
of domination through the construction of powerful weaponry (p.46)30. In the fourth 
chapter, on the production structure, Strange makes the point that states and companies 
need to keep in the 'forefront of certain advanced technologies' in order to 'lower the 
costs of production and remain competitive in world markets' (pages 65, 76, 78, 81 and 
83). Life is much the same in the financial structure: 'all the big banks have been quick 
to use available technology to improve their competitive position in international 
foreign exchange and capital markets' (p. 129).
30 Compelling recent affirmations of this from two very different perspectives can be found in 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, and 
James Der Derian, Virtuous War.
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By identifying the causal connection between ideology and technology as 
power, Strange has opened a cognitive door to the possibility of a reversal in the 
relationship between means and ends. Let us see now, was ideology supposed to be a 
technology or was technology meant to be an ideology? With power playing the role of 
go-between, Strange is going to find it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the 
two, simply because one person's technology of domination logically becomes another 
person's ideology of subjugation. Each new 'advanced technology' that enters the scene 
will thus come wrapped within the question 'cm /  bono?'. Who reaps the benefits and 
who pays? This is why Strange cannot let go of the term 'information revolution' in spite 
of the fact that she thinks it is poor theory. 'Information revolution' has become a 
troublesome sign of aporia hovering over the word technology because 'clear thinking 
about it' in the guise of 'structural analysis' is threatening to upset her intrinsic value 
order:
'Cui bono? Who gets the benefits and who pays? Who gets the new 
opportunities to acquire wealth or power, security or the freedom to 
choose? And who has imposed on them new risks of being denied these 
things?' (p. 117)
Blink and you could miss the subtle change which occurs here in Strange's ruminations 
about the social impact of the 'information revolution' upon fundamental beliefs about 
the human condition. In chapter one an intrinsic value order was proposed suggesting 
we start by thinking about the basic human values that humans seek through social 
organisation. These were listed as wealth, security, freedom and justice. In chapter six 
we find that justice has fallen away and been displaced by power. We all want justice 
but you have to have the power to get it.
Now we can begin to attempt a deeper explanation for the sudden intrusion of 
the term 'information revolution' on page eleven in Strange's discussion about The 
Conflict of Values and Theories'. Recent developments in technology subtly lead 
Strange to question her own epistemological beliefs about the relationship between 
ideology and technology. Her basic human values' thus came into conflict with her 
theory of society. On the one hand the term 'information revolution' was poor social 
theory because it surrenders human values to determination by technology without any 
valid 'causal connection'. On the other hand structural analysis leads her to the 
irresistible conclusion that this was what was actually happening in the world political 
economy. In Strange's opinion justice appears to be the first casualty of this reversal,
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but security, freedom, wealth and justice were all put into the same 'ideology* lifeboat 
together. The three remaining values have just seen what has happened to justice. They 
begin to look to each other in fear and trepidation. Which one is next for the chop?
In the final pages of her chapter on the knowledge structure Strange begins to 
draw conclusions. It is argued there is enough evidence to suggest that competition 
between states is becoming a competition for leadership in the knowledge structure'. So 
how is this leadership to be attained? Through the achievement of a superior sensitivity 
to 'value and risk' perhaps? Or possibly by greater awareness of the rules needed to be 
able to bring about peaceful changes in T^ asic belief systems'? Here Strange's previous 
confidence in the sovereignty of ideology over technology appears to falter slightly:
'Today the competition is for a place at the 'leading edge' (as the jargon 
has it) of advanced technology. This is the means both to military 
superiority and to economic prosperity, invulnerability and dominance.'
(p.133)
Our intrinsic value order is changing fast! We were just getting used to the idea of 
losing justice. But now security, wealth and freedom have also fallen prey to military 
superiority, economic prosperity and invulnerability. Strange has come to the 
conclusion that where the causal connection between ideology and technology is power, 
the pursuit of technology will become an end in itself and transform the values it was 
supposed to serve. Security has become military superiority. Wealth has become 
economic prosperity. Freedom has become invulnerability and dominance. People who 
resist this inexorable process of modernisation merely risk falling behind in the 
competition for a place at its 'cutting edge' (as the jargon has it). The ideology lifeboat, 
being trapped in the davit-like commas surrounding the term 'information revolution', 
cannot escape the sinking ship. And so it comes to pass that security, wealth, freedom 
and justice are all lost beneath 'the stormy water' (p.l).
It remains to be found what is so special about the term 'information revolution' 
that leads Strange to re-evaluate her intrinsic value order so drastically, rather than 
some other technological development that might perhaps have offered a more 
respectable historiography. The social revolutions involved in the transitions from 
wood, to coal, to oil, to nuclear and solar energy conversion, for example, are also 
technical changes that have attracted a great deal of interest from many historians of 
various political persuasions, whose findings would appear to be of particular salience
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with regard to Strange's special interest in the metaphor of'power'31. Yet in spite of the 
fact that Strange demonstrates she is well aware of these factors in chapters seven and 
nine, their technological aspects do not make much impact upon her theory of the 
knowledge structure32. It is only with the term 'information revolution' that she begins to 
consider the mercantilisation of knowledge, with its attendant implications, as a 
problem for her epistemology and for her basic human values'.
Perhaps one explanation why the term 'information revolution' has taken on 
special significance for Strange is that it brings the notion of 'technology as means to 
power' back home to roost in the Academy33. The word information is close enough to 
words like science and knowledge to set alarm bells ringing at the sight of the phrase 
'information revolution':
There is a semantic question here which is puzzling but not really very 
important. Is there a difference between knowledge and information?
For many purposes the two terms are interchangeable.' (p. 118)
But if a semantic question is puzzling but not really very important then why did we 
have to ask it in the first place? This is a puzzle in itself if we are scrupulously trying to 
follow Strange's epistemological advice that good theory is that which seeks to explain 
a puzzle or a paradox (p.l 1). And so we turn to our third dialectic...
(1.6) Science and Technology
Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the relationship between ideology 
and technology is stable in States And Markets if we compare its structural theory of 
knowledge as power with its official epistemology. What does seem to remain 
consistent about the word technology, however, insofar as it is used in the text, is that it 
has to do with the means of human agency. There may be some confusion over whether 
in a high technology age' the means become ends in themselves, or have changed 
human ends beyond recognition. But as far as States And Markets is concerned there is
31 See for example R.A. Buchanan, The Power o f the Machine: The Impact o f Technology from 
1700 to the Present. Buchanan puts energy at the core of his archaeology of technology as power.
32 For her references to technology in transport see chapter 7, pages 137, 140, 142, 149, 151, 
153, 156 and 158. For her references to technology in energy see chapter 9, pages 187, 188, 190, 
194,195,198,199,201, 204 and 205.
33 See note 2 above.
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little doubt that technology has to do with human agency in its use of instruments, tools 
and skills upon nature or upon other people. Technology is practice.
By contrast, science is an appellation of knowledge which is often held to be 
autonomous from both ends and means. We have already seen how science is supposed 
to be different to ideology. But science is also traditionally distinguished from 
technology, this time by the separation of theory and practice. The purpose of science is 
to produce theory about the world that corresponds with reality and contributes to 
human understanding, whereas the aim of technology is the practical application of this 
theory in correspondence with human needs. The human motivation for science is held 
to serve something rather enigmatic, often called curiosity, or wonder, whereas the 
human motivation for technology is to serve something rather more pragmatic which is 
called interest. As an advertising blurb once put it, technology is 'the appliance of 
science'34. Therefore, if technology may be defined as 'know-how', science may be 
defined as the Tmow-what'. Science is theory.
As we have seen with science and ideology and with ideology and technology, 
the relationship between science and technology is usually cast as a hierarchical one. As 
far as science and technology are concerned, science is often thought to be at its best 
when playing the role of top dog35. It is not envisaged as a wholly one-sided 
relationship. Theory does inform practice and practice does inform theory. Furthermore, 
in an abstract sense, many scientists do of course dedicate their work to the highest 
interests of humanity. But in the concrete everyday world of science it is curiosity, not 
necessity, that is supposed to be the mother of invention36. Theory achieves its 
scientific autonomy from the technological world of ends and means by being driven 
instead by curiosity. The official line of the scientific community is that if scientists are 
left to satisfy their own independent curiosity and are doing their job properly, 
technology is the supplement to science. For example, the scientist feels fortunate when 
he is doing scientific 'research', free from the immediate obligation to produce 
applications. He often feels unfortunate if he is reduced to technological 'development'. 
When lobbying civil servants and politicians about 'science policy', scientists often 
petition that 'pure' or basic' research should not be neglected, because it is the essential
34 Quoted by John Street, Poltics and Technology, p.8.
35 See for example the ruminations of Lewis Wolpert, Technology is not Science’, in The 
Unnatural Nature O f Science, p.25-35.
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source of that which is ’applied'. The 'authority/market bargain1 struck at the outset of 
modernity was that if scientists could be left to their own devices and given state 
licence to satisfy their curiosity, there would be a 'spin-off for both the national and the 
universal human interest. To challenge this authority/market bargain and put technology 
before science will, the scientist often warns, risk killing the goose that lays the golden
egg-
In the play between the two words science and technology there can be found a 
certain amount of vacillation. There are some, for example, who are so anxious to turn 
science toward technical applications and make science look useful that in the end they 
turn the hierarchy on its head, so that science is seen to be a mere supplement to 
technology37. Then there are those who say that scientific curiosity has always operated 
from within a technological sensorium and always involved technological practice upon 
nature, so that from an empirical perspective science was always already the 
supplement of technology anyway38. Then there are those who put forward the view 
that the difference between science and technology is little more than a shield to protect 
many scientists from having to face up to the material consequences of their theoretical 
actions39.
In spite of all this confusion we may observe that as far as the rhetoric is 
concerned, the hierarchical relationship of science over technology remains dominant. 
No matter how intimate the relationship between science and technology may become, 
in the general economy of understanding science is not technology, and is somehow 
judged to be more meritorious than technology. The acid test is how people prefer to 
think of themselves. So, for example, if research within the Academy has been 
commissioned by government, business or industry, or when its intellectual fruits are 
bought and sold wholesale for exclusive right to their technical application, great pains
36 Herbert J. Muller, The Children o f Frankenstein: A Primer on Modem Technology and 
Human Values, p. 130.
37 For example, see Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 'Adam Smith and Alma Mater: Technology and 
the Threat to Academic Freedom', in Paul T. Durbin (Ed), Europe, America, and Technology: 
Philosophical Perspectives, p. 175-189.
38 For example see Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld. Also Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and 
Power: Toward A Political Philosophy O f Science.
39 Stanley Aronowitz, Science As Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modem Society. Also J.R. 
Ravetz, The Merger o f Knowledge with Power: essays in critical science.
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are taken to reassure everybody that scientific integrity has not been compromised in 
any way whatsoever40.
Let us now observe the hierarchical tension between science and technology as 
it works itself into Strange’s prose. To find her most favourite assumptions of difference 
between science and technology we have to return back to pages eleven and twelve of 
States And Markets, where Strange makes her epistemological pledges. Running our 
fingers down the page we read once more the lines:
'Ey contrast, the common use of the term 'information revolution' does 
not usually reflect good theory. While it notes rapid technological 
change it does not postulate a clear and causal connection, supported by 
logic or evidence, between that technological change and social change.'
( pH)
Now we are told twice here that the term 'information revolution' notes technological 
change. It does not denote scientific change. Information takes the form of a technology. 
We have already observed that Strange is making a point about the relationship between 
ideology and technology. Upon a second reading, however, we can see that she is also 
affirming a well known and generally accepted distinction between information 
technology and science. Strange has already described science as theory by which 
people seek to understand and explain a puzzle or a paradox, whereas the simple 
accumulation of facts, data or information are mere technical operations which do not in 
themselves have anything to do with science (p. 10-11). Science may assist in the 
generation of information and information can be used as means to develop scientific 
theory. But information could just as easily be used as means for some other purpose in 
business, administration, or war. Therefore, an 'information revolution' would not by 
itself do anything to 'advance our understanding' or, in other words, promote science.
That is one epistemological distinction Susan Strange makes between science 
and technology. The second epistemological mark of difference lies further down page 
eleven in the space between 'explanatory theory' and 'policy prescription'. Strange 
argues it is a matter of choice whether the theorist decides to stick with explanatory 
theory or goes on to try to apply this theory to policy-making. In other words, scientific
40 Slaughter & Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial 
University. Bill Readings, The University in Ruins. Peter Jarvis, Universities and Corporate 
Universities. Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace.
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explanatory theory does not feel under any compulsion to get involved with the 
technical business of policy prescription:
'As to prescription, that is a matter of choice. Whether the theorist 
chooses to proceed from explanatory theory to policy prescription is up 
to him or her. He or she need not necessarily apply theory to policy­
making, since policy-making necessarily involves value judgements and 
risk assessments that are exogenous to theory and that are better made 
by practical policy-makers than by irresponsible academic theorists.'
(p. 11-12)
If we leave the ideological issue of value judgements and risk assessments to one side 
(as they have already been dealt with in a previous section), notice how science steps 
away from the burden of technological agency.
To think of Politics, Economics, and International Relations in terms of 
technological applications may seem odd because social theory is more used to thinking 
of technology in terms of machine tools, capital goods, industrial processes, or men in 
white coats. Even so, 'policy prescription' conforms to the definition of technology in 
the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Technical experts also come in grey suits. Policy­
making is the practical craft of the political or economic artisan, the technocrat who 
carries out policy by the systematic application of theory. The scientific theorist, on the 
other hand, is attracted by a more patrician, contemplative mode of existence. The 
scientific mission is not to make policies or plan how to bring them about, but to 
understand and explain, motivated by simple curiosity:
'Of course there will always be those who want (or feel they ought) to 
come up at the end of their analytical work with moral exhortations or 
with more specific normative prescriptions; and they are perfectly free 
to do so whether it is more order, more justice, more free trade and 
efficiency or just more brotherly love that they value and advocate. But 
there are those like myself who do not always (or even very often) feel 
any such compulsion but are mostly motivated by unsatisfied curiosity 
about the endless whys of the international system.'41
Strange wishes to distance her science from both ideological ends and technological 
means through the simple pursuit of curiosity. But in the salad days of Enlightenment 
the pursuit of curiosity was seen as a political project. So we could argue that what 
Strange has really done is to add a fifth value to her intrinsic value order of security,
41 'Structures, Values and Risk...' op cit, p.210.
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wealth, freedom and justice. Strange has taken a solemn oath of allegiance to the value 
of curiosity as an end in itself.
For Strange then, science is in the strictest and best sense a glorious 
entertainment, and it is to this sense of unsatisfied curiosity that Strange seeks to appeal 
in an open address to her students on page nine42. She declares States And Markets not 
to be 'a conventional textbook1 or a technical manual telling people what they should 
know and do. To justify this declaration Strange invokes a classic clause hidden away in 
the small print of the 'authority/market bargain' that Enlightenment once struck with its 
state patrons:
'I believe profoundly that the function of higher education is to open 
minds, not to close them. The best teachers are not those who create in 
their own image a crowd of uncritical acolytes and followers, obediently 
parroting whatever they say or write.' (p.9)
Immanuel Kant would have approved. His most precious heirloom appears to be in safe 
hands here. Strange is trying to suggest a way to think about the world political 
economy which encourages us to choose what to think for ourselves. She wants us to 
develop our own ideas through independent reading, discussion and 'disciplined 
thinking'43. She is making a direct appeal to hunger for emancipation from tutelage, or 
from the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from 
another. In other words, she has placed a wager upon a human trait called curiosity, the 
desire to find out for oneself. We call this activity of independent reading, discussion 
and disciplined thinking 'theory'. Page nine of States And Markets may therefore be read 
as a cordial invitation to indulge in theory, which is (as she quotes) defined by the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary as: 'a supposition explaining something, especially one 
based on principles independent of the phenomenon to be explained'.
Strange's critique of much of the literature of contemporary international 
political economy is that she thinks it not to be supposition explaining things based on 
principles independent of the phenomenon to be explained. She feels that it has been 
'too much dominated by the sheer weight of American academics' whose theory is
42 Jacques Barzun, Science: The Glorious Entertainment, (quoted in) Herbert J.Muller, op cit, 
p.130.
43 'Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to 
make use of his understanding without direction from another'. Immanuel Kant, 'Essay on 
Enlightenment', quoted by Mary Midgley in Science As Salvation, p.65.
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driven less by curiosity than by the technical logistics of the American national interest. 
'Scholars who accept this definition of the subject thus become the servants of state 
bureaucracies, not independent thinkers or critics' (p. 13).
It can only be curiosity that drove Professor Strange to write chapter six on the 
knowledge structure. We can be sure of that. But what everyone is bound to find 
curious is that her profound belief in the purpose of higher education and research does 
not appear to cut much ice when it comes to writing about the knowledge structure. 
Towards the middle of the book, for some reason or other, theory driven by curiosity 
seems to abdicate its primary place in the order of things to technology driven by 
interest. Now why on earth does this happen? If one's belief in the value of curiosity is 
so profound, then surely one ought to be able to show empirical evidence for its 
existence when it comes to writing about the knowledge structure.
To find empirical evidence of the existence of curiosity in the world political 
economy, the first place one might expect to find it is in the transition from the 
traditional to the modem age during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This is 
when, as the story goes, curiosity as an end it itself achieved some of its greatest 
moments of glory. Those were the days when, as legend has it, curiosity as an end in 
itself really felt like it was on the up, not just down on its uppers. In search of curiosity 
we therefore turn first to Strange's narrative of the transition from Medieval 
Christendom' to the 'scientific state' on pages 119 to 123.
Sadly, within these pages the news is not good for curiosity. The transition from 
Christianity to science, we leam, was all about the replacement of one knowledge 
structure by another in terms of power and of authority:
'whereas in the old structure, both the state and the market - the 
economy - had to some degree acknowledged the Church as master, in 
the new one it was the state - and beneath the state, the market economy 
- that were the masters. Science was the servant of both.' (p. 121-22)
The authority of scientific reason thus came to rest not upon its commitment to curiosity 
as an end in itself but upon its ability to serve the interests of the state and its 
merchants. The Enlightenment challenge to the authority of the Church was useful to 
loosen the religious constraints upon the 'political behaviour of rulers or the economic 
behaviour of merchants and traders' (p.121). The founding of the British Royal Society 
for the Advancement of Science and the French Academie Francaise apparently had
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very little to do with the search for explanations independent of the phenomena to be 
explained and everything to do with the importance of scientific inquiry for advancing 
the wealth and power of the state (p. 121). To the same end, rather than for the purpose 
of opening minds, the state took over from the Church responsibility for enlarging the 
education system, sponsoring the development of universities and schools (p. 121). A 
major effect of the 'scientific revolution', apparently, was to consolidate state power 
over the individual and to increase the disparity of wealth and power between the rich 
and poor. Meanwhile, scientific research into modem techniques of communication was 
really all about making a contribution to the development of Western imperialism
(p.122).
Having failed to find empirical evidence of curiosity as an end in itself in the 
transition from medieval Christendom toward the scientific state, let us not despair. Let 
us turn instead to Strange's depiction of more recent developments in the evolution of 
the knowledge structure. Intimations of the possibility of a world view that is not bound 
by the mastery of state and market do begin to appear between pages 124 and 126, but 
for Strange this appears to be not so much a case of the emancipation of science, more 
the emancipation from science itself:
'At all events, the tide of support for an alternative knowledge structure 
such as characterised the latter periods of the Church's dominance may 
be seen today turning against the scientific state. In flower power, Band 
Aid, organic farming, vegetarianism, acupuncture and alternative 
medicine, we may detect a common thread often more emotional than 
rational - questioning the basic beliefs of the dominant knowledge 
structure, just as the early scientists and religious Protestants questioned 
the basic beliefs and authority of medieval Christendom.' (p. 124)
Without the tutelage of the state or the market, it seems, curiosity often becomes more 
emotional than rational and puts itself in danger of losing its scientific status.
As we approach the middle of the book, science vacillates over the question of 
motivation. Strange digresses into a well-researched test case of 20th century 
relationships between science and technology, the Manhattan Project, where the most 
prestigious science of them all, the prince of subjects, was used with devastating effect 
in warfare. Strange presents us with two alternative accounts of this episode in the 
evolution of the knowledge structure. The first is that the Manhattan Project represents 
a shift to a more asymmetric power structure where the United States, as an emerging 
hegemon, could call upon the services of a team of multinational scientists to serve its
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aims. The second is that science ultimately remained true to the cosmopolitan value of 
curiosity as an end in itself throughout the whole affair, initially by recognising the 
legitimacy of the war against a radically incurious Fascism, then by passing on the 
results of their research to other states when it looked like they might be misused.
On page 126, Strange notes that some potentially important groups involved in 
the production of knowledge are questioning the supremacy of the state in their value 
systems. The scientists:
’seem to be developing a kind of secular-ecumenical movement that 
rates scientific truth and progress above the narrow interests of any one 
nation.' (p. 126)
On the other hand, Strange feels it would be rash to draw any final conclusions about a 
permanent change in the locus of power derived from the knowledge structure. Because 
opposition to the nation-state system is itself divided and:
The environmentalists are often as much anti-science as anti-state. The 
scientists still believe in material progress and technical advance, in the 
existence of scientific solutions to economic and even political 
problems. They want to go forward, whereas the organic food 
enthusiasts, the advocates of natural childbirth, clean air and clean 
water, alternative medicine and alternative lifestyles want to go back, to 
reverse and not just to halt scientific progress.' (p. 126)
Something rather odd has just happened to our motivation for science. Our 
epistemology ruled that the purpose of science was to satisfy a cosmopolitan curiosity, 
not for technical reasons of state policy making or policy prescription. But now we 
learn that it is about technical progress and advance, and about finding scientific 
solutions to economic or even political problems. Those who are merely curious about 
the endless whys of the international system, such as why food is not organic, why 
childbirth is not natural, or why there is no clean air or water, have suddenly become 
'anti-science'44.
On page 126 then, the study of international political economy has plunged into 
an abyss of doubt about the legitimation of science itself. Science driven by curiosity 
appears to have abdicated its primary place in the order of things and has become
44 Reasoned arguments for natural childbirth can be found in Sensitive Midwifery, by Caroline 
Flint. Also Sheila Kitzinger, Giving Birth: how it really feels. For more scientific arguments for 
natural childbirth: Michel Odent, The Scientification o f  Love.
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instead technics driven by interest. Under such circumstances, Strange reasons, it is 
unlikely that states will lose structural power to other sources of authority, such as 
'some amorphous international network of scientists'. The consequences of the 
supremacy of technology over science become clear throughout the remaining pages of 
the chapter. The history of the knowledge structure turns into a catalogue of technical 
innovations. Knowledge becomes 'information'. People who participate in the 
knowledge structure become knowledge workers'.
Thus we are in a situation where on page nine Strange has put her money on the 
value of curiosity. But in chapter six she describes a knowledge structure which does 
not appear to be a healthy environment for its propagation. We arrive at a place in the 
engine room of knowledge where two loose ends of the Western subject meet, as it 
were, causing an explosive short circuit. The ship, with one last shuddering lurch, sinks 
beneath the stormy water. Curiously, in her desert island story Strange has done exactly 
what she accuses the gloomy environmentalists of wanting to do. She has reversed 
centuries of western 'material progress and technical advance', and plonked the 
shipwrecked survivors on an island with organic food, natural childbirth, clean air and 
water. It looks as if they are going to have to rapidly develop some alternative lifestyles 
and probably also some form of rudimentary alternative medicine. How on earth are 
they going to cope?
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3; Tekhne
(2.1) Desert Island Story
'They have no idea where in the wide ocean they are. Water's getting 
short when, well into the third night adrift, they hear breakers. 
Miraculously escaping the reef, they land exhausted on a beach, and all 
fall asleep on the sand, happy to be alive.' States and Markets p. 1
Marx once remarked that political economists have 'always been fond of 
Robinson Crusoe stories'1. They are not alone. Images of the wreck and the desert island 
have long held a firm grip upon the western imagination. Now Susan Strange has left us 
with yet another shipwreck, yet another desert island to add to our textual archipelago. 
There is a literary term for this genre. After Crusoe, it was called the Robinsonade. The 
distinguishing marks of a Robinsonade are as follows.
First comes an apocalyptic break with modernity in the form of a wreck, where 
all the trappings of western civilization are made to 'sink beneath the stormy water'. 
Next comes an idyllic encounter with primordial nature as the survivors set out to 
explore the margins of their desert island paradise. Here they discover a forgotten 
lifeworld hitherto overlooked by Western reason, hence left uncharted, undisturbed:
'In the morning, they explore the shore of their desert island. They find 
fresh water, coconut palms and fish in the lagoon.' (p.l)
Gradually, a drama begins to unfold about how the survivors manage to rebuild their 
lives upon the blank slate that is their desert island. Like many other stories that have 
stood the test of time, this one is fertile soil for the propagation of questions. The desert 
island is a favourite spot for modernity when it wants to get away from it all and find 
some time to reflect and take stock. So what would happen to us if we were to be 
shipwrecked on a desert island? How would we live and what would become of us? 
What baggage of knowledge from the past would we choose to take with us? What 
baggage would we most like to leave behind? And what baggage would we probably 
bring along with us without even being conscious of it?
Strange's tale develops a rather postmodern twist in that it fragments into three 
parts. Her island is not experienced by its new inhabitants as a rational whole or unified
1 Karl Marx, Capital (volume 1), translated by Ben Fowkes, p. 169.
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subject like in Robinson Crusoe for example, or The Swiss Family Robinson. Instead, 
her desert island story splits into treblethink. Three different lifeboats land upon the 
same island separately, so that as far as each group of survivors know they are the only 
people alive on the island. It comes to pass that three incommensurable societies evolve 
upon the same island out of the same wreckage of modernity: incommensurable simply 
in the sense that they originally develop without any knowledge of each other’s 
existence. In the beginning they are not even an anarchical society. They are simply 
states without relations.
Martin, a ship's officer, assumes command of the group of survivors from the 
first lifeboat. Exploring the hills of the island behind he finds some alien human 
footprints. Like his famous forebear Crusoe, this discovery makes a dramatic impression 
upon Martin. Being a realist, he decides it is prudent to prepare for the worst:
'"Friends", he says, "we may be in danger. We must cut down some trees 
and build a stockade. We must fashion some spears, organize a watch 
and send out some patrols'". (<States and Markets, p. 1)
Some dissent is expressed at Martin's battle plans by two lovers and a mother. But the 
three former crew members are so 'used to taking orders from Martin' that his speech 
carries force within the group, and gradually everybody else also gets used to the idea of 
doing as they are told.
The second lifeboat consists of a band of young students who, in their three 
days and nights at sea together, talk endlessly about what they should do if they ever 
find land. They are idealists. They decide that it would be a good idea to organise a 
commune:
'To each according to their needs, from each according to their ability.
Equality in taking decisions; the same rules for everybody1. {States and 
Markets, p.2.)
Things seem to go well at first, but after a few days the problems arrive. First of all, 
there are the two lovers, Bob and Betty, who don't pull their weight and who keep on 
wandering off to the woods. Secondly, nobody is prepared to take on the task of 
building and maintaining a latrine, so the camp starts to get a bit smelly. And then 
thirdly, there is Joe, who seems to think he has secured some sort of exclusive right to 
ownership of the means of production. Even so, in spite of all these problems, everyone 
still seems to think the commune was a good idea.
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The third lifeboat is a rather more mixed society with old people, mothers, 
children and crew. A budding anthropologist would probably choose this group as the 
most promising subject for his doctoral thesis. They appear to be building a primitive 
kinship system based around the totem of a bag of old nails:
To begin with everyone will be given an equal share of nails and they 
can be used to buy or sell fish, coconuts, fruit and personal services.'
(iStates and Markets p.2.)
This kinship system has its teething troubles. Fish seem to be held in higher regard than 
fruit, coconuts and personal services. This is true to such an extent that kinship relations 
become rather asymmetrical. Odd behaviour, our young anthropologist might ponder, 
for many of the crew, who are so used to living long periods of life at sea. Still, at least 
everyone is sheltered, fed and able to manage.
(2.2) Primary power structures and primary state formation
We have seen how Strange's desert island story postulates the possibility of 
three communities developing autonomously, in complete ignorance of each other. This 
story happens to be analogous to the way many archaeologists have perceived the 
emergence of the first four known civilizations2. Four primary civilizations emerge out 
of the rubble of pre-history. One sprang to life in China on the banks of the Yellow 
River. Another grew upon the Indus in what is currently Pakistan. A third civilization 
was Mesopotamia, probably the eldest of the four, which germinated out of the silt 
accumulated by the Tigris and the Euphrates. The fourth civilization to emerge out of 
the silt was Egypt upon the river Nile. As with Strange's castaways, each of these 
civilizations are thought to have developed autonomously, in complete ignorance of 
each other.
The reader of States And Markets who finds it hard to credit just how close 
Strange's castaways are to these events happening so many thousands of years ago might
2 Just as there tend to be realist or structuralist accounts of contemporary international relations, 
prehistorians have developed 'isolationist' or 'diffusionist' paradigms about the origins of 
civilization. For example, an isolationist position might stress the 'autochthonous origins' of Greek 
civilization, tending to deny 'oriental' influences, whilst the most extreme diffusionist position 
would argue that all civilizations sprang from a single source. For the international political and 
economic provenance of these positions see Bruce G. Trigger, A History o f Archaeological 
Thought (Cambridge, CUP, 1989). This case study seeks to use Strange's model to assimilate the 
best of both traditions, stressing the interplay between internal and external forces.
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find it useful to consider how they might survive in practical terms. If Strange's 
islanders cannot plug themselves back into modernity soon, all three groups face the 
prospect of a giant leap back in time. The first group start out with nothing except the 
lifeboat which saved their lives. The second group has a toolbox containing a saw and 
an axe, and the third group has a bag of nails, all probably made out of steel forged via 
the Bessemer process, which means they remain children of the industrial revolution for 
a while at least. But even steel wears out after prolonged use. Joe's toolbox will 
probably last long enough for the islanders to realise how precious this metal can be, but 
they are not going to find it easy to muster all the skills and resources necessary to smelt 
and work it. Unless the tekhne of metallurgy can be reproduced Strange's islanders will 
find themselves falling back into a Neolithic existence. In fact, we can already see the 
Neolithic beginning to reassert itself upon the very first page of States And Markets, 
where Martin's group resorts to the fashioning of spears. The security structure Martin 
envisages would appear to be a rather pathetic affair of sticks and stones. Later on in the 
story there is also evidence of hunting and fishing, the gathering of fruit and nuts, some 
basic agriculture and a hint of animal husbandry. Such is the structure of everyday life 
which beckons the first generation of Strange's islanders. Their plight provides us with a 
fitting allegory for western philosophies of international relations and political 
economy, because such was the lifestyle of many communities living on the European 
continent when its Mediteranean fringe first established regular communications with 
Near Eastern civilization during the Bronze-Age.
Civilization is one of those words which modernity finds hard to pin down^. 
This is largely because of the normative qualities it has acquired since first minted. It 
was first introduced into the English language during the Renaissance from the Latin
root civis, meaning citizen, a member of a city^. Its early use carries a strong sense of 
belonging to and identification with large scale communities that have achieved high 
levels of sophistication, order and co-operation. Perhaps above all it carried a strong 
sense of value for acheivement in the fields of craftsmanship, art and thought. This 
positive sense of the word shone brightest during the heyday of the Enlightenment, with 
the semantic help of its ugly siblings: barbarism and savagery. During the Romantic 
backlash against many enthusiasms of the Enlightenment, however, this positive sense
3 Robert W. Cox, ‘Civilizations in World Political Economy’, New Political Economy, Vol.l, 
No.2,1996, p. 143.
4 Raymond Williams, Keywords, p.57-60.
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of civilization was eclipsed by rather more negative connotations, which might be 
summed up as a sense of nostalgia for what the civilized have lost, combined with a 
sense of alienation from what they have gained. We are still haunted by this romantic 
sense of the word more than we know. Our habit of playing out utopian theories upon 
imaginary desert islands is one symptom. Latterly the word has become even more 
complicated, as people are sensitized to the displays of hypocrisy which often surround 
it. The word's days of innocence are long gone. Consequently, many scholars today find 
it hard to use the word normatively without an ironic sense of embarrassment about the 
gangsters who have left their fingerprints upon it.
If we leave the normative properties of the word to one side for the moment, 
and concentrate instead upon its structural aspects, we could use Strange's work to 
describe the first civilizations as those human societies where we can see the first 
identifiable signs of a production structure, a security structure, a financial structure and 
a knowledge structure. The key ingredient here is complexity5. Civilization appears 
where social organization has become elaborate enough for us to be able to distinguish 
between four primary sources of structural power. Civilization vanishes beyond the 
point where it makes heuristic sense to discriminate between them. Beyond this point 
society achieves that sublime simplicity where it makes more sense to make use of 
anthropological modes of explanation.
(2.3) Production
Strange's desert island castaways do not appear to be particularly enthused by 
the tekhne of agriculture. Meg, from the first group, thinks it would be quite nice to start 
a garden, but there is no indication that she receives support for her plans. The second 
group seems content to gather and fish. The third group does consider whether to grow 
crops and also encounter a wild goat, but the idea of domestication does not appear to 
be taken up with any great enthusiasm. This half-heartedness is quite understandable. 
Agriculture is hard work. Hunter-gathering was the good life. Hobbes has been proved
5 Tainter, The Collapse o f  Complex Societies, p.22-38. Julian Jaynes, The Origin o f  
Consciousness In The Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind, p. 139.
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wrong about that one. Anthropologists can still find pockets of wilderness where the last 
remaining representatives of the hunter-gathering lifestyle live peaceably to a ripe old 
age, arguably amongst the happiest, healthiest humans alive on our planet6. The only 
problem with the hunter-gathering lifestyle is that it is extensive. The flora and fauna of 
a desert island simply cannot support a hunter-gathering lifestyle for long. That is why 
so many islands were left deserted by humans in prehistory in the first place7. This is 
the real scenario for potential conflict between the three groups of castaways. We are 
told that the third group of castaways give priority to the value of wealth. Do they know 
what this word means? If we take on board what the biologists tell us about desert island 
ecosystems our counsel to the castaways must be that they have no time to lose. Without 
agriculture all three groups will soon discover the meaning of wealth in absolute terms.
The prevailing theory of the neolithic revolution is that it was a response to the 
desert island problem writ large. It took many millennia and many mammal extinctions 
before population pressure eventually forced humans to consider the question of wealth 
for the first time. One answer to this problem was conflict; violence to obtain control 
over dwindling resources. The second answer was to persuade nature to become more 
productive. Some of the first experiments with agriculture are thought to have been 
pioneered in the foothills of the mountain ranges of the fertile crescent, from about 
10,000 BC, where there was a wide belt of sufficient rainfall for 'dry-farming', but 
where communities could fall back upon hunter-gathering when the crops failed8. As the 
wild grasses and game became scarce people began to learn to reproduce them 
artificially to supplement their diet. The acquisition of knowledge about agriculture was 
a slow business, a process of trial and error, but after 6000 BC the harvests, flocks and 
herds had become reliable enough for some communities to try opening up new areas 
for cultivation.
One such area was southern Mesopotamia. The first settlers in these waterlands 
would have been hunters and gatherers. Fish, game and water buffalo could be found 
along the rivers and lagoons together with fruit from trees such as the date palm, but 
there was not enough rain there for dry farming. We do not know precisely how it 
happened, but the practice of agriculture migrated from the hills to the meandering 
streams of the alluvial floodplains. It had been realised that the gentle gradient could be
6 Jeremy Rifkin, Entropy: A New World View, p.73-75.
7 Clive Gamble, Timewalkers: The Prehistory o f Global Colonization, p.233-240.
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used to dig transverse trenches to divert water in order to compensate for the lack of 
rainfall9. The use of the plough now became useful for breaking up the heavier sod. 
Once the idea of irrigation had taken hold the fertility of the alluvium produced yields 
far in excess of those harvested in the hills. The increased yields coupled with the 
abundance of fish, game and fruit had two consequences. Firstly, the area of land 
needed to feed a given community was reduced, which meant that settlements could 
huddle closer together and develop structured relationships with each other more 
easily10. Secondly, wealth in the form of large agricultural surpluses could be 
consistently produced and stored in communal granaries11.
Taken together these two developments worked to sponsor a multiplication in 
the division of labour. Favourably placed villages in Mesopotamia became the nuclei 
around which specialised functions could cluster, providing services to surrounding 
villages. These nuclei became centres for what Gordon Childe once called an 'urban 
revolution'12. Since Guide's day it has become conventional to qualify both the heavy 
emphasis upon 'river valley' cultures and his use of the word 'revolution'. We now know 
that towns existed at Catal Huyuk and Jericho for example, from as early as 7000 BC. 
Excavations in the future will probably uncover many other impressive settlements 
contemporary with these outside the river valley areas. Furthermore, it has become 
apparent that neolithic villages were capable of supporting more craft specialisation 
than had previously been thought13. Nevertheless, the old theory that the density of 
settlement furnished by the Mesopotamian alluvium sponsored unprecedented changes 
in human organization and in the organization of human knowledge is one of the few to 
have withstood the many floods of revisionism which have swept across archaeological 
thought in recent decades. During the fourth millennium BC a complex settlement 
structure developed in southern Mesopotamia, forming a hierarchy of two, three and 
then four tiers. At the apex of this hierarchy stood the prototypes of the first cities, 
absorbing the agricultural surplus from the second, third and fourth tiers of settlement. 
The city used the surplus to release some of its population from lives tied to the soil. 
Thus released from the black earth, many of these urbanites were able to concentrate 
their labour power upon the further development of specialised crafts. This settlement
8 H .J. Nissen, The Early History o f  the Ancient Near East, chapters 2 & 3.
9 Moorey, Ancient Mesopotamian Materials and Industries, p.4.
10 Ibid, p.43.
11 Gordon Childe, What Happened In History, p.97-100.
12 Ibid.
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pattern of core and periphery enabled a production structure to develop that a simple 
village economy could not have sustained.
(2.4) Finance
As the surpluses accumulated in the cities of Mesopotamia it became necessary 
to build financial structures, or systems of credit whereby the agricultural wealth could 
be collected, stored and re-distributed. The first distinct financial structures pioneered 
by the Sumerians were based around the god and the temple. The genesis of the city- 
gods goes something like this:
'Now one important side of the new urban life was a process of division 
and differentiation that took place within the human personality itself.
When a villager came to the city, he ceased to be a man among men; he 
became a specialist among specialists... he left part of himself behind.
Under the new regime, it might take twenty different kinds of craftsmen 
and vocational specialists to make a single man... To offset this, the city 
created a sort of super-personality, visible in the city’s god or ruler, who 
brought all the parts together.'14
This super-personality had to be internalized by all of its individual parts in order to 
help determine, motivate and regulate their actions. There is a psychological theory that 
the first gods of civilization were sown into the right hemisphere of the brain, from 
whence voices grew with the authority to inform their subjects how best to cooperate 
and solve problems associated with the unpredictability of social complexity15. The 
sacred task of the temple was to promote the voice of its god within the human spirit 
and to act as a centre for the collection and redistribution of the economic surplus.
The temple was manned by a new type of human being, the priest. The priest 
had to promote the voice of god and collect, store and redistribute the surplus. The 
priest was new in that for him the creation and reproduction of the city-gods had to 
become a reflective act16. The priest literally had to make, preserve and present the
13 Moorey, ibid, p.3.
14 Lewis Mumford, 'University City, in City Invincible: A Symposium On Urbanization And 
Cultural Development In The Ancient Near East, Edited by Kraeling & Adams, p. 10.
15 Julian Jaynes, The Origins o f Consciousness In The Breakdown O f The Bicameral Mind.
16 The word ‘conscious’ is used here to refer to the human condition of purposive agency as 
suggested by: Louise Amoore, Richard Dodgson, Randall D. Germain, Barry K. Gills, Paul
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icons and idols through which the city god could inculcate her voice into the heads of 
her people. This meant that the priest was intimate with his god in a way that other 
members of his civilization were not. Somewhere here, probably, lies the origin of 
consciousness17.
At some level, if only to carry out the specialized task civilization had allotted 
him competently, the priest must have been aware that god was the product of man18. At 
another level, if only to be more convincing to others about the authenticity and 
authority of god, the priest had to hear the voice of god and obey just as if he were any 
other member of his civilization19. This doubling required the invention of an analog 
self that could do or be one thing on the inside and another on the outside20. The priest 
could thus become the faithful servant of god, but simultaneously conceal the 
thaumaturgical stage magic behind which he mediated the prayers of his city in the 
divination of god’s word and its dissemination through ritual21:
The gods could not be known, their workings were inscrutable, and man 
could only propitiate. The temple supplied that need, and the high priest 
became mediator between man and god. Man met these obligations 
through offerings and the payment of tribute to the temple, so that, in the 
course of time, the temples accumulated considerable wealth, controlled 
by what became a corporation of priests.'22
As long as man met his obligations to god by the payment of tribute to the temple, god 
would meet his obligations to man when the crops failed, by using his good offices to 
redistribute the surplus. In time, the financial functions of the temple became ever more 
complex. It made sense for god to also set aside some of the surplus for investment in 
public goods, such as a new granary, dyke, canal, etc. God thereby reinforced the 
authority of his voice within the minds of her populace and found that even more tribute
Langley and Iain Watson, 2000, ‘Paths to a historicized international political economy’, Review 
o f International Political Economy, vol.7, no.l, p.56-8.
17 My narrative slightly modifies Julian Jaynes’ hypothesis in that it assumes that the rise and fall 
of the bicameral mind and the evolution of consciousness would have to have been combined but 
unequal developments, thus giving his psychological theory a political and economic angle.
18 Sloterdijk, Critique o f Cynical Reason, p.28-34.
19 Paul Ekman, ‘Self-Deception and Detection of Misinformation’, in J.S. Lockard & D.L. 
Paulhus (eds), Self-Deception: An Adaptive Mechanism?
20 Julian Jaynes, op cit, p.219-20.
21 Strange's model has the advantage of being able to assimilate both the 'integrationist' and the 
'conflict' theories of state origins. For a discussion of these see Jonathan Haas, The Evolution o f  
the Prehistoric State, chapter 2 & 3. Also Cohen & Service (eds), Origins O f The State: The 
Anthropology o f  Political Evolution, Chapters 1 & 2.
22 James Bowen, A History o f Western Education, Volume One, p.6.
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would thereby flow back into his pots. Some, like Enki for example, then set aside some 
of the surplus to invest in the new arts and crafts that were prepared to huddle around 
the temples, which brought even more tribute back in return as a miraculous multiplier 
sprang into effect23. The demand for materials and manufactures from afar then tempted 
the temple to sponsor the creation of the merchant, who would eventually learn to trade 
on his own account, but who would always return to the temple to seal bargains, pay 
taxes and deposit his profits for safe keeping under the regulation of the voice of god. 
Every once in a while god took a little from the till just to spend on himself. The 
priesthood found that the authority of god’s word depended upon him having a head 
office which inspired awe. In a way, god was the first banker24.
(2.5) Security
At a veiy early stage in the development of civilization though, its gods began 
to summon up and develop a capacity for organized violence. This wrath from the gods 
was partly a response to the development of inequality. Scholars are agreed that a 
marked increase in the production and accumulation of wealth brought about a 
corresponding increase in the complexity of social conflict in Mesopotamia, both 
internal and external. Given the paucity of evidence the scholars are divided, however, 
on the extent to which it is feasible to construct a narrative about how this increase in 
complexity manifested itself. When the experts disagree, we may either pass over in 
silence or select from a variety of competitive plausibilities.
Extrapolating from early epic literature and from anthropological observations 
of village based cultures, Thorklid Jacobsen once proposed that during the early Ubaid 
phase of Mesopotamian settlement conflicts were simple enough to have been dealt with 
by village assemblies, made up of women and men and possibly presided over by
23 Enki was the water god of Eridu in Southern Mesopotamia. Eridu was, according to 
Babylonian legend, the first city to be created. Enki 'was renowned for his wisdom and learning, 
his patronage of the arts and crafts, and his power over the sweet waters that flow beneath the 
earth.' Max Mallowan, 'The Development Of Cities From Al-'Ubaid To The End Of Uruk 5', in 
The Cambridge Ancient History, volume 1 p.330.
24 See Morris Silver, 'Gods as Inputs and Outputs of the Ancient Economy1, in Economic 
Structures o f the Ancient Near East.
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elders25. Naturally these elders were often also priests who had access to the appropriate 
rituals by which their ancestors had learnt to orchestrate model responses. Internal 
feuds, for example, would be thrashed out in public before the assembled village, which 
could then perform a ritualized expression of its vested interest to put communal 
pressure upon the antagonists to settle. Wrongs would be put right by the reparation or 
punishment deemed appropriate by the whole community. The assembly would also 
serve as a forum for the regulation of communal obligations. Here failures to meet 
social obligations could be exposed and corrected. When it came to the problem of 
external conflict, the assembly would attempt to deal with it by the ritual appointment of 
a temporary officer or king, with instructions to parley or to lead in attack or defence. 
These simple means of communicative mediation worked well enough to begin with, 
but when civilized life became more complex such assemblies ran up against a number 
of problems.
One set of problems were simply practical. As the populations in the cities 
grew, the assemblies became larger and more difficult to manage. The work the 
assembly had to get through increased, whilst the size of its meetings meant that its 
capacity to do it decreased. The issues the assemblies had to deal with also became 
more complex, which meant that many more meetings had a propensity to go on forever 
without coming to any conclusion. All this meant that the number of meetings called 
had a propensity to multiply. Meanwhile, the unit area of each community had become 
more extensive, so people had to walk further to attend the increasing number of 
meetings of longer duration26. The increase in the size of population also led to a steady 
erosion of kinship. Whereas before many had known each other through the daily 
intimacy of communal life, now increasing numbers of people found they were 
becoming strangers to one another. Anonymity made life less commensurable, made it 
harder for the multiplying numbers of people to arrive at decisions within assemblies 
that were becoming increasingly fractious and impatient. In the interests of his own 
subjects, God eventually decided to intervene.
25 Thorklid Jacobsen, Trimitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia', in W.L. Morgan (Ed), 
Towards the Image ofTammuz, p. 157-70. See also: Henri Frankfort, 'The Last Predynastic Period 
In Babylonia', in The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 1, Part 2, p.92.
26 Thorklid Jacobsen, 'Political Institutions, Literature, And Religion: Discussion introduced by 
Thorklid Jacobsen', in Kraeling & Adams, City Invincible, p.65-66.
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Via a series of improvised solutions many assemblies started to devolve some of 
their powers on a temporary basis, and gradually these temporary solutions became 
more permanent and formalised. One of the first powers to be devolved seems to have 
been the power to make judgements over internal disputes and feuds. It made sense to 
delegate the work that was becoming irrelevant to the majority of the population who 
neither knew nor cared about the individuals embroiled in the petty disputes of another 
parish. The assemblies would appoint priesthood magistrates to arbitrate between 
conflicting parties and consider alleged wrongs or crimes.
Another power that was devolved quite early on can be plausibly linked to 
another set of problems to do with the evolution of social stratification. The steady 
accumulation of the agricultural surplus was a blessing, but some people found that they 
were accumulating much less of this blessing than others. Given that the priest would 
always be the first to be in on the secret that god seemed to need man as much as man 
needed god, it is perhaps understandable that the priesthood was often a major 
beneficiary of this process.
Growing inequalities inevitably led to forms of alienation that the theocratic 
assemblies had not had to deal with before. Spiritual reflections about inequality may 
well have been a factor that can explain why some people proved to be better at paying 
tribute to the temple than others. Why listen to and pay tribute to a fertility god who is 
proving to be more fertile for someone else? Many early gods appear to have been taken 
by surprise at the novelty of inequality. This is evident in an impertinent letter written 
by Apiladad to his personal deity, explaining his recent spell of absence from the shrine:
To the god my father I speak; thus says Apiladad, thy servant; 'why have 
you neglected me so?' Who is going to give you one who can take my 
place? Write to the god Marduk, who is fond of you, that he may break 
my bondage; then I shall see your face and kiss your feet. Consider also 
my family, grownups and little ones; have mercy on me for their sake, 
and let your help reach me.'27
Apiladad is so intimate with the voice of his god that he thinks he is perfectly entitled to 
ask him: 'cui bono?\ He expects justice and is not afraid to threaten the withdrawal of 
his affection when it is not forthcoming. Perhaps his poor fortune is merely due to some 
divine administrative oversight? If so the deity is instructed to put this right without
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delay. The Mesopotamian record is full of letters like these28. It seems that the authority 
of god’s voice had limits beyond which obedience in the form of tribute failed to meet 
temple targets regularly enough. Therefore, god persuaded his assembly to order their 
priests to invest some of the surplus in the construction of a coercive apparatus to help 
encourage people to meet their social obligations more faithfully:
’And now the priest lands on the embankment and will register the 
harvest. The porters carry sticks, the police palm ribs. They say: "Give 
grain!" "There is none here." He is stretched out and beaten; he is bound 
and thrown into the canal. His wife is bound in his presence, his children 
are put in fetters.'29
To begin with both the judicial and coercive powers were simply executive arms of
temple administration. Whenever an assembly decided to devolve these powers, the
temple was the civil service in place to provide the necessary resources in terms of 
material and authoritative personnel. It was only when a third set of problems to do with 
the management of external conflict prompted the parallel development of a defensive 
apparatus that we can begin to see the crystallization of a security structure as an 
independent source of power in its own right.
Up until the onset of the Uruk phase of Sumerian civilization, say about 4000 
BC, the demands of external conflict were generally simple enough to be dealt with on 
an ad hoc basis. As has already been noted, when trouble was brewing with another 
town the theocracy would appoint a temporary king, or lugal (literally big man’), to 
conduct diplomacy or lead in battle. This practice has also been observed by 
anthropologists in tribal areas all over the world30. Towards the close of the fourth 
millennium however, external security requirements within Sumer gradually became 
more complex as various towns waxed in size and wealth. One consequence of this was 
that the temporary kings began to grow in status and influence within their own 
communities. Without the benefit of much in the way of written records the 
archaeologists are reduced to a human needs based approach to the study of inter-
27 Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen & Irwin, The Intellectual Adventure o f  Ancient Man: An Essay On 
Speculative Thought In The Ancient Near East, p.205.
28 Ibid.
29 This is a bit of a cheat because the quote is from Egypt (see 'The Schoolboy Texts' translation 
by Joseph Kaster, The Wisdom O f Ancient Egypt, p. 195.). But it is a viable cheat because the raw 
details of tax coercion in the two lands are generally thought to have been pretty similar.
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communal conflict in prehistory, and when they survey the evidence in Mesopotamia 
two major candidates stand out as likely factors making for an increase in the 
complexity of inter-communal conflict. One candidate is the importance of trade, which 
is a subject that shall be dealt with in a following section. The second candidate is the 
development of scarcity in water and pasture.
According to Nissan, in its early Ubaid phase of settlement the ’land between 
the two rivers' had been the prototypal 'Garden of Eden'31. The early settlers found an 
abundance of fresh water, date palms, and fish in the lagoons. Large areas of rich land 
were suitable for cultivation at a time when there was plenty of water around in a 
profusion of small creeks and natural waterways. Artificial irrigation could be obtained 
without any great effort because almost every arable plot of land had easy and direct 
access to it. Meanwhile, away from the water, there were semi-arid steppes, ideal for the 
seasonal pasture of sheep and goats. During the fourth millennium, however, fate 
intervened. Changes in the geology and climate of the region caused the water table to 
sink. Much of the semi-arid zone gradually turned into desert. Meanwhile, many of the 
smaller waterways on the floodplain dried up. Consequently, more concerted social 
effort was required to make the water go to where it was needed.
The Mesopotamians heroically accepted their sisyphean fate, progressively 
improving their water management skills and building an unprecedented network of 
canals, dams and reservoirs. Each town and its surrounding area functioned as an 
irrigated island separated from other such islands by open stretches of semi-desert and 
swamp32. But given the density of settlement that had been achieved during the golden 
age, these islands sometimes overlapped. This meant that the struggle to control water 
flows and regulate the remaining pastureland often involved struggles with the gods of 
other towns. As the water receded, power in the production structure tended to shift 
towards the settlements that had access to the remaining water channels. Where disputes 
over rival claims to water supplies and pasture could not be resolved by synoecism, they 
were often settled by violence.
30 Elise Boulding, The Underside o f History: A View o f  Women Through Time, p. 150. The 
reference she cites is: Jacobsen, Thorklid. 1960. "Discussion." Pp.62-70 in City Invincible, edited 
by Carl H. Kraeling and Robert M. Adams.
31 See Nissan, op cit: pp.59-60; 69; 95; 129-134; 142-143.
32 Bernard Knapp, The History and Culture o f Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, p.45.
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It was this increase in the intensity of conflict that led to the rise of the 
institution of permanent kingship in Mesopotamia. As Strange has argued, security has a 
high value in times of great peril. During increasingly prolonged periods of conflict the 
more charismatic generals found themselves in a position to exploit their ability to 
provide this value. It was a dangerous job, but it had perks for which a man could 
acquire a habit. When a community sensed the march of an enemy approaching it made 
sense for the theocracy to cut down on debate and bend its ear to the decisive voice of 
the lugal. It made sense too for the priests to secede to the lugal certain powers over the 
resources of the temple. He was in the right position to put them to maximum strategic 
use. The lugal was therefore appointed as the tenant of god’s dominium. Likewise, a 
god terrified of external violence was not likely to quibble about the assumption of a 
monopoly by his king over the forces of internal coercion. This was a job for which he 
was eminently well qualified and he may well have been recruited from the ranks of this 
apparatus anyway. Similarly, in times of war precious time wasted divining god’s word 
over an internal dispute is bound to have been considered a luxury. All judicial 
casework was handed over to the lugal or his lieutenants for summary justice in god’s 
name.
Naturally, whenever it looked like an era of peace was about to break out the 
lugal could claim that he would be neglecting his duty not to counsel prudence when it 
came to the delicate business of handing back the powers to which he had become 
accustomed. How could god ever know that the time of mortal danger of his people had 
truly passed? Having accumulated considerable prestige within the theocratic 
community during his military campaign, any arguments to the effect that the lugal 
should retain many of his powers in peacetime would not have been easy to counter. 
And when it came down to the nitty-gritty, who was going to argue the toss with the Trig 
man1 who had become chief soldier, speaker, priest, policeman, judge and bailiff? There 
appears to be little or no philological evidence of heresy at this stage in the formation of 
the human spirit.
Some powers were clawed back by elements within the Sumerian community. 
The rich landowners who controlled a significant portion of the means of agricultural 
production were a faction to reckon with. So were the priests, who still controlled a 
major part of the spiritual realm, banked the surplus, and managed the input and output 
of credit. But both of these factions were people with whom the lugal could bargain in 
private negotiations. The rich landowners were ready to do a deal over land in exchange
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for security against external danger plus indemnity against internal sabotage from 
disaffected small-holders. The priests were happy to concede a stake in the 
determination of god’s will, plus a stake in the keeping of his accounts: in exchange for 
leaving temple affairs alone; plus security against external danger; plus indemnity 
against the internal vandalism of the alienated poor33.
In the short term these deals were easy enough to stitch together. In the longer 
term they were more unstable due to the existential problem of the ageing process, as is 
highlighted by the Epic o f Gilgamesh34. Reading this text for the first time, it is hard not 
to jump to the conclusion that the priests are trying to josh their lugal with serious 
intent. ’Jolly well, Mr would-be Gilgamesh1, the priests seem to be saying, 'you may be 
the "big-man” now. But do not forget that you are mortal. Do not forget that we are the 
ones who balance the books at the end of your day. And do not forget that the temple is 
the institution that has to supervise the hereditary principle that you are trying to foist 
upon the populace'. Trouble-free successions have always been a notoriously difficult 
thing to engineer, but in Early Dynastic Sumer the practice was only just being 
pioneered. The office of the lugal would thus frequently decompose along with the 
corpse until a new recruit emerged out of fresh bout of inter-city conflict. With the 
progressive dessication of the environment, however, these fresh bouts of inter-city 
conflict became increasingly frequent.
The development of the Sumerian security structure was combined but uneven. 
The Uruk phase', for example, is so called because for an uncertain period, let us say 
from 4000 to 3100 BC, the town of Uruk was by far the most precocious urban 
development and appears to have enjoyed a degree of hegemony over Mesopotamia and 
beyond. We have reason to suspect that this hegemony came complete with coercive 
teeth. Mythologies of Uruk have Gilgamesh building the first city walls around this 
town - perhaps the first true polis. It was during this period that the word lugal first took 
on connotations of authority over other cities for the purpose of determining the 
boundaries of neighbour-god's estates - or in secular terms to settle frontier disputes
33 Some scholars are less prepared to accept there was a dialectic between temple and palace in 
Mesopotamia than others. Compare: Knapp, op cit, p.69-72; with Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient 
Near East, p.34.
34 N.K. Sandars, The Epic o f Gilgamesh (London, Penguin, 1960).
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between cities35. The Jemdet Nasr period which followed, let us say from 3100 to 2900 
BC, is thought to have been a phase of urban diffusion during which many sibling towns 
began to flourish under the protective umbrella of Uruk. It was perhaps during this 
period that the titles en and ensi took on the designation of leaders of independent city 
states, whilst being in some way deferential to the lugal. The Early Dynastic Period I to 
EH, let us say from 2900 to 2350 BC, is generally characterized as an age of rival city 
states. By this time the hegemony of Uruk had crumbled and it is just one powerful city 
state amongst many. In this period the word lugal often appears to slip its connotations 
of arbitration between cities, but deepens its connotations of soveriegnty within cities, 
displacing other appellations of urban authority such as en and ensi like cuckoos in the 
nest36.
To sum up, the security structure that emerged in Sumer was made up of a 
community of independent city-god states, each of these cities having a lugal who 
offered a security package of judicial, coercive and defensive functions brought together 
under the rubric of the palace. Though these states were fiercely independent, together 
they did form a community with a common set of customs and conventions. The 
Sumerians acheived this with the innovation of the pantheon, the temple in the city of 
Nippur dedicated to all the city-gods of Mesopotamia37. This city was a crucial nexus, a 
kind of fusion between Rome and Geneva of the inter war years. In Sumerian mythology 
Nippur was the seat of assembly for all the city gods under the chairmanship of Enlil:
'the gods who owned and ruled the various city-states were bound 
together in a higher unity, the assembly of the gods, which possessed 
executive organs for exerting outward pressure as well as for enforcing 
law and order internally'38
As god of Nippur and in his capacity as chairman of the divine assembly, Enlil was 
custodian of the Sumerian inter-city world order; but it was an anarchical world order, 
regulating principles and norms in which all gods had a common interest. By leaving 
aside a seat of worship for every city-god in the league, Nippur managed to cultivate an 
air of impartiality which enabled it to rise above intercity strife. Having released itself
35 C.J. Gadd, 'The Cities of Babylonia', The Cambridge Ancient History (volume 1 part II), 
p. 103-4.
36 The chronology here is conventional. However, my typology of terms would probably be too 
neat for many scholars. See Knapp, op cit, p.71.
37 Roaf, op cit, p.81. H. Frankfort, H.A. Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen and Irwin, op cit, p. 193-5. 
Knapp, op cit, p.69-70.
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from the fray Nippur discovered an niche within which it could prosper, as a neutral site 
to meet for the purpose of mediation, negotiation and settlement:
'We see, already at the dawn of history, that a boundary dispute between 
the neighbouring city-states Lagash and Umma was viewed as a dispute 
between two divine landowners, Ningirsu, the god of Lagash, and Shara, 
the god of Umma. As such it could be taken to court and adjudicated by 
Enlil in Nippur. Enlil implemented his decision through the ruler who 
was then his human representative, Mesilim, king of Kish. Mesilim 
measured the disputed territory and marked the boundary line which 
Enlil had designated.'39
As with every such nexus in any particularist world order, Enlil of Nippur was 
thoroughly pragmatic and shows no sign of ever getting carried away about what he 
could achieve. Whenever the shifting sands of Sumerian political economy drifted 
toward hegemony, Nippur's instinct for self-preservation saw to it that the ministrations 
of its god did not step on the hegemon's toes: 'any conqueror, if he was successful, was 
recognized as the agent of Enlil'40. And when he had to, Enlil also knew how to turn a 
deaf ear. From four and a half thousand years ago, when Ningal the goddess of Ur goes 
to Nippur to make an impassioned plea for her besieged city, her pathos still has the 
power to momentarily sieze the breath from the modem scholar of international studies:
'Then verily, to the assembly, where the crowd had not yet risen, while 
the Anunnaki, binding themselves (to uphold the decision), were still 
seated, I dragged my feet and stretched out my arms. In truth, I shed my 
tears in front of Anu. In truth, myself I mourned in front of Enlil: "May 
not my city be destroyed!" I said indeed to them. "And may its people 
not be killed!" I said indeed to them. But Anu never bent toward those 
words, and Enlil never with an, "It is pleasing, let it be," did soothe my 
heart. Behold, they gave instruction that Ur could be destroyed... as its 
destiny decreed that its inhabitants be killed.'41
Nippur was also a place for the city-gods of Sumer to discuss foreign policy beyond 
Mesopotamia. From the Late Uruk to the Early Dynastic I, the agenda would have been 
dominated by the desire for joint ventures to establish trading links abroad. As well as 
being chairman of the divine inter-city assembly, Enlil was 'trader of the wide world'42. 
From the Early Dynastic II discussions probably drifted more toward common threats to 
security as the Sumerian age drew to a close. Because of its neutral political status the
38 H. Frankfort, H.A. Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen and Irwin, op cit, p. 194.
39 Ibid, p.195. See also Kuhrt, op cit, p.41-43.
40 H. Frankfort, H.A. Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen and Irwin, op cit.
41 Ibid, p. 197.
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relative peace which Nippur enjoyed meant that it was also a safe haven for inter-city 
finance.
Scholars have speculated on why particularism was such a characteristic feature 
of Sumerian civilization. One explanation commonly offered is the periodic floods that 
were characteristic of the region, and which were liable to change the main course of the 
two rivers at a stroke. This appears to be what finally did for the hegemony of Uruk 
during the Early Dynastic I period43. Just as a city had managed to establish a stable 
hegemony, a catastrophic flood could change the main course of its river overnight. Its 
network of waterworks and thus its attendant alliances with suppliant villages would be 
rendered obsolete. City-gods favoured by the new course of the river would vie with 
each other to step into the breach and a new struggle for hegemony would ensue; before 
the next deluge, whereupon the cycle would repeat itself44.
A second possible explanation for Sumerian particularism is the relative 
security of its people vis a vis the outside world by virtue of their position as 'first 
comers'. Being members of a primary civilization without peer, they got used to the idea 
of having a competitive advantage over the less complex social forms which surrounded 
them. Each urban formation lying along the Euphrates and the Tigris was thus, as a 
seminal text has put it, a city invincible as far as the outside world was concerned45. The 
lack of insecurity with regard to the outside world meant that there was precious little 
incentive for unification. This world order was changing by the middle of the Early 
Dynastic HI period, but the Sumerians could not find the time to look up and realise this 
until it was too late. By then the city-gods of Sumer had become locked into the habit of 
putting their internal struggles over water and pasture at the top of the security agenda.
(2.6) Knowledge
The agricultural surplus, managed by the temple and secured by the palace, 
enabled the concomitant development of a distinct knowledge structure. As has been 
noted, some of the surplus was siphoned off toward the cities to finance specialization 
in the division of labour. In these cities craftsmen were able to concentrate their efforts
42 Knapp, op cit.
43 Nissen, op cit, p. 131.
44 Ibid.
45 Kraeling & Adams, op cit.
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on a particular skill and thus achieve levels of excellence and innovation that had not 
been possible beforehand. Many of the crafts were developed from skills common to 
village communities right across the Near East. These were augmented by skills 
pioneered by journeymen who already practised a limited degree of specialization by 
travelling from village to village along the fertile crescent in search of trade. The wealth 
of Sumer leached many of these journeymen down into the cities where there was 
enough work to persuade them to take up permanent residence. In this way knowledge 
became structured in the sense that it became concentrated into the hands of the elites 
who controlled the temples and palaces.
The division of labour also brought about the structuration of knowledge in 
another sense. The skills being developed in the cities were no longer reproduced 
collectively by society as a whole and held in common as before, because of the 
opportunity costs that were beginning to evolve in terms of teaching and learning. The 
villagers of the late Neolithic had already recognised this when they sponsored the 
development of specialized journeymen, but with the coming of the city the 
structuration of knowledge became far more radical. It became unfeasible to 
communicate an increasingly sophisticated set of skills to all members of a given 
community. The only way to reproduce the hard earned skills down the generations was 
by a long process of exclusive association between the apprentice and the craftsman. 
The opportunity cost of devoting a life to learning the skill of the carpenter, for 
example, meant the loss of opportunity to learn the skill of the potter. It ceased to be 
viable to be a Jack or Jane of all trades. In order to benefit from the development of the 
new skills the Mesopotamian gods thus made a faustian bargain with civilization. A 
dialectic between knowledge and ignorance came into play whereby certain people had 
to accept that they were becoming dependant upon others for a multiplicity of skills that 
would forever remain mysterious. This then, was a second form of enclosure. 
Knowledge became a source of structural power in the sense that it became something 
which could be possessed by an individual, family or guild, and ceased to be part of the 
knowledge held in common by the community as a whole. The first civilization thus saw 
the debut performance of the person whom the Greeks would later call the tekhnikos, 
the possessor of a particular tekhne, meaning an art, skill or craft46.
46 J.O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 162.
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So far we have talked about tekhne in abstract terms. Both the strength and 
weakness of all abstraction, of course, is that it simplifies. It helps us to glean a broad 
overview, but can eventually become an obstruction to understanding unless balanced 
with a strategic approach to detail. Tekhne may be considered as a whole in order to 
comprehend many of the things that each of the specialized crafts had in common, but it 
also had heterogeneous qualities that can only be fully appreciated by a sectoral 
approach47. Given that there is not enough time or space to cover every sector even for a 
relatively simple civilization such as Sumer, we have to select in the hope that we can 
dredge up a representative sample. Every single one of the specialized arts being 
sponsored by the surplus in the Mesopotamian delta made important contributions to the 
development of early civilization, but here we shall single out a mere three sectoral 
examples for attention: pottery, metallurgy and writing.
Archaeologists have good reason to be particularly grateful for the tekhne of the 
ancient potter. Compared with the skills of many of his contemporaries his work has 
proved to be relatively durable. Much of what we know of prehistory has been gleaned 
by meticulously piecing together the broken fragments of his work. In fact, 
archaeologists have built whole chronologies out of the shards of pottery which have 
been recovered. Pottery also lends itself to chronologies because clay was a relatively 
democratic material, being widely distributed in the alluvial silt along the banks of most 
waterways. Provided it is not a volcanic island, Strange’s castaways ought to be able to 
find the stuff and get some ’hands-on1 experience without too much difficulty. The 
ubiquity of clay made it a precocious medium for human innovation and the subsequent 
dissemination of that innovation. Today we tend to think of pottery mainly in terms of 
ornament or as utensils for eating and drinking, but in ancient times pottery had a more 
universal significance. Not only was it used to make tools and weaponry such as clay 
sickles and sling bullets, but was also used in the manufacture of containers for storage, 
manipulation and transport. Pandora's box, if we reinscribe the mythology of ancient 
Greece, was actually a potter's jar48.
Like many of the early crafts such as basket making and spinning, pottery 
started out as a household skill, probably pioneered in villages during the neolithic by
47 Roger Tooze, 'Sectoral Analysis and the International Political Economy1, in Perspectives On 
Political Economy: Alternatives to the Economics o f Depression, edited by R.J. Barry Jones, 
p.231-240.
48 M.Grant & Hazel, Who's Who In Classical Mythology, p.264.
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women49. Clay had already become a familiar raw material by the end of the eighth 
millennium through the manufacture of bricks for construction: also figurines, tokens, 
bins and basket linings50. During the seventh millennium some communities began to 
experiment further with this material, using slabs of clay to make the first pots, which 
were then baked in the sun. Major breakthoughs in the use of hearths and kilns for 
controlled firing were being made by the second half of the seventh millennium, 
dramatically improving the utility of the finished goods. At this stage potting was still a 
household seasonal craft and agricultural labour and pottery manufacture complemented 
each other in the community's annual life-cycle, but by the sixth millennium 
archaeological analysis begins to detect the first signs of production for exchange, a tell­
tale indicator of incipient specialization. Moorey carefully defines this as a shift from 
•household production' to Tiousehold industry': where certain members of a village 
produce more than is required locally and where other villages choose to acquire pottery 
of finer quality than can be made at home. The finer wares were distinguished by little 
tricks of the trade learnt through trial and error, such as improving the working 
properties of the clay by using grit rather than fibre as temper, or by allowing the clay 
mixture to age in a sheltered place for a couple of weeks to allow the fine particles to 
wet through and thus maximise plasticity. Another development which lent extra 
prestige to the products of some villages was the use of slips, ochres, oxides and other 
mineral mixtures which, when painted onto the pottery surface, would combine to form 
permanent layers of colour when heated and also help to make the product less poros.
We have seen then that the basic fundamentals of pottery manufacture were 
well established by the end of the early neolithic, but when settlement in Mesopotamia 
began to condense into towns toward the close of the fifth millennium there is evidence 
to suggest that the evolution of specialization in ceramics gathered pace. Some potters 
were now turning over enough work to find it worthwhile to introduce the toumette, 
consisting of a wheel balanced upon a stone pivot whereby the clay object could be 
slowly turned. Many potters also now began to use 'trademarks': either to distinguish 
their work from wares made by others with whom they fired jointly; to signify some 
form of collective authorship; or to identify the particular customer for whom the given 
artefacts were intended. Higher temperatures were often now being employed in the 
process of firing, evidence which is consonant with archaeological claims that many
49 Boulding, op cit, p. 101.
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purpose built kilns can now be distinguished from ovens built for household use. The 
first hints of a shift from household industry' to 'urban production' become evident, as 
the manufacture of pottery begins to move from residential areas toward sectors on the 
outskirts of town. This may be partly explained by the fact that as an occasional activity 
firing in rural areas could be done at home, but that on a more permanent basis in an 
urban setting firing became a public nuisance. Once a ceramic sector had been thus 
designated it became feasible to contemplate production on a slightly larger scale. In 
addition to the aforementioned purpose built kilns and toumettes, space could be found 
where pots could be set to dry, and permanent basins could be installed for the day to 
day preparation of clay, pigments and slips. In this way some pottery production was 
organised on a large enough scale by late Ubaid times in Mesopotamia to export 
significant quantities along the Gulf toward Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Nevertheless, 
household production and household industry together still enjoyed the major share of 
gross pottery produced.
In the Uruk phase of urbanisation during the fourth millennium large scale 
specialized urban pottery production expands whilst household production and 
household industry begins a slow decline. The toumette was supplemented with the 'low 
fly wheel' which was fixed on a spindle and turned by an assistant at a speed of up to 
twenty rotations per minute. This was still far too slow to be able to enlist the use of 
centrifugal force to 'throw' a pot, but did enable the introduction of more rapid forming 
methods and opened up a vacancy for the apprentice as a recognised means of 
reproducing knowledge from one generation to the next. The use of coil building in 
spirals also came in at this time. By the close of the fourth millennium, ceramics had 
become a highly centralised temple or palace based affair, and it was urban industry 
which now enjoyed the gross share of pottery produced. The enigmatic bevilled rim 
bowls' which have puzzled so many archaeologists may actually turn out to have been 
symptomatic of a widespread de-skilling of the population as a whole, the last gasp of 
household based production before it finally petered out51. Meanwhile, on the outskirts 
of town, pottery was acquiring a mass produced 'almost factory made look' (Moorey
50 The following digression on pottery relies on Moorey, op cit, p. 149-162 (though he would 
possibly find my precis of his research too 'diachronic').
51 See for example Nissan's discussion of Uruk's bevelled rimmed bowls', op cit, p.83-85. For a 
critique of Nissan's interpretation see T.W. Beale, 'Bevelled Rim Bowls And Their Implications 
For Change And Economic Organization In The Later Fourth Millennium B.C.', Journal o f Near 
Eastern Studies, 1978, volume 37, number 4, p.289-313. For a glimpse of the geographical 
distribution of these bowls see Roaf, op cit, p.64-65.
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calls them ’dull pots'). Shapes and forms conform to a standard range produced in large 
quantities and decoration is greatly simplified52.
Frankfort believed that the decline of fine decorated pottery by the third 
millennium BC may be partly explained by the fact that it was supplanted by stoneware, 
jewellery and metal trinkets as the key signifiers of wealth, taste, nobility and status53. 
As his tekhne became preoccupied by a patronage of increasingly utilitarian 
commissions the potter is thought to have suffered a relative decline in socio-economic 
status when compared with many of his contemporaries. When the first third 
millennium inventories pull Sumer into history, potting is identified as a specialist skill, 
but is not regarded as precious enough to register very often in the rosters of 'civilised' 
crafts54.
Perhaps the potter's pioneering experience of demotion can help explain why 
clay was chosen as the key metaphor for the first known algodicy55. The myth of Enki 
and Ninmah uses the skill of the potter as a metaphor for creation itself, thus retaining a 
memory of his former prestige, but tempers it with a mordant touch of ambivalence that 
makes our modem existentialism look almost adolescent. The myth tells how the gods 
get fed up with having to earn their living and decide to make human beings out of clay 
in order to do all the work for them56. To celebrate their emancipation the gods decide 
to throw a party but, unfortunately, they proceed to get drunk and things get out of hand. 
With great merriment they take turns to sit at the wheel and compete with each other to 
see who can pot the human with the most hilarious affliction: disease; malformity; 
infertility; incontinence and old age. Eventually the game turns sour with the creation of 
old age because the goddess Ninmah cannot think of any use for it. Being the worse for 
wear, Ninmah loses her temper and the divine party breaks up in acrimony. Thus left 
helpless and redundant, humanity in old age has 'to return to the original clay': the 
Sumerian euphemism for death.
We have seen how, during the Neolithic Age, pottery firing inspired households 
to become more adroit in the use of fire, learning how to build ovens in which high
52 Moorey, op cit, p. 155.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, p. 149.
55 Peter Sloterdijk defines algodicy as: 'a metaphysical interpretation of pain that gives it 
meaning', op cit, p.460.
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temperatures could be achieved and sustained. It was this knowledge which made the 
smelting of metals possible57. The first experiments in metal working were with copper, 
gold, silver and lead, which could be found on the surface of the earth in their natural 
state. When these nuggets were heated in the fire it was found that they were more 
malleable and could be beaten into ornaments and tools. The association of metal 
working with fire eventually led to the discovery that they could be produced artificially 
by collecting strongly coloured metalloid ores, which are more plentifully found on the 
earth's crust than pure nuggets, and then smelting them in a furnace58. Humans had long 
been familiar with the practice of collecting brightly coloured ores like blue azurite, 
green malachite and red ocher for the purpose of processing them into body paints59. 
Gold, silver, lead and copper have relatively low melting points, which would have 
rewarded the first trials. Gold and silver were attractive for ornament because of their 
colour, lustre, and resistance to corrosion. Being soft and ductile, they were also easy to 
work. Lead was easy to find, work and, because of its weight, could be used for weights 
and anchors. Copper was easy to find and work too, and when it was mixed with ores 
rich in arsenic or tin would form a harder alloy that could take a cutting edge60.
Unlike clay, metal is an exclusive raw material. That is to say, metal ores are 
more unevenly distributed across the surface of the earth's crust. Some metals are more 
unevenly distributed than others, but Strange's castaways will be lucky if they can find 
any deposits on their island at all. The consequence of unequal distribution was that the 
earliest innovations in metallurgy confined themselves to regions that were rich in the 
raw materials, and there was a natural barrier to the dissemination of innovation beyond 
these regions. Working from the reasonable assumption that within a given framework 
of physical conditions all humans are capable of independently arriving at similar 
deductions, modem archaeologists tend to assume that thousands of early neolithic 
communities must have experimented with metals on their own initiative right across 
the great mountain chains stretching from the Pyrenees to the Himalayas61. Many of
56 Frankfort et al, op cit, p.161-165.
57 J.D.Bemal, op cit, p.96. Also: R.F. Tylecote, Tumaces, Crucibles, and Slags', in Wertime & 
Muhly (eds), The Coming o f  the Age o f Iron, p. 183.
58 J.D.Bemal, op cit, p. 110. Gold is slightly different because much of it was recovered from 
alluvial deposits.
59 Schmandt-Besserat, 'Ocher In Prehistory1, in Wertime & Muhly, op cit, p. 127-150.
60 T.S. Wheeler & R. Maddin, Metallurgy and Ancient Man', in Wertime & Muhly, op cit, p. 101- 
13.
61 James A. Charles, The Coming Of Copper And Copper-Base Alloys And Iron', in Wertime & 
Muhly, op cit, p. 158.
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these communities would thus have become familiar enough with metals to be able to 
emulate foreign innovations in mining and manufacture. It is also reasonable to assume, 
however, that local variations in social conditions did, over time, sponsor pioneers who 
set the pace of innovation. An important step seems to come with the smelting of ores. 
Tekhne would not have been necessary within communities when it came to the 
relatively simple business of working with natural metals. Even Strange's castaways 
ought to be able to bodge a bit of hot and cold hammering. But the need for 
specialization would have become more urgent when it came to prospecting for and 
mining ores, collecting fuel and making furnaces, crucibles and moulds to smelt and 
cast, and then working with the processed materials to manufacture diverse sets of 
artefacts such as the ones found in sixth and fifth millennium contexts at Catal Huyuk, 
Cayonu and Tepe Yahya.
When we select for areas according to an early ability to make it both feasible 
and worthwhile for communities to pioneer the sponsorship of metallurgical 
specialization the field of likely candidates is reduced significantly62. The most 
precocious zones appear to have been in the Taurus and Zagros mountains. Given the 
natural location of most ores in relation to the average distribution of early settlements, 
the first smiths are likely to have been recruited from nomadic sectors of the local 
population. It would have been natural for such people to finance their trade by 
becoming a bit itinerant; mining and smelting the materials themselves in the 
mountains, bringing their bun ingots down to the bazaars in the hills and steppes and 
then tinking their way through the lowland villages of the fertile crescent. Some of their 
goods had functional value, such as copper pins, awls, hooks and axes. But most 
neolithic communities would have been content with their own tools made from local 
materials, so many of the most transferable metal goods had symbolic rather than 
functional value63. For both tinkers and merchants it made sense in marketing terms to 
target the most powerful members of each village community. They were the ones most 
likely to be in control of the surplus. They were also the ones in a position to be able to 
grant a safe passage and allow the metal trade to continue. The answer was trinkets, 
easily carried luxury goods designed for conspicuous consumption by which elite 
elements could parade and reinforce their elevated status.
62 James D. Muhly, The Bronze Age Setting', in Wertime & Muhly, op cit, p.27.
77
Some of these goods trickled down into the villages and towns of southern 
Mesopotamia through down-the-line exchange, prestige chains, freelance trade, or a 
mixture of the three64. Bits and pieces of gold and copper have been found in Ubaid 
deposits of the early fifth millennium, though these finds are more isolated and the 
workmanship generally of lower quality when compared to more numerous examples of 
contemporary work closer to the source zones65. It took a while for the burgeoning elites 
of southern Mesopotamia to acquire a serious taste for metal goods, but once they did 
their unprecedented surpluses enabled them to become a major source of effective 
demand. By late Ubaid times there is already evidence to suggest that demand in 
southern Mesopotamia had exceeded the capacity of existing forms of supply, and that 
temples such as Eridu were financing the first forms of directional trade. This trend was 
sustained into the fourth millennium, when there was ’a marked expansion in the use of 
metals' in and around Uruk66. By this stage ingots are being imported into Sumerian 
workshops, where they are being melted and then hot or cold hammered after casting. 
Perhaps these workshops were initially manned by former tinkers who had been 
recruited from the highlands to find permanent employment in the towns. Or perhaps 
some of them were smiths sent as diplomatic gifts from foreign city-gods such as Susa 
to the east67. No doubt there was also indigenous initiative involved, whereby newly 
imported artefacts would challenge local artisans to emulate their manufacture. By the 
end of the fourth millennium the workshops of Sumer were providing her cities with 
metallurgical skills that were beginning to rival those developed nearer to the source of 
the raw materials hundreds of kilometres away.
The accumulation of metallurgical skills in Sumer during the Late Uruk and 
Jemdat Nasr phase was important because it pooled together pockets of knowledge that 
had previously been dispersed. Before about the middle of the fourth millennium the 
tinkers working from the mountains above the fertile crescent tended to gain experience 
in working the particular metal sourced in their area. From the middle of the fourth 
millennium the cities of Sumer gradually became metropolitian agencies for the 
combination of metallurgical skills and resources. The synergic reactions produced by
63 John Oates, Trade and power in the fifth and fourth millennia BC: new evidence from northern 
Mesopotamia', World Archaeology, 1993, Volume 24 No.3, p.408.
64 See following section below. Also: Colin Renfrew, 'Four models for external trade or 
exchange', in The Emergence O f Civilization, p.465-471.
65 Moorey, op cit, p.221 & 256.
66 Ibid, p.256.
67 Ibid, p. 16.
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this concentration of skills and resources were essential in the formation of the 'truly 
international age of polymetallic metallurgical technology' which was to have such a 
profound impact upon the Near East and beyond throughout the third and second 
millennia68.
It was in the fourth millennium that gold and silver first became the media of 
symbolic power. These two precious metals were used to furnish the temples and 
palaces with charismatic fixtures and fittings, and for other assorted props such as cult 
equipment and the jewellery for personal adornment which helped to help buttress the 
authority of god’s servants of the highest rank69. Copper was the principal utility metal. 
Once the tinkers had settled down into their smithies in the cities they were able to 
diversify their product base. The prehistoric pins, awls, hooks and axes were 
supplemented with luxury household goods such as bowls, dishes, tumblers, ladles and 
razors. Meanwhile, the advantages of using copper tools had an important knock-on 
effect upon other crafts in the production structure. The copper knife, chisel, nail, drill 
and saw, for example, transformed the working of wood and stone, making jointed 
carpentry and coursed masonry practical on a large scale70.
In addition to the copper axes the archaeological record in Mesopotamia also 
turns up increasing numbers of copper spear and arrow heads throughout the fourth 
millennium. One drawback with pure copper was that it is a soft metal, but the earliest 
smiths learnt how to alleviate this shortcoming by a repeated process of hammering and 
annealing. In their efforts to narrate a 'story of progress' many authors have understated 
the efficacy of this simple chalcolithic technique71. Nevertheless, it is still axiomatic 
that a new phase in the evolution of metallurgy as a tekhne came when it was discovered 
that the utilitarian properties of copper could be improved by alloying it with other 
minerals. This discovery is thought to have been first made during the fifth millennium 
in areas such as Tepe Yahya on the southern Iranian side of the Zagros, where 
geological fate had left unique deposits of arsenical-copper ores that, when smelted, 
would produce superior coppers that were not only easier to cast but also more 
responsive to the hammering and annealing process, yielding a bronze 'cutting edge' that
68 Muhly, op cit, p.25.
69 Moorey, op cit, p.221,224-5, & 238.
70 J.D.Bemal, op cit, p.l 14.
71 J.A. Charles, op cit, p. 167.
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was harder and more durable72. At first this would have simply manifested itself as a 
local eccentricity within a chalcolithic paradigm. But once the advantages of the 
naturally occuring alloys were recognised through contacts with other tinkers and metal 
traders, a cosmopolitan appetite for them gradually spread, and people began to 
deliberately seek out minerals which were similar in colour to the impurities in the 
arsenical copper ores with the intention of adding them to their local supplies of pure 
copper73. Isomorphic developments subsequently occurred with the stannite copper ores 
that chalcolithic communities began to mine in the foothills of Afghanistan74. Here tin 
became the natural alloy, which was eventually destined to become the favourite, 
probably due to difficulties caused by the variable composition of arsenical ores and the 
propensity of arsenic to vapourize in the smelting process.
The advent of bronze metallurgy posed a challenge to the chalcolithic world 
which some communities were better placed to turn to their advantage than others. An 
indication of what was to come may be seen in the late fourth millennium hoard found 
at Arslantepe in southern Anatolia, including 22 arsenical copper daggers. According to 
Renfrew:
The plain fact is that until daggers were invented, no metal product was 
so remarkable or original as to be indispensable. Stone axes were nearly 
as efficient as copper ones, and shaft-hole axes of copper were not an 
enormous improvement upon those of antler furnished with a stone 
working edge. The dagger, on the other hand, was a new form...
Connected with the appearance of the dagger is the discovery of alloying 
copper with tin (or arsenic) to make bronze. The increased strength and 
hardness which this produces were highly desirable when a robust yet 
rather thin blade was required. The new form, coupled with this 
technological advance, produced a universal military threat which could 
be answered only by equipping oneself with similar weapons. The 
analogy with the various twentieth century arms races is obvious...'75
In short, bronze became a strategic material. Before the advent of bronze there would 
have been a fairly egalitarian structure of access to the primary means of violence. After 
bronze, it became more feasible for certain members of a society to attempt to construct 
monopolies in the use of force. Also, when it came to the dissemination of bronze 
metallurgy beyond the source areas of copper and its alloys, the first cities had an
72 Dennis Heskel & Carl Clifford Lamberg-Karlovsky, 'An Alternative Sequence For The 
Development Of Metallurgy, in Wertime & Muhly, op cit, p.229-265.
73 T.S. Wheeler & R. Maddin, op cit, p. 106.
74 J.A. Charles, op cit, p. 172-8.
75 Renfrew, op cit, p.320.
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organizational advantage over less complex social forms in the procurement of minerals 
and skills.
That bronze was a strategic material is evident in the fact that its use was mainly 
reserved for the production of arms (outside source areas). Utilitarian tools and 
implements were almost exclusively made of copper until the Late Bronze Age. Bronze 
was a highly sought after material made in small quantities from ingots produced and 
transported from far away. Consequently its distribution and use became tightly 
controlled and regulated by the most powerful elements within the security structure.
Having become such an indispensable productive, financial and strategic asset 
the polymetallic smith became something of an aristocrat amongst the trades, judging by 
the measure of religious anthropomorphism; but there was a price to be paid. A minor 
footnote in history. Metallurgy was the first tekhne to engender an occupational disease. 
Unfortunately, arsenic is poisonous and has a low vapour point. The absorption of small 
quantities of arsenic over long periods causes muscular atrophy. The smith also had to 
handle hazardous hot and molten metals on a daily basis. This is the most plausible 
explanation for why so many smith-gods all over the ancient world came to be 
represented as cripples76. The use of arsenical bronze begins to take off at the beginning 
of the fourth millennium. Its gradual replacement by tin bronze starts at the beginning of 
the third, but the relative scarcity of tin meant that arsenical bronze continued to be used 
in areas such as Egypt right up until about 1900 BC.
We have seen how pottery firing helped to provide the pyrotechnological 
background for the development of metallurgy. Pottery was also instrumental in the 
genesis of writing. Cuneiform, the first known writing system used by man, was made 
by using sharpened reeds to cut wedge-shaped signs into clay tablets. To understand the 
history of the tekhne of writing it is first necessary to dispel a common fallacy that has 
crippled western thought about it for many years. Writing was never invented to 
represent speech. The use of writing to record speech was a spin-off which happened 
hundreds of years later. Writing was originally designed simply to reproduce difference 
for the purpose of generating information, data, models, calculations, calendars, lists, 
orders, bills, reciepts and accounts, plus the signatures that signed, sealed and delivered 
the accumulation of power over property and people. The logocentric premiss that true
76 Saggs, Civilization Before Greece And Rome, p.200-1.
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writing is for the representation of speech is thus a philological error, which obscures 
both the nature of writing and its historical role in the development of knowledge and 
power77.
From about 8500 BC, clay was used to make pebble-sized tokens, which 
archaeologists have found in the storage areas of many neolithic dwellings across the 
fertile crescent78. One theory is that these fired-clay tokens, moulded into different 
shapes, were used to represent units of crops and livestock in order to model economic 
activities in the village79. The tokens served as mnemonic aids to help the first 
agriculturalists make long-term communitarian decisions about things, such as how to 
divide a given harvest into grain for current consumption, future consumption, and seed- 
corn - a basic accounting system or planning tool. These economic models gradually 
became more complex, as is evident in the way the tokens acquired a greater range of 
shapes and began to bear a range of marks on their surfaces. Slightly later in the 
archaeological record, the tokens become placed into clay containers. The containers 
served as means to record economic transactions. A given movement of grain, for 
example, could be represented by moving an appropriate token from one container to 
another. This is something which Economics tends to overlook in its fetish over money. 
The production and finance structures rely on a knowledge structure because they both 
need a memory. In order to foster the economic exchanges necessary to develop a 
complex division of labour human society had to create an artificial mnemonics.
With the emergence of the city and the temple two related things begin to 
happen in the archaeological record. Firstly, the clay containers for the tokens start to 
fold into envelopes, or bullae. This enclosure was a temple innovation, invented to 
regulate the editing of the record contained inside. Once the tokens had been sealed 
inside the envelopes the only way to change the record was to break the bullae, so any 
tampering would be detected. The utility of such a device is obvious in a society that
77 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology.
78 Geoffrey Sampson, Writing Systems, p.57.
79 Denise Schmandt-Besserat (see bibliography). Although Schmandt-Besserat's scholarship is 
well respected by archaeologists, her theories about the invention of writing are not universally 
accepted. For a very critical appraisal see Stephen Lieberman, (1980) 'Of clay pebbles, hollow 
clay balls, and writing: a Sumerian view1, American Journal o f Archeology, vol.84, p.339-58. For 
a paper countering many of Lieberman's criticisms see Powell, H.A. (1981) Three problems in 
the history of cuneiform writing: origins, direction of script, literacy.' Visible Language 15 : 419- 
40. One attempt to pick a way through the controversy, together with helpful comments
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was becoming more stratified and heterogeneous and where kinship and ritual were 
ceasing to be effective forms of social cohesion. One consequence of this enclosure was 
that the priests decided that it would be useful to be able to tell at a glance what was 
inside the bullae without having to break them open, so they started to mark the outer 
surfaces of the envelopes with the negative imprint of the tokens before they were 
enclosed inside.
The second innovation was the development of cylinder seals. These seals were 
like tiny rolling pins, made out of stone and carved in such a way that a relief was 
produced when they were rolled out on wet clay. They were used to seal the 
aforementioned bullae, denoting that the information therein was the property of a 
certain individual or institution, but they were also used to seal many other things such 
as jars, baskets, and the doors to storerooms. The seals worked through the reproduction 
of difference. Every seal was carved in such a way that it produced a distinct design 
when rolled out onto the wet clay. The clay then dried to produce a permanent record. 
The differences produced by the seals stood for particular individuals and organizations, 
or signatures which could be rolled into and then read from the embossed surfaces80. 
Any unauthorized access to the objects that had been sealed could thus be ruled out. 
These seals were instruments of power that could be used to guarantee the effective 
supervision of certain proceedings and the security of certain goods: crucial tools in the 
early formation of the state and private property.
The consequence of the tokens, the bullae and the seals was that people 
acquired the habit of reading difference from variegated impressions marked out upon 
clay surfaces. The habit took hold to such an extent that for many purposes the tokens 
themselves became redundant and the bullae envelopes evolved into clay tablets, upon 
which cuneiform, the first known writing system, was pioneered.
As with the potter and the smith, the tekhne of writing began life as the preserve 
of a specialist, in this case the scribe. In many ways writing was just like any other kind 
of tekhne. It involved the use of special tools requiring a high degree of expertise, which 
people would acquire over a long period of association with a master of the craft. But
concerning Schmandt-Besserat's influences, can be found in: Geoffrey Sampson, op cit, 57-61; 
see also Jack Goody, The Logic o f Writing and the Organization o f Society, p.50-55.
80 Nissen, op cit, p.74-80. Roaf, Cultural Atlas O f Mesopotamia And The Ancient Near East, 
p.72-73.
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there was something about the tekhne of writing that made it special right from the start, 
and which made its possessors a class apart from all the other tekhnikoi.
What made the scribe so different was that it was writing which coordinated all 
the other trades into an effective political and economic whole. Early social experiments 
in the division of labour would have been impossible without him81. His ability to 
process data placed him at the centre of the rapid acceleration in social complexity 
characteristic of early Mesopotamia. The scribe was the person in possession of the 
tekhne that inscribed the voice of god, the management of credit, the communication of 
instructions and the recording of social bargains. The early scribes were thus 
indispensable servants of divine volition and its earthly agencies of wealth, power and 
influence. In Mesopotamian mythology the scribe was the eternal companion and 
servant of the leviathan, perpetually jotting down his divine orders, first as Nisaba the 
wife of Enlil, then as Nabu the son of Marduk82. But the myths also carry a hint of 
suspicion akin to that between king and courtier, emperor and mandarin, minister and 
civil servant. Both wife and son are suppliants who might also become supplanters if 
given half a chance83.
The suspicion was well founded. The tekhne of writing was the servant of 
power that paradoxically acted as a trigger for its dissemination at the same time. It was 
simply too useful to be contained, and refused to remain within the confinement of one 
profession. To begin with the scribe was synonymous with the priest. Writing had been 
pioneered in the temple and the temple thereby held an early monopoly over its 
transmission. It was in this context that the first attempts at organizing the process of 
education on a systematic, institutional basis took place84. Within the Sumerian temples 
a specific building called the 'tablet house’ would be set aside for the training of scribes, 
complete with rows of benches, exercise tablets and counters for reckoning and 
computation. Here the student scribal priest would learn how to externalize the voice of 
god by inscribing it upon the silent clay, thus hollowing out an interior space in his 
mind ripe for the development of a sovereign capacity for the purposive, reflective act85. 
It was thus the scribe who was bound to be the first human tempted to take a bite from
81 Florian Coulmas, The Writing Systems o f the World, p. 15.
82 Knapp, op cit, p.53.
83 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, p.84-94.
84 J. Bowen, op cit, p. 11-17.
85 Julian Jaynes, op cit, p.208.
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the apple of consciousness, and his dissemination of writing that inaugurated the genesis 
of history.
When the tekhne of writing spread, so too did the capacity for consciousness. 
As the palace began to exploit its power over the provision of security the temple began 
to lose its scribal monopoly. The palace began to recruit scribes for its own purposes. 
Whenever the temple tried to resist this the palace moved to ensure that the training of 
scribes became a more secular affair. The 'tablet house' thus became an institution in its 
own right, now called the Tiouse of learning', where elites were trained to serve either in 
the temple or the palace. A third phase of diffusion took place when merchants started 
to take up writing in order to trade on their own account. With their account books, 
invoices, letters of credit and business correspondence the merchants carried literacy 
north, south, east and west. A fourth phase of dissemination took place when literacy 
was taught to the slave so as to assist the master in his household affairs. The slave 
gains the power of consciousness! But the impact of slave consciousness and its role in 
the rise of cosmopolitanism would not become evident for many centuries...
(2.7) Secondary Power Structures and Secondary State Formation: trade; 
transport; energy; welfare and development
We have seen how the emergence of civilization in Mesopotamia may be 
interpreted with Strange's model of production, finance, security and knowledge 
structures. The less well-thumbed part of States And Markets is the third part, where 
Strange talks about the 'secondary power structures'. According to Strange, the 
secondary structures are major sources of power in the sense that they are frameworks 
within which important human choices are made, but are secondary in the sense that the 
four primary structures 'play a large part in shaping the secondary structures' (p. 135). In 
this section we will attempt to demonstrate how the concept of 'secondary power 
structures' could be useful in accounting for the historical phenomenon of secondary 
state formation in Syria-Palestine and Anatolia.
Though both Syria-Palestine and Anatolia witnessed the development of some 
of the first neolithic, food producing communities along with the rest of the fertile 
crescent from about 10,000 B.C, subsequent development during the fifth and fourth 
millennia did not evolve at the same pace as in Mesopotamia (or Egypt - see below). 
The geography of Syria-Palestine was made up of coastal plains, rolling plains, deserts,
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hills and mountains. Generally, the land was consistent with village and encampment 
polities based on variegated subsistence mixtures of fishing, hunting, dry-farming and 
pastoralism. The geography of Anatolia was even more diverse, consisting of coastal 
plains, continental mountain ranges, steep river valleys, high plateaus, pluvial plains and 
lakes. This terrain was generally more punishing than most of Syria-Palestine, but could 
also support human populations based upon similar productive ingredients and with 
similar settlement patterns. Niether Syria-Palestine nor Anatolia could produce the 
agricultural surplus furnished by the irrigated alluvial plains of Mesopotamia. 
Consequently, they did not autonomously develop the distinct production, finance, 
security and knowledge structures characteristic of Sumer and the other primary 
civilizations.
What they did have was an unevenly distributed array of natural resources that 
could be used for manufacture, transport and trade. The development of transport and 
trade networks was an inevitable consequence of the neolithic revolution. By choosing 
to settle down and cultivate the land many communities made themselves less mobile 
and were less able to fetch materials for themselves86. At the same time immobility 
removed the barrier to acquisitiveness that results from having to leave behind what 
cannot be carried87. For these reasons it became important to cultivate exchange 
relations between peoples. Communities that happened to have desirable materials on 
their doorstep were in a favourable position to specialize in their production. A window 
of opportunity also opened for those who were prepared to specialize in their transport.
Catal Huyuk, for example, was a small town occupied in southern Anatolia 
from about 7000 to 5600 BC. Its subsistence was based upon the agriculture made 
possible by the gradual drying up of a pluvial lake in what is now the Konya plain, but 
the precociousness of its development is also explained by the working of obsidian in 
the mountains nearby88. Another Anatolian centre for obsidian was Chayonu, situated 
about 50 kilometres south east from the modem town of Elazig. Obsidian is a volcanic 
glass rock capable of being chipped into cutting tools89. The volume of the obsidian 
trade was not great and the sharpness it furnished was a luxury, but the distribution in 
terms of distance travelled is impressive. Anatolian obsidian reached right across the
86 J.G. Macqueen, The Hittites and their Contemporaries in Asia Minor, p. 14.
87 Bronowski, The Ascent o f Man, p.37-8.
88 Macqueen, op cit, p. 14.
89 Roaf, op cit, p.34.
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fertile crescent, from Beidha due south of the Dead Sea, to Eridu in the Mesopotamian 
delta. Scientists have proved this by using chemical analysis to match obsidian finds 
back to their source. What the scientists cannot tell us is how the obsidian changed 
hands and who carried them from A to B.
One model which might account for the prehistoric distribution of obsidian is 
called 'down-the-line' exchange90. If we imagine a chain of villages equally spaced 
across the fertile crescent, each village down the line would receive obsidian through 
exchange from its neighbour nearer to the source, and pass on about a half to two thirds 
of what they received to the next settlement along the chain. This primary mode of 
exchange has been observed in many anthropological contexts and we may assume that 
it can account for the distribution of some of the obsidian. If we were to try and turn it 
into an exclusive explanation for the movement of obsidian, however, the model runs up 
against a number of problems. The first weakness of the model lies in the assumption of 
an even distribution of villages across the fertile crescent which were more or less 
equally capable of passing on goods further down the line. One of the few things that we 
can take for granted about neolithic settlement is that it was not evenly distributed, and 
that the combination of climate and terrain actually placed some rather formidable 
obstacles between the sources of obsidian and many of the places it managed to reach. 
A second weakness of the model is its apparent lack of interest in the different 
commodities that would have had to travel in the opposite direction to provide down the 
line exchange with any incentive91. It is reasonable to postulate that many of these 
goods would have been perishable and that this is the reason why they have not been 
detected by archaeologists. When we contrast the relative self-sufficiency of neolithic 
settlement with the diversity of goods that would have had to have been traded in the 
reverse direction, however, it becomes clear that the simplicity of the down-the-line 
exchange model has been achieved by sweeping the most perplexing half of the 
necessary gross number of bargains outside its purview. A third weakness of the down- 
the-line model is its propensity to regard neolithic communities as undifferentiated 
wholes, when we know that a lot of ancient Near Eastern villages were the nuclei 
around which nomadic agencies orbited.
90 Renfrew, op cit, p.465-466.
91 Harriet Crawford (1978), 'The mechanics of the obsidian trade: a suggestion', Antiquity,UA, 
p.129.
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Thanks to research conducted within the discipline of Anthropology, we are 
now in a position to know more about the nature of nomadism than any previous 
generation of scholarship92. Previously the nomadic contribution to civilization has 
often been conceived in fairly violent and destructive terms, but recently their role has 
been reassessed. One of the most plausible reconstructions of the genesis of trade draws 
from anthropological research which suggests that nomads may have played a major 
role93. The word 'nomad' often conjures up images of Bedouin or Mongol warriors, but 
neither camels nor horses were domesticated until late into the third millennium BC. 
The nomads of Mesopotamia, Syria-Palestine and Anatolia during the neolithic and 
early Bronze Age were simple sheep and goat herders practising what Rowton calls 
enclosed nomadism94. Pastoralism is now thought to have been a form of agricultural 
specialization designed to exploit the diversity of environments rather than a primitive 
stage in the evolution of agriculture itself95.
Each nomadic community had a regular cycle of movement that varied in detail, 
but which generally remained the same from year to year. These cycles were regulated 
by the nature of the terrain and its seasons. Steppe nomads would chase the rains in the 
arid plains during the wet months and then, with the onset of the summer seasons, herd 
their animals along to the sedentary zones where there was still pasture, rivers and 
springs. Mountain nomads would take to the hills in the summer and then, with the 
onset of winter, descend from the mountains into the sedentary areas for shelter. In 
between these two extremes were pastoral zones that supported a rich mix of 
intermediate cycles, such as areas where rain catching mountain ranges would cut across 
steppe. All these nomadic cycles were enclosed in the sense that the annual odyssey 
involved regular periods of close economic and political contact with sedentary 
communities at certain times of the year.
Both parties had strong motives for wanting to cooperate and bargain with each 
other. The nomads wanted free access to shelter and water supplies and the right to
92 For example see: Cynthia Nelson (ed), The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider 
Society', A.M. Khazanov, Nomads and the outside world', M.Rowton (1973), 'Autonomy and 
nomadism in Western Asia', Orientalia, 42, p.247-258.
93 Harriet Crawford, op cit, p. 129-132. (In a paradigm example of scholarly prudence, Crawford 
cautions us not to overstate the value of anthropological analogies and draws our attention to 'the 
very tentative title given to this paper1.)
94 M. Rowton, (1974), 'Enclosed nomadism', Journal o f the Economic and Social History o f  the 
Orient, volume 17, part 1, p. 1-30.
95 Moorey, op cit, p.2.
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graze their flocks on stubble fields. They were also keen to obtain grain and vegetables 
to supplement their diet and would prefer to negotiate a peaceful passage through 
potentially hostile territory whenever possible. The sedentary communities were 
generally happy to let the nomads' sheep manure the fields when the crops were in, as 
long as they could negotiate agreements to prevent the ruination of fields in cultivation. 
They were also mildly interested in the supplementary meat and animal products the 
nomads had to offer, but what really got them excited was any exotic materials that the 
nomads might have been able to pick up on their travels. What tipped the balance for the 
nomads was the fact that sedentary demand for milk, meat and leather products was 
relatively elastic, owing to the fact that animal husbandry was just as feasible on the 
farm as it was upon open pasture. Demand for exotic material goods, however, was 
inelastic. Therefore a potential advantage for the nomads to exploit was their 
comparative mobility. Anything spotted on the annual cycle that was portable, easy to 
acquire at source but valuable at a distance would be picked up and transported by the 
nomads as handy bargaining chips to be used further down the road.
This scenario for the genesis of trade is supported by surveys which have shown 
that the oldest caravan roads tend to follow transhumant livestock paths across country, 
rather than what would have been easier natural valley routes96. The low volume of this 
trade needs to be emphasised. It was limited to what could be transported on the backs 
of humans. In other ways though it could be surprisingly sophisticated. The regularity of 
the nomadic cycle was capable of engendering such relations of trust between nomad 
and sedentary that in some cases villagers would place orders, offering credit in the 
form of goods such as grain or vegetables to pay for goods that would not be received 
until the following year. The nomads knew how to put this credit to work too, buying 
and selling on their journey to make cyclical profits of up to 200 per cent97. The 
nomadic cycle also involved regular contact with other nomadic groups in the steppes 
and mountains. Here the nomads would exchange bargaining chips with each other, thus 
pooling their global reach and increasing the diversity of goods traded. Over time these 
exchanges evolved into formal bazaars, traditionally held well away from the settled 
villages at certain times of the year98.
96 Harriet Crawford (1978), op cit, p.131.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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The overland trade and transport structure envisaged then for the neolithic is of 
an interlocking network of migratory cycles redistributing materials from far distant 
places: salt from the Dead Sea; shells and dyes from the Levant; obsidian from 
Anatolia; bitumen from the Zagros". Most of these goods were perishable and thus 
invisible to our archaeological record, but obsidian was the first major exception, 
leaving behind the indelible trace of an early source of secondary power. It was an 
important power source as far as the nomads were concerned, making quite a difference 
to the warmth of the reception they could expect to receive on their travels. But it was 
always a secondary source of power in the sense that demand for exotic materials was 
determined by sedentary developments in the realm of production, finance, security and 
knowledge. And we must always remember that the economy of neolithic settlement 
was relatively autarkic, living mostly upon resources close to hand.
Our archaeologists regretfully inform us that the shift from the Neolithic to 
Bronze Age trade did not begin with quite the same grace as one might expect from the 
theories of Smith and Ricardo. The major stimulus to the entrepreneurial activity of the 
nomads from the beginning of the fifth millennium was the gradual development of 
social stratification in the towns, particularly in Mesopotamia. This development 
furnished rich gods with human retinues who were hungry for exotica through which 
their authority could be expressed and reinforced. They did not want for food and they 
had no need for tools. Subsistence was already catered for, but power often feels naked 
without a steady supply of new clothes. What the gods, priests, landowners and kings 
desired were exotic things they could flaunt about the town to demonstrate both to self 
and other that they were sources of authority, refinement and distinction. To these gods 
and men nomads would come with small bags filled with pretty things such as lapis 
lazuli, turquoise and camelian. Then there were metal trinkets made from gold, silver, 
lead, copper and bronze. Then there were the sweet smelling carvings made out of 
cedar. Then the nomads also whetted appetites for other luxury portables made from 
pearls, shells, dyes, ivory and perfumes100. Bronze Age trade thus began as a source of 
symbolic power and wealth in the functional sense had nothing to do with it. Over time 
the trade structure became more sophisticated as more materials got added to the list of 
goods for exchange, and power more structured in the sense that the cities of 
Mesopotamia provided the largest source of effective demand.
"  Roaf, op cit, p.34 & 35.
100 Ibid..
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The next step came when effective demand for foreign materials became so 
keen in Mesopotamia that it outstripped existing supply. Supply was constrained by 
what the nomads could carry on their backs and by the number of hands the materials 
would have to pass through on the way to the delta. The temples started to finance city- 
state initiatives to foster improvements in supply. One scheme was to commission boats 
from the fishermen to help establish trading outposts on the upper tributaries of the 
Euphrates. By using the river traffic skills of the fishermen these trading posts could be 
placed closer to the supply source of a desired material. An early example of this is the 
site of Degirmentepe, near the modem town of Malatya, deep into eastern Anatolia on 
the upper Euphrates101. This initiative was sponsored by the Temple of Eridu during the 
fifth millennium BC, establishing a Ubaid enclave beyond the Taurus to tap into the 
local nomadic exchange networks in copper and silver. By utilizing the advantages of 
water transport the priests at Eridu hoped to import copper and silver in quantity. 
Having an outpost close to the source of supply also helped to cut out many middlemen. 
But to make the Degirmentepe project viable the temple had to commission a navy. The 
first navy was comprised of fishing boats, looking like oversized canoes, usually made 
out of reeds but sometimes wood, and propelled by paddles and poles102. There were 
sailors too, the earliest evidence of the use of sail to harness the energy of the wind has 
been found in a grave at Eridu. But sail was more useful in the Gulf as the use of sail 
was not frequently appropriate on either the Euphrates or the Tigris.
Another significant development in the structure of trade and transport was the 
domestication of the donkey at the beginning of the fourth millennium103. The 
domestication of the donkey made it feasible to carry more cargoes of greater bulk and 
weight over longer distances overland. Once the use of donkeys for transport had 
become common practice, and once demand had reached a certain level, certain 
elements within the nomadic community realised that a living could be made in long 
distance caravaning. The process of fragmentation from nomadic life would have been 
gradual. The first caravaneers would have been simply foraging for the good of their 
own kin, reliably returning to the nomadic bazaars on the mountains or steppe on a 
regular basis, from where the traditional sheep and goat nomads would then distribute
101 Joan Oates, Trade and power in the fifth and fourth millennia BC: new evidence from 
northern Mesopotamia', World Archaeology, Volume 24 No.3., p.408-411.
102 Lionel Casson, Ships And Seamanship In The Ancient World, p.23-29.
103 Roaf, op cit, p.36.
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the materials locally. But once word got round that there were was a trading enclave on 
a river nearby where people were offering a good deal, many caravaneers naturally felt 
tempted to work for the rich foreigners as well.
By 3200 BC there were at least fifty of these Sumerian enclaves situated along 
the upper reaches of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Along the Euphrates and the Tigris 
the Sumerians were able to bring all four primary sources of power to bear. First of all, 
they had the wealth in terms of an agricultural surplus to sustain long term adventures. 
Second, they had the credit systems in place to organize surplus wealth for certain 
projects. Thirdly, the institution of the lugal was already there to try to ensure that the 
outposts were secure. Fourthly, the Sumerians had developed a division of labour in the 
city that furnished crafts able to turn out large quantities of quality products for trade, 
such as in textiles, reeds and ceramics. Fifthly, they had city-gods blessed with an 
unrivalled ability to summon the collective will of thousands of human subjects to 
action. Lastly, the Sumerians were able to make these power sources count over long 
distances because of their ability to use the rivers for transport.
The agrarian barbarians who happened to be situated along the banks of the 
rivers were probably given offers that they simply could not refuse. They had precious 
little to fight with and yet neither could they run away, for their lives depended upon 
what had been sown in the ground. It was these communities that tended to find their 
villages being turned into enclave towns. Sumerian quarters of these enclaves were 
protected by walls, and it is around this time that we see the first seal impressions of 
conflict in Uruk, with Sumerian soldiers taking bound prisoners using spears and 
whips104. ’Bargain' would probably be a pretty word for some of the things that went on 
here, but it was never in the civilized interest to utterly crush those barbarians who were 
prepared to become supplicants and help the city-god achieve its foreign policy 
objectives. The deal was that the suppliant riverine community should produce food to 
help sustain the Sumerian personnel manning the outposts. In return they were left in 
peace. Perhaps they got a few goods in exchange. Maybe they would also gain some 
right to famine relief in the event of a bad harvest. After a while some of the suppliant 
communities began to thrive and prosper, by falling into niche positions within which 
they could make themselves useful. The most suppliant families within these suppliant 
communities formed into petty elites, quickly internalising the gods, mannerisms and
104 Joan Oates, op cit, p.411-112.
92
habits of their civilized masters. Suppliant communities were also a potential source of 
labour in areas where the extraction and processing of raw materials required its ready 
supply.
The pastoral barbarians, the ones who had chosen a nomadic way of life moving 
with the flocks and herds plus a little bit of trading thrown in, were in a much better 
position to bargain105. They too had precious little to fight with, but they could run 
away. Nomads have never been as footloose and fancy free as popular mythology has 
painted them, but their livelihood was certainly portable enough for them to be able to 
disappear into the mountains or steppes whenever they saw civilization coming. 
Consequently, their gods retained a degree of autonomy. Being river delta peoples, the 
Mesopotamians did not care much for mountains nor steppes. Another thing the 
nomadic barbarians had in their favour was their superior knowledge of foreign lands. 
In a world without geography the quickest route to the biggest deposits of material 
resources was to be found by people who had grown intimate with the lands which they 
had traversed for so long. Then there was the fact that the nomads were the ones who 
were skilled with donkeys, breeding and training them to carry heavy loads. They also 
knew how to drive caravans, with generations behind them gained in treading 
treacherous roads from one pasture to another. They also had diplomatic skills: they 
knew how to manage the delicate business of negotiating a passage through other 
people's land without drawing unwanted attention to themselves. Perhaps above all they 
knew the markets inside out. They were after all the very agents of the interlocking 
migratory trade network that had existed hitherto. They knew the routes. They knew the 
bazaars. They had the contacts. They commanded Sumerian respect.
They knew how to strike bargains too. The picture that emerged on the ground 
in Syria-Palestine and Anatolia toward 3200 BC was of Sumerian authority over the 
settlements along the Tigris and the Euphrates, combined with semi-nomadic authority
105 The division between the sedentary and the nomadic way of life needs to be carefully defined 
here. According to Khazanov, in Nomads And The Outside World, p.85-118, 'pure' nomadism as 
it is commonly understood today did not evolve much before the second millennium BC, when 
the domestication of the horse and the camel was consolidated. However, KhazanoVs definition 
of 'true' nomadism is a very exclusive one and his account of the genesis of pastoral nomadism is 
based on the assumption that right from the start of the Neolithic Age, many communities were 
plumping for a clear choice between a sedentary and a more mobile, pastoral means of existence. 
The use of the word nomadism in this thesis refers to the concept of ‘enclosed nomadism’ already 
explained above, assumes that some communities were able to keep a foot in both camps, and that 
others were able to switch from one to the other and back again, according to prevailing 
circumstances.
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in areas beyond the Tigris and the Euphrates. Let us explain the concept of 'semi- 
nomadic authority1. Away from the banks of the two rivers lay various chalcolithic 
communities variegated along the themes of sedentarism and nomadism. The Sumerian 
enclaves provided a stimulus to the caravan trade and thus upset the existing balance of 
power. Elements within the nomadic community suddenly found they were more 
powerful, both vis-a-vis fellow nomads and the sedentary groups. For one thing 
dividends from the caravan trade were so great that some caravaneers found that their 
wealth was too heavy to carry. Strongholds had to be built in the summer pasturages to 
keep it safe106. The chieftains thus became semi-nomadic. Their hearts would lie in their 
tents, but the bank balance lay in the temple. These temple strongholds were often 
placed next to the sites of bazaars that had been held from time immemorial. With these 
sedentary enclaves the chiefs acquired the ability to accumulate more wealth. And with 
this wealth the chiefs began to dominate business at the bazaars, hence accumulating 
further wealth. Eventually the opulence became so conspicuous that it began to arouse 
jealousies within the nomadic population. In time this led to the pillaging of caravans en 
route and the raiding of strongholds107. Nomadic chieftains began to sink their wealth 
into the building of security structures to protect their caravans and strongholds against 
their former kin.
With the caravan trade the nomadic elites could also accumulate authority over 
the local sedentary communities. The semi-nomadic chieftains were dealing with 
powerful clients from Mesopotamia now. They no longer needed to peddle petty 
bargaining chips to secure tolerance from the numerous highland and lowland villages. 
What they were more interested in now was tribute, regular supplies of agricultural 
produce to help finance the security of trade and transport. In return the sedentary 
community was left in peace. This turning of tables must have been difficult for many of 
the villagers to accept, and probably needed countless punitive expeditions. Some 
villages also had to be turned into citadels to provide the nuclei for manufacturing, 
administrative and military support. Of particular interest were those villages close to 
the sources of material supplies. It made sense for many chiefs to try to secure control 
over the production of materials from the mountains. To achieve all this many 
chiefdoms probably received advice and maybe even grants from the Sumerians. It was 
in the Sumerian interest to provide financial, military, organisational and technical
106 M.B. Rowton, (1973), 'Urban Autonomy In A Nomadic Environment', Journal o f  Near 
Eastern Studies, Volume 32, p.205 & 207-8.
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assistance to those groups who were most likely to be able to guarantee reliable supplies 
of the required materials. The priests even taught some of them how to use cuneiform.
Our hypothesis then, is that the Sumerian enclaves on the upper reaches of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris stimulated the development of a number of dimorphic 
chiefdoms in Syria-Palestine and Anatolia, based upon the secondary power sources of 
trade and transport108. The chiefdoms of Syria-Palestine tended to recruit its elites from 
the nomadic communities of the rolling plains and steppes. The chiefdoms of Anatolia 
tended to recruit its elites from the nomadic communities of the northern mountains and 
highland plateaus. They were dimorphic in the sense that nomadic and sedentaiy 
elements combined to create autonomous polities that secured the supply of materials 
for the trade to Mesopotamia. In return these polities received the wealth, financial 
acumen, military and technical aid required to help them provide the infrastructure 
which kept the supply lines open. The warlord tended to spend his time in the open 
country policing the roads which gave him his authority. But the tiny package of basic 
ingredients for the formation of secondary states he acquired in exchange for his 
services could not be carried with him. They had to be left behind in the fortified towns 
complete with surrounding fields, granaries, treasuries, barracks and workshops. These 
citadels were the protective husks which helped to seed the dissemination of tekhne 
throughout the West. In Syria-Palestine a good example would be Ebla, soon to become 
one of the most prosperous merchant towns in Syria109. In Anatolia the paradigm 
example would be Troy, a meaner looking place overlooking the crucial trade route 
across the Dardanelles. By about 3000 BC there was even a modest little citadel based 
on Anatolian antecedents as far away as Thessaly110.
(2.8) And then there was Egypt: ”Lo, the vile Asiatic!”111
According to Redford:
'One of the outstanding questions plaguing prehistorians of Egypt is
when did that fundamental change in human economy from food
107 Harriet Crawford, (1978), op cit, p. 132.
108 Rowton, (1973), op cit, 202-203.
109 Bermant & Weitzman, Ebla: An Archaeological Enigma, p. 153-169.
110 Macqueen, op cit, p. 17.
111 'Lo, the vile Asiatic!' is an Egyptian exclamation from the wisdom literature of Akhtoy III, 
quoted by D.B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, And Israel In Ancient Times, see chapter 4 & p.67.
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gathering to food production take place in northeast Africa? Was it an 
indigenous development, or were the primitive Nile dwellers 
beneficiaries of the importation of agriculture from outside? 112
On the one hand there is the 'out of Africa' argument. We know that there were early 
attempts with agriculture in the Nile valley at a time when cultivation was still unknown 
in the fertile crescent, about 12,000 BC113. Stone tools have been found above the 2nd 
Cataract with traces of 'sickle-gloss', and pollen analysis confirms the presence of wheat 
and barley. According to Grimal, these cultures bear 'many points of resemblence to 
that of neolithic cultures'114. We also know that the Sahara was not always the desert 
that it is now, and that it had 'wet and dry' periods. Research has uncovered some very 
early settlements in the Sahara, together with evidence of the emergence of cattle 
pastoralism. One theory is that when climate change dessicated the Sahara for the last 
time, many of its people were driven into the Nile valley where they intermingled with 
the hunter-gathering communities already there, bringing with them cattle, wheat, barley 
and flax115.
On the other hand there is an 'out of Asia' argument. This thesis builds upon the 
assumption that the optimum habitat for the domestication of wheat and barley, sheep, 
goats and cattle was the 'Mediterranean type woodlands of the Fertile Crescent116. The 
idea is that there was no great rainfall belt in North East Africa to sponsor the hundreds 
of agricultural experiments that were possible beneath the mountains of the fertile 
crescent, so that African agricultural experiments were only sporadic and received less 
sustained natural encouragement. Perhaps this can explain why the precocious 
discoveries above the Nile seem to fizzle out by the turn of the tenth millennium BC, 
just when the fertile crescent laboratories of Asia were getting down to work.
What about the dogs? The dog is our oldest friend, the mammal that joined 
forces with us way back in the Upper Palaeolithic, the animal who taught us how to 
domesticate nature and then bore witness to the domestication of ourselves117. Perhaps
112 Ibid, p.5.
113 Nicolas Grimal, A History o f Egypt, p.20-21.
l u Ibid.
115 Frank. J. Yurco, 'Black Athena: An Egyptological Review1, in Lefkowitz & MacLean-Rogers, 
Black Athena Revisited, p.66-67.
116 Redford, op cit, p.5.
117 James Serpell, 'From paragon to pariah: some reflections on human attitudes to dogs', in James 
Serpell (ed), The Domestic Dog: its evolution, behaviour and interactions with people, p.247.
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the Egyptian hound can give us an allegorical answer to Redford's second question. 
Most dogs from western Asia are generally thought to have descended from canis lupis, 
i.e. the wolf, producing canis familiaris11*. The Egyptian hound was a bit different, a 
rare cross breed between the wolf and the North African jackal, producing canis 
lupaster domesticus:
The dog's probable descent from the jackal is suggested by several 
factors: its distinctive red-gold colour, its capacity as a scavenger, and 
its very curious practice of 'calling'. This consists of the articulation of a 
sort of keening moan which the dog will sustain, varying it in pitch and 
tone and maintaining a dialogue with its interlocutor.'119
Dogs do tend to follow their owners around. Egyptian dogs were much like many other 
working dogs found across the Near East, but with a distinctive African component. We 
might say then that the Egyptian neolithic was the product of sustained dialogue 
between North Africa and Western Asia. This exchange was maintained by the nomadic 
tribes of people, dogs and other animals that wandered back and forth along the corridor 
of Sinai, from the fringes of the Nilotic plains to the Jordan, and by the constant 
migration of peoples travelling in the hope that the grass might be greener on the other 
side.
Farming villages only really get going along the floodplains of the Nile from 
about 5500 BC, maybe four centuries later than along the floodplains of 
Mesopotamia120. At this point the historiography of the Nile already begins to divide 
between Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt. Lower Egypt first supported encampments 
around the lake at the modem town of El Fayyum, living on the combined economy of 
cereals, hunting and fishing: a culture generally known as Tayyum A-B\ Rice reckons 
that the Fayyum were seasonal visitors, dwelling in tents made from animal skins121. A 
contemporary settlement has been found at Merimda on the western edge of the delta. 
Butzer compares this site to those of the Mesopotamian Ubaid culture and the earliest
118 Juliet Clutton-Brock, 'Origins of the dog: domestication and early history1, in James Serpell, 
ibid, p.8-9.
119 The breed left Egypt by sea at the end of the Pharaonic period, and then somehow became 
marooned on the Maltese island of Gozo until a 'small colony1 was discovered earlier this century. 
See Michael Rice, Egypt's Making: The Origins o f Ancient Egypt 5000 - 2000 BC, p.291-296.
120 Knapp, op cit, p.34-35 & Roaf, op cit, p.51. The Egyptian chronology plumped for here 
cleaves to the self-confidence of Frank J. Yurco, in Lefkowitz & MacLean Rogers, op cit, p.xix.
121 Michael Rice, op cit, p.29.
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layers of settlement at Eridu122. From here human habitation seems to spread and 
sedentarize. By 4000 BC there was a site at El Omari toward the south eastern edge of 
the delta. By 3500 BC settlement has moved deep inside the delta itself onto the islands 
or 'turtle backs', just like some of the earliest Mesopotamian layers at Ur, Uruk, Nippur 
and Lagash. Excavated sites in the Nile Delta so far include Buto, Sais and Mendes123. 
The apex of the delta also witnessed the settlement of Maadi, where large quantities of 
copper ore have been found124. There were probably many other settlements such as 
these in Lower Egypt which are now lost beneath the alluvium125. In addition to 
irrigated agriculture, these cultures made stone tools, weapons and vases. They also 
manufactured pottery. By at least 3500 BC they were also working copper.
Upper Egypt also sustained settlements from 5500 BC, practicing a mixed 
economy of grain cultivation, animal husbandry, hunting and fishing: the culture 
generally known as 'Badarian'. These settlements lay beside the series of flood basins 
that were strung along the floor of the Nile valley. Every year these basins would be 
replenished with silt and water by the reliable summer floods. As the floods receded the 
Badarians would sow the basins with grain for a winter harvest. Beyond the basins there 
was still enough rainfall through the sixth and fifth millennia to support the grazing of 
many domesticated animals, particularly along the wadis where accessory ground 
moisture was available126. The Badarians became excellent stockbreeders. They kept 
their cattle and continued to experiment with other native animals. And when they 
encountered Asiatic sheep and goats that were hardier and better suited to life in the 
valley, they took them and adopted them as their own127. For tools and weapons the 
Badarians relied on stone and woodwork. For containers they had very fine pottery. For 
trade the Badarians worked ivory into things like combs, and had just begun to 
experiment with the working of copper.
By 4500 BC this Badarian culture was successful enough to swim upstream and 
spawn the so-called Naqada I. During this phase the heavy reliance on hunting appears 
to diminish rapidly, and improved farming techniques lead to an increase in the density
122 K.W. Butzer, Thysical Conditions In Eastern Europe, Western Asia And Egypt Before The 
Period Of Agricultural Settlement', The Cambridge Ancient History, volume 1 part 1, p.60.
123 Redford, op cit, p. 15.
124 Rice, op cit.
125 K.W. Butzer, op cit, p.58. See also: Rice, op cit, p. 17 & 25.
126 Butzer, op cit, p.67.
127 Rice, op cit, p.27.
98
of population. The combination of hunting, pastoral resource depletion and incipient 
aridity had begun to thin out the local populations of rhino, elephant, giraffe and 
gazelle, but there was still enough savannah for the pastoralists to continue refining 
their stock of domestic animals. Meanwhile, back on the flood basin, emmer wheat was 
now grown and the living was easy enough for the dog to become a familiar part of the 
household128. River boats got made out of papyrus, first for fishing, then for river 
traffic. Ivory, stone and pottery work became more elaborate and sophisticated. Copper 
was shaped into pins and harpoon heads. In addition to copper, some Naqada people 
began to experiment with the properties of gold.
Gold seems to have upset the chalcolithic equilibrium in Egypt. Up until the 
onset of the Naqada II phase, 3800-3300 BC, Egyptian development seems to be 
travelling along a fairly smooth and autochtonous path. Judging from the cemeteries the 
greatest density of village settlement was in the Delta129. In the Egyptian Delta then, 
developments were analogous to what had already happened in Ubaid Mesopotamia. A 
major difference between the two civilizations, however, was the early Egyptian 
propensity to develop an Upper Egypt' all the way along the river valley up to the first 
cataract. In Mesopotamia the river plains above the delta lead to where the Euphrates, 
Tigris and Diyala converged. The floods here were violent, unpredictable and often 
disastrous. The flood basins were large and difficult to control130. Consequently, it took 
time for an Upper Mesopotamia1 to develop and when it did floods were always liable 
to throw things into reverse. Egypt, by contrast, had just one river with a long line of 
river valley flood basins flanked on both sides by dry savannah; with only wadis for 
tributaries that produced very marginal, seasonal quantities of water. The source waters 
from Ethiopia thus gave the Nile a summer flood profile that was relatively regular, 
gentle and predictable. Flood basins here were smaller and easier to manage, affording 
significant encouragement to farmers131. Consequently, and in contrast to Mesopotamia, 
an Upper Egypt did develop from the start, and these developments tended to be 
cumulative.
Agricultural production was organized upon a flood basin basis. Work in these 
flood basins thus tended to structure settlement into fairly well defined communal units
128 Ibid, p.30.
129 Butzer, op cit, p.69.
130 Ibid, p.60.
131 Knapp, op cit, p.32.
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which the Egyptians would eventually call nomes. In Lower Egypt these flood basin 
districts were naturally clustered together, forming a concentration of settlement that 
would have been favourable for third and fourth tier layers of urban development, 
especially at the apex of the Delta132. In Upper Egypt the flood basins were strung along 
the river like beads on a string, and so here the matrix of production and settlement was 
not quite so conducive to third and fourth tiers of urban growth. From this we may 
deduce that if the political economy of human settlement on the Nile had been left to 
itself, its society would have continued to grow at a constant rate in a smooth, linear 
fashion, with the productive power of Lower Egypt providing continuous 
encouragement for the structural hegemony of Lower Egypt over Upper Egypt.
But the political economy of the Nile was not left to itself; its society did not 
continue to grow at a constant rate in a smooth, linear fashion, and Lower Egypt does 
not appear to have secured hegemony over Upper Egypt:
'Egypt bounced overnight, as it were, out of the Stone Age and into 
urban culture. High-rises suddenly replaced mud huts; a civil service 
superseded the village elders. A new sophisticated focus for human 
organization filled the void where only chiefdoms had occasionally 
appeared: a king sat over Egypt'133
From 3800 BC, in southern Upper Egypt, certain centres started to outstrip others in size 
and importance. All centres were situated in places where control over a manageable 
floodplain was possible. Larger centres were situated in places that were also next to 
wadis where the community found supportive conditions for the development of a 
nomadic sector with cattle, sheep and goats. Still larger growth centres were the ones 
that lay at the mouth of a wadis that led to a caravan trail. Abydos, for example, lay at 
the mouth of a wadi leading to the western oasis of Dakhleh. Hierakonpolis grew at the 
mouth of two wadis, one leading west to the oases routes across the Sahara, and one 
leading east into the Red Sea Hills. Naqada lay opposite the western end of the wadi 
Hammamat. This wadi was destined to become a well worn route through the hills to the 
Red Sea134.
132 See Nissan's typology of settlement systems, op cit, p.41.
133 Redford, op cit, p.3.
134 Ibid, p. 14.
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That the enclosed nomads of Egypt had an interlocking network of exchange 
links with the lands beyond Sinai is suggested by the fact that their sheep and goats 
were of south western Asiatic strains. That is probably how tiny amounts of ivory and 
gold from Upper Egypt first found their way into Mesopotamia. Ivory products would 
have been highly prized, but with Nubian gold the Upper Egyptians unleashed an 
appetite that appears to have galvanized the ancient world political economy.
Once the first gold items percolated their way into the towns of Sumer they 
prompted an eager source of demand. It was around this time that the Egyptian Naqada 
II & HI acquired the name of 'gold town'135. How the trade manifested itself is a matter 
of debate. Rice itemizes three possible trade routes: one by sea from the Persian Gulf to 
the Red Sea around the Arabian coast; another by land across the Arabian peninsula; 
and a third up north towards Syria and then down to Mesopotamia via the Euphrates136.
The first two suggestions are feasible. Evidence is accumulating to suggest that 
the Gulf and the Red Sea were the nursery slopes of mercantile trade. There were 
stopping places and potential intermediaries at Bahrain, Oman, and the mysterious 'land 
of Punt'. The Red Sea also happens to be the scene for the first known tale of a 
shipwrecked sailor marooned upon a desert island137. We also know that the Arabian 
peninsula was not as arid as it is today, so there may have been an oasis route similar to 
ones we already know about traversing the Sahara. Sadly, however, Arabian 
archaeology is still in its infancy138. The Arabian contribution to the political economy 
of the ancient Near East has to remain a disturbing source of aporia as far as this case 
study is concerned.
The third suggestion of trade between Mesopotamia and Egypt via the 
dimorphic chiefdoms of Syria-Palestine is the safest line for intuitive reasoning, having 
a longer tradition of scholarship behind it that has survived a respectable length of time
135 Redford, op cit, p. 19.
136 Rice, op cit, p.40-47.
137 'The Shipwrecked Sailor, or the Isle of the Serpent', translation by Joseph Kaster in The 
Wisdom O f Ancient Egypt, p.282-287.
138 In the first volume of The Cambridge Ancient History, published in 1970, Arabia hardly gets a 
mention. Some exciting work has been done since then, but it is still too fresh to the discipline of 
Archaeology for a mere eavesdropper to be able to absorb and assess. For an extensive 
bibliography see Michael Rice, The Search For The Paradise Land.
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for critical appraisal139. We know that neolithic sea shells found their way up to 
Palestine from the Red Sea, and that obsidian found its way down to Palestine from 
Anatolia140. Palestine has also traditionally been seen as a potential source of salt. On 
the western coast of the Red Sea there was a Naqada I village with Badarian graves near 
the modem port of Quseir141. From here small boats might have taken the sea route up 
the Gulf of Aqaba; here goods would be exchanged for those from the Jordan valley 
where settlements like Jericho, Beth-Shan and Beth Yerah were experiencing an 
increase in size and density of population142. Alternatively some goods might have 
taken a coastal route up to the Gulf of Suez, and from there overland along the 
Mediterranean coast toward the Lebanon. Along this trail goods could stop off at new 
settlements like Laschish and Megiddo. Then there was the possibility of a river and sea 
route that bypassed Palestine altogether, though it is likely that this sea route only got 
going towards the end of the fourth millennium143. The Nile was navigable from the 
first cataract to the delta. From here boats could hug the Levantine coast until they hit 
ports like Byblos and Ugarit, from there overland to Carchemish or Ebla, next to 
Habuba Kabira, and then down the Euphrates to Sumer144.
Why was it necessary for so many merchants to tread a tortuous route through 
200 kilometres of mountainous terrain when all they had to do was to float their goods 
down the Nile to the Delta? Perhaps there was a degree of rivalry between Lower and 
Upper Egypt even then. Perhaps the string of settlements downstream expected to be 
paid prohibitive tariffs for safe passage along their stretch of the river, making the 
overland route a necessary bypass. Whatever the reason, by the Naqada II phase there 
were several Badarian villages on the Red Sea coast. Behind them in the hills lay the 
wadi Hammamat. To find the wadi Hammamat on a modem atlas you look for the 
natural chink in the mountains between the town of Qena and the port of Quseir. The 
people of Naqada II thought that boats were important enough to them to make pictures
139 William Ward, (1963), ’Egypt and the East Mediterranean from Predynastic Times to the End 
of the Old Kingdom', Journal O f The Economic And Social History O f The Orient, volume 6, p.l- 
57. William Ward, (1964), 'Relations Between Egypt And Mesopotamia From Prehistoric Times 
To The End Of The Middle Kingdom', Journal O f The Economic And Social History O f The 
Orient, volume 7, p.1-45 & p.121-135. Also: Redford, op cit, p.19-24.
140 Amnon Ben-Tor, (1986), 'The Trade Relations Of Palestine In The Early Bronze Age', 
Journal o f  the Economic and Social History o f the Orient, volume 29, p.3.
141 Ward, (1964), op cit, p.29.
142 Ibid, p.6.
143 Casson, op cit.
144 Roaf, op cit, p.79.
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of them on rocks, on pottery and in paintings. At the same time lapis lazuli beads were 
placed in Naqada II graves. The appearance of lapis lazuli is significant because of their 
origin. The only two known sources for them are Badakhshan in north-east Afghanistan 
and Quetta in Pakistan. Large numbers of them found their way to Mesopotamia where 
the Sumerians used them as status items. Then they start to turn up in Upper Egypt:
'Lapis appears in Egypt dated to the early Naqada II period, late in the 
fourth millennium, often in association with foreign, specifically 
Mesopotamian elements. It is often found in context with gold or gold 
mounted objects and generally and not altogether surprisingly seems to 
be identified with richer burials, suggesting that its acquisition was a 
perquisite of the developing elites in the communities which were 
beginning to assume a formal, hierarchic status in the valley.'145
In other words Egypt had become linked up to a trade network of considerable reach. A 
steady trickle of merchants began to arrive at the villages of Upper Egypt eager to do 
business. The local leaders who had secured control over access to the gold supplies on 
behalf of their community suddenly found that they were wealthy. Some of this wealth 
was invested back into those villages destined to become major central place trading 
towns, where local elites and foreign merchants would meet to conduct business.
During the Naqada II phase two major towns emerged in Upper Egypt, Naqada 
and Hierakonpolis. But during the Naqada HI phase, about 3300-3100 BC, 
Hierakonpolis appears to emerge as the dominant player. A temple was built there based 
upon Mesopotamian design with a tell-tale walled oval enclosure, possibly with 
Sumerian assistance146. As with Sumer, the Egyptian temple became a centre for the 
genesis of complexity through the development of a production structure, a financial 
structure, a security structure and a knowledge structure. Within the walls there are 
indicators of the appropriation and redistribution of an agricultural surplus, an 
accounting system, a standing army and a priesthood. Under the aegis of the local god a 
new altar was opened up for international trade. Curiously, the Naqada HI merchants 
have a specialist god to accompany him on his journey147.
The wealth from the gold trade attracted not only merchants bearing precious 
foreign goods but also craftsmen who brought with them skills that had already been 
pioneered in Asia. Crucial advances in hydraulic engineering appear to have been
145 Rice, op cit, p. 89.
146 Ibid, p.90-91.
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absorbed by Egypt at this time148. New pottery forms with no antecedents in the Nile 
valley began to supplement the local styles149. The craft of the coppersmith became 
more widespread and advanced dramatically in technique150. This in turn had a knock 
on effect in terms of the Egyptian ability to work stone. Mud brick architecture was 
used in ways that had antecedents from Mesopotamia151. At Hierakonpolis brick and 
stone was used to build city walls and the grand city gate. Tools of central 
administration began to make an appearance too. Cylinder seals inspired by 
Mesopotamian manufacture began to arrive in Egypt from about 3500 BC, and soon 
became adapted for local use152. By 3100 BC the Egyptians had adopted the Sumerian 
concept of writing and taken it to a new level of sophistication153. In short, much of the 
fourth millennium appears to have been a period of Egyptian openess and deference 
towards the Asian world, during which it absorbed many of the skills on offer and 
adapted them for its own needs.
Trade contacts with the outside world during Naqada II and particularly Naqada 
HI appear to coincide with prolonged bouts of conflict in Egypt. There is not enough 
evidence to say much for certain, but a plausible case can be made to suggest that there 
was a positive correlation between the two154. Some of the most impressive 
fortifications found so far were built to protect those settlements that were most 
involved with early trade. Hierakonpolis in particular was defended by a defensive wall 
9.5 metres thick in places with a monumental gateway designed to baffle raiders155. We 
may deduce that the wealth brought by trade excited the predatory instincts of gods who 
fancied they stood a chance of seizing it by force. When these threats became more 
persistant Egypt witnessed the rise of kings. But the interesting thing about these 
predynastic conflicts and the security structure that grew out of them was Egypt's
147 Ibid.
148 Baumgartel, 'Predynastic Egypt', in The Cambridge Ancient History, volume 1 part 1, p.481- 
483.
149 Redford, op cit, p. 17. Ward, (1964), op cit, p.6-8.
150 Redford, ibid.
151 Redford, ibid. Ward (1964), op cit, p.19-27.
152 Roaf, op cit, p.73.
153 Florian Coulmas, The Writing Systems o f the World, p.59-61.
154 An alternative model based on a 'dessication hypothesis' is summarized by Amelie Kuhrt, op 
cit, p. 132-135. However, if we cross-reference this with Nissan's hypothesis for Sumer we may 
deduce that dessication may help account for the acceleration of indigenous human conflict, but 
cannot explain why certain groups from upper Egypt were so much more successful in that 
conflict than others. Contacts with Aisa provide that extra explanatory dimension.
155 Rice, op cit, p.86 & plate 39.
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propensity for political unification which, as we have observed, is a striking contrast to 
the particularism of Sumer. One explanation could be environmental. Once 
Hierakonpolis had secured a hegemony over the towns of Abydos and Naqada for 
example, this hegemony remained undisturbed by the relatively controlled flood cycle 
enjoyed by the Egyptians. The main channel of the Nile remained the same over the 
millennia, offering the Egyptian settlement patterns a political stability that was not 
possible in Mesopotamia.
A second possible explanation for the early Egyptian propensity for unification 
is that trade contacts during the fourth milliennium stimulated power imbalances in the 
regional politics of Egypt, whilst at the same time stimulating a profound sense of 
insecurity vis-a-vis the outside world. Trade furnished regional elites within Egypt with 
the wealth to finance military and technological developments that made it feasible for 
them to assert sovereignty over other less fortunate elites along the Nile valley. At the 
same time trade sponsored a sense of vulnerability to social forces beyond the Nile 
valley. Given what we know about the many transfers of tekhne from Mesopotamia, we 
may surmise that early Egyptians would have been aware of their 'second comer' status. 
Syrian, Palestinian or even Mesopotamian merchants may have returned home with 
tales of Egyptian gold combined with information on the relative naivety of the 
Egyptian defences compared to the great cities of Sumer. Certainly there are artefacts 
like the Jebel el Arak knife which suggest that some expeditions from Asia were 
becoming less like trade missions and more like raids for loot and tribute156. We also 
know that the predatory raid for booty as a means of accumulation was already a factor 
in the international relations of the Near East157. What is envisaged here is that an 
Egyptian elite managed to defeat potential rivals from within the Nile valley, then began 
to use its sovereignty over the Nile from the Delta to the first cataract to anticipate the 
threat of predatory raids sponsored by the dimorphic chiefdoms of Syria-Palestine, and 
then secure state monopoly over the mines of Egypt, Nubia and Sinai.
According to Egyptian legend, the man who claimed the credit for the first 
attempt to unify the kingdoms of upper and lower Egypt under the control of one 
sovereign was Menes-Narmer, the first Pharaoh of the first dynasty from about 3100
156 Rice, op cit, p.l 14.
157 Christopher Edens & Philip Kohl, 'Trade and World Systems in Early Bronze Age Western 
Asia', in Trade and Exchange in Prehistoric Europe, edited by Scarre & Healy, p.29-30.
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BC, initiating the 'Archaic Era'158. If 'Namier's palette' is anything to go by violence was 
a key ingredient159. On one side Menes is shown wearing the white crown of upper 
Egypt, about to strike a kneeling enemy of lower Egypt with a mace. Menes has 
assumed his monopoly over the use of force. Behind him is his son bearing the king's 
sandals, the loyal heir apparent. The new dynasty is built to last! Beneath this two more 
enemies are in flight. On the reverse side Menes is wearing the red crown of lower 
Egypt, still carrying his mace. He looks on serenely at the headless corpses of the kings 
he has defeated. Standard bearers hold heralds aloft to signify the sovereignty Menes 
now enjoys over all the communities in the land. In the background is a high prowed- 
ship, the mode of transport and communication upon which his hegemony over the Nile 
relies. Beneath this there is a bull tearing down the fortifications of a city, and yet 
another enemy flees in terror.
It seems sheer force was not enough to secure the legitimacy of the Egyptian 
state over the long term. Menes instigated a policy of conciliation with the north in 
order to consolidate his rule160. The sovereignty of the god-king was unstable in the 
delta whilst he simply remained a symbol of Upper Egyptian conquest. He tried to make 
his regime more palatable by marrying a northern princess whose royal name was 
changed to Neithhotep ('may Neith be appeased'); Neith being the deity of Sais in the 
Delta. By producing heirs of mixed descent and turning his dynasty into a product of 
both cultures the god-king internalised its conflicts and cultivated an image as a force 
for consonance. This consonance was called maat, logographed by the priests as a naked 
adolescent goddess with a feather in her hair, whose beauty emanated from the mouth of 
the hegemon161:
'Usually translated as truth, justice, order, balance, or righteousness, 
maat is more accurately characterized as a cosmic or divine force for 
harmony or stability, dating back to the beginnings of time.'162
We know that this goddess was invented very early on in Egyptian history because her 
name is compounded in the names of some of the first queens. Maat was the security
158 Modem pre-historiography tends to see the unification as a prolonged affair, which Egyptian 
legend subsequently telescoped into the heroic figure of Menes.
159 Rice, op cit, p. 107-112 &p.l57.
160 Grimal, op cit, p.49.
161 Rice, op cit, p.57. Frankfort (et al), op cit, p. 14, 82, 84, 88,105,108-9, 369 & 375.
162 Knapp, op cit, p.103.
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dividend that the king’s subjects enjoyed through the sovereignty of his divine voice, the 
deliverance from conflict wrought by his unification of the two lands.
In Egypt the king was not just an agent of the gods, as in Mesopotamia, he was 
a god himself. The divinity of the Pharaoh may be another indicator of the relative 
insecurity of Egypt vis-a-vis the outside world. Given that the Egyptian creator god was 
sensitive to his vulnerability to foreign predator gods at a very early stage in his 
development, the Egyptian priesthood was unable to cultivate the same formative 
independence from the king that the Sumerian temple had enjoyed. In other words, the 
theocracy of Egyptian civilization was bom with a club in one hand.
Being in control of the treasury, the pharaoh was able to finance public works. 
Menes was one of the first in a long line of god-kings depicted ritually cutting canals 
and building dykes before rejoicing subjects. The Egyptian tradition of using the tekhne 
of hydraulic engineering to help legitimate the authority of the god-king begins around 
the time of Menes, who is supposed to have diverted the course of the Nile to found his 
capital city of Memphis. The site of Memphis was chosen deliberately on the margin 
between upper and lower Egypt. It was both a symbolic and strategic site from which 
the god-kings consolidated the unification of the two lands. Memphis was a good place 
from which to despatch troops into lower Egypt, request reinforcements from upper 
Egypt or, if necessary, beat a hasty retreat into upper Egypt.
In the longer term there was also a political dimension. Memphis was the 
appropriate place from which a Pharaoh could distance himself slightly from his 
southern origins and make concessions to the north. Being so close to the delta he could 
observe its culture, adopt some of its mannerisms, patronise a few of its gods. Memphis 
was well placed to nurture a metropolitan culture that could act as a buffer between the 
two lands. Menes dedicated the temple of this new capital city to Ptah, previously a 
minor local deity, now promoted to the position of supreme creator-god, the 'craftsman 
who makes all other gods', patron deity of Egyptian tekhne163. Here Menes was able to 
sponsor the development of the crafts to such an extent that the craftsmen began to lose 
their Mesopotamian accents164. No longer did the state have to rely on attracting foreign
163 I.E.S. Edwards, 'The Early Dynastic Period In Egypt', The Cambridge Ancient History volume 
I part 2, p.53.
164 Rice, op cit, p. 192.
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knowledge from abroad. It had a thriving centre of workshops and schools producing 
craftsmen and priest-scribes of its own.
Menes initiated the foreign policy that slowly became more ambitious 
throughout the Archaic age. One objective was to secure hegemony over the mineral 
resources that lay just beyond the borders and then to protect this hegemony from 
foreign incursion165. The first expeditions were to Nubia, where most of the gold mines 
were located166. During the Naqada era the Nubian chiefs appear to have grown quite 
powerful. Burial sites contain symbolic objects of wealth, knowledge and military 
power that appear to match contemporary sites in Egypt. After the unification of Egypt, 
however, these potential rivals were eliminated167. Then the Egyptians began to turn 
their attention to the resources of copper and turquoise in the Sinai168. Before Egyptian 
unification the resources of Sinai appear to have been open to elements from within 
Palestine But in the annals of the reigns of the successors of Menes the priests begin to 
make entries such as 'smiting the Asiatics', or 'first occasion of smiting the east' as the 
key events by which to commemorate the year169. Artistic motifs begin to incorporate 
shaggy-haired kilted foreigners with arms manacled, or as cowering figures about to be 
struck down by the confident profile of the Egyptian god-king, accompanied with 
captions like: 'lo, the vile Asiatic'.
(2.9.) The Meditteranean Rim: The 'Upper Sea' and the 'Great Green'
The 'ship of state' is not just a metaphor for poets and philosophers. It contains 
an image of the state which is well grounded in historical fact. Shipbuilding came with 
state building. As we have noted, the first shipwrights made boats for river traffic on the 
Tigris and the Euphrates. The earliest evidence of the use of sails to harness the energy 
of the wind has been found in a grave at Eridu, dated about 4000 BC. The Persian Gulf 
was friendly enough to tempt some of these boats out to sea. The earliest shipwrecks 
would have happened here, where there were plenty of islands waiting for the first 
castaways. Eventually some of these islands became important stepping stones to Oman, 
which became an important source of Mesopotamian copper. We have also touched on
165 Grimal, op cit, p.27.
166 Lucas, Ancient Egyptian Materials And Industries, p.257.
167 Rice, op cit, p. 136-7.
168 Lucas, op cit, p.231-5.
169 Redford, op cit, p.33.
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the probable importance of the ship in the development of Upper Egypt through its 
contacts with Asia via the Red Sea. The importance of river transport along the Nile for 
the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt in the formation of the first nation state has 
been rather taken as given, but was briefly alluded to in our discussion of the Narmer 
Palette.
One thing that we have not noted so far is the advantage of sea transport over 
land transport in the ancient world. The Mesopotamian caravan routes into Anatolia and 
Syria-Palestine were fine when civilized trade was only just getting going, but when it 
came to bulk and weight over long distance the most efficient way of transporting goods 
was over water. The Mediterranean is the largest inland sea on earth, offering the 
communities living around it a large natural transport medium together with easy access 
to shelter from relatively benign storms170. By the beginning of the third millennium, 
whilst Egyptian unification was being consolidated, the combined skills of the 
shipwright and the seaman had matured sufficiently to make it feasible to exploit this 
advantage and accelerate the dissemination of tekhne along the strandlines of Europe.
It is important to stress that Near Eastern mercantile activity in the 
Mediterranean did not develop in a vacuum. It was built upon an already existing 
network of seaborne exchange relations stretching far back into the neolithic. In a sense, 
coastline communities were the pioneers of international relations because their 
existential circumstances anticipated the paradox of cultural isolation combined with the 
need for interaction. In the island clusters of the Cyclades, for example, where tiny 
farming communities were scattered in low densities across a semi-arid archipelago, 
total autarky was never an option. Things like exogamy and aid in adversity were 
essential for survival. But seaborne neolithic exchange was not necessarily important 
just for the value of the goods in themselves171. Sometimes the goods exchanged were 
simply marble tokens. What was equally important was the mutual recognition of the 
need to keep in touch, rather like the exchange of Christmas cards. Neolithic exchange 
in the Mediterranean was often not so much for the goods in themselves but for the 
invisible baggage of news, information and the stimulation of new ideas that came with 
them. This is why neolithic Crete and the Cyclades display cultural artefacts resonant
170 Relative to the great oceans. The Mediterranean was no millpond and still has to be treated 
with respect by sailors today.
171 Cyprian Broodbank, 'Ulysses without sails: trade, distance, knowledge and power in the early 
Cyclades', World Archaeology, Volume 24 No.3.
109
with mainland Greece and Anatolia. They were neither closed to, nor dependant upon 
the surrounding world. They were simply connected. So when Egyptian ships began to 
skirt the Levantine coast, or when Syrio-Palestinian ships hugged the coast around 
Anatolia heading toward the Dodecanese, these expeditions would not have been 
completely blind. They would have set off with a pretty clear idea of what they were 
looking for and where they were going. There was a subtle interplay between 
autochtonous and diffusionist forces. Long distance navigation by the foreign ship 
would have depended upon the captain’s ability to tap the resources of local knowledge 
accumulated through the interconnecting network of shorter journeys that had been 
pioneered with the paddle and the canoe.
Trading networks there were already, but Near Eastern civilization did initiate a 
qualitative and quantitative shift in the nature of production for exchange in the 
Mediterranean from about 3000 BC. The theocratic elites of Sumer and Egypt were not 
particularly interested in keeping in touch. What they wanted was luxury goods to 
buttress the authority of the god-king and his state apparatus. It is possible that the first 
attempts to use the Mediterranean to this end were based at the Syrian site of Ugarit, 
sponsored by the appetites of Sumer172. Here was the coastal village on the 
Mediterranean that lay nearest to the Euphrates, offering a sea bypass around the 
Amanus to the 'silver mountains' of Anatolia. Later in history, Ugarit often seems to act 
as a nexus within an Anatolia-Syria-Mesopotamia axis, cousin rather than sibling to the 
Canaanite ports of Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre.
The first unchallengable historical records of mercantile activity in the 
Mediterranean, however, are between Egypt and Byblos. Byblos was a neolithic coastal 
village with a natural harbour that happened to be situated at the foot of the Lebanon. 
Being perched upon alluvial floodplains and flanked mainly by savannah and desert, 
Egypt was not rich in timber173. This had never bothered traditional Egyptian 
settlements much. For making things like boats and shelter they traditionally relied on 
their ingenuity with indigenous materials like papyrus. With the growth of cities like 
Hierakonpolis and Memphis, however, and for the palatial tombs necessary for their 
attendant elites, the appetite for timber as a superior construction material became more 
persistant. The foothills of the Lebanon above Byblos were rich in wood, particularly
172 Max Mallowan, 'The Development Of Cities From Al-Ubaid To The End Of Uruk 5', in The 
Cambridge Ancient History, volume 1 part 1, p.418-20.
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cedar, which only grew in a few patches along the coastal mountains round the 
Mediterranean. Byblian cedar has been found in the 1st Dynasty tombs of Egypt. Early 
Egyptian annals such as the Palermo Stone mention 'Byblos boats', meaning vessels 
seaworthy enough to navigate the Mediterranean. They also mention cedar oil and resin, 
which has been found in the bandages that were used to bind the bodies of their 
mummified kings174.
It was certainly possible to carry timber overland. The legends of Gilgamesh of 
Uruk mention his expeditions to the cedar mountains of Lebanon for timber earlier in 
the fourth millennium, and he would have had no choice in the matter175. But timber 
does have bulk and weight, which would have given the Egyptians an incentive to 
exploit the advantages of sea transport. The first 'Byblos boats' were made from 
papyrus, slightly adapted from those used to navigate the Nile, but after a while the 
Egyptians began to perceive the advantages of using the very timber they intended to 
import176. Under Sneferu of the fourth dynasty, around 2600 BC, an Egyptian text 
records the arrival of 'forty ships from Byblos laden with cedars', out of which the 
Pharaoh had three ships made. With the remaining offcuts the carpenters made doors for 
the royal treasury177.
To begin with the local people around Byblos were probably just an essential 
source of labour in the forests were the trees had to be felled and then taken down to the 
shore. Later they appear to have been recruited to man the ships that brought the cedar 
to Egypt. A scene from the pyramid temple of Sahure (2500 BC) portrays a wooden 
boat manned by a crew who are all drawn in the fashion of the classic Egyptian 
stereotype of the Asiatic. But these stereotypes assume rather uncharacteristic postures. 
No longer are they cowering figures being smitten by Egyptian god-kings. Instead they 
adopt postures of obedience and suppliance. The caption above reads: Hail to thee, O 
Sahure, god of the living! May we behold thy beauty!'178. By supplying the Egyptian 
theocracy the people from the valley of cedars acquired an early presence in the 
development of seafaring skills along the Levantine coast. It also made sense for the 
Egyptians to encourage a shipbuilding capacity to be located next to the source of the
173 Lucas, op cit, p.488.
174 Gerhard Herm, The Phoenicians, p.35.
175 Redford, op cit, p.38.
176 Lionel Casson, Ships and Seafaring in the Ancient World.
177 Herm, op cit, p.34. & Donald Harden, The Phoenicians, p.40.
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new material so that the timber did not have to be transported all the way to Memphis. 
The people of the valley of cedars thus also became excellent shipwrights179.
Byblos highlights the differential nature of Egyptian foreign policy as it 
matured towards the peak of the Old Kingdom. The once proud kingdoms of Nubia to 
the south were now merely part of Egypt’s backyard, important for tribute in the form of 
gold with a periodic rebellion that would be crushed. The Libyans to the west could 
sometimes be a nuisance, but would be brushed off without much effort and possessed 
little that was worth stealing. Meanwhile, the Asiatics to the immediate east had to 
endure sustained Egyptian campaigns of military aggression. Most likely they were 
simply close enough to be a potential threat to the security of the Delta and were 
reluctant to accept the Egyptian claims of monopoly over the mines of the Sinai. 
Perhaps there was also rivalry over their ability to control what were once crucial 
overland trade routes along the Levantine coast and up the Jordan. Anyway, once the 
sea route to Byblos starts to take off toward the end of the second dynasty, trade 
overland through southern Palestine goes into a steady decline. Egyptian epitaphs on the 
question of Asian smiting become noticeably more bombastic. Many towns are 
destroyed and abandoned and the place seems to become a pioneer in the political 
economy of underdevelopment180. Old Kingdom foreign policy toward the Asiatics of 
Byblos appears to have been rather different. It may be summed up as the strategy of 
'creating a sphere of influence by setting up ties of mutual obligation'181. In practice this 
meant the regular despatch of embassies laden with gifts both for the god and the chief 
of the target area, whereupon the emissary would invite the local chief to reciprocate by 
offering the Egyptian god-king supplies of the required material, as is intimated in the 
tale of The Shipwrecked Sailor182.
This foreign policy appears to have been highly successful. Most monarchs of 
the Old Kingdom are represented in the Egyptian gifts found at Byblos. The Egyptians 
got their timber and the elite of Byblos changed. They began to wear Egyptian dress and 
adorn themselves with Egyptian jewels183. It was in the interest of the Egyptian god- 
king to help the local elite develop its local power base and thus provide them with both
178 Redford, op cit, p.52.
179 Ibid, p.40.
180 Amnon Ben-Tor, op cit, p.18-20. Also Redford, op cit, p.33-37.
181 Redford, op cit, p.40.
182 Kaster, op cit, p.285.
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the motive and the ability to ensure reliable supplies. Soon Byblos had its own temple 
constructed using masonry techniques derived from Egypt184. To protect this elevation 
the town was enclosed by walls, and the Egyptian records begin to speak of 'fortress 
Byblos'185. Simultaneously, Byblos also acquired the use hieroglyphic script that the 
Egyptians had brought with them. By 2300 BC Byblos was not just a source of timber, it 
was also an important Egyptian doorway to the east, which the Egyptians called Qedem. 
About 200km north of Byblos by sea lay the port of Ugarit, offering further contacts 
with Anatolia as well as with the overland routes to Ebla, Carchemish and Emar on the 
Euphrates. Eastwards from Byblos over the Lebanon lay the stepping stone towns of 
Damascus and Qadesh, a blistering 400km away from Mari. With the development of 
shipbuilding and seafaring skills there were also opportunities to the west. About 200 
km west there was the island of Cyprus, soon to become a handy source of copper. From 
Cyprus one could hug the southern coast of Anatolia to the Aegean. Here Egypto- 
Palestinian embassies could choose to disburse their gifts along the coast of western 
Anatolia, Crete, the Cyclades or indeed the Greek mainland. Byblos became so useful 
that it found a place in Egyptian mythology and the Byblian goddess Baalat began to 
merge with the Egyptian goddess Hathor.
The only trouble with being rich in a place like Syria-Palestine was that it was a 
dangerous place to flash the cash, especially when your only guardian is about to go 
through a major internal crisis which will bring about the end of the Old Kingdom and 
take Egypt into the First Intermediate Period, 2234-2040 BC. Joseph Kastar summarizes 
the First Intermediate thus:
'we find that the strong central authority of the king that obtained during 
the Old Kingdom breaks down completely, and Egypt resolves itself into 
its constituent districts or provinces, called nomes, with the power 
wielded by the various nome chiefs, each the authority in his own petty 
domain. We have lists of royal names of the Seventh to Eleventh 
dynasties, but these kings are shadowy figures with, apparently, merely 
nominal rule.'186
Redford cautions that paucity of evidence makes it the 'height of sophomoric hubris' to 
imagine that we can find causes for the decline of the Old Kingdom187. Then he draws
183 Herm, op cit, p.35.
184 Redford, op cit.
185 Ibid, p.43.
186 Joseph Kaster, op cit, p.26.
187 Redford, op cit, p.59-63.
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our attention to three important trends. Firstly, central government begins to suffer from 
a progressive shrinkage of the tax base. For some obscure reason lost beneath the debris, 
the Egyptian state suddenly feels compelled to give away so many tax breaks that it can 
no longer afford to finance anything. Secondly, there is a general loss of respect for 
central authority which appears to have discredited itself in some way, and powers 
become devolved to the regions. Thirdly, the Egyptian tradition of maat begins to break 
down. Rich manorial families in the provinces feather their tombs whilst famine stalks 
the land and the crime rate soars188. As the pillars of theocratic government in Memphis 
fall into terminal crisis the national frontiers cease to be policed, and Egyptian texts 
begin to complain of ’Asiatic' incursions. In short, during the First Intermediate Period 
Egypt was hardly in a position to formulate domestic policy, let alone pursue a foreign 
policy. The god of Byblos was on her own.
Sometime between 2300 and 2100 BC Byblos was sacked, and the temple of 
Baalat-Hathor was destroyed by force and burnt189. One theory holds that the key 
agents of this destruction were impoverished marauders from Southern Palestine who 
had been the chief victims of Egyptian 'Asiatic' campaigns of the Old Kingdom, but 
there were plenty of other potential marauders around at the time. Being so well
connected by trade routes Byblos had became embroiled in the political economy of the
Near East as a whole and it had become part of the buffer zone caught between 
Mesopotamia and Egypt. In Mesopotamia the Sumerian age of anarchical city states was 
already drawing to a close. Urukagina, the desperate legal reformer of Lagash, had been 
stamped out by Lugalzaggisi the ensi of Umma190. Lugalzaggisi then proceeded to try to 
extinguish the Sumerian tradition of particularism. Official records in Nippur put it like 
this:
'Enlil gave to Lugalzaggisi the kingship of the nation, ...put all the lands 
at his feet, and from east to west made them subject to him; then from 
the Lower Sea along the Tigris and Euphrates to the Upper Sea, he put 
their routes in good order for him. From east to west, Enlil permitted 
him no rival; under him the lands rested contentedly.'191
188 See The Admonitions of Ipuwer', in Kastar, op cit, p.206-213.
189 Herm, op cit, p.31.
190 The legal reforms of Urukagina appear to have been motivated by the belated recognition of a 
legitimation crisis that was undermining the loyalty of his subjects in the defence of his kingdom. 
They initiated a Mesopotamian tradition that may be compared to the Egyptian tradition of maat.
191 Roaf, op cit, p.89.
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Through the human warlord Lugalzaggisi then, the god Enlil was attempting to 
construct a theocracy that would rival Egypt, linking the Persian Gulf via the two rivers 
to the Mediterranean. Certain elites in Sumer had obviously woken up to the fact that 
they were not living in invincible cities anymore and had to unite, though it seems they 
realised this too late.
Twenty five years later a high-ranking Semitic official in Kish overthrew his 
Sumerian master in a palace coup and proclaimed himself Sargon: meaning 'the king is 
legitimate'. Sargon then proceeded to defeat Lugalzaggisi and incorporate the Sumerian 
city-states into his dimorphic Akkadian empire:
'The fall of Lugalzaggisi... ends an age. The Early Dynastic period is 
over, and after it the face of Babylonian history changes. The cleavage is 
apparent in almost every aspect of civilization. For the first time another 
element has assumed the power and imposed its language upon the 
official and private records. An epoch of small local states was 
succeeded by the creation of a wide dominion, henceforth to remain, 
with intermittent lapses, the pattern of political history in Western Asia 
until the end of the Persian empire.'192
Once Sargon had made himself sovereign over the whole of Mesopotamia, he followed 
the example of Lugalzaggisi and marched west to try and secure the foreign policy 
objective of a corridor to the Mediterranean:
'It is clear that it was not military glory, in the first instance, which drew 
them so far from their homes, but a real combination of political and, 
above all, economic necessities. They needed to have access to the 
'Upper Sea', the Mediterranean, just as they had access to the 'Lower 
Sea', the Persian Gulf. To be more precise, they needed to secure for 
themselves the riches of the west, which had always been indispensable 
to their country, where they were not produced - wood, stone and 
metals.'193
In his annals Sargon claims to have extended his rule as far as the 'forest of cedars' and 
the 'mountains of silver'. It is thought that this refers to the Amanus and the Taurus 
mountains respectively. It is not thought that Sargon bothered to conquer as far south as 
Byblos, though he may have encouraged those who had a grudge against Egypt to do so 
in a form of conquest by proxy, as is often the way in peripheral buffer zones. One of
192 C.J. Gadd, 'The Cities Of Babylonia', The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume I Part 2, 
p. 144.
193 C.J. Gadd, 'The Dynasty Of Agade And The Gutian Invasion', The Cambridge Ancient 
History, Volume I Part 2, p.322.
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Sargoris Akkadian successors however, Naram-Sin, who tried to take a leaf out of the 
Egyptian book of political theocracy by shedding his steward-king status and promoting 
himself as god-king, seems to have come close to Byblos, claiming authority as far 
south down the Levant as Kadesh194. Byblos may or may not have fallen under the 
hegemony of the Akkadian kings during the First Intermediate Period. More likely it 
just kept a very low profile, ducking behind the mountains of Lebanon. What we can 
say is that a large portion of the Levant was under Mesopotamian hegemony. We can 
also say that the Upper Sea1, as the Mesopotamians called it, or the 'Great Green', as the 
Egyptians called it, had already become a major area of concern for foreign policy as far 
as the great powers of the Bronze Age were concerned.
That the Mesopotamians called the Mediterranean the TJpper Sea' suggests that 
they found the business of maintaining access to it to be an uphill task. The ambition of 
ruling such an extensive territory with so many particularistic components exhausted 
Akkadian political culture195. At the risk of stating the obvious, the Nile fans out onto 
the Mediterranean whilst the two rivers of Mesopotamia do not. Being 200km away 
from the upper reaches of the Euphrates and without the aid of the horse, the corridor to 
the Mediterranean was amongst the first losses in the chronicle of Akkadian decline and 
fall. Internal disunity weakened Akkadian immunity to predatory raids by Gutian 
chiefdoms from the Zagros mountains in the east. Concentration on the Gutians in the 
east tempted the Akkadians to lower their guard in the north and west. Whereupon 
Human, Anatolian and Canaanite chiefdoms each spotted their opportunity in turn to 
destroy Akkadian authority throughout Anatolia and Syria-Palestine.
By 2040 BC, when king Mentuhotep from Thebes emerged victorious out of a 
series of struggles with the kings of other cities and reunited Egypt, taking her out of the 
First Intermediate Period and into the Middle Kingdom, Akkadian hegemony over Asia 
had already been dead for at least sixty years. After consolidating the unification of 
Egypt, Mentuhotep II began to revive some Old Kingdom foreign policies196. First, he 
sent an expedition west to smite the Libyans. Then he sent expeditions east to reassert 
control over the Sinai. Next he turned his attentions to Nubia, making sure that Egyptian 
mining and trading interests there were secure. Finally, he moved to fill the power 
vacuum in Syria-Palestine, using the old double-edged strategy of gift combined with
194 Ibid, p.327.
195 Knapp, op cit, p.92.
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military raid, thus re-establishing spheres of influence in Byblos, Sidon and Tyre along 
the Levantine coast. After the death of his father, Mentuhotep HI built fortresses along 
the eastern side of the Nile delta to protect it from Asiatic incursions. Mentuhotep IV 
then revived the practice of sending Red Sea expeditions to the land of Punt.
The foreign expeditions of Mentuhotep IV appear to have been organized and 
led by his loyal vizier and head priest, Ammenemes. Redford suspects that Ammenemes 
used these foreign expeditions to enhance his own prestige at the expense of the king197. 
We have reason to believe that this is the same man as Ammenemes I, the king who 
mysteriously emerges to found the Twelfth Dynasty during another bout of civil strife. 
Curiously, when the priests write the Prophecies Of Neferti they choose not to mention 
the king's glittering career in the temple-civil service prior to his divine coronation, but 
the advice that Ammenemes later offers to his son Sesostris may be pertinent:
'Be on your guard against subordinates, of whose plotting one is not 
aware. Trust not a brother, know not a friend, and make yourself not 
intimates.'198
Having once been a loyal subordinate himself we may surmise that Ammenemes knew 
what he was talking about. Bitter memories of Ammenemes as the usurper may have 
contributed to the harem conspiracy that assassinated him thirty years later in 1962 BC. 
The fallout produced by this event provided the inspiration for the Tale Of Sinuhe, a 
political thriller now regarded as one of the great classics of Egyptian literature.
Sinuhe tells us that he was a top harem official (probably working in the field of 
procurement), accompanying a military expedition to Libya led by the royal prince and 
heir apparent Sesostris I. When the expedition returns home after a successful 
campaign, secret messengers from the capital arrive to intercept. Prince Sesostris rushes 
off to the capital leaving his army behind wondering what on earth is going on. As 
rumours begin to fly, Sinuhe overhears that king Ammenemes has been assassinated by 
a conspiracy in the harem. Being a harem official Sinuhe fears he will become 
implicated by the plot, so he flees for his life. He becomes a fugitive and crosses the 
Egyptian Walls of the Ruler' at Sinai, built 'to repel the Syrians and to defeat the Sand-
196 Grimal, op cit, p. 157.
197 Redford, op cit, p.71-74.
198 Kaster, op cit, p. 176.
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Crossers'. As he tries to cross the Sinai, Sinuhe is overcome by thirst and tells himself 
'this is how death tastes'. Then he lifts up his heart:
'for I heard the sound of the lowing of cattle and I spied some Syrians. A 
distinguished chieftain among them, who had been in Egypt, recognized 
me. Then he gave me water and cooked milk for me. '199
Sinuhe's luck has chanced upon the old nomadic trade network that still stretches from 
Egypt to Syria. The network takes him as far as Byblos. Being a member of the 
Egyptian upper class Sinuhe knows this trading port well, but the city of Byblos is too 
loyal to the Egyptian crown to be a safe haven for a refugee, so he finds contacts that 
can help him flee to Qedem for a year and a half. Then:
'Amu-nenshi a ruler in Palestine took me in. He said to me, "You will 
fare well with me; here you will hear the speech of Egypt". He said this 
since he knew my character and had heard of my capacities. The 
Egyptians who were there with him bore witness for me.'200
Over the years this Palestinian chief appears to have recruited a little band of Egyptian 
exiles. Amunenshi clearly takes a keen interest in Egyptian affairs. He knows that 
Sinuhe was a top civil servant whose flight from Egypt must mean that there is 
something up at the Palace:
'For what reason have you come to this place? What is it? Has something 
happened at the Palace?'
Amunenshi wants intelligence. Could there be any signs of internal division and 
weakness within Egypt? Sinuhe may be a fugitive but he is also a true patriot. He is not 
the sort to divulge information that might cause harm to the Egyptian state. He blandly 
announces that Ammenemes is dead and denies any knowledge of an attempted coup. 
Amunenshi then proceeds to ask Sinuhe for his assessment of the current political 
situation in Egypt:
What, then, will the land be without him, that excellent god, the fear of 
whom pervaded the foreign lands like the goddess of war in the year of 
pestilence?'
199 Kaster, op cit, p.291.
200 Ibid, p.292.
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Sinuhe tries to disinform Amunenshi that Ammenemes' son Sesostris has achieved a 
smooth succession to the throne, no problems at all, and then bursts into patriotic song 
to ensure that Amunenshi is left in no doubt about the internal harmony and military 
capability of the new king:
'He it was who subdued the foreign lands while his father was within the 
palace. Mighty indeed is he, achieving with his strong arm; a valiant one, 
and there is not his equal! He slakes his wrath by smashing skulls; and 
no one can stand up to him. He is robust of heart at the moment of 
attack; and does not let sloth rest upon his heart. Bold of countenance is 
he when he sees the melee; to attack the barbarian is his joy. He girds his 
shield and crushes the foe; and does not strike twice in order to kill! But 
he is lord of charm and great of sweetness; and through love has he 
conquered! His city loves him more than itself; it rejoices in him more 
than in its god; men and women salute and rejoice with him now that he 
is king! He conquered while still in the egg, and his face was turned to 
royal deeds since he was bom. He makes multiply those who were bom 
with him; he is unique, the gift of the god. He is the one who makes wide 
the boundaries; he will seize the southern countries, and the northern 
ones with ease, having been created to smite the Syrians and to crush the 
Sand-Crossers. How this land rejoices now that he is come to rule!'
Having done his duty to dispel Syrian rumours that the Egyptian state may be divided 
and weak, Sinuhe then advises Amunenshi to cultivate diplomatic contact with the new 
king who 'will not cease to make happy a land which will be loyal to him!'. Amunenshi 
wryly contrasts the happy state of Egypt with Sinuhe's decision to become a refugee:
'Well, assuredly then, Egypt is happy, knowing that he flourishes there.
And yet behold, you are here, and you shall stay with me. I will treat you 
well.'
Amunenshi clearly thinks that Sinuhe is a valuable addition to his Egyptian collection 
and quickly moves to assimilate him, appointing him chief of a local tribe and marrying 
him off to his eldest daughter together with a rich dowry of land that produces figs, 
grapes, honey, olives, barley, wheat and 'all kinds of cattle without limit'. Sinuhe thrives 
in his new life. His wife bears him sons who grow up to become local chiefs. He 
becomes a powerful man by making his territory safe for merchants and couriers and by 
proving his worth on the battlefield: 'I became great there'.
The Tale Of Sinuhe is a stunning glimpse into the mind of the Twelfth Dynasty 
priesthood. It was used as a standard text for copying by temple schoolboys for 
generations. Whilst learning to read and write, the schoolboys are initiated into a world 
of court intrigue, suspected plots, god-king assassinations, and subtle decision-making
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in foreign relations. In order for the Middle Kingdom dynasty to survive, its gods seem 
to have decided to share the secrets of consciousness widely amongst a large number of 
middle ranking officials. The mind of Sinuhe may still be bicameral, but his second 
chamber has clearly been entrusted with an impressive range of powers. Like Sinuhe, 
Middle Kingdom schoolboys are expected to develop a strong sense of self, with wills 
that can speak and act independently of their spiritual realms containing the voices of 
their gods. The decision of Sinuhe to desert, flee Egypt, and take refuge in Palestine is a 
profound expression of the need for a whole class of officials who are equipped to take 
initiative outside the routine thought processes of the theocracy in order for it to survive 
the new challenges that confront that theocracy. The figure of Amunenshi represents 
one such challenge. Clearly, by the second millennium BC, there are alternative poles of 
consciousness in Syria-Palestine that require recognition. This is why the Pharoh needs 
a court of officials and advisors such as Sinuhe, but his consciousness is still carefully 
constrained by the message that even the estranged refugee priest ultimately remains 
loyal to the gods of his homeland, and no matter how successful the emigre may be 
abroad he will always yearn to return to civilization. When the emigre does decide to 
return, the Egyptian state is forgiving and ready to welcome its long lost son with open 
arms.
Another constraint injected into the consciousness of the Middle Kingdom 
schoolboy was the construction of a city upon the political economy of mortality. 
Sinuhe's greatest fear is that he will die and be buried abroad without the necessary 
funeral rites that will conduct him to the immortal city of the afterlife:
(Sinuhe) 'Old age has befallen me, and infirmity has overtaken me. My 
arms are weak and my legs have slackened. My heart is weary, I am near 
to departure, and they will take me away to the City of Eternity!'
(Sesostris I) 'Indeed, you have begun to grow old, and have lost your 
virile powers. Be mindful of the day of burial, of passing to a revered 
state...You must not die in a foreign land! The Asiatics shall not escort 
you to burial. You shall not put a sheepskin and a mound made over 
you! This is too long to tread the earth. Be mindful of illness, and come 
back before it is too late!'
When Sinuhe tries to find out what 'the memory of me is in the Palace' Sesostris himself 
writes to Sinuhe to tell him that he is prepared to forget the past and that the faithful 
Sinuhe would be welcomed back into the fold with honour. He is offered an estate and a 
seat at court plus a state funeral with all the trimmings. Sinuhe the homesick emigre is 
delighted, he leaves his Palestinian chiefdom behind in the charge of his barbarian son
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and returns to Egypt. He thus secures the ambition of every Egyptian priesthood 
schoolboy, the eternal pension: 'a funerary domain was made for me with fields in it, as 
is done for a foremost courtier'.
Sinuhe dies a happy man, so we are told. But as with any other story the Tale o f 
Sinuhe invites an infinity of supplements. For Sinuhe's tale to have been imaginable 
there must have been other fugitives like him during the periodic bouts of Egyptian 
political turbulence that punctuated the third and second millennia BC. What happened 
to them? What about the people who really did attempt to stage a coup against the 12th 
Dynasty? Doubtless many of them would have been killed before they even had time to 
contemplate the possibility of escape. Others probably would have gone to ground 
within Egypt itself. Some may have tried to make it to Nubia or Libya, where there were 
clearly downtrodden communities which might have had reason to shelter dissidents 
from the Egyptian state201. One or two may even have tried to make it to Punt. But 
political fugitives often gravitate towards expatriate communities where old favours can 
be called in or where somebody knows someone who might be able and willing to help. 
Like Sinuhe, many of the more well-to-do refugees would have aimed for Byblos. It was 
probably not a safe place to stay in the long term, but in the short term it was the place 
to find your feet and get good advice about where to hide next. Sinuhe was obviously 
advised to flee to Qedem which, as we have already noted, was the Egyptian catch-all 
term for 'the east'. Qedem could mean a Syrian trading town such as Ugarit, Ebla or 
Carchemish, or even as far as Mesopotamia itself. Other refugees may have been able to 
get a passage to the silver mountains of Cicilia in Anatolia. But the refugee who really 
wanted to disappear might have been well advised to try their luck along the western 
coast of Anatolia, or Crete and the Cyclades. In the grand preamble to Sinuhe's message 
to Sesostris telling him of his intention to come home, he happens to mention 'the isles 
in the midst of the sea'202.
The Tale o f Sinuhe also tells us that there were foreign rulers about like 
Amunenshi who had developed a habit of collecting and assimilating Egyptian refugees. 
Cui bono? What was in it for them? To begin with, Amunenshi of Syria-Palestine was 
clearly after intelligence about Egypt. Had Sinuhe given Amunenshi confirmation that 
Egypt was divided and weak, he may well have considered mounting a predatory
201 Kuhrt, op cit, p. 120.
202 Kaster, op cit, p.299.
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expedition such as those that the Egyptian texts complain of during the First 
Intermediate Period, or indeed the later Hyksos invasions during the Second 
Intermediate Period (1674-1566 BC). This kind of intelligence is usually only of short 
term value, however, because the defector will exhaust his reserves of useful 
information pretty quickly. For the longer term the Egyptian emigre could try to become 
a useful source of intelligence by cultivating foreign contacts. Sinuhe talks of having 
made efforts to attract couriers, merchants and other travellers coming and going from 
Egypt, and boasts that they would 'tarry because of me*203. The generous host of lodgers 
like these could have provided a valuable news gathering service. Some of the Egyptian 
refugees would also have had useful military experience. Sinuhe claims to have served 
Amunenshi as a chief military advisor and commander though, being a literary role 
model, his assistence obviously had to be directed against other 'rulers of foreign lands' 
rather than against the very state that had alienated him. In real life of course, many of 
Sinuhe's colleagues may not have been quite so fastidious. Another incentive for a 
chieftain like Amunenshi to harbour fugitives like Sinuhe was that there was always the 
possibility that palace machinations in Egypt might produce a reverse. When Sinuhe 
returns to Egypt to become a member of the court entourage it is clear that Amunenshi's 
policy of hospitality has paid off. The humble barbarian has earned a friend in one of 
the most powerful courts of the Bronze Age world.
Political, economic and military considerations then may have encouraged 
chieftains in Syria-Palestine to offer hospitality to someone like Sinuhe. But the thing 
which would have given the Egyptian or indeed the Mesopotamian refugee a warm 
welcome amongst elites even further afield, such as in Anatolia or the Aegean, was his 
education. Right from the first beginnings of civilization states have tended to reserve 
their most charitable immigration policies for those who possess knowledge which is in 
short supply. Sinuhe, for example, having once been a top official, would have been 
able to furnish the best education Egypt had to offer204. From boyhood he would have 
known how to read and write in the Egyptian script, and how to reckon and calculate 
using mathematics. As a promising student he would then have graduated to further 
education, which the Egyptians called 'the House of Life'. Here he would have learned 
his accounting, calendrical and administrative skills. He would also have received a 
basic grounding in what we might call 'organizational ethics'. In this field Sinuhe
203 Ibid, p.294.
204 Bowen, op cit, p.22-42.
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undoubtedly shone, for he had been selected to specialize in a particularly sensitive area 
of the Egyptian bureaucracy. Above all, his temple training would have given him a 
working knowledge of how to build the kind of temple-palace bureaucracies that could 
organise complexity and manage the development of craft specialization within an 
urban division of labour. This kind of expertise would have been useful in Crete during 
the twentieth century BC, contemporary with the Egyptian Twelfth Dynasty, where the 
Minoans were developing their first temple building projects at sites like Knossos.
The archaeological evidence left us by Minoan civilization on Crete and the 
Cyclades fits quite well with a model of the dissemination of tekhne carried upon the 
winds of trade and dissidence. The precise nature of the dialectic of Bronze-Age 
development between the Near East, Crete and the rest of the Aegean has been the 
subject of a lively and at times rather intemperate debate. Only a highly provisional 
narrative may be attempted here.
One thing that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt is that if the early 
civilizations of the Aegean were a consequence of dissemination from the Near East, 
such dissemination could only have germinated upon the fertile soil of an indigenous 
political economy where neolithic settlements had been thriving for some considerable 
time205. Levels of human settlement on the island of Crete are among the deepest in 
Europe, beginning as early as the sixth millennium BC, displaying similarities with 
contemporary cultures in Anatolia206. Being an island culture before the development of 
large scale, long distance sea transport, however, Neolithic life on Crete lagged behind 
Anatolia and Greece and subsisted at a mean level comparable with Strange's desert 
islanders until late in the fourth millennium. The economy of these communities was 
based upon an agriculture of cereals, goats and sheep supplemented by the fruits of the 
sea. As yet there was little evidence of social stratification or craft specialization207. 
Most cultural influences at this time appear to have come mainly from mainland Greece 
and Anatolia via small scale regional exchange networks, upon tiny fishing boats 
braving the seas between the Cyclades and the Dodecanese.
205 See Colin Renfrew, The Emergence o f Civilization: The Cyclades and the Aegean in the Third 
Millennium BC.
206 Rodney Castleden, Minoans: Life in Bronze Age Crete, p.29.
207 Knapp, op cit, p. 198.
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Then, shortly after 3000 BC, developments on Crete started to gather pace. The 
development of the Mediterranean galley, pioneered at hubs like Byblos, enabled 
seafarers to increase the range and velocity of cultural exchange between the 
communities of Egypt, Syria-Palestine, Anatolia and the Aegean208. One by one the 
Cretan settlements collected what would become the classic building blocks of Bronze- 
Age civilization in the Mediterranean. Cretan agriculture was supplemented with the 
fig, the date, the olive and the grape. Olives and grapes are thought to have been 
particularly important in the formation of an agricultural surplus because they flourished 
on the rocky ground of the hillsides rather than upon the plains, which were more 
suitable for grain, thus opening up new areas of land for cultivation209.
Agricultural specialization to exploit regional variations in terrain depended 
upon the formation of local exchange, however, as different farms would have had 
surpluses in some products and shortages in others. In response to this need for 
exchange the Cretans built centres which could take delivery, store and redistribute 
supplies. To manage these centres an organizational elite began to emerge. Meanwhile, 
Near Eastern ships began to wander into the coves of Crete bearing gifts. Anatolian and 
Syrian metal goods begin to appear in the Early Minoan layers of sediment, together 
with Egyptian Old Kingdom stone bowls and ivory products210. These gifts would 
naturally have been presented to the incipient Minoan elites. Luxury goods brought both 
pleasure and prestige to the Minoan ruling classes. A desire to acquire more of these 
foreign goods motivated the Minoan elites to intensify local production in order to 
extract bigger surpluses for foreign exchange211.
The major Minoan industries recruited for this export drive to the Near East 
appear to have been textiles, wine and olive oil212. In one Egyptian Middle Kingdom 
tomb Minoan envoys turn up bearing folded cloths, whilst large concentrations of 
spindle whorls and loom weights have been found in Early Minoan contexts at
208 Martin Bemal, ’First by land, Then by sea: Thoughts about the Social Formation of the 
Mediterranean and Greece', in Genovese & Hochberg (eds), Geographic Perspectives in History 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), p. 15-16.
209 Renfrew, The Emergence o f Civilization: The Cyclades and the Aegean in the Third 
Millennium BC, chapter 15.
210 Renfrew, op cit, p.446-7.
211 Knapp, 'Thalassocracies in Bronze Age eastern Mediterranean trade: making and breaking a 
myth', World Archaeology, Volume 24 No.3, p.340.
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Knossos213. The export of Cretan wine and oil to the Near East has been deciphered 
from textual records found at Ugarit, Ebla and Mari214. The records also sometimes 
mention grain, which seems bizarre when we consider the prevailing soils and climate 
of Crete, but serves to show what a profound impact the gift-bomb can have upon a 
local elite. It would not be the first or last time in history that a young state has been 
tempted to risk the starvation of its own people in order to proffer a surplus for foreign 
exchange.
Meanwhile, the grape and olive trade stimulated a native pottery industry, partly 
through the production of amphorae for storage, shipment and transport, but also in the 
intensified production for export of the many products which complemented the 
consumption of wine and oil, such as drinking cups, serving jugs and lamps215. The 
toumette was in use in Crete by 2500 BC, whilst the simple fast wheel was in use by 
2000 BC216. This compares with ceramic innovation in Mesopotamia at about 5500 BC 
and 4000 BC respectively217. Then, as now, it was often easier to emulate than innovate. 
Branigan found many Cretan pottery artefacts from the third millennium reminiscent of 
Levantine ware, also suggestive of dissemination from east to west, but it was not very 
long before Minoan ceramics took on a dynamic of its own and influences began to feed 
back in the opposite direction. The spiral patterns on the frescoes of the palace at Mari 
and on the Egyptian scarabs of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, for example, are thought 
by some to have been inspired by the designs on imported Minoan pottery218.
In exchange for textiles, wine, oil, grain and pottery, Minoans were able to 
import metal ingots in the sort of quantities that could sponsor native metallurgy. At 
3000 BC the consumption of metal products in Crete was limited to axes, awls, pins, 
hooks and beads219. By 2000 BC a thriving industry was producing gold and silver cups, 
jugs, lamps and ornaments, some of which were fine enough for export. Likewise, 
proficiency with copper and bronze was also furnishing Crete with knives, razors, axe-
212 F. Matz, ’The Maturity of Minoan Civilization', The Cambridge Ancient History, volume II 
part 1, p. 163 (Matz also suggests timber, but amongst other authors consulted only Sinclair Hood 
appears to concur).
213 Renfrew, op cit, p.351-4.
214 Knapp, The History and Culture o f Ancient Western Asia and Egypt, p.202.
215 Renfrew, op cit, p.282-287.
216 Castleden, op cit, p.64-5 & Renfrew, op cit, p.346.
217 Moorey, op cit, p. 148.
218 Matz, op cit, p. 159 & 163.
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adzes, chisels, sickles, hammers and saws220. The Minoan bronzesmiths also began to 
produce some very distinctive daggers and spearheads, providing the incipient ruling 
class with new coercive opportunities for domestic purposes221. The first Cretan seals, a 
key indicator of the development of property relations, are thought to be primitive 
copies based upon samples of Levantine design. The first experiments with writing 
begin to appear upon broken shards of pottery, possibly inspired by syllabaries 
developed in Syria and Anatolia, and which eventually matured into what is now called 
'Linear A'222.
It was the adze-axes, saws and chisels which enabled the Minoans to construct 
their labyrinths from blocks of limestone dressed with gypsum, supported with stone 
columns and beams of pine and cypress223. The first one was completed at Knossos in 
about 1930 BC, in the same century as the founding of the Egyptian Twelfth Dynasty, 
the assassination of Ammenemes and the fictional flight of Sinuhe. By this time the 
town of Knossos was supporting around 12,000-18,000 souls224. The stone construction 
at Knossos was followed by others at Mallia, Zakro, Phaistos and Kydonia. 
Traditionally these labyrinths have been called 'palaces' in deference to the Greek 
legends which surround the figures of king Minos and his maverick mephisto, Daedalus, 
but Castleden makes a strong case for seeing them as Bronze-Age temple complexes225. 
They were probably a bit of both, being temples founded by dynastic elites who also 
lived over the shop in a bicameral semi-divine capacity. Let us provisionally call them 
labyrinths.
In a pattern that will now be familiar from our examination of state formation in 
Mesopotamia, Syria-Palestine, Anatolia and Egypt, the labyrinths of Crete housed 
financial organizations that collected an agricultural surplus and used it to sponsor the 
development of crafts in the towns, producing goods that were then traded with the 
outside world. With these labyrinths Crete moved from the Early Minoan to the Middle 
Minoan Period, from a society of prosperous small communities into a cluster of states 
ruled from central places. When an earthquake destroyed the original labyrinths on
220 Castleden, op cit, p.90-91.
221 Renfrew, op cit, p.321-323.
222 See Castleden, op cit, p.100-103, & Bemal, op cit, p.162-164.
223 Renfrew, op cit, p.348-9.
224 Castleden, op cit, p.68.
225 Castleden, op cit and also The Knossos Labyrinth: A New View o f the 'Palace o f  Minos' at 
Knossos (London, Routledge, 1989).
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Crete around 1700 BC, the Minoan political economy managed to bounce back with a 
lavish reconstmction programme that took the culture into its most powerful and 
prosperous period. New labyrinths were built on an even more ambitious scale.
So far we have considered Crete in isolation from the rest of Greece. As with 
Crete, neolithic settlement along the strandlines of Greece had been developing from the 
6th millennium. As with Crete, it is generally agreed that agriculture was introduced 
here from elsewhere by people who brought many of their domesticates with them: 
wheat; barley; dogs; sheep and goats226. As with Crete, they appear to have brought the 
tekhne of pottery with them as there seems to be little in the way of aceramic 
antecedents. And as with Crete again, the most plausible scenario has the first neolithic 
immigrants hailing from the Near East via Anatolia, using their agricultural knowledge 
learned elsewhere to coax a subsistence from the 'narrow twists of fertile land1227.
Unlike Crete, however, settlers in north-western Greece were fortunate enough 
to chance upon the fertile plains of Macedonia and Thessaly, where the most precocious 
densities of early neolithic settlement could prosper228. Gradually, once the new 
inhabitants had acclimatised to their new environment, they began to diversify the base 
of Aegean agriculture, cultivating the fig, the vine and the olive, and adding the option 
of cattle and pigs to their repertoire of livestock. It was this diversification that enabled 
the subsequent development of the more arid and previously less fertile regions of 
Attica, the Peloponnese, the Cyclades and Western Anatolia, so that by the beginning of 
the third millennium it was southern Greece which was becoming the major area of 
growth in the Aegean in terms of population and prosperity. But there was a problem: 
the dagger, the longship and piracy.
The tekhne of metallurgy had been present in the Aegean from early in the 
fourth millennium, producing the familiar supplements to neolithic life such as copper 
axes, awls, beads and fish hooks. From the beginning of the third millennium the bronze 
dagger begins to make an appearance. The earliest ones start to appear around Troy in 
north west Anatolia. According to Renfrew 'the possiblity of influence from the Near 
East cannot be excluded'229. Daggers then begin to turn up in the Cyclades and Crete,
226 Vermeule, Greece In The Bronze Age, p.4-22. Renfrew, op cit, p.50 & 270-280.
227 Vermeule, op cit, p.4.
228 Renfrew, op cit, p.227-8.
229 Ibid, p.321.
127
followed by the rest of Greece. To begin with there is ambiguity about the precise 
meaning of these artefacts, as wear analysis suggests they could have been used for 
many purposes, but gradually this ambiguity falls away as the dagger starts to lengthen 
and turns into the dirk.
Another innovation introduced to the Aegean during the third millennium was 
the longship. The earliest concrete evidence for their presence is their representation on 
'flying pans' found in the Cyclades230. This coincides with a marked increase in the 
number of fortified settlements in the Aegean, which also begin to desert the coasts and 
move inland up onto higher ground231. Renfrew deduces that the abundance of Aegean 
coastline produced a destructive incentive for piracy whereby easy pickings were 
available at little cost to those who had gained precocious access to the fruits of the 
bronzesmith and the shipwright. The cycles of devastation begin from the beginning of 
the third millennium, but look particularly grim from about 2200 BC to 1900 BC. It was 
the radical depopulation of the areas worst hit by piracy which provided subsequent 
opportunities for successive waves of Indo-European immigration from the north.
Early 20th century models of Indo-European immigration tend to conjure up 
images of ruthless warrior hordes, but a more realistic picture is probably one of pathos 
given the poor levels of tekhne attributed to them. We know that many forms of 
immigration tend to gravitate toward desolate areas where previous locals are either 
dead or no longer prepared to live. But immigrants are also fast learners. They have to 
be. Once they were established prevailing circumstances would have taught the 
newcomers various strategies for coping with the violence. One method was to try to 
establish a relationship with the aggressor. Pragmatic elders, for example, might attempt 
to forestall the inevitable seasonal raids with formal agreements to pay tribute. Another 
option was to prepare some resistance in the hope that this would encourage the men 
from the longships to move on to easier pickings elsewhere. These would have been 
communitarian options for the short to medium term. A longer term aim, which may 
have become more attractive after many years of summer raids, was to try to join the 
club and become another player in the game of piracy.
230 Ibid, p.357.
231 Ibid, p.263-264.
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Being relatively isolated from the rest of the Aegean, Crete was generally 
immune to the destructive effect of piracy throughout the Early and Middle Bronze Age, 
as is evident in the apparent lack of fortifications, making it a relatively attractive island 
of stability upon which Aegean contact with the Near East could focus. Meanwhile, 
development on the turbulent mainland of Greece and western Anatolia lagged far 
behind, but towards the middle of the second millennium the destructive impact of the 
dagger and the longship was beginning to simmer down into a patchwork pattern of 
Indo-European speaking fiefdoms. Some of the more successful buccaneers of the 
Aegean were starting to reinvent themselves as monarchs ready to do business with the 
civilized world. The ’Shaft Graves’ of Mycenae offer us a tantalising glimpse of one 
such dynasty in transition232. These tombs were in use from about 1700 to 1500 BC, 
holding a grand total of forty three bodies. Two sets of graves have been excavated, one 
found to be older than the other. The more recent graves boast far richer inventories of 
treasure, which has been interpreted as a clear sign of an incipient ruling class on the 
ascendant. Much of the early wealth appears to have come from a proud family tradition 
of plunder. This is partly evident in the armouries of bronze daggers, dirks and spears 
which the dead carry with them, but also in some of the designs inlaid on the weaponry 
and silverware, painted on pottery or carved into stone. A striking example is the ’Siege 
Rhyton' silver drinking cup, which celebrates a Mediterranean battle scene complete 
with besieged citadel, olive groves, assorted soldiers, dead bodies, terrified women 
civilians and, just out of view due to the ravages of time, a ship233. Some of the grave 
goods, however, particularly in the second set of graves, have cosmopolitan ingredients 
which indicate the growing significance of trading contacts: gold and ostrich eggs from 
Egypt; lapis lazuli from Mesopotamia; ivory from Syria-Palestine; silver from Anatolia; 
faience from Crete and amber from the Baltic.
Crete was the primary agent of contact with the Near Eastern world during the 
Shaft Grave period. By 1700 BC Minoan tekhne had advanced far beyond any of their 
Aegean neighbours. It was natural that their products should be in demand there234. At 
the same time the Minoan gods may have been galvanised by any one of a number of 
foreign policy objectives. Firstly, the emerging chieftains of Greece and Western 
Anatolia would have been a potential market for Cretan manufactures. This Minoan 
desire to diversify their client base was aggravated by prolonged bouts of political
232 Vermeule, op cit, chapter IV.
233 Ibid, p. 100-105.
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instability in the Near East at the time, which lead to a depression in trade to the 
Levantine ports235. Secondly, the Aegean was a possible source of raw materials such as 
basalt from Sparta or silver from Attica236. Thirdly, the mainland chieftains were a 
potential source of stability in the region, offering the promise of improved security for 
Minoan trade missions heading for Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic seas. Fourthly, some of 
the chieftains of Greece and Western Anatolia may have been groomed for the purposes 
of military alliance. Any Minoan embassies returning from the Near East throughout the 
Middle Bronze Age would have brought back alarming news of the Hyksos in Egypt, 
the Hittite forays from Anatolia, followed by Egyptian New Kingdom and Human 
aggression in Syria-Palestine237. Such reports would have shaken the Minoans out of 
any sense of splendid isolation they might have previously enjoyed. As the Cretan 
reputation for wealth in wine, oil, pottery and textile exports spread throughout the Near 
East, the Minoans had reason to suspect that it was only a matter of time before the first 
predatory forays arrived. It made sense to domesticate a few carefully chosen barbarians 
from the Aegean who were no strangers to violence and who could be trusted to help 
see off any unwanted guests.
The temple centres of Crete set up subsidiaries on many Aegean islands 
stretching from Kythira to Rhodes, plus a few offices on the mainland such as Iasos and 
Miletus on Western Anatolia238. These subsidiaries were the stepping stones by which 
the Minoans were able to despatch so many of those gifts which the barbarian chiefs 
proudly took with them down into their Shaft Graves. In return the chiefs were more 
than ready to help protect the subsidiaries which supplied the goods. They were also 
happy to intensify the output of any Helladic produce which the Minoan emissary 
declared an interest in. In order to supply horses for the chariots that would become the 
civilized means of war of the Late Bronze Age for example, but which were expensive 
to breed in terms of land for grazing, local peasants had to be evicted from some of the 
scarce strips of fertile plain in order to accommodate them. If Greek mythology has any 
relevance to the Bronze Age at all, locally produced slaves were another invisible 
export. But perhaps more than anything else, the Helladic chiefdoms were prepared to 
produce soldiers and battleships on demand whenever the Minoans required their
234 Castleden, op cit, p. 121.
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services239. Such deals were consummated with diplomatic marriages. The Minoan 
embassy-brides would have also brought weaving skills and civilized tastes, plus a 
dowry entourage of potters and bronzesmiths. At some stage they also sent scribes, 
because the Minoan Linear A script was adapted for Helladic Greek to produce what we 
now call Linear B.
Minoan foreign policy was an extraordinary success for about two hundred 
years. The New Temple Period was an era of security and prosperity for the Cretan 
elite. Their island palaces were powerful enough for the Egyptian court to rank the 
Minoans almost on a par with the Hittites, Hurrians, Assyrians and Kassites. The irony 
of all foreign policies, however, is their inevitable propensity to produce unforseen 
consequences. It was only natural for the Minoans to focus all their security concerns 
upon the Near East, but in the meantime their allies in the Aegean were becoming more 
prosperous and their gods increasingly ambitious, as is evident in the Tholos tombs 
which were replacing the barbarous Shaft Graves during the sixteenth century.
Southern Greece was equally suited to the production of wine, olive oil and 
textiles. By 1500 BC Helladic pottery was as good if not better than Minoan and, with 
the advent of Linear B, the Myceneans now had the scribal capacity to organise 
Mediterranean polyculture and a complex division of labour. They also had 
bronzesmiths and access to reliable supplies of copper and tin. Through joint ventures 
they had become familiar with Near Eastern markets and had developed contacts in the 
Levantine ports. They also had a longstanding militaristic tradition of predatory forays 
and daring raids. Sometime after 1500 BC, numerous Minoan subsidiaries were 
destroyed or abandoned. The palace of Knossos appears to have suffered minor damage 
and its scribes suddenly start to use Linear B instead of Linear A. All the evidence 
points to a predatory merger240. The domestic policy of alienation toward the local 
population meant that the elimination of the native Minoan ruling class by foreigners 
was probably accepted with minimal Cretan resistance: 'the masters come and go, life 
remains the same'. But the new gods proved to be more footloose, less prepared to 
reinvest and rebuild. In about 1400 BC Knossos and the other Cretan palaces were all 
destroyed, possibly by earthquake, never to be rebuilt again. Daedalus had been
239 Vermeule, op cit, p. 145-6.
240 Sandars, The Sea Peoples, p.58.
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relocated. New temple-palaces began to bloom in Messenia, Lakonia, Argolis and Attica 
in southern Greece.
(2.10) Male and Female Pudenda: 'They put to death the men of military age, 
made slaves of the women and children, and gave the land to the...'.241
'It is unlikely that, in Homeric times, Helen’s face -  contributing factor 
though it may well have been -  was the primary reason for launching a 
thousand ships and causing King Agamemnon to lay siege to Troy. More 
likely, the Greek’s crucial motivation was their desire to seize control of 
the lucrative trade route that passed through the Dardanelles.’
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f International Relations, p.4.
When Herodotus rambles his way through Egypt in Book II of his Histories, 
about halfway he suddenly changes tack from 'results of my own direct observation and 
research' to accounts proffered him by the Egyptian priests who he claims to have 
interviewed. The priests begin by telling him about Menes, 'the first king of Egypt'. 
Herodotus seems mildly interested. Next the priests read out to him a list of three 
hundred and thirty monarchs. A queen Nitocris on this list arouses his curiosity, and he 
is fed a juicy story of revenge and murder. Herodotus then proceeds to yawn his way 
through the rest of the list until he gets to Sesostris. What never fails to get his 
historiographical salivary glands going are tales of great men making great conquests. 
The Egyptian priests duly decide to serve him one:
'Sesostris, the priests said, sailed first with a fleet of warships from the 
Arabian gulf along the coast of the Indian Ocean, subduing the coastal 
tribes as he went, until he found that shoal water made further progress 
impossible; then on his return to Egypt he raised a powerful army and 
marched across the continent, reducing to subjection every nation in his 
path. Whenever he encountered a courageous enemy who fought 
valiantly for freedom he erected pillars on the spot inscribed with his 
own name and country, and a sentence to indicate that by the might of 
his armed forces he had won the victory; if, however, a town fell easily
241 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Penguin Edition), p.328. Standard reference: Book V, 
32.
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into his hands without a struggle, he made an addition to the inscription 
on the pillar - for not only did he record upon it the same facts as before, 
but added a picture of a woman's genitals, meaning to show the people 
of the town were no braver than women. Thus his victorious progress 
through Asia continued, until he entered Europe...'242
Of course, as a historical source Herodotus has to be treated like high explosive. Being 
the 'father of history' Herodotus was also appropriately known as the 'father of lies'. The 
helpful notes which accompany the Penguin Edition inform us that the legend of 
Sesostris is an amalgamation of the kings Sesostris I and Sesostris n, and that there is no 
evidence to support the curious tale of the Egyptian war memorials. Modem scholars 
strongly suspect that the Egyptian priests of Herodotus' day puffed up the conquests of 
the Twelfth Dynasty in order to puncture the vanity of Persian kings like Darius and 
Xerxes, who claimed to have conquered where no monarch had conquered before243. 
Writing fresh after the Persian wars of course, Herodotus may have been more than 
willing to suspend his powers of incredulity. Herodotus goes on:
'Most of the memorial pillars which King Sesostris erected in the 
conquered countries have disappeared, but I have seen some myself in 
Palestine, with the inscription I mentioned, and the drawing of a 
woman's genitals."244.
There is evidence to support the claim that 12th Dynasty monarchs campaigned 
extensively in Syria-Palestine, but what we are primarily interested in here is the curious 
career of the cunt as an international icon of surrender and subjection245. Three 
centuries later, when Manetho wrote his History o f Egypt, working from journals and 
annals preserved in the Egyptian temples, he too stumbles upon the Twelfth Dynasty 
tale of genital graffiti. By now the story has been embellished a little:
'In nine years he (Sesostris) subdued the whole of Asia and Europe as far 
as Thrace, everywhere erecting memorials of his conquests of the tribes.
Upon pillars he engraved for a valiant race the secret parts of a man, for 
an ignoble race those of a woman.'
How was it that the great Sesostris and his historians came to associate the balls and the 
penis with courage and valiance whilst the vulva was seen as the appropriate signifier of
242 Herodotus, The Histories (Penguin Edition), p.120-121. Standard reference: Book II, 102-3.
243 Frank J. Yurco, 'Black Athena: An Egyptological Review1, in Lefkowitz & Maclean-Rogers, 
op cit, p.72.
244 Ibid, p. 122, standard reference: Book II, 106.
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surrender and subjection in foreign affairs?246 That we can even ask the question is to 
assume that these associations have not been universally held. Before the Bronze-Age, 
for example, the semantic intent of Sesostris' graffiti would not have been possible. 
Neolithic cultures tended rather to venerate the womb as an icon of awesome power, as 
is evident in the earth-mother goddesses that have been found, and in the earliest 
creation myths which are invariably myths of birth247. Anthropologically speaking, 
research has revealed that the vagina is just as likely to signify the impotence of its 
opposite member in the face of overwhelming odds as it is likely to excite meanings of 
penile triumphalism248. Camille Paglia, for example, has had great fun with the North 
American Indian myth of the toothed vagina:
The toothed vagina (vagina dentata) is a gruesomely direct transcription 
of female power and male fear. Metaphorically, every vagina has secret 
teeth... In sex, the male is consumed and released again by the toothed 
power that bore him, the female dragon of nature... Man honoured but 
feared her. She was the black maw that had spat him forth and would 
devour him anew.'249
Closer to home, on the couch of western culture, there is Freudian psychoanalysis, 
whose Viennese hang-ups remain pertinent simply because they are still taken seriously 
by an awful lot of people. Freud's fear of the female genitalia is evident, apparently, in 
his accounts of his dream life250. Clearly he thought that these dreams were important. 
At least he was honest. Or was he? We shall skip the details.
Let us take it as given then that gender is a cultural construct and that as far as 
International Relations is concerned there is nothing naturally dominant about the balls 
and the dick and nothing innately submissive about the cunt, vulva, womb or vagina251.
245 "cunt n. (vulg.) Female genitals; (derog.) person, esp. woman. [ME, = ON kunta, MLG, 
MDu. kunte f. Gmc *kunton]" The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, p.249.
246 "vulva n. (Anat.) External female genitals, esp. external orifice of vagina; hence ~AR a., 
~I'TIS n. [L, = womb]", ibid, p. 1305.
247 womb (woom) n. Organ in woman and other female mammals in which child or young is 
conceived and nourished till birth, uterus, (fruit of the child(ren)); (fig) place of conception 
and development {future events in the womb o f  time). [OE wamb, womb, = OHG wamba, ON 
vomb, Goth, wamba]", ibid, p. 1342.
248 vagi'na n. {pi. ~ae or ~as). 1. Canal between womb and external genital orifice of female 
mammal; similar canal in insect etc; hence vaginl'TIS n. 2. (Bot) Sheath formed round stem by 
base of leaf. 3. Hence ~AL a. [L, = sheath, scabbard]", ibid, p.1283.
249 Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae, p.9, 13 & 14.
250 Paul Roazen, Freud And His Followers, p.464.
251 "dick n. 1. (si.) Take one's swear, affirm, (that), [abbr. of declaration] 2. CLEVER Dick; 
TOM, Dick, and Harry. 3. (vulg.) Penis." The Concise Oxford Dictionary, p.285. Also: 'Sex is
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When seeking an explanation for Sesostris' graffiti we naturally turn to the feminist 
historians, simply because they have had cause to think most deeply about the political 
economy of our pudenda for longer than anyone else.
Elise Boulding and Gerda Lemer both choose to pick up the story way back in 
the Paleolithic, with the evolution of the home base and the primary division of labour 
that took place between males and females252. The invention of the home base was 
important because of the development of prolonged dependency in the infant253. This 
was determined by our evolutionary gamble upon bipedalism and brainpower. In order 
for the ape to be able to walk on two legs the hips had to narrow. On the other hand in 
order to pack more brainpower per body the head had to bulge. This posed a profound 
design problem for the female pelvis, to which any woman in childbirth will testify. The 
improvised solution was to rely much more upon brain development in the child after 
birth and dramatically improve the quality and longevity of nurture. Other evolutionary 
adjustments meant that human infants also lost their hair and their ability to cling, so 
they had to be protected from the cold and carried by hand. Given the mortality rate it 
was essential for females to devote most of their adulthood to pregnancy and 
motherhood. All these factors limited female mobility and made necessary the home 
base to which food would be carried for sharing and preparation. Some hominids then 
diversified into big game hunting, which required more mobility than ever254. The first 
primordial division of labour thereby evolved, whereby men did the bulk of the big 
game hunting whilst women took control over the camp and did the small game hunting 
and gathering255.
At this stage there was no question of dominance or subordination. The division 
of labour between men and women just made practical sense. The two lifeworlds 
complemented each other and there was no sense of one being submissive to the other.
the biological given for men and women. Gender is the cultural definition of behaviour defined as 
appropriate to the sexes in a given society at a given time.' Lemer, op cit, p. 10. See also p.238.
252 Elise Boulding, The Underside o f History: A History o f Women Through Time (Revised 
Edition, Sage, London, 1992), Volume 1. Gerda Lemer, The Creation o f Patriarchy (Oxford, 
OUP, 1986).
253 Lemer, op cit, p.38-40. Boulding, op cit, p.58-62.
254 Boulding, op cit, p.65-66.
255 We are talking in abstract terms. There will always be someone who can come up with an 
obscure anthropological example where men and women share in the fun of big game hunting. I 
have decided to put my trust in the judgement of two respected feminist scholars.
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The roles of men and women had become separate but equal256. Within this division of 
labour both men and women developed the appropriate skills essential for group 
survival. Boulding suggests that the skills developed by women tended to be reproduced 
inclusively, because men were in a position to learn them as children whilst under the 
tutelage of their mothers257. Skills developed by men may well have offered more 
opportunities for the growth of an exclusive knowledge habit, the first hunting trip being 
a common rite of passage into male adulthood.
Nevertheless, female skills were as manifold as male skills and certainly as 
essential. Female and child gathering would supply up to 80% of the human diet by 
weight, and combined considerable botanical knowledge with conservation skills. 
Observations made by anthropologists living in hunter-gathering societies reveal that the 
women will teach their children where to find the most efficient quantities of resource 
bearing plants and trees in a given area. The women also teach how to leave emergency 
rations in place Tor next time1258. There was also a female reserve knowledge of survival 
skills, involving edible plants that were not normally used, being tough to chew, less 
tasty and so on, but which might see the next generation through prolonged shortages of 
the normal foods. The mystery of menstruation is also thought to have prompted women 
to record some of the first astronomical observations, using notched sticks or slates to 
notate relations between cycles within their own bodies and the lunar cycle beyond259. 
These calendrical findings could then be used to predict other natural cycles, such as 
pregnancies and seasons.
Boulding reasons that the camp was an important base for human innovation 
and that because women spent more time in and around the camp they were well placed 
to have been the primary innovators there. In hunter-gathering societies women are 
often skilled builders, making shelters out of trees, plants, mud and animal hides. 
Keepers of the home base are likely to have had the deepest motivation to develop the 
domestic use of fire, and the camp was a natural workshop where people could sit down 
and explore the potential of animal skins as garments. Being the primary gatherers, 
women would have been the first to spot the need for storage260. Seeds were nutritious
256 Lemer, op cit, p. 18 & 29.
257 Boulding, op cit.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid, p.71 & 78-81
260 Ibid, p.87-88.
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and easy to store, but could only be fully exploited if the women could teach each other 
how to weave containers out of withies, grind them from stone or mould them out of 
clay. Seeds were hard to digest without preparation, so the camp also had to develop the 
tekhne of food processing. Here humans conducted the first experiments with parching 
and boiling seeds, using containers over the campfire. The relative immobility of the 
camp also made it the natural site for research and development into heavy tools. Here 
humans found out how to use grindstones to make flour. These skills came in handy 
when meat started to become increasingly scarce as a result of incipient population 
pressure upon a dwindling supply of game. They formed the essential preconditions for 
the development of agriculture.
Women became aware that the men were staying away for longer at a time 
while coming back with less meat, and they began to consider how they could make up 
for this shortfall by making their own activities more productive261. They began to use 
the ecological knowledge they had built up over the generations to make timely 
interventions which would dramatically improve the fertility of nature:
'It would be inevitable that grains from sheaves of einkom carried in 
from a distant field would drop in well-trodden soil just outside the 
home base or perhaps in a nearby pile of refuse. When the band returned 
the following year to this camp site - perhaps a favourite one, given that 
not all camp sites were revisited - there would be a fine stand of einkom 
waiting for them right at their doorstep. Because of the construction of 
the seed, einkom easily plants itself, so it was a good plant for initiating 
humans into agriculture. We might say that the plants taught the women 
how to cultivate them.'262
Some of the game hunted was brought back alive to the camp. Confused baby goats and 
lambs tottering around the camp after their wild mothers had been eaten would have 
provided the first experiments in animal domestication and training. By keeping a stock 
of animals close to camp the women and children could raise meat instead of just having 
to wait for it. Gradually, the success of agriculture persuaded people to settle down and 
turn the camps into permanent villages.
Both Boulding and Lemer distance themselves from the branch of feminist 
thought that believes it has found a 'golden age' of matriarchy in the transition from the
261 Ibid, p.95.
262 Ibid, p.97.
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Paleolithic to the Neolithic263. Even so, both authors assume that the productive skills of 
women placed them in positions of considerable power during a period when the 
traditional hunting expeditions of the men were suffering from static or diminishing 
returns.
Boulding divides women's activities on the typical Neolithic village into three 
spheres: the hearth, the fields, and the courtyard264. Hearth activities included the 
cooking, feeding and care of infants. Field activities included: the gathering of fruit and 
nuts; the planting, cultivating and harvesting of crops; caring for sheep and goats; 
collecting fuel for the fires and finding the materials for building. The courtyard was 
where women spent much of their time together and where the productive, financial and 
knowledge based powers of the village tended to concentrate. This was where the 
communal food processing would get done, where women would make the textiles, do 
the basket weaving, brewing, pottery, stoneware and jewellery. It was also the place 
where the economic surplus would be stored and where village meetings, ceremonies 
and work routines would be organized. Lastly, it was the place where the women would 
exercise their control over the upbringing of their children, where many of the skills and 
beliefs of the next generation would be inculcated. The village courtyard tended to place 
women together at the centre of political and economic life. The hunting or fishing trips 
of the men tended to marginalise them away from the hearths, fields and courtyards for 
long periods or until the evenings when the day's work was done. By then, many 
important decisions would have already been made.
The decline of hunting and the rise of agriculture is likely to have been a 
difficult time for men. A major source of meaning was slowly being taken away from 
them. By the time historical records begin, hunting is already becoming a symbolic 
privilege of the male nobility. The exclusive skills of hunting were crucial for male 
identity because his experiences of childhood dependency would have taught him to 
associate woman with a profound fear of powerlessness. Tenderness and love have 
probably always been the major ingredients of mothering, but many boys are also likely 
to have emerged from childhood with an acute sense of the dark side of matriarchy. By 
our standards abuse was endemic, infanticide was the recognised means of population
263 Boulding, op cit, p.121-123. Lemer, op cit, p.27-35. For an example of the kind of thing that 
Boulding and Lemer choose to distance themselves from: Monica Sjoo & Barbara Mor, The 
Great Cosmic Mother: Rediscovering The Religion O f The Earth.
264 Boulding, op cit, p.l 13.
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control, and rejection by the mother meant certain death265. Increasingly prolonged runs 
of meagre returns from hunting trips would have brought men face to face with these 
old fears. The general failure to impress back at home base meant that those men who 
were lower down in the pecking order were liable to public humiliation, maybe even the 
harsh reality of just fading away from communal life. Under matrilineal and matrilocal 
kinship structure a husband could easily be thrown out if he did not please his wife or 
her family. He could expect to have a thin time of it if he failed to persuade another 
woman to take him in266. It is not hard to imagine how many men would have been on 
the lookout for new roles to compensate for the loss of the old. The dissemination of the 
plough as a means of soil preparation is thought to have been a major breakthrough. 
Plough work required the strength of men and was not an occupation for pregnant 
women or lactating mothers267. Care of the oxen and the use of the plough became the 
male preserve which gave men something to bargain with in agricultural affairs268.
As the Neolithic progressed there was an erosion of female power over 
production, finance and knowledge. One factor of decline was the existential obstacle of 
motherhood upon women's ability to respond to a multiplication in the division of 
labour269. As long as craft production was on a village scale women could hope to 
maintain their status as 'Jane of all trades'. But when surpluses were used to finance 
specialization it was the men who were able to take up the skills they had learnt as 
children from their mothers and develop them further in the city temples and workshops. 
Meanwhile, the women were left behind in the village courtyards, still using the old 
communal skills to bring up their children just as before. Boulding suggests that most 
women would have been so busy in their day to day lives that they simply did not have 
the time to look up and take a strategic look at what was happening around them. The 
relative decline of hunting meant that men had the leisure to think carefully about how 
to respond to any increase in the division of labour. As they did so, they carried over 
from the old hunting tradition the habits of knowledge exclusion that had been so 
crucial in the formation of male identity. Many women probably saw very well that this 
was a defensive move from their fathers, brothers, lovers and sons, and so may have 
even actively encouraged it. Initiation into the trade secrets of the city temple and the
265 Ibid, p.99-100. Also Lemer, op cit, p.39-40.
266 Boulding, op cit, p. 101.
267 Lemer, op cit, p.51.
268 Boulding, op cit, p. 139-140. Lemer, op cit, p.49-51.
269 Boulding, op cit, p. 12,112 & 126-127.
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workshop became the new rites of passage which allowed young men to declare 
independence from the call of mother, strengthen their confidence and validate a sense 
of worth.
Another way to maintain status was to cultivate the male potential for 
aggression. We may postulate that childbearing and other physiological factors did 
place women at a disadvantage when it came to the provision of organized violence, and 
that men who could provide it were often appreciated270. However, the asymmetric 
distribution of human aggression has probably been made to do more work than it 
should in modem thought about prehistory. Evolutionary arguments based on the male 
potential for aggression are often made by rather feeble middle class men who have 
never seen women really fight. Nor is there conclusive evidence that conflict in the 
Neolithic was a universal problem. When assessing the various archaeological and 
anthropological arguments, of course, Hobbes and Rousseau should always be on the 
shelf to sensitise us to our propensity to find what we wish to see, but as far as 
Mesopotamia is concerned we have already followed Nissan's advice that Ubaid conflict 
was marginal. Where violent conflict did occur, primitive societies could not always 
rely upon the luxury of a male warrior class. And where there was a male warrior class, 
this already qualifies as a form of civilized behaviour. If we apply strategic analysis to 
Strange's scenario of violence upon her desert island, for example, all things being 
equal, we may deduce that the prevailing group will be the one whose women can 
summon up latent reserves of aggression as well as the men. Clausewitz agrees271. So 
do the modem adherents of gender integration in the military. Boulding suggests that 
this is the grain of tmth that lies behind many of those scandalised Greek and Roman 
yams about the Amazonians272. To sum up, the male ability to contribute violent 
solutions to problems of conflict were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
early creation of power differentials between the sexes.
According to Lemer, a major factor that can explain the story of Sesostris' 
graffiti was the commodification of the reproductive capacities of woman273. Sexual 
exchange was the primordial form of international relations because even
270 Lemer, op cit, p.45-46.
271 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, 'Superiority Of Numbers', p.264-269.
272 Op cit, p.263.
273 Lemer, op cit, p.46-53.
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communitarians have genitals that are cosmopolitan by nature274. In time this is 
something that Strange's castaways will have to think about quite seriously. All 
primitive societies that have thrived have had to practice some form of sexual exchange. 
Partly this is a biological imperative because of the risk of genetic inbreeding within the 
community275. But over time humans learned that sexual exchange could also serve as a 
means to gain skills from and forge alliances with other groups. Our need for nurture 
meant that sexual exchange was culturally regulated within kinship structure. 
Anthropological observations reveal that the early regulation of sexual exchange tends 
to fall somewhere between two poles: matrilocal and patrilocal276. Hunter-gathering and 
horticultural economies will often develop kinship structures which are matrilocal, but 
as they shift toward agriculture they show a general propensity to become patrilocal. 
Lemer suggests that the shift toward patrilocality may be partly explained by 
Malthusian factors of population control. In late hunter-gathering societies childbearing 
women were a potential liability, so good diplomacy would seek to top up with more 
men who could hunt extensively and help secure control over scarce resources. In 
agricultural societies childbearing women became an economic asset because farming 
was labour intensive. The production of more food depended upon the availability of 
labour. Given that men do not produce children directly, the tribe holding more women 
could increase the labour supply more rapidly than the tribe with more men. Under such 
circumstances the shift from matrilocality to patrilocality would prove to be an 
advantage to those communities that achieved it.
Lemer stresses that women were active participants in the switch from 
matrilocal to patrilocal exchange. We need not suffer from any romantic delusions 
about female solidarity here277. Lemer cites anthropological examples where queens 
arrange inter-communal marriages to increase their own wealth and influence278. Only 
later did female exchange fall into the hands of men. In any case, to be selected for a 
career as a diplomatic bride may well have originally been seen as a privilege, 
conferring honour and status. Many marriages also held out the prospect of being
274 'When the famous Arletty was accused of having had sexual relations with members of the 
German occupation forces, her answer is said to have been: "My heart is French, but my fanny is 
international.'" Peter Sloterdijk, op cit, p. 148.
275 Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature, p.37-38.
276 Matrilocal exchange is where a married couple will go to live with the wife's family. Patrilocal 
exchange is where the couple will live with the husband's family.
277 On the existential possibility of a woman’s inhumanity to another see: Phyllis Chesler, 
Woman’s Inhumanity to Woman.
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upwardly mobile, involving promotion to communities that were higher up in the world 
pecking order. However, using the work of Levi Strauss, Meillassoux and others, Lemer 
argues that overall the exchange of women had consequences far beyond those which 
women or men originally intended. The act of displacement from kith and kin can leave 
humans feeling exposed and vulnerable. This is so for both men and women. But once 
the tradition of patrilocality was up and running it began to dawn on people how, under 
similar conditions of displacement, women could be made more vulnerable than men. 
This made them easier to subordinate and assimilate. The two things went together and 
made women less risky for use as diplomatic pawns:
'Supposing grown men were exchanged among tribes, what would 
ensure their loyalty to the tribe to which they were traded? Men's bond 
to their offspring was not, then, strong enough to ensure their submission 
for the sake of their children. Men would be capable of violence against 
members of the strange tribe; with their experience in hunting and long 
distance travel they might easily escape and then return as warriors to 
seek vengence. Women, on the other hand, would be more easily 
coerced, most likely by rape. Once married or mothers of children they 
would give loyalty to their children and to their children's relatives and 
thus make a potentially strong bond with the tribe of affiliation.'279
Under patrilocality the community would give away a daughter for marriage with the 
same kind of solemnity as the modem statesman signs a treaty. It was a token of 
commitment. The daughter was the ideal bargaining chip because on the one hand she 
was reasonably dear to the donor family and thus a potential hostage if the alliance 
turned sour. On the other hand her reproductive potential could be used to quickly 
assimilate her into the new community and thus serve as a bridge between them both. 
Given that the exchange was consummated by marriage, it is not hard to imagine how 
the vulva became associated with the idea of male ownership. The by-product of the 
exchange of women was that it reified their sexuality and fertility, and thus helped to 
usher in the formation of abstract property.
Even so, the diplomatic marriage was still seen as a partnership, and as such 
implied the existence of mutual obligations. Man now had rights in woman that woman 
did not have in man. But as yet woman was still only mother, wife or pawn. She was not 
yet also a slave. This was the next stage in the subordination of women, according to 
Lemer, where the vulva takes on the additional connotations of surrender and
278 Lemer, op cit, p.48.
279 Ibid, p.47-48.
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domination280. Many authorities have argued that the practice of slavery originated out 
of war and conquest281. Most historians dealing with the subject of ancient slavery also 
note that the great majority of those first enslaved were women282. Early in the 
formation of primary civilizations it became common practice to kill the males of a 
beaten enemy and then enslave the women and their children. Lemer argues that this 
was because:
'The crucial invention, over and above that of brutalizing another human 
being... is the possibility of designating the group to be dominated as 
entirely different from the group exerting dominance. Naturally, such a 
difference is most obvious when those to be enslaved are members of a 
foreign tribe, literally "others". Yet in order to extend the concept and 
make the enslaved into slaves, somehow other than human, men must 
have known that such a designation would indeed work. We know that 
mental constructs usually derive from some model in reality and consist 
of a new ordering of past experience.'283
The exchange of women as diplomatic pawns had given men the habit of seeing woman 
as a commodity. So when it came to war, the victors naturally saw the defeated in terms 
of the enemy and his property in women. This property could be divided up amongst the 
victors. Men had learned over the years the mental construct and the technique which 
could both be developed to coerce the women of the defeated communities into slavery. 
The means for extending this enslavement to male prisoners of war had not yet been 
worked out and was too dangerous, so they had to be killed.
Orlando Patterson has isolated three major techniques that processed captured 
women toward the acceptance of enslavement284. First, the slaughter of the menfolk 
made it clear to the women that their new status was a substitute for violent death, and 
that this was conditional on submissive behaviour. Second, the women and children 
were put through a social process of natal alienation. That is to say they were stripped of 
any claims to social existence apart from that of ownership by the master: their men 
were killed, their homes were put to the fire and their land was given away for 
resettlement by others. The mothers and children would be separated from their kin, as 
the victors divided up the booty. Then they would be severed from their geographical 
bearings by being transported many miles away from homes that no longer existed
280 Lemer, op cit, p.77-100.
281 Ibid, p.76.
282 Ibid, p.78.
283 Ibid, p.77.
284 Ibid, p.78.
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anyway. Thirdly, male ownership over the body of the female slave was established by 
the systematic use of a disempowerment ritual pioneered under the system of patrilocal 
exchange:
'The impact on the conquered of the rape of conquered women was 
twofold: it dishonoured the women and by implication served as a 
symbolic castration of their men. Men in patriarchal societies who 
cannot protect the sexual purity of their wives, sisters, and children are 
truly impotent and dishonoured. The practice of raping the women of a 
conquered group has remained a feature of warfare and conquest from 
the second millennium BC to the present.'285
'Physical terror and coercion, which were an essential ingredient in the 
process of turning free persons into slaves, took, for women, the form of 
rape. Women were subdued physically by rape; once impregnated, they 
might become psychologically attached to their masters. From this 
derived the institutionalization of concubinage, which became the social 
instrument for integrating captive women into the households of their 
captors, thus assuring their captors not only their loyal services but those 
of their offspring.'286
Combining previous experience with the capacity for experiment, men learnt that with 
such methods women could be persuaded to endure enslavement and would adapt to it 
as best they could. It started in Mesopotamia and Egypt, then it spread to Syria- 
Palestine, Anatolia and the Aegean. The cultural impact of this upon the classical world 
is breathtaking. Herodotus begins his account of the Persian wars with the question of 
'women stealing'287. Homer's heroes are consummate professionals in the business of 
female enslavement, as we shall see later. The whole plot of the Iliad revolves around 
the question of how best to divide up the booty of a conquered city without conflict. 
This was the wisdom used during the Peloponnesian war so succinctly summarised by 
the war weary Thucydides: 'they killed the men of military age, made slaves of the 
women and children, and gave the land to the Plateans'288.
This is not to say that there were no male slaves, even as early as Sumer. By 
experimenting with the enslavement of women and children, men soon came to 
understand that all human beings had the potential for tolerating enslavement. The first 
adult male slaves would have been the captured children who subsequently became
285 Ibid, p.80.
286 Ibid, p.87.
287 Herodotus, op cit, p. 1-5, standard reference: Book 1 ,1-6
288 Thucydides, op cit. (Lemer cites three examples, op cit, p.85-86, but the Greek historian's text 
is littered with them).
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mature slaves, or the male progeny of rape who were thus bom into slavery. Having 
grown up with their chains, subordination would have been etched into their very 
bodies. By the beginning of the second millennium slavery in women and men was 
becoming widespread. The slave trade in men and women thrived particularly well 
along the Mediterranean coast, where sea transport opened up new opportunities for 
subordination and reduced transaction costs. But because male slavery was an extension 
of female slavery, the iconography of sexual domination was carried over to the male 
slaves.
The practice of castration is particularly interesting in this respect, another 
innovation credited to the Sumerians which has been widely copied throughout the 
civilized world. Here the symbol of male power is physically removed from the slave. 
But castration was only necessary for the sensitive parts of the temple or palace 
bureaucracy, because most male slaves were thought to be like women anyway: that is 
to say, effeminate people whom it was possible to enslave. Communities which assessed 
the odds and decided to yield were 'no better than women' because power had become 
conceptually related to sexual violence. This explains why the Sesostris legend of male 
and female pudenda had resonance for historians like Herodotus and Manetho. The balls 
and the penis had become instruments of domination. Distinctions of subordination 
became laced with genital overtones because the tekhne of human property had been 
pioneered in the realm of sexual violence.
Where did the enslaved women and children come from? In Mesopotamia the 
Akkadian cuneiform sign for 'female slave' was 'woman' plus 'mountain', which would 
suggest anywhere along the mountian chain that stretches right from western Iran to 
south-west Anatolia289. During the Uruk phase the first chattels were probably taken 
from the settlements lying along the upper reaches of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Later 
on, some of the slaves would have come from inter-city rivalries within Mesopotamia 
itself. Many more would have then been provided by the secondary states which had 
begun to encircle the Mesopotamian delta. By the turn of the second millennium there 
are also recorded instances of an internal source of slaves within the city state itself. 
This was the problem which the communitarian Greeks were to confront a thousand 
years or more later. Slavery outside the community inevitably leads to slavery inside the
289 Ibid, p.86.
145
community. By the time that the Laws o f Hammurabi were written, early in the second 
millennium, the legal infrastructure was in place for the father to pawn his own family:
'Hammurabi's Laws, ~117: I f  a debt has brought about the seizure o f a 
man and he has delivered his wife or his son or his daughter for silver, 
or has delivered them as persons distrained for debt, fo r  three years 
they shall serve in the house o f the buyer or distrainer; in the fourth 
year their freedom shall be established.'290
In Egypt the women and children would originally have come from the three 
main spheres of Egyptian military action: Nubia; Libya and Syria-Palestine. In our 
discussion of the story of Sinuhe the Egyptian, for example, we noted that Sinuhe was a 
harem official attached to a military campaign in Libya, and that he was probably 
working in the field of procurement. With the defeated males, according to Sinuhe, the 
good king Sesostris 'slakes his thirst by crushing skulls'. After this the first task of the 
harem-military-attache was to act on the king's behalf when it came to the division of 
the spoils. His next task was to ensure that the selected women were returned to the 
palace in good condition. That was the Middle Kingdom. By the New Kingdom (1566- 
1080 BC), the slave racket is so familiar that it is being parodied:
When the victory is won His Majesty distributes the plunder for the 
return march to Egypt; (but) the Asiatic woman is exhausted by the 
march and is put on the shoulders of the soldiers.'291
The greed of the master becomes his burden. Arguably this subtle hint of satire 
anticipates the relationship between Xanthias and Dionysus in The Frogs292. 
Meanwhile, as far as the selfish gene is concerned, men and women have an equal 
number of chromosomes...
(2.11) Civilization is mortal: 'Would that I were not born amongst the fifth age of 
men, but either dead earlier or born later!'293
290 Quoted in Saggs, op cit, p. 157.
291 Redford, op cit, p.221.
292 Aristophanes, The Frogs: 1-41.
293 Hesiod, Works And Days, translated by M.L. West, (Oxford, OUP, 1988).
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One day in about 1200 BC a merchant ship was sailing from the Levant towards 
the Aegean. The vessel was laden with a ton of metal cargo, ready made ingots of 
copper, tin and bronze, plus a miscellaneous assortment of metal goods for scrap. On 
board was a merchant who owned a cosmopolitan set of standard weights that enabled 
him to trade with merchants from Egypt, Syria-Palestine, Cyprus, Anatolia, Crete and 
mainland Greece. He also carried a personal cylinder seal, which means he must have 
had some deposits of wealth stashed away somewhere in at least one of his ports of call. 
The merchant was also a tinker who could work the metals himself, carrying anvils, 
hammers, rubbers, polishers, a whetstone, a hammer and a punch. Some of the crew 
were supplementing their income by doing a little trade of their own on the side, 
carrying coloured beads, pottery and other brie a brae. It was a fairly routine voyage on 
a well known shipping lane that took advantage of a westward current which runs along 
the coast of Anatolia. But when the ship approached the southernmost point of the 
Anatolian peninsula, Cape Gelidonya, things started to go wrong. Perhaps the westward 
current was unusually strong on that particular day, or maybe an unexpected southerly 
wind took the crew by surprise. Whatever the reason, when attempting to sail between 
two islands near the mainland the ship ran onto some rocks and sank in nearly thirty 
metres of water. The prospects for the survivors were not good. The two desert islands 
nearby consisted of barren rock with no fresh water.
We know all this because the shipwreck in question was excavated in 1960 by a 
team of marine archaeologists led by George Bass and Peter Throckmorton294. Later in 
his career Bass led the excavation of another Bronze Age wreck slightly further along 
the coast at Ulu Burun295. This ship appears to have sunk slightly earlier, in the 
fourteenth century BC, and carried a much more diverse cargo. This included: copper, 
tin and silver ingots; bronze tools and weapons; gold and silver jewelery; glass ingots 
with colouring materials; glass beads; purple dye for textiles; unworked hippopotamus 
and elephant ivory; logs of Egyptian ebony; an eclectic selection of pottery and fifty two 
amphorae containing about a ton of resin which is thought to have been intended for 
aromatic purposes. Analysis has also confirmed that the ship carried oils, fruits, nuts,
294 George Bass, (1967), 'Cape Gelidonya: A Bronze Age Shipwreck', Transactions O f The 
American Philosophical Society, NS 57.8.
295 Bass, (1986), 'A Bronze Age Shipwreck at Ulu Burun (Kas): 1984 Campaign', American 
Journal o f Archaeology, 90, p.269-297. Also: Bass, Pulak, Collon & Weinstein, (1989), 'The 
Bronze Age Shipwreck at Ulu Burun: 1986 Campaign', American Journal o f  Archaeology, 93, 
p. 1-29.
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spices and other organic products both for trade and shipboard use296. The presence of 
the merchant is indicated once again by standard weights designed for scales, but also 
by the discovery of three cylinder seals. One of the seals is Mycenaean. Another is from 
Kassite Mesopotamia. The third is an Old Babylonian seal recycled for fourteenth 
century use with an Assyrian retread. Perhaps the most sensational find was a diptych. 
This consists of two wooden leaves that fold together by an ivory hinge. The wooden 
leaves were recessed and scored with crosshatching to hold a beeswax writing surface. 
The beauty of the diptych was that the beeswax could be melted to produce a fresh 
surface, providing a convenient form of erasure. The diptych thus became popular as a 
teaching tool for apprentice scribes, for diplomatic and business correspondence, for 
temporary jottings, dictation and first drafts297. Its presence in the wreck suggests that 
Linear A and B were probably not the only scripts sloshing around in the Aegean during 
the Late Bronze Age.
Taken together, the two shipwrecks help provide a vivid picture of the 
international political economy of Late Bronze Age civilization in the Mediterranean 
between about 1400-1200 BC. It is a time of intensive trade, travel, interdependency and 
cultural interaction. This interaction is complex and multi-directional, and cannot be 
contained within the traditional paradigms of 'thalassocracy' or ’pax egyptica'. The 
Gelidonya ship, for example, belongs to an independent merchant venturer risking his 
life for a fortune on the high seas. In this case he happens to be Syrian but, judging from 
his cosmopolitan set of weights, he might just as easily have been Anatolian, Egyptian, 
Cypriot, Cretan or Greek. The Ulu Burun wreck lies toward the other end of the trade 
spectrum. Its cargo of elite luxuries is described almost verbatim in several of the letters 
found in the Egyptian diplomatic archive at el Amama, which suggests that this vessel 
involves the agency and direct intervention of the state298. Furthermore, royal merchants 
are working in collaboration with merchants from other states, as is suggested by the 
Mycenaean, Kassite and Assyrian seals found on board the Ulu Burun wreck. If they 
had not been sunk, the goods on board the two wrecks would have been destined for 
Helladic citadels such as the ones found at Mycenae, Tiryns, Athens or Pylos299. These 
were the major centres which could proffer sufficient quantities of surplus in the form
296 Cheryl Haldane, (1993), 'Direct evidence for organic cargoes in the Late Bronze Age', World 
Archaeology, Volume 24 No.3, p.348-359.
297 Bass, (1989), op cit, p. 10-11. Leila Avrin, Scribes, Script And Books, p.68-9, 143-4, 165-7.
298 Bass, (1986), op cit, p.293. Haldane, op cit, p.348-9.
299 Pylos was not a citadel, but a palace without defensive walls.
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of oil, wine and pottery, which both vessels would have been laden with on their return 
voyage to the Levant. These were the Aegean centres which housed the specialized 
craftsmen who could work with exotic raw materials such as ivory and thus support the 
appetites of chieftains trying to ape the opulence of the Near Eastern palace.
The two shipwrecks also provide us with clues that can help us understand the 
fragility of Bronze Age civilization in the Mediterranean which was to have such 
catastrophic consequences in the Aegean after 1200 BC. The goods found on both 
wrecks show that the specialization of labour within the production structures of the 
Helladic citadels was highly dependent upon the security of transport and trade, both 
within the Aegean and with the Levantine ports of the Near East300. Greek soils were 
never fertile enough to support the densities of population achievable on the alluvial 
plains of Mesopotamia or Egypt. The larger Mycenaean towns were no bigger than a 
fair-sized village of Early Dynastic Mesopotamia301. To satisfy their appetite for 
symbolic capital in the form of luxury goods and strategic capital in the form of bronze 
weaponry, the Helladic chieftains had to support their craftsmen with enough food to 
live and the raw materials with which to work. When it came to wealth in subsistence 
terms, Greece thus had to become technically overpopulated if its gods were to become 
players in the Bronze Age international political economy. The citadel-towns were 
probably self-sufficient in food during good years, but would need assistance to 
overcome the bad years. We need to bear in mind that the population of Greece during 
the 14th and 13th centuries BC was more dense than it would be until the fifth, when 
imports of grain to cities such as Athens were common302. When it came to wealth in 
the form of raw materials for Bronze Age manufactures, the Helladic economy was poor 
in the crucial area of metals and many other prestige materials. The drive to export 
productive surpluses in textiles, oil, wine and pottery was thus crucial to finance the 
Helladic political economy, and the major source of supply and demand for all these 
imports and exports lay in the Levantine ports of Cyprus and Syria-Palestine.
Security over trade along the Levantine coast during the 14th and 13th centuries 
BC was dependent upon a delicate Late Bronze Age world order. We only have space
300 The following account of collapse is mainly inspired by the 
historiographical legwork of Sandars, The Sea Peoples, plus the 
theoretical acumen of Tainter, The Collapse o f  Complex Societies.
301 Renfrew, op cit, p.244.
302 Vermeule, op cit, p.257.
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here to outline a few contours of this world order. To the east, authority in Mesopotamia 
was divided between Kassite Babylonia and Assyria. In the 14th century the foreign 
policies of these two powers were mainly preoccupied with the urgency of local affairs, 
tending to concentrate upon relations toward each other, and upon the rise of the 
Elamite state in Iran and the decline of the confederation of Hurrian states called 
Mitanni, based in the Jezireh303. To the west, authority over the eastern Mediterranean 
was dominated by the Hittites of Anatolia and New Kingdom Egypt. The Egyptian and 
Hittite diplomatic archives testify that all these states communicated with each other in 
Akkadian, by now the conventional diplomatic language of the Near East. By this time 
the ancient world had become so extensive, diverse and fluid that the pantheon as a 
form of intertheocratic organization was unworkable, so the gods delegated the conduct 
of diplomacy to their leading human representatives who, by recognizing each other as 
relatively autonomous subjects, now shared with each other the secrets of conscious 
being. This secret knowledge was shared by using the metaphor of the family together 
with all its connotations of kinship and rivalry. Thus diplomatic communications had a 
universally recognised means of codifying intertheocratic relations through the 
patriarchal terms of 'father', 'son' or 'brother'304. To address another king as 'my father' 
implied the acceptance of seniority, to address him as a ‘son’ implied its assumption, 
whilst the address of 'my brother' was a claim to mutual equality. Another key indicator 
of world order was that warfare between these states and their proxies was conducted 
according to an accepted set of rules and procedures. The widespread use of the chariot, 
for example, required certain rules of engagement, being unsuitable for rough ground305. 
Dynastic marriages between all the major powers were particularly common at this 
time, so that dynasties everywhere became inter-related and were in fact, a true 
family306. Another convention that helped to develop an intertheocratic ruling class was 
the practice of accepting the sons of vassal rulers for tutelage by the overlord. Many 
kings of Syria-Palestine, for example, were alumnae from the top colleges of the 
Egyptian court.
Although the Hittite and Egyptian courts were rivals jockeying for power over 
Syria-Palestine for most of the Late Bronze Age, the stalemate between these two
303 'Jezirah: Area between upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in modem Iraq and 
Syria. It is the Arabic term for island.' Knapp, op cit, p.282.
304 Saggs, op cit, p. 182.
305 Sandars, op cit, p.32.
306 Saggs, op cit, p.181.
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hegemons provided a source of stability within which mercantile trade in the 
Mediterranean prospered. The network of strategic alliances between 1400-1200 BC 
were dynamic and complex, but a crude rule of thumb would place the crucial port of 
Ugarit on the Syrian coast under Hittite protection, whilst the ports of Byblos, Sidon, 
Acre and Tyre were typically under the hegemony of Egypt307. Meanwhile, Enkomi and 
Kition on the copper rich island of Cyprus were isolated and wealthy enough to 
maintain a measure of independence until the close of the 13th century, keeping both the 
Hittite and Egyptian courts sweet with handsome payments of tribute. Within this 
security structure the vassal ports of the Levant were allowed a degree of commercial 
autonomy that enabled them to become important centres of mercantile power. Given 
the mutual need for exchange, the two superpowers tended to respect their commercial 
neutrality, and thus they became affluent cosmopolitan freeports. Ugarit, for example, 
boasted merchants using Hittite, Egyptian, Akkadian, Human, Canaanite and other 
scripts. It was this rich mixture of scribal traditions which provided the synergy that 
inspired the first forerunners of the alphabet308. Bass reasons that the wrecks at Ulu 
Burun and Cape Gelidonya would have left from Ugarit, Byblos, Sidon or Tyre and then 
stopped off at Enkomi or Kition before heading toward the Aegean.
By 1200 BC this Late Bronze Age world order was beginning to fall apart. The 
older models of Bronze Age collapse have tended to seek external causes for this 
breakdown in the form of barbarian hordes such as the Dorians', 'Gasga tribes' and 'Sea 
Peoples'. More recent models of collapse tend to look more toward internal causes, 
working from the reasonable assumption that the decision makers of the Late Bronze 
Age are unlikely to have been any more rational than our own. The dynasties had 
managed to improvise a conscious alternative to the pantheon but, to be succinct, levels 
of complex economic interdependency had been achieved by the late 13th century BC 
which were beyond the political competence of the ruling dynasties to sustain. The 
'father-son-brother' paradigm of intertheocratic relations was simply unable to find an 
adequate response to the demands which the Late Bronze Age made upon it. The ruling 
classes of the Late Bronze Age consequently destroyed their webs of interdependency 
through the pursuit of sibling rivalries they could no longer afford, and in doing so, 
destroyed themselves.
307 One school of thought has the Hittite sphere of influence sweeping down the Levant at the 
expense of Egypt during the reign of Akhenaten, including the loss of Byblos. But see Kuhrt, op 
cit, p. 196-7.
308 Knapp, op cit, p. 189-191.
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The collapse became such a bewildering torrent of actions and interactions that 
it is impossible to find a truly satisfactory point from which to begin a narrative, but 
Sandars chooses the battle of Kadesh as the point where the political equilibrium 
between Hittite Anatolia and Egypt took its first wobble, though as yet the impending 
chaos was about as far off in the future as a typhoon caused by an eddy from the wings 
of a butterfly. In the spring of 1286 BC Ramses II led an army from Egypt toward Syria- 
Palestine with the aim of recovering the hegemony it had enjoyed there during the 15th 
century. Meanwhile, Muwatallis, having been forewarned by an Egyptian razzia the 
year before, plus a provocative defection by the frontline state of Ammuru, led his 
Hittite forces from Anatolia toward Syria-Palestine with the intention of defending 
gains made there against Egypt during the 14th century. Ramses II was a young man 
with the high expectations of his court weighing on his shoulders. In his haste to take 
the city of Kadesh he led his army straight into an ambush laid by the Hittites, and was 
fortunate to be able to turn what could have been a total rout into an orderly retreat. The 
battle of Kadesh had resulted in a clear victory for Muwatallis, but the war turned out to 
be a defeat for both sides.
When Ramses II returned home the spin-doctors immediately got to work, 
turning the retreat from Kadesh into a crushing victory, but the truth was not so easily 
manipulated back in Syria-Palestine. Benteshina, the hapless king of Ammuru, who had 
tragically been made an Egyptian offer he could not refuse and switched his vassalage 
from Muwatallis to Ramses II on the very eve of the conflict, was deposed by the 
Hittites and carted off to Anatolia as a traitor309. This fate was a salutary example to 
contemporary Syrian kings who may otherwise have been disposed to give Egyptian 
overtures a favourable hearing and contemplate secession from the Hittite embrace. 
Egyptian dreams of hegemony over the trade routes of Syria were finished, but things 
were even worse than that. As Ramses and his army fled, the Hittites harried them as far 
south as Damascus310. This spectacle of undignified retreat meant that the Egyptian aura 
of invincibility was shattered even in Palestine. The security value of vassalage toward 
Egypt slumped. Many Palestinian kings began to eye the north nervously, vacillate, or 
even openly rebelled and withheld their tribute payments. Egyptian recognition of its 
widespread slump in authority over Palestine is evident in a strengthening of its
309 Redford, op cit, p. 183 & 185. Compare with: Goetze, The Hittites And Syria', in The 
Cambridge Ancient History, volume II part 2, p.252 & 254.
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fortifications around the north eastern Delta311. After three years of licking his wounds 
and making sure that the perception of Egyptian weakness did not spread to Nubia and 
Libya, Ramses II spent the next eleven years worth of summer campaigns besieging the 
towns of Palestine, trying to regain the ground lost at the battle of Kadesh.
Despite the glorious victory at Kadesh the years of war with Egypt also had 
serious consequences for the Hittite king Muwatallis. His forces were overstretched. 
Back in Anatolia a number of Gasga chieftains had taken advantage of the temporary 
depletion of Hittite forces to make predatory raids on the northern frontier. The gravity 
of the Gasga threat is evident in the fact that Muwatallis had already moved his capital 
from Hattusas to a more southerly site as a precautionary measure before his departure 
to fight the Egyptians312. This move turned out to be fully justified when Hattusas was 
taken and sacked. Exhausting campaigns in the north against the Gasga were going to be 
necessary to re-establish authority there. But there was an even greater threat brewing to 
the east. Whilst the Hittites were fighting the Egyptians the Assyrian king Adadnirari 
seized his moment to conquer the Hittite vassal states of Mitanni, stopping just short of 
Carchemish on the Euphrates. By this time Assyria had been knocking on the door of 
•brother' status for over a century, but now that the buffer states of Mitanni had been 
eliminated Muwatallis and Adadnirari were neighbours. Hittite control over the strategic 
trade route down the Euphrates to Mesopotamia was under threat. Given that the 
Mitanni had paid tribute to Muwatallis, the Hittite ability to protect its vassal states 
against Assyria was now in question.
After annexing the Mitanni Adadnirari sent a carefully nuanced diplomatic 
letter to Muwatallis, addressing him as a 'brother' and 'requesting' to be allowed to visit 
the Amanus 'silver mountains' which lay within Hittite territory. If this was an offer of 
rapprochement from Adadnirari, on the proviso that his annexation of Mitanni be 
accepted along with the recognition of status as a brother with right of access to the 
Hittite silver markets, Muwatallis was having none of it. In his letter of reply 
Muwatallis admitted that Adadnirari had a perfect right to call himself a 'great king' 
having seized Mitanni, but:
310 Goetze, op cit, p.254.
311 Redford, op cit, p. 185.
312 Goetz, 'Anatolia From Shuppiluliumash To The Egyptian War Of Muwatallish', The 
Cambridge Ancient History, volume II part 2, p. 129.
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'as for brotherhood, and your visit to the Amanus mountains - why 
should I write to you about brotherhood? You and I - were we perhaps 
bom of the same mother or father?'313
The rebuff is an indication that Muwatallis intended to take on Assyria in his next great 
campaign, leaving his brother Hattusilis behind to defend the northern territories against 
the Gasga. But fate intervened. Muwatallis died suddenly in 1282 BC without leaving a 
legitimate heir. A succession crisis ensued. Constitutional procedures were invoked to 
install the eldest son of one of his concubines to the throne, namely Urkhi-Teshub, who 
assumed the royal title of Mursilis HI314. A campaign to check the Assyrian threat was 
soon out of the question however, because Mursilis HI suspected that his uncle 
Hattusilis had designs on the throne. Hattusilis had acquired considerable prestige both 
through his role in the victory at Kadesh, and through his successful command of recent 
victories against the Gasga. He had also begun to cultivate friends who had had quarrels 
with Muwatallis and Mursilis HI.
When Mursilis HI finally moved to check his uncle's power by reducing the 
territories under his control (he took them all away from me and made me small') 
Hattusilis responded with a well planned coup which split the Hittite alliance. Most of 
the nobility took the uncle's side, but the Arzawa-lands in western Anatolia supported 
Mursilis HI. When Hattusilis finally defeated Mursilis HI and proclaimed himself king 
in 1275 BC, most of these western lands disappear from the Hittite records and we have 
to assume they took advantage of the civil conflict to secede from Hittite control315. 
Hattusilis had achieved his ambition, but his state now faced enemies on four fronts: the 
Egyptians along the Levant; the Gasga chieftains to the north; the Assyrians to the east; 
and the Arzawa lands to the west who were busy recruiting allies from the Aegean to 
help consolidate their secession. In desperation Hattusilis moved with swift adroitness 
to try to repair the damage. First, he negotiated a mutual defence treaty with Kassite 
Babylonia against the event of Assyrian aggression. This was of limited use in the long 
term because the Kassite dynasty was on the wane, but it checked the Assyrians in the 
short term and brought Hattusilis time to campaign in the Troad and protect the vital tin 
route to the Balkans316. Second, Hattusilis despatched an embassy to Egypt proposing a
313 Kuhrt, op cit, p.354.
314 Goetz, 'The Hittites And Syria', op cit, p.256-7.
315 Macqueen, op cit, p.49.
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treaty of peace317. Having spent eleven exhausting years trying to claw back authority in 
Palestine and sensing that the strength of Assyria was becoming a mutual threat, 
Ramsses II responded positively to the Hittite overture. A treaty between the two old 
enemies was agreed in 1269, leading to a half century of unprecedented peace and 
prosperity on the Levant, an indian summer of open borders and thriving commerce.
However, the Hittite regime was still under pressure from Assyria, the Gasga 
and the western lands. Hattusilis was constantly on the defensive. Whenever he moved 
to check one opponent the other two would threaten while his back was turned. Part of 
the problem was the proto-feudal security structure upon which the Hittites relied. This 
worked well during periods of expansion when the king could use the power of 
patronage to motivate his staff, but when things were going badly the inevitable 
cutbacks sowed dissention in the ranks318. After pausing for breath with the death of 
Adadnirari in 1275 BC, the Assyrians consolidated their hold over the states of Mitanni. 
The new Assyrian king, Shalmaneser, eliminated the old vassal kings of Mitanni and 
replaced them with Assyrian officials, and populations were uprooted and resettled. 
Hittite forces temporarily managed to arrest the Assyrian advances in Syria around the 
city of Carchemish, but then Shalmaneser's forces began to inch their way up the valleys 
into Anatolia on the eastern side of the Euphrates. Eventually they managed to seize 
control of the copper mines of Isuwa. This was a serious strategic blow to the Hittites, 
Isuwa hitherto being their primary source of the metal319. When Hattusilis died in 1245 
BC, his son Tudhaliyas IV resorted to the invasion of Cyprus in order to secure control 
over an alternative source of copper. To do this he had to enlist the fleet of the vassal 
state of Ugarit and thus become dependent upon a maritime power. We may imagine 
that this act would not have been popular with the Helladic kings of the Aegean, for 
whom Cyprus was an important source of copper and a gateway to the flourishing 
markets of the Levant.
Sometime after the accession of Tukulti-Ninurta to the Assyrian throne in 1244 
BC, the new king took a campaign across the Euphrates deeper into Syria. On one stela 
Tukulti-Ninurta claims to have taken prisoner and deported 28,000 Hittite subjects320. 
Tudhaliyas tried to retaliate by leading an army across the Euphrates in the opposite
317 Redford, op cit, p.189-90.
318 Sandars, op cit, p.32.
319 Macqueen, op cit, p.50.
320 Knapp, op cit, p. 194.
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direction, taking the fight to the Assyrians. The result was a resounding defeat321. The 
fallout from this and other losses produced another bout of internal disunity within the 
Hittite dynasty and its records complain of sinister conspiracies. At one stage 
Tudhaliyas' cousin Kurunta, the king of Tarhuntassa, appears to have attempted a coup 
to seize the Hittite throne. This attempt was eventually put down, but did nothing to 
enhance Hittite authority abroad. The vassal states of Syria started to become lax in 
making their tribute payments. The king of Ugarit prudently began to enter into 
diplomatic correspondence with the king of Assyria322. From here on, the decline of the 
Hittite state is evident in the way the records become more sporadic. After the death of 
Tudhaliyas in about 1215 BC the throne passes to his son Amuwandas, of whom we 
know nothing except that he was reduced to trying to buy off the raids of the Gasga with 
tribute and that he died after a short reign of about five years. By now the perennial war 
efforts had exhausted the immunity of the Hittite political economy to natural disaster. 
Harvests were failing and Egypt, presumably alarmed by the strategic implications of 
Hittite decline, was now seeking to prop up its old foe by sending aid shipments of grain 
to ward off famine323. The last king of the Hittite state, Suppiluliumas n, clung on for 
about five years, after which the records fall silent and the Hittite capital of Hattusa was 
destroyed.
The reason we have devoted so much space to the decline of the Hittite state is 
that its fall, when it came, removed a source of stability in the Mediterranean, leading to 
a political and economic crisis of extraordinary ferocity. The last annals and diplomatic 
letters of the ruling dynasties of Hittite Anatolia, Ugarit and Cyprus suggest a 
widespread breakdown of international security obligations amidst a background of 
chaos, confusion and mutual recrimination. In one letter that has survived the last Hittite 
king complains bitterly of an alliance betrayed:
■You were not beside me. Did I not go alone to Nihirija and when the 
enemy tried to capture a part of Hurri Land (Hatti), and I was left totally 
deserted in the town of Alatarma.'324
The last tablet in the Hittite archive boasts of a victory against an unidentified enemy, 
but the context of the battle reveals how desperate things had become. The battle is over
321 Gurney, The Hittites, p.31.
322 Ibid.
323 Macqueen, op cit, p.50-51.
324 Sandars, op cit, p. 139.
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Cyprus. The Hittites are clearly struggling to maintain authority over what had been 
their major source of copper since the Assyrian advance in eastern Anatolia:
1 mobilised, with speed, I Suppiluliumas the Great, I reached the sea.
The ships of Alashiya (Cyprus) came up against me and gave battle, 
three times at sea... when I arrived on dry land the enemy came against 
me to do battle in multitudes...'325
The most disturbing thing about the enemy is that he seems to erupt from outside the 
margins of the hrother-father-son' paradigm. He has no T  to whom a diplomatic letter 
might be addressed, and cannot be identified as a legitimate subject in the great game of 
war and diplomacy. If the ships of the enemy are from Cyprus, where is the king of 
Cyprus who was supposed to be a Hittite vassal? He is locked inside his citadel writing 
to the king of Ugarit, trying to place responsibility elsewhere:
'Greetings to yourself, and to your country. As to those matters 
concerning the enemy. It was indeed men of your country and your boats 
that did it, your people were indeed responsible for that offence, but 
don't complain to me. The 20 boats that the enemy left previously in the 
mountainous parts did not stay there, but they went off suddenly, and 
now we don't know where to look for them. I write to inform you, and to 
put you on your guard.'326
Sovereignty seems to be breaking up. Part of the problem was the cohorts of 
mercenaries the Late Bronze Age kings habitually used in their wars against each other. 
When the vassal kings became increasingly exposed as their hegemon fell, many of 
these mercenaries began to spot opportunities to improve their income by raiding on 
their own account. Some of the raids may have been sponsored by local kings too, on a 
strictly non-attributable basis of course, because once Hittite hegemony crumbled local 
rivalries previously subdued could tentatively begin to surface. Two other letters 
exchanged between the kings of Cyprus and Ugarit testify to the breakdown of security 
obligations. The last king of Ugarit has written to the king of Cyprus asking for help. 
The king of Cyprus replies:
Thus says the King to Hammurabi King of Ugarit. Greetings, may the 
gods keep you in good health. What have you written to me 'enemy 
shipping has been sighted at sea'. Well now, even if it is true that enemy 
ships have been sighted, be firm. Indeed then, what of your troops, your 
chariots, where are they stationed? Are they stationed close at hand or 
are they not? Who presses you behind your enemy? Fortify your towns,
325 Ibid, p. 141.
326 Ibid, p. 142.
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bring the troops and the chariots into them, and wait for the enemy with 
feet firm.'327
Things have reached the stage where alliances can no longer be honoured. The king of 
Cyprus knows he cannot afford to put his own kingdom at risk by sending any of his 
forces to help the king of Ugarit. All he can offer is advice. It is a simple case of every 
king for himself. The king of Ugarit replies with a mixture of desperation and sarcasm:
'To the king of Cyprus. My father, thus says the king of Ugarit his son. I 
fall at my father's feet. Greetings to my father, to your home, your wives, 
your troops, to all that belongs to the king of Cyprus, many many 
greetings. My father, the enemy ships are already here, they have set fire 
to my towns and have done great damage to my country. My father, did 
you not know that all my troops were stationed in the Hittite country, 
and that all my ships are stationed in Lycia and have not yet returned?
So that the country is abandoned to itself...'328
Hammurabi has fulfilled his international obligations by sending his security forces off 
to help others in need, and is about to suffer the consequences. The above letter was 
probably never sent. It was found still in the kiln for firing in the palace at Ugarit. The 
pirates took the great Bronze Age cosmopolis and it was sacked and put to the fire. As 
for the king of Cyprus, his instinct for self-preservation kept his kingdom intact for a 
while, but it was not long before the raids picked him off too.
These disturbances along the Syrian ports had grave consequences for many of 
the Helladic temple-palaces of the Aegean. Their wealth was based upon trade links 
with these ports, but these trade links were being cut and the Levantine markets 
destroyed. The Helladic ruling elites were no longer able to exchange their cash crops 
and specialized manufactures in order to obtain the imports of grain and Near Eastern 
luxuries to which they had become so accustomed. The only assets they had left was 
their swords and their longships:
'All that was left to them was to rob their neighbours, to live the life of 
the corsair for as long, but only as long, as the amassed wealth lasted 
among the strongest.'329
A great wave of beggar thy neighbour sieges and destructions ensued in the Aegean. As 
if by some sort of deadly knockout tournament, the Greek citadels and temples fell.
327 Ibid, p. 142-3.
328 Ibid, p. 143.
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Some of the Helladic warlords took their swords and ships to the Near East and became 
part of the great movement known as the 'Sea Peoples', which culminated in two great 
battles commemorated by Ramses HI, the king of Egypt. The Sea Peoples were soundly 
defeated, but the swathe of destruction they left in their wake crippled the remaining 
Levantine markets, leaving the remaining Aegean palaces even more isolated, adding 
fresh impetus to local piracy. Welfare obligations were naturally one of the first things 
to go. This was of particular importance in the Aegean because the normal climactic and 
ecological pattern was one of local shortages, not widespread famine330. Such shortages 
suddenly became major disasters once the local trade and welfare structures had broken 
down. The local disasters sparked off a series of desperate and sometimes violent 
emigrations, which scholars are still trying to unravel through the philological study of 
dialects331. War, famine, plague and the emigrations thus combined to produce a vicious 
cycle of depopulation and displacement. Snodgrass has offered three sets of figures 
representing the numbers of Greek settlements known to archaeology through 
succeeding centuries which help us gain an idea of just how dark the Dark Age' was:
Occupied in the thirteenth century: c.320 sites
Occupied in the twelfth century: c.130
Occupied in the eleventh century: c.40332
Imagine a thirty years crisis like the one that hit the beginning of our 20th century 
which, instead of bottoming out to mature into an extraordinary recovery, proceeds to 
deepen and persist for another three hundred years. Snodgrass advises caution, but 
estimates a reduction in the Aegean population of at least three quarters, probably 
worse. Little wonder that Hesiod, writing toward the close of this age, did not feel 
particularly chipper, and readily accepted a historical paradigm of almost infinite 
regress.
As the centralised palatial economies of the Aegean collapsed in upon each 
other, the four sources of social power disintegrated and the Helladic ruling classes 
began to melt away. Specialized, organised polyculture was abandoned and the 
treasuries left derelict. Agriculture reverted to small scale cultivation and pastoralism
329 Ibid, p. 184.
330 Ibid, p.24.
331 Snodgrass, The Dark Age o f Greece, p.298-304.
332 Ibid, p.364-367.
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with a barter household economy. The fortified citadels were left to rural squatters and 
the once mighty soldiery was reduced to a dwindling rabble of petty banditry. Many 
forms of tekhne vanished altogether, including the scribes who used Linear B. However, 
there were a few elements of continuity within this general picture of discontinuity. The 
specialized production of pottery continued, though only for local use and generally in 
regressive forms which the archaeologists have called 'submycenaean'. This pottery has 
been described as ’narrow in range and utterly derivative', and in many cases shows 
'some deterioration in technique' or even 'actual incompetence on the part of the 
potter'333. Other skills survived the fall of the palaces by returning to the life of the 
itinerant craftsmen. This is probably how metallurgy survived, though the loss of the 
copper and tin routes forced many of the worst hit communities to fall back on the old 
substitutes of bone and stone for many years. One way the smiths made up for the 
scarcity of bronze was, of course, to resort to the use of iron. A number of technical 
difficulties had to be overcome before the use of iron could actually be preferable to the 
use of bronze, but being more liberally distributed across the surface of the earth's crust, 
iron ores could actually be found in the Aegean and so it became by default an 
acceptable substitute334. Another tekhne that survived the fall of the palace by becoming 
itinerant was the singer with his lyre.
333 Ibid, p.34, & 38-39.
334 Ibid, p.230-231.
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4: Sophia
3.1. Desert Island Story
The next part of the story is about what might happen if, and when, the 
three groups find out that they're not, after all, the sole survivors from 
the sinking ship. This is where the reader joins in, and the desert island 
stories become an allegory of political economy.' {States and Markets 
P-3)
We have seen how Strange's desert island story postulates the possibility of 
three communities developing autonomously, in complete ignorance of each other. The 
first is a fortress community, giving priority to order and security. The second is a 
commune, giving priority to justice and equality. The third is a market community, 
giving priority to wealth and efficiency in production. Having split the subject of her 
desert island story up into these three sets, the next thing Strange does is to invite the 
reader to reflect upon what might happen when the three groups discover each other. 
Three scenarios are offered to suggest how relations might develop between the three 
separate groups.
The first scenario imagines that Martin's fortress society, being forewarned by 
the footprints, sends out patrols to survey the island and thus become the first group to 
discover the existence of the other two. Martin reasons out a game plan:
We can't afford to let Jack's lot get too rich, and we can't risk the 
mothers and the lovers slipping away to join the students...we have to act 
first.' (page 4)
This action takes the form of an ultimatum issued to the other two groups: 'join us, or 
else...'.
The second scenario has the students discover Martin's group first whilst 
hunting for wild goats. They take a dim view of the kind of people who can only think 
of building a stockade so soon after having been lucky enough to be stranded in what is, 
after all, a desert island paradise:
'They figure out what they think is going on and decide they had better 
prepare for the worst. Freedom and equality have to be compromised.
Socialism has to wait.' (P.4.)
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They prepare for war until they feel strong enough to issue their own ultimatum: ’be 
liberated or we attack*.
The third scenario has the third group make the initial discovery that they are 
not alone on the island. After putting the first two groups under surveillance they also 
decide that they do not like what they have seen. Fortunately the kinship system they 
have built can deal with the problem:
'they decide to double their 'security tax', appointing Mac to organise an 
army of paid volunteers.' (p.4)
This innovation enables the majority of the group to liberate themselves from the 
prospect of having to be present at the scene of violence. With ruthless efficiency the 
mercenary force gets straight down to business and launches a surprise night attack on 
Martin's group whilst their watchmen are asleep. Next follows a take-over of the 
commune, 'increasing the size of the market and the opportunities for specialization in 
the division of labour'.
Strange observes that all three scenarios contemplate the possibility that the 
relations which develop between the three groups will become violent, and we are 
invited to reflect upon whether these three scenarios of prospective violence are realistic 
or pessimistic. A latent potential for peace is also mooted, or at least for the containment 
of conflict, by the means of a game of diplomacy between an anarchical society of 
states, each making and breaking alliances over trade and defence, although this 
potential is not worked out for us in the form of a scenario.
(3.2) Three Lessons
Whatever the outcome of the three scenarios we are presented with, or of any 
other scenario which we may care to develop, the first lesson that Strange draws from 
her desert island stories is that different societies, in ordering their political economy, 
will give different values priority over others. This much is obvious she concludes, and 
Strange's inference would also appear to be consistent with her previously noted
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intrinsic value order: of security, wealth, freedom and justice1. Values clearly lie at the 
core of Strange's vision of how the international political economy works. The second 
lesson Strange draws from her desert island story is that judgement over values is a 
purely subjective matter, and that theories of international political economy are rooted 
in personal preferences, prejudices and experience. We are all stranded, apparently, 
rather like Strange's desert island castaways, in a fragmented moral universe2.
A third lesson, perhaps less obvious, or rather perhaps so obvious that it may 
seem hardly worthwhile to mention, and thus less obvious because it is so obvious, is 
that different societies, when ordering their political economy, employ language to forge 
values, and that they also use language to try to give their values priority over those 
made by others. Paulo Freire, a man who has thought more deeply about pedagogy than 
most, calls this lesson 'the tramp of the obvious'3.
Scholars of International Relations, good materialists one and all, are not 
famous for devoting a great deal of thought to this banality of language. Speculation 
about language seems to carry with it connotations of things metaphysical that do not 
need to be taken account of in the hard-headed world of 'realpolitik'. And yet this is 
bizarre, for it would be hard to think of any kind of international political economy 
developing without the material fact of language. Let us try to illustrate this by retracing 
our steps through Strange's desert island story, marking out our own tramp of the 
obvious. Let us begin where Martin says he has found tracks that look human and 
concludes that there is a mysterious 'other' trampling around on his island:
'Martin gets everyone together one evening and tells them he has been
exploring the hills behind.' (p. 1)
Strange's allegory makes the obvious point here that in a predominantly oral society, 
where social interaction has to be composed by the power of speech, in order to forge 
collective values its people have to be gathered together so that they can be in each 
other's presence. Unless Martin can maintain the power to 'call people to assembly' his 
ability to boss his group about will dissipate because of the fact that he cannot
1 See chapter two.
2Alistair MacIntyre calls this approach to value theory: 'Emotivism'. See After Virtue.
3 Paulo Freire, The Politics o f  Education (South Hadley, Bergin and Harvey, 1985), pg.55, 
quoted in 'A Forward' by Ann. E. Berthoff, in Paulo Friere and Donaldo Macedo, Literacy: 
Reading the Word and the World, pg.xv.
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physically be present in more than one place at any one time. In an oral society an 
efficient command structure thus relies upon the ability to regulate formations of 
presence. Speech, which manifests itself in material form by the means of a series of 
different sounds emanating from the diaphragms, lungs, throat, mouth and nose of the 
human body all in co-ordination, requires people to be presented within its field of 
amplification. Without presence Martin's persuasive powers would simply fall on deaf 
ears. To structure a society efficiently around a given set of values under oral 
constraints, the formation of these values has to be witnessed collectively in speech by 
all members of the group. As long as his group are all assembled and present together in 
one place at one time, Martin can demonstrate to us that he knows how to do things with 
words.
'Friends...we may be in danger. We must cut down some trees and build 
a stockade. We must fashion some spears, organize a watch and send out 
some patrols.'4
Martin is trying to forge the common value of security in his group with his 'speech-act'. 
But rather than praising the virtue of security in a strictly logical manner, and then 
describing the rational action necessary to attain this virtue, he carves out a more 
felicitous route. A bias is hidden within the syntax of his speech. By holding up first 
before his assembly the spectre of the supplement of security, namely 'danger', and then 
describing the actions necessary to avoid it, his 'we may' is far more easily glossed into a 
'we must'. 'So' (the pedant might ask), 'what is the semantic relationship between human 
footprints and danger?' Martin does not care to proffer an explanation for one. Any 
other castaway could just as easily have interpreted the very same footprints to signify 
'rescue'5. But what Martin does know, probably, is that pedants tend to be thin on the 
ground and that unless his inference is challenged immediately after it has been 
produced it stands a good chance of turning into an implicit assumption. Once this 
implicit assumption has been achieved the value of security will have been forged. As 
anyone who petitions for the development or employment of the means of violence 
knows, the value we attribute to security is directly proportional to the fear of its 
supplement.
In spite of Martin's pragmatic ruse there are some in the group who are not 
convinced. This we know because it is written in the story that 'there's a bit of a
4 Strange, op cit, pg.l.
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discussion about that'. But Martin has another advantage in his bid to impose priority for 
his own values over those held by others in the group. We learn that 'the crew are used 
to taking orders from Martin'. Order is a very special word in the Western lexicon. In 
this context of Strange's desert island story it is used to denote that Martin's crew are 
examples of what in Latin was once called instrumentum vocales6. Their capacity for 
consciousness has been underdeveloped to the point where Martin’s voice has the power 
to oblige Mike, Jack and Terry to act as if their bodies were the mere instruments of 
Martin's will.
Using the terminology of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, we could say 
that Martin is endowed with symbolic capital7. Part of the baggage which Martin and 
his crew have brought with them to their desert island without hardly even being aware 
of it is a habitus, or a structured mode of communicative behaviour which put Mike, 
Jack and Terry into a subordinate relationship to Martin. They have been inculcated 
with a set of communicative dispositions which are structured to embody Martin's 
speech with power. Those who have served in the armed forces would immediately 
understand what Bourdieu is going on about. The habit of taking orders from an officer 
has been drilled into the crew members' bodies to such an extent that it feels 
instinctive8. Strange is making the point here that these structured dispositions, which 
manifest themselves in language, can often be highly durable and transposable. They are 
capable of surviving and regenerating linguistic practices of symbolic power in times 
and places other than those in which they were originally acquired. Here we can observe 
that the command structure of the sunken ship is quietly reproducing itself on Strange's 
desert island, and this takes place in spite of the fact that the ostensible reason for that 
command structure has been lost irrevocably beneath the 'stormy water'. Even some of 
the former passengers, we learn, are gradually getting 'used to doing as they're told'.
In the second group an assembly of presence takes place on the lifeboat during 
the three days and nights at sea, before its members even reach the island. But their 
speech acts are made from within a structure of communicative action which is very
5 This is the same point Cynthia Weber makes about Realism during her discussion of another 
desert island story, see International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction.
6 See Perry Anderson, Passages From Antiquity To Feudalism, pg.24.
7 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power.
8 In the city of Plymouth, where many senior citizens have served time in the armed forces, it is 
still possible to observe civilian jokes on the theme of military 'drilling'. Of these, the most 
common is a loud authoritative bark: MAKE WAY FOR A COMMANDING OFFICER' at the 
sight of a queue in the post office, bank, shop, etc.
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different from the first group. A fellow called Jerry appears to be able to make speeches 
which have more symbolic capital than those of his companions by virtue of him being 
the oldest, and we are told that he leads the group. However, the school from which the 
students have come must be something rather special, for it has inculcated in them the 
ability to:
’talk endlessly, as students will, about their predicament and what they'll
do if they ever find land.'
Their absent professors would probably be delighted by the manner in which the 
students, unsupervised, are using their power of assembly to agree upon a common set 
of values by which they choose to live with one another. Habermas would argue that the 
priority this group gives to justice and equality is anticipated already in the way that 
everybody talks, a hypothesis grounded in his universal pragmatics. Bourdieu would 
counter Habermas with the observation that the linguistic habits of the students have 
been inculcated by an institution. Their schooling has inculcated a set of dispositions 
which are structured to embody their collective assembly with power. To assume that 
they are using a model of language which occurs naturally in society, Bourdieu has 
argued, is to suffer from 'the illusion of linguistic communism' typical of many social 
applications of Sassurian and Chomskyian linguistics9.
The people from the third lifeboat are a much more disparate group. No one 
seems to take overall charge and there is no initial assembly of presence enabling debate 
about how relationships between members of the group might be organised. Everybody 
does their own thing, catches their own fish and cracks their own coconuts. However, 
after a few days the mothers start to complain that their diet of coconuts upsets the 
children's stomachs. Clearly the members of this group, no matter how individualistic in 
character they may be, are at least homogeneous in the sense that they can speak the 
same language. We know this because the mother's complaints prompt Jack to propose 
his solution to the group of using the bag of nails as a tool for kinship. Without the 
kinship of language, or the means of translating between different languages within the 
group, it is difficult to see how the mothers complaints could register, or how Jack's 
plan could get off the ground. Anyone who had not been privy to the linguistic 
agreement to base their kinship system on a bag of nails would be reluctant to exchange
9 See Thompson's 'Introduction' to Bourdieu, op cit, Pg.1-31.
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his fish for nails, on the not unreasonable assumption that the aspiring purchaser hoping 
to make the exchange had been swallowing too much sea water.
The banality of language, its colossal obviousness, also intrudes into 
proceedings when the three groups discover that they are not the only ones on the island 
and relations between them are established. In the first scenario, as we have already 
noted, Martin issues the following ultimatum to both:
'Join us, or else../
As we can see, the transposability of symbolic capital cuts both ways. Mike, Jack and 
Terry have been inculcated with a predisposition to take orders, but Martin has been 
inculcated with a disposition to hand them out. Any situation which might call for an 
alternative approach clearly presents a bit of a challenge. But what language is his 
ultimatum spoken in and will the other two groups be able to understand it? Was it in 
French, the language of diplomacy until after the first world war? Or was it in English, 
the lingua franca of twentieth century modernity? Or was it delivered using one of the 
90% of the world's 5000 or so remaining languages of the world that are currently 
estimated to be on the verge of extinction? Whatever language Martin uses, he surely 
cannot be indifferent as to whether the other two groups will be able to understand his 
orders.
In the second scenario, as has already been noted, Strange has the second group 
issue their own ultimatum. As with the first scenario, the diplomatic language used by 
the students is not specified. But whatever language has been used, it clearly does not 
play by the same rules as the one used whilst 'talking endlessly' in that assembly of 
presence which took place in the lifeboat:
'Be liberated, or we attack...' (p.4)
Given their propensity for dialectics, perhaps our students will also find some time to 
talk about their language of liberation. If they succeed in their project to 'liberate' the 
other two groups, what sort of pedagogy will be required to inculcate the liberated with 
the linguistic skills needed to ensure 'equality in taking decisions; the same mles for 
everybody'? Martin's crew for example might not be used to the conventions of the 
seminar room. If the students are sincere they might try talking to the crew about what 
they mean by liberation, but their innocent love for talking endlessly could simply serve 
to remind the crew of a deep bitterness, of opportunities in life that they never had.
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They may not like Martin very much, but at least he doesn't patronise them with sweet 
words that mean nothing to them10.
In the third scenario the last group does not bother with talk at all. The surprise 
attack in the night does the talking for them, but this recourse to violence has only 
deferred the question of language until a later date. After they have liberated the first 
group from Martin's lonely rule, and the second group from its smelly commune, how 
are they to bring about the new island order they seek of an increased market and 
greater specialisation in the division of labour? The conquered groups will need to be 
taught a few things about nails in a language they can understand if they are going to 
conform to the laws of the market. Before the invisible hand can work its magic there 
first needs to be an audible tongue.
Recent research has suggested that the extraordinary ability of children to learn 
how to use language creatively so early in life is possible because of a 'universal 
grammar' that human evolution has written into our genes11. If this is true, it means that 
the potential for language is part of our biological identity. We are bom spluttering with 
the ability to learn a language which enables us to tell, discuss, think, order, organise, 
argue, claim, complain, suggest, sell, bargain, decide, negotiate, threaten and issue 
ultimatums. All of these things are done in the first six pages of States And Markets and 
they are all done with words. They are part of what makes Strange's castaways seem like 
real people with the power of volition rather than just the automatons of some obscure 
political theory. We may deduce then, from our little tramp of the obvious around 
Strange's desert island, that each group of noble savages has at least one thing in 
common. Language is a part of the baggage that all of our castaways have brought with 
them to their desert island without even having to think about it. Perhaps by analogy we 
can see why it is not very surprising that many scholars of Political Economy and 
International Relations also take their own use of language for granted. They too bring 
language with them to whichever 'island of theory' they happen to be interested in 
without even having to think about it. It is not among the list of things that the social 
theorist has to remember to pack, just something that seems to tag along anyway. But if 
values really do lie at the core of our understanding of the global political economy, and 
if language is one of the means by which humans forge values and give them priority
10 Many tyrants from Napoleon to Pinochet have been very good at exploiting this kind of
resentiment.
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over others, then it follows that language should be a central concern in the study of 
International Relations and IPE.
A plausible recent theory about how evolution managed to hardwire the 
grammar of language within our brains focuses upon its function as a force for social 
cohesion12. Dunbar argues that language evolved as a more efficient substitute for 
grooming (a commonly observed form of bonding in primates) as the size of human 
groups increased relative to that of other hominid groups. Amongst evolving hominid 
groups, the theory argues, the process of natural selection favored those who could build 
and maintain large groups, because in competition for food and territory the cohesive 
large group could dominate the smaller one13. The earliest utterances of proto-language 
were thus, according to Dunbar, primitive versions of gossip, verbal stroking, slapping 
and jousting that reproduced, sorted and serviced the complexity of human relationships 
needed to maintain the unity and cohesion of larger and larger groups. Once language 
had begun to evolve, however, it could be carried over and developed for other 
cognitive purposes in the realm of hunting and gathering or generating operational 
models of the physical world. For example, if an individual encountered a problem 
whilst engaged in some communal project, it could ask for help, and someone might be 
able to produce a helpful utterance to help the enquirer see a solution to the problem14. 
Once these query and response habits had become established, it would have been 
possible for an individual to accidentally ask a question when no one else was within 
earshot. Upon hearing its own request, the question provokes an answer from a sub­
system in the brain of the human that asked it! This is because evolution had bundled 
together a modular nervous system of different tools for different tasks. But now, as an 
accidental side effect of being able to ask questions of others, the human learns how to 
provoke itself into answering its own questions. Given that evolution had built plasticity 
into the neuronal networks of the human brain, such acts of auto-stimulation began to 
thread internal wires linking up its various modules, allowing the new model hominid to 
jettison the vocalization and listening process.
11 John Lyons, Chomsky.
12 Dunbar, E, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution o f  Language.
13 Donald, M, Origins o f the Modem Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution o f Culture and 
Cognition, p. 140.
14 The following ‘just so’ story conies from Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 194- 
199.
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For the thought processes of the modem subject, of course, nowadays we have 
the architectural model of a modular mind that knows it can talk silently with itself. But 
in the first few thousand years of human experience these answers that seemed to spring 
from nowhere may well have often been very puzzling, if not awe inspiring moments. 
What grounds did the first human mind have for leaping to the conclusion that these 
hallucinated voices actually sprang from himself? Clearly, it would have been easy for 
him to assume that these words of wisdom came from an other, supernatural source. It is 
this basic insight into the diversity of ways ancient humanity might have apprehended 
the identity of its own thought that led Jaynes to come up with his hypothesis of the 
bicameral mind.
The story of how humanity began to explore its mind and openly claim all its 
thoughts as its own is a long one, and is a story that hasn’t even finished yet. In 
retracing the very few first steps of this journey, we shall definitely be seeking to 
undermine the view that talking about the values of wealth, security, freedom and 
justice cannot hope to change minds and that reasoned debate about them cannot hope 
to settle anything.
3.3. Homeric sophia: 'All men honour and respect the bards'15
The ancient Greeks spent quite a lot of time thinking about the relationship 
between language and power. They had a word for it. They called it logos. The story of 
logos begins with the minstrels who entertained the Helladic kings and queens of the 
Late Bronze Age. We know that there were minstrels in the Aegean Late Bronze Age 
because they were celebrated in so many representations such as the one found on a 
fresco at Pylos, or the sculptures from the Cyclades16. The ivory remains of a lyre have 
also been found in a Late Bronze Age tomb in Crete. Its owner was buried with a gold 
ring and gold beads, indicating that his tekhne yielded this particular musician 
considerable status. Other frescos, pottery and figurines attest that the Late Bronze Age 
Greeks also liked to dance. What all these fragments of evidence cannot do is actually 
reproduce the music, songs and dances which accompanied the food and wine, but if the 
example of many other cultures is anything to go by the songs would probably be 
familiar to us in the sense that they would have mused upon the timeless themes of love,
15 Odyssey, 8:480.
16 Renfrew, op cit, p.434-435.
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sorrow, remorse, anger, joy, fear, desire and worship17. Some of the more sophisticated 
songs in the minstrel's repertoire would have juggled together a combination of these 
ingredients within extended ballads of comedy, tragedy or adventure. The bards would 
also be expected to play those tunes designed to engender group identity and loyalty: the 
communal anthems which dutifully sang the praises and glorious deeds of the great and 
the good, past and present.
When the Helladic palaces began to collapse during the 12th century, making 
for a drastic contraction in complexity in terms of production, finance, security and 
knowledge, the bards began to lose a major source of patronage. A large number must 
have perished amidst the general devastation and depopulation, just like the craftsmen 
of so many other forms of tekhne. Other minstrel families would have lost their 
instruments and forgotten the old songs as they returned to the land where they eked out 
a meagre subsistence. A small number, however, survived, slowly adapting the old 
songs to suit what few sources of patronage there were to be found. The main sources of 
patronage now were the oikos and the polis. Oikos is usually translated as Tiousehold', a 
convenient shorthand term, but is more accurately translated as 'family estate' (whence 
'economics', from the Latinised form oecus)li. The oikoi were the primary units of 
production and finance that emerged from the wreckage of the Bronze Age. The typical 
oikos lay in a hamlet living off the agricultural wealth of its surrounding fields. The 
focal point of the oikos was the house of the basileus, often translated as king' or 
'prince', but more accurately oligarch. From his base in these hamlets the basileus would 
accumulate and redistribute any micro-surplus there was to be had. The early polis was 
usually a cluster of oikoi living close enough to each other to make use of a communal 
citadel which was, in many cases, the site of a former Mycenaean citadel19. To begin 
with this citadel was not generally inhabited on a day to day basis but the place where 
the oikoi would congregate in the event of a sudden need for security, a meeting place or 
agora where the local basileis could thrash out matters of common concern, also a 
sacred site complete with a shrine for a god that commemorated communitarian values.
17 Jack Goody, The Domestication o f  the Savage Mind, p. 19-35.
18 Finley, The World O f Odysseus, p.58.
19 Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, p.31-33. Lack of time and space has persuaded me to conform to 
the tradition of marginalising the background social formation of ethne from this narrative, but the 
reader is advised to bear in mind the following: 'Just as the polis as a state-form was not the 
peculiar property of Greek lands, so too it was not universal in them. Alongside it there continued 
to flourish a very different conception of the state, the ethnos.' Certain aspects of the classical 
polis are difficult to comprehend without a basic awareness of its context within a supplementry 
ethne. See Snodgrass, ibid, p.42-45.
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The oikoi were not homogenous. Some were bigger than others in terms of land, 
labour and coercive muscle. For security the smaller oikoi tended to cleave toward the 
more powerful oikoi in clan type structures. Some of the more powerful oikoi may well 
have been rich enough to patronise a resident bard as well as a potter or smith. As a rule, 
however, most households had neither the means nor the need to independently finance 
the more specialised skills on a permanent basis. Like many of the smiths and potters, 
many minstrels thus became demioergoi (public workers) after the collapse of the 
palaces, wandering from oikos to oikos and from polis to polis in search of work20.
In the polis the bards found opportunities to perform at the public fairs 
sponsored by the local basileis to demonstrate their public largesse and honour their 
communitarian gods. Within the oikos the bards could find employment at the 
symposium, where the basileis would lay on an extravagant display of food, wine, 
women and song to help provide a convivial environment within which to conduct 
business, cement bargains, and to impress their cronies (hetairoi) with the power of 
their hospitality and thank them for services rendered. Later, some bards became 
employed on a more long term basis by a cluster of oikoi to tutor their children in the art 
of music.
The bards were professionals. What they did gave them food to eat. When 
people have to sing for their supper they are not in the business of singing songs that 
people do not want to hear. When people do not know where their next meal is coming 
from they are not likely to teach the children songs that their parents would not wish 
them to sing. The songs continued to plough the old themes of love, sorrow, remorse, 
anger, joy, fear, desire and worship, but gradually the musician adapted his repertoire to 
achieve maximum resonance within the oikos and the polis.
The more successful songs were the ones which appealed most to the basileis 
controlling these two life-worlds. A tradition of bardic rivalry, probably encouraged 
through the sponsorship of schools and festivals by the basileis, inspired musicians to 
compete with each other to produce songs that could cast dramatic spells over their 
audiences for longer periods. To do this they exploited their natural sensitivity as 
musicians to the rhythms of the human voice to develop mnemonic formulas which
20 Finley, op cit, p.36-37 & 55-56, and Burkert, The Orientalizing Revolution, p.23-25 & p.41-46.
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enabled them to extend many of the old ballads into narratives of epic length. Another 
way the minstrel could compete for fame was to compose songs in praise of the norms, 
customs, virtues or values that the basileis found particularly admirable. In this way the 
songs of the bards became the favored media of pedagogy through which the basileus 
could reproduce, reflect and experience his world. As well as providing entertainment 
the tekhne of the minstrel thus acquired normative authority. The actions, speeches, 
qualities and flaws of the gods, heroes and heroines of the bard's songs became a mental 
vocabulary for the formation of a nascent Hellenic consciousness. The repertoire 
evolved into a compendium of orally preserved statements which the basileis used to 
reproduce a sustainable sense of self, identity and agency. The bard thus came to 
command honour and respect as a source of divine sophia, the medium of the muse 
through which the sons and daughters of the basileis were expected to imbibe the 
received wisdom of previous generations21.
With their formulaic verse the minstrel fraternity was thus able to produce many 
epics which furnished a kind of normative database. The fact that the minstrels were 
illiterate and reproduced their songs through oral mnemonics is an important point 
which can help us to understand the early Hellenic mind.
In our modem age we take memory for granted. It is easy to underestimate how 
much our knowledge structure relies upon powerful mnemonic systems that are external 
to flesh, bones and brains, but these means were not available to the bards. In his book 
Orality and Literacy, Walter Ong has identified eight major points of difference 
between a knowledge structure based upon speech from one based upon writing22. 
Firstly, an oral knowledge structure tends to be additive rather than relational. That is to 
say its components are joined together in ways that are convenient for a speaker. An 
easy way to do this is through a mythical narrative whereby information can be threaded 
together. In an oral culture the pre-dominant connective is generally 'and', the term most 
useful for keeping a narrative flowing. Writing enables a more elaborate grammar (if, 
but, then, thus, while), which can thus carve out more diverse relations between the 
components of thought. Secondly, an oral knowledge structure tends to be aggregative 
rather than analytic. That is to say it will rely heavily on formulas to spark up the
21 This interpretation of Homer follows Eric Havelock, in Preface To Plato & The Greek Concept 
O f Justice.
22 See pages 37-57. Actually Ong lists nine points, but I felt that points 5 & 9 were close enough 
to be merged for the sake of economy without doing too much damage to the subtlety of his 
thought.
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memory, which become tiresome cliches in a written culture. For example a soldier has 
to be a 'brave soldier', the dawn 'rosy-fingered', an oak a 'sturdy oak'. When a cliche 
crystallises in an oral culture, it is an asset, it is kept intact and is cherished. The 
cumulative effect of these formulaic expressions is a resistance to logical analysis. 
Without writing, breaking up thought for analysis is a high risk procedure because such 
thoughts are more likely to be forgotten. Thirdly, the oral knowledge structure will tend 
towards redundancy. That is to say the pragmatics of oral composition requires such a 
high level of repetition that it tends to act as a drag on linear thought. Fourth, an orally 
based knowledge structure tends to be conservative or traditionalist. Knowledge that is 
not repeated aloud often enough will tend to be forgotten, so an oral society must invest 
a lot of its energy in saying again and again what has been learned arduously over the 
ages: not an ideal environment for the iconoclast. Fifthly, oral knowledge structures will 
stay close to the human lifeworld. This means that concepts and categories remain 
situational rather than abstract and can only exist within the narrative context of life and 
agency. All explanations for everything will thus tend to be anthropomorphic. Sixth, 
orally based knowledge structures are agonistically toned. Explanations for things will 
thus drift toward the melodramatic, for example through the simulation of violent 
conflict, extreme happenings, extravagant gestures, and all the other memorabilia that 
help to make a narrative punch its way into the brains of listeners. Seventh, oral 
knowledge structures are empathetic and participatory rather than objectively distanced. 
That is to say the action of knowing will involve close identification with the known 
and there is little scope for the division of subject from object. Eighth, oral knowledge 
structures are homeostatic. That is to say information tends to be stored in synchronic 
rather than diachronic context. The ancestral past has to be remembered as if it were a 
perpetual present.
Over time the conservative requirements of orality meant that the successful 
epics elbowed others aside, until the Aegean repertoire began to crystallise into a 
canonical cycle of seven or more, including the Little Iliad, the Cypria and the Seven 
Against Thebes, of which only tantalising fragments and allusions have survived the 
ravages of time23. The two epics which were to become the most celebrated and which 
consequently did survive were the Iliad and the Odyssey. Being the foundation stones of 
western literature these two texts have accumulated many thousands of commentaries. 
We take it as given that the unfathomable depth of this scholarship mocks any posture
23 Finley, op cit, p.35.
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of closure or originality. We take it as axiomatic that there is more than one way to 
appreciate Homer, and that the value of a classic lies in its propensity to outlive 
interpretations. Having made these provisos, we obtain license to argue that one reason 
why the Iliad and the Odyssey became so celebrated by the basileis above all the other 
epics was because of their ability to furnish a memory of the laws, customs and values 
necessary for the early formation and reproduction of the polis and the oikos. In this 
respect the two narratives overlap and complement each other, though the Iliad focuses 
more upon relations within the polis and between poleis, whilst the Odyssey places more 
emphasis upon relations within the oikos and between oikoi. We shall glance first at the 
Iliad, then the Odyssey.
In her prologue to States And Markets Strange used a desert island story to 
introduce students gently to her analysis of the world political economy but during the 
Greek Dark Age, when there was little or no literacy, narratives like these were the 
essential vehicle of thought. Using the gods and heroes of the Iliad the Homeric minstrel 
can be observed juggling with the values of wealth, security, freedom and justice. The 
Iliad revolves around the question of conflict over these values, the consequences of 
this conflict, and the formal use of language to regulate and resolve conflict. Right from 
the start Homer tells us that this is the main theme of the Iliad, the disaster that awaits 
the community when its leaders fall out:
'Sing, goddess, of the anger of Achilles, son of Peleus, the accursed 
anger which brought uncounted anguish on the Achaians and hurled 
down to Hades many mighty souls of heroes, making their bodies the 
prey to dogs and the birds feasting...Sing from the time of the first 
quarrel which divided Atreus' son (Agamemnon), the lord of men, and 
godlike Achilles.' (l:l-6)24
The anger of Achilles takes place within the context of the Trojan war. In the thick of 
this war the Achaian soldiers successfully carry out a routine mission on an enemy city 
and then proceed to enslave its property in women. This wealth has already been shared 
out amongst the soldiers by the time an old man approaches the Achaian ships to beg for 
the return of his daughter. His name is Chryses. In his arms he carries the sacred totems 
of his city, and he explains that he is a rich priest who can offer unlimited ransom in 
return for the restoration of his daughter's freedom.
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Chryses is an archetype whose pathos promotes the value of security. Many 
other characters may subsequently be observed reflecting on the dreadful consequences 
of defeat in war and the imperative value of the defensive walls of the sacred polis. But 
he is also there to signify the international convention of ransom. The convention of 
ransom is viable because it is in the interest of both sides. For the vanquished this 
convention offered a way for the wealthy members of a traumatised community to 
petition looting soldiers and bargain for the freedom of their children. From the point of 
view of the victor the convention of ransom is a means of looting more efficiently, 
enlisting the help of the vanquished to reveal wealth that may otherwise remain hidden 
away. When Chryses makes his offer of ransom it is made clear that he is addressing 
'the whole body of Achaians' (1:13-14 & 1:77-78). This body supports the convention 
by duly expressing its opinion:
'All the other Achaians shouted their agreement, to respect the priest's 
claim and take the splendid ransom.' (1:20-22)
The only problem is that Chryseis, the priest's daughter, happens to have been a share of 
the booty that was apportioned to Agamemnon. Being the most powerful oligarch in the 
Achaian forces Agamemnon thinks he can afford to break the convention of ransom and 
ignore the opinion of his comrades, which he does. Agamemnon warns the old man not 
to breach the security of the Achaian camp again, on pain of death, and is taunted with 
his daughter's fate (1:28-31).
The old priest leaves the soldiers and prays to his god Apollo, the protector of 
his ransacked village (1:40-41). Apollo hears the prayer and brings down a plague on 
the Achaian camp, which first hits the mules, then the dogs, and then the soldiers.
It is clear that the wrath of Apollo is not for the sack of Chryse and the 
enslavement of its women, a legitimate act of war which is taken for granted by the 
minstrel, but for the violation of the convention of ransom. This is the first example of a 
mnemonic device that is used repeatedly by Homer. Havelock calls it the transgression 
formula25. In a world without writing normative arguments had to be memorised within 
performative statements. Justice {dike) is defined by characters who violate the norm 
and suffer the consequences until the status quo is restored. The sophia of the tale of
24 All quotations from the Iliad are from the translation by Martin Hammond unless otherwise 
stated.
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Chryse is that Agamemnon has brought his community to the verge of disaster by failing 
to recognise an international obligation. He is the most powerful of the Achaian 
basileis, the Iliad leaves us in no doubt about that, but it is also apparent that his 
judgement is not always perfect. Unlike the Egyptian concept of maat where justice is 
the order that emanates from the mouth of the monarch, the Homeric ruler is mortal. He 
is human and makes mistakes. This was the message the last dying bards of the Bronze 
Age wished to pass on to their survivors in the Iron Age. Given that powerful men like 
Agamemnon are capable of errors of judgement that can have a detrimental effect upon 
the whole community of oikoi, social complexity has to be organized on a more flexible 
basis, and attention is therefore invested in the question of how these errors may be 
explained, forgiven and corrected.
On the tenth day of the plague Achilles begins to define the Homeric answer to 
this question. The goddess Hera surfaces within the mind of Achilles to suggest that he 
call for an agora, a collective assembly where the heroes come together to talk. There 
will be countless instances of the agora in session in the Iliad. Taken together, these 
instances provided the basileis with an idealised paradigm of oral procedure whereby 
dike, or justice, emerges from the collective winged words of an oligarchy. Oligarchic 
speech is winged because it is inspired by divine voices emanating from the Mount 
Olympus inculcated within the mind of a hero26. This paradigm of oral procedure may 
be summed up by the word themis. Themis is the constitutional goddess of law and 
order who convenes the gods to assembly on Mount Olympus (20:3-6) and whose name 
is thus invoked whenever a mortal assembly is summoned or dissolved (Odyssey 2:67- 
70).
In his opening speech to the agora Achilles introduces the only item on the 
agenda, the plague, and calls for the services of Kalchus the prophet to tell the assembly 
why 'Apollo has felt such anger towards us' (1:61-62). At first Kalchus expresses grave 
reservations about the request Achilles has made of him: 'I think I shall anger a man 
who holds great power over all the Argives and command among the Achaians' (1:77- 
78). He is afraid of the consequences of speaking out. Achilles swears to protect the 
security of Kalchus 'even if you speak of Agamemnon'. Emboldened by this promise, 
Kalchus proceeds to tell the assembly that it is Agamemnon's behaviour toward Chryses 
that has caused Apollo's wrath, and that the plague will now not be lifted until his
25 Havelock, The Greek Concept o f Justice, p. 123-4.
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daughter is returned without ransom. Agamemnon then stands to speak (1:98-118). He 
realises now that the agora was called to deprive him of Chryseis. He is furious and lets 
Kalchus know it. He is now willing to relinquish his property rights over Chryseis ’if 
that is for the best1, but seeks compensation from his own community because the 
former offer of ransom no longer applies. Achilles then stands to address Agamemnon 
(1:119-27). Agamemnon's concern for wealth in the midst of a devastating plague is met 
with an opening barb of irony: ’Glorious son of Atreus, most acquisitive of all men'. 
Achilles argues that Agamemnon will have to wait for his compensation because the 
wealth gleaned from the sacking of cities has already been divided and hence the public 
purse is empty. The social upheaval that would result from a redistribution of wealth 
already shared just to satisfy the honour of Agamemnon is out of the question. Instead, 
Agamemnon will have to be content with the promise of more tomorrow: 'we Achaians 
will recompense you three and four times over if Zeus ever grants that we sack the well- 
walled city of Troy'.
This intervention is too much for Agamemnon. He feels that his power is being 
usurped. Achilles has provoked the anger of the most powerful oligarch amongst the 
Achaians on three counts: by daring to exercise his right as a basileus to convene an 
agora; by giving Kalchus the courage to speak out about the cause of the plague; and by 
having the temerity to challenge Agamemnon's claim to immediate compensation for the 
loss of his share of the sack of Chryse. Agamemnon threatens to replace her with 
Briseis, who had been enslaved to Achilles during an earlier mission on another 
smoking Trojan village. This threat provokes a coruscating verbal assault from Achilles 
(1:149-170). In one of the first recorded canine pejoratives, Agamemnon is called 'dog­
face'. Achilles is angry with the hubris of Agamemnon, who thinks he can just pull rank 
and abrogate the laws of their community whenever it suits his own interest. As far as 
Achilles is concerned, Briseis is his property to keep: 'I have laboured hard for it'. 
Achilles implies Agamemnon is not at the front in the field of battle but first in the 
queue when it comes to the division of the spoils. Achilles argues that the legitimacy of 
Agamemnon's power is undermined by his greed. How is the Achaian army expected to 
follow Agamemnon's orders when the wealth is always divided in such a way that 
Agamemnon gets the greater share? Achilles threatens to leave the war and head for 
home: 'I have no mind to stay here heaping up riches and treasure for you and receiving
26 Julian Jaynes, op cit, p.71-75.
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no honour myself. The sophia being promoted as this drama unfolds is that the folly of 
injustice is a major cause of conflict.
In the heat of the moment Agamemnon fails to perceive the danger of his 
dispute with Achilles. He makes a show of being unconcerned at Achilles' threat of 
desertion. He is more concerned to reassert his authority and not to show any trace of 
weakness by backing down in the face of the challenge made by Achilles. Agamemnon 
makes it clear that his move for Briseis is to put Achilles firmly in his place. It is a 
public demonstration of power:
'So I shall take the beautiful Briseis, your prize, going myself to fetch 
her from your hut, so that you can fully realise how much I am your 
superior, and others too can shrink from speaking on a level with me and 
openly claiming equality.' (1:183-89)
This public humiliation almost brings Achilles to the point of violence. He is about to 
draw his sword when divine intervention in the form of Athena swoops down and 
cajoles him to 'use your tongue' instead (1:191-220). The divine chamber within the will 
of Achilles exercises its power of veto over his mortal chamber. Achilles obeys the 
Homeric intra-communal violence taboo and uses his tongue to repeat the accusation of 
cowardice and excessive avarice, but now Agamemnon faces the additional charge of 
stealing the wealth of people who dare to speak out against him: 'a king who feeds fat on 
his people with mere ciphers for subjects' (1:230-1).
Achilles then swears *by this staff that the whole community will regret 
Agamemnon's behavior. His use of the staff is symbolic. It is the sceptre of sovereignty 
which the basileis ritually hold when they stand to speak in the agora21. Achilles 
informs us that the Homeric sceptre is the totem of communal law and order: 'the sons 
of the Achaians carry it in their hands when they give judgements, those who guard the 
ways of justice under Zeus' (1:237-9). It is a means by which the social bargains which 
bind the society together are solemnified: 'an oath by this staff has the power to bind' 
(239-40). Achilles flings it to the ground in a dramatic expression of indignation at the 
way he thinks Achaian themis has been dishonoured. He thinks that Agamemnon has 
abused his powers by offending traditional rules about what is fitting and proper.
27 There is an oral residue to this day analogous to the staff or skeptron in the House of 
Commons, in all the rituals enacted around the 'mace'. Nowadays these rituals tend to strike
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At this point in the quarrel Nestor 'the sweet spoken' stands up to speak in the 
agora and attempts to mediate between the two parties. Nestor represents the sophia of 
the elder who has 'already seen the passing of two generations'. He invokes his age and 
experience as a reason for his counsel to be listened to with respect. He predicts that 
unless the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles is resolved it will prove to be a 
disaster for the Achaians. Nestor's counsel is that for the sake of their community 
Agamemnon should renounce his claim to Briseis, and that Achilles should take care to 
show more respect for the authority of Agamemnon. Nestor is the spokesman for the 
central argument the bard is trying to promote: conflict between poleis has to be taken 
for granted, but conflict within the polis cannot be taken for granted at all, because 
success in external conflict with other poleis depends upon the ability to domesticate 
internal conflict within the polis itself. Communal conflict cannot be allowed to escalate 
into a destructive spiral because unity is strength. However, the mnemonic requirements 
of the transgression formula mean that the feud between Achilles and Agamemnon 
cannot be allowed to blow itself out yet.
Both adversaries try to put themselves in a good light by showing deference 
toward the dike of Nestor and the themis of the Achaian community, but also make it 
clear they are not yet ready to participate in a resolution of the conflict. Agamemnon 
makes a cursory nod to the wisdom of Nestor: 'Yes, all that you say, old man, is right 
and true', but then deflects attention away from his own behaviour by claiming that the 
outspokenness of Achilles is really a veiled bid for power: lie wants to control all, rule 
all, to dictate to all' (1:284-5). Then, just in case anyone was thinking of coming out in 
support of Achilles, Agamemnon confidently reminds the assembly of the inevitability 
of his hegemony: 'there are some of us I doubt will obey him'. For his part Achilles 
moderates his abusive language toward Agamemnon but claims that the arrogance of 
power has legitimated his sense of alienation. There is an element of reproach in 
Achilles' address to the assembly (1:288-300). Intelligent governance needs dissent, and 
Achilles has performed a public service by calling for the agora and by giving Kalchus 
the security to tell the hegemon what everyone has been quietly thinking, but Achilles 
senses that the agora has not got the gumption to repay this service by protecting his 
property against the vengeance of Agamemnon. Everybody is busy keeping their heads 
down, and thus the agora is too craven to oblige Agamemnon to comply with Nestor's 
judgement over Briseis: 'you Achaians gave her, and you have taken her away'.
people as antiquated, but in previous times when orality was a more dominant medium, such
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Consequently Achilles proceeds to mark out the parameters of a form of civil 
disobedience worked out in conversation with the inner voice of his mother-goddess 
Thetis (1:351-427). He will not lift a finger to fight the violation of his property over 
Briseis, but will offer passive resistance by refusing to obey orders and withdrawing his 
armed forces from the war effort. And if Agamemnon is foolish enough to attempt to 
confiscate any more wealth from Achilles, civil disobedience will turn into civil war: 'in 
an instant your dark blood will drip from my spear'.
This is how things stand when the assembly is dissolved, but the agora has 
achieved the purpose for which it was convened. Agamemnon has given out orders to 
restore the freedom of Chryseis and Odysseus is despatched with a ship and twenty men 
to return her to Chryse along with a hundred oxen for sacrifice. This is a grand gesture 
of reparation. Once the Achaians have acknowledged that an international convention 
has been broken and signalled their willingness to make amends and comply, they are 
ready to be readmitted into international society. Reunited with his daughter, the priest 
Chryses is happy to provide the necessary ceremony to symbolise the return of the 
Achaians to the international fold:
Hear me, lord of the silver bow, protector of Chryse and holy Killa, and 
mighty lord of Tenedos. As you heard my former prayer, and brought 
honour to me and great harm to the Achaian people, so now grant this 
my further desire - now at last drive the shameful plague away from the 
Danaans.' (1:452-456)
Barley grains are sprinkled and the oxen slaughtered in front of an altar to the god 
Apollo. The carcasses are ritually butchered, roasted, an extravagant feast ensues, 
followed by dancing and singing. The status quo is restored. The god is appeased. The 
plague relents. Odysseus returns with his embassy back to the camp. The Achaians are 
now free to resume the Trojan war and loot more cities. The god Apollo, whom Chryses 
calls the 'protector' of his city, has performed his task. He has not prevented it from 
being attacked and looted, but he has forced the Achaians to comply with a basic 
minimum standard of behaviour toward the defeated in war.
Meanwhile, Agamemnon fails to heed the counsel of Nestor and sends men to 
appropriate Briseis. Achilles gives Briseis up without a fight, but asks his mother-god 
Thetis to petition Zeus to assist the Trojans. As with Chryses the prayers of Achilles are
rituals lent the spoken word extra gravitas.
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answered. Divided and without the help of Achilles, Nestor's predictions prove true and 
the Achaians fare badly in the war with the Trojans. By book nine, when things are 
looking particularly bleak, Agamemnon is more ready to heed the counsel of Nestor in 
agora (9:95-113):
'Agamemnon...you are the king of many people and Zeus has entrusted 
to you the sceptre and the ways of law, to make judgements for your 
people. Therefore you more than any other man should speak the 
thoughts of your mind and listen too, and act even on another's advice, 
whenever a man's heart prompts him to speak for the good - yours will 
be the credit for all that he begins.'
Leaders are sophos to heed good counsel in the agora. They will enhance their 
legitimacy through the just decisions which result. Nestor then tactfully reminds 
Agamemnon that his advice was ignored earlier, and counsels it is not too late to 
appease Achilles 'with soothing gifts and kind persuasion'. In reply Agamemnon readily 
agrees with Nestor, and accepts that he has made a gross error of judgement:
'You have accurately recounted my disasters. I have been disastered, 
there's no denying it...Disastered as I have been, through giving way to 
wits pestilential, I desire in return to conciliate and give enormous gifts.'
(9:115-120)
'Your talk of my blindness is no lie: I was blinded, I do not deny it 
myself...Since I was blinded, and listened to my hearts wretched 
persuasion, I am ready to take it all back and offer the appeasement of 
limitless reparation.' (9:115-120)
These two translations refer to the same lines of text. The first translation is by 
Havelock from The Greek Concept o f Justice2*, whilst the second is by Hammond from 
the Penguin Edition. Hammond translates ate as blindness whilst Havelock translates 
ate as disaster29. Both are equally valid and each convey a valuable trace of the original 
meaning, but the aporia of difference between the two reveals how easily the 
anthropomorphic character of Homeric thought can get lost in translation. With an oral 
knowledge structure there are no dictionaries, so the most important reflective words of 
deliberation had to define themselves through divine personification.
28 Op cit, p. 125.
29 Compare with the use of blindness' and blindspots' in Roger Tooze and Craig N. Murphy, The 
Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness, and 
Invisibility1, Millennium, 1996, Vol.25, No.3.
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Ate was the goddess who personified folly, 'rendering her victims incapable of 
rational choice and blinding them to distinctions of morality or experience', thus 
bringing them to the brink of disaster30. In the divine genealogy of the Hellenic bards 
Ate was the daughter of Eris the goddess of conflict, and thus were related to each other, 
not by a theory as we would understand it, but by kinship. The pragmatics of an oral 
knowledge structure and its bicameral means of reflection made it difficult to think 
about human folly and its consequences without the mnemonic assistance of divine 
personae. The figure of Ate helps Agamemnon to publicly come to terms with the fact 
that he has committed a gross error of judgement. By narrating this reflective 
achievement of Agamemnon, the bard stores one possible policy option within the mind 
of his basileus.
A series of reverses in the field of international conflict which pose a profound 
threat to the security of the Achaian forces have finally persuaded Agamemnon that it 
was folly to provoke a quarrel with Achilles by transgressing the heroic code of justice 
with regard to the distribution of wealth, so now Agamemnon is ready to play a full part 
in the resolution of the conflict. He lays out before the agora his inventory of soothing 
gifts. Agamemnon's offer may be distilled into four words: metals; land; horses and 
women. All four are key sources of social power in the Homeric world-view. After 
Agamemnon has finished speaking, Nestor the mediator stands to express approval. He 
thinks the Achaian community now has an excellent offer they can take to Achilles. He 
picks an embassy approved by the agora which then heads along the strandline 'of the 
sounding sea' toward the camp of Achilles.
Upon arrival, after the necessary formalities, Odysseus is the first member of 
the embassy to speak to the alienated Achilles (9:223-308). Firstly, Achilles is informed 
of the dire military situation faced by the Achaian alliance. The sackers of cities now 
even fear for the destruction of their own ships, without which the Achaians are doomed 
'to perish here in Troy'. Then Odysseus reminds Achilles of his father's parting words 
when his prodigal son left for war:
"'you must hold down your heart's high passion in your breast - good will 
between friends (philos) is a better thing. And if a quarrel begins its 
mischief, you should abandon it - this way the Argives, young and old 
alike, will show you greater honour.'"
30 Grant & Hazel, Who's Who In Classical Mythology, p.59.
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That was your old man’s advice', Odysseus argues, 'and now you are forgetting it'. 
Please stop, let go the anger that pains your heart'. Next Odysseus repeats the inventory 
of wealth that Agamemnon has offered in recognition of his previous transgression of 
justice. Odysseus makes it clear he thinks these terms are generous, but tops this with an 
offer from the community of Achaians as a whole:
'But if hatred for the son of Atreus (Agamemnon) has grown too strong 
in your heart, for the man and for his gifts, then still have pity on all the 
other Achaians of the army in their affliction, and they will honour you 
like a god.'
In other words Odysseus accepts that Achilles' respect for the authority of Agamemnon 
may be damaged beyond repair, but argues that Achilles is still obligated by ties of 
loyalty to his community, and now has a superb opportunity to gain power over the 
hearts and minds of his fellow Achaians through the value of security: 'You could win 
the very greatest glory in their eyes, because now you could kill Hector'. The Trojan 
hero, Hector, has been tempted to over-expose his forces by the recent spell of Trojan 
success.
Now it is the turn of Achilles to transgress the Homeric normative code. In his 
reply Achilles makes it clear that he is not yet ready to play a full part in the resolution 
of the conflict (9:309-430). First he registers his lofty disgust for the cognitive 
dissonance that inevitably comes with the shabby business of compromise when cutting 
deals with a sworn adversary: 1 hate like the gates of Hades the man who hides one 
thing in his mind and speaks another'. If he accepts the bargain Achilles knows he will 
have to feign respect for the authority of a man for whom he has no respect any more: 'I 
know him well now'. Achilles tells the embassy bluntly he does not think Agamemnon 
nor the Achaian community can bring him back into the fold. His disillusionment with 
them both is too profound:
'it now appears that there is no thanks if a man fights the enemy 
relentlessly on and on. Stay at home or fight your hardest - your share 
will be the same. Coward and hero are honoured alike...And it has done 
me no profit to have suffered all that pain in fighting on endlessly with 
my life at constant risk...I have spent many sleepless nights, and won 
through many days of blood and battle, fighting with men over their 
wives. I have sacked twelve of men's cities from my ships, and I claim 
eleven more by land across the fertile Troad. From all these I took many 
fine treasures, and every time I brought them all and gave them to 
Agamemnon son of Atreus: and every time, back there by the fast ships 
he had never left, he would take them in, share out a few, and keep the
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most for himself. All the other prizes he gave to the kings and leading 
men stay safe with their owners. I am the only Achaian he has robbed.’
Once bitten twice shy: 'He has cheated me and wronged me. He will not work his 
cheating tongue on me again’. Achilles gives notice that tomorrow he will set sail for 
home with the booty he still possesses. He is not tempted by the inventory of wealth 
Agamemnon is belatedly offering him now that his political incompetence has finally 
caught up with him and got him into trouble. It is all too little too late because after all 
is said and done Achilles knows no amount of wealth can equal ’the worth of my own 
life’:
'Men can raid cattle and sturdy sheep, and men can win tripods and bay 
horses by the head - but there is no raiding or winning a man’s life back 
again, when once it has passed the guard of his own teeth.'
Achilles senses the mortality of the warrior more keenly than most, since his mother 
Thetis has foretold that he has a straight choice. He can fight on and die gloriously in 
Troy or go home and live to a humble old age, but the injustice of Agamemnon has left 
Achilles with no illusions about the value of military glory, so Odysseus' appeal on 
behalf of the Achaian community is also meaningless.
When Achilles has finished the meeting plunges into silence, 'shocked by his 
words and the great force of his refusal'. Eventually, the embassy plays its next card and 
Phoinix starts to speak (9:429-602). Phoinix is the old teacher who has seen his pupil 
grow from a small child: 'with no knowledge yet of making war or debate'. Phoinix 
begins by employing the pathos of his life story and invokes his feelings for Achilles as 
surrogate son: 'I brought you up to manhood, godlike Archilles, with heartfelt love'. 'I 
went through much trouble and much hard work over you'...(teaching Achilles to be)...'a 
speaker of words and a doer of deeds'. Rhetoric for the purposes of public speaking 
already forms an essential part of the heroic curriculum. Having cast these emotional 
hooks, Phoinix begins his attempt to reel the errant pupil in:
'Come then, Achilles, master your great passion. You should not have a 
heart that does not forgive...You see, the Repents are the daughters of 
great Zeus. They are lame and wrinkled and squint-eyed, and their 
business is to come behind the course of Ate. Ate is strong and sound of 
foot: she outruns them all by far, and is first to do her harm in every land 
where men live - and they come behind with their healing. When a man 
shows respect as the daughters of Zeus approach, they prosper him and 
hear his prayers. But if he refuses them and spurns them in the hardness 
of his heart, then they go to Zeus the son of Kronos and beg him that Ate
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should visit that man, so that he pays with his own hurt. You too,
Achilles, should give the daughters of Zeus that respect which bends the 
minds of other men'
Here the agencies of the gods, which are the primary form of abstraction within the oral 
knowledge structure, are being employed for an argument about the causes of conflict. It 
is folly that is responsible for the destructiveness of conflict, which is so embedded in 
the human condition that it has to be accepted as a part of life, but in its wake creeps 
remorse, and if people engage with the consequences of conflict in a constructive 
fashion good fortune may be redeemed. However, if such opportunities are repressed 
the cycle of folly cannot be broken, which will eventually prove to be equally 
destructive for the person who has failed to break it. 'Now1, Phoinix argues, if 
Agamemnon was not showing contrition by offering so many gifts 'but keeping up the 
fury of his resentment I would not ask you to put away your anger and defend the 
Argives'. But in fact Agamemnon has gone out of his way to make amends, Phoinix 
argues, sending an embassy in an unambiguous gesture of reparation, and so Achilles is 
obliged to reciprocate.
Then Phoinix buttresses his divine argument with a heroic argument, a 
cautionary tale drawn from the 'tales of past heroes'. This curious Russian doll effect, 
where a song is found within the song, can also be discovered elsewhere in Homer. 
Phoinix summarises a tale of war where a community called the Aitolians are being 
besieged by the Kouretes. Things go well for the Aitolians until their best soldier, 
Meleagros, gets involved in a blood feud whereby he deserts. When the enemy is at the 
gates the Aitiolians approach Meleagros trying to appease his anger offering him gifts, 
but he rejects them. Only when 'the enemy weapons were hitting thick on his own room', 
and his wife confronts him with the fact that the men will be killed, the city put to the 
fire, and the women and children lose their freedom, does Meleagros belatedly return to 
the fray to defeat the marauding soldiers. By this time his prestige amongst his 
community had fallen to the point that it no longer felt obligated 'to pay him those 
lovely gifts' that he had rejected. Phoinix uses the parable of Meleagros in the same way 
as the Greeks would be expected to quote from the 'anger of Achilles' when trying to 
resolve a communal conflict. There comes a point where resentment can become self- 
destructive, suggests the old mentor of Achilles. Eventually things will get so bad that 
Achilles will have to become reconciled with Agamemnon and rejoin the fray anyway, 
Phoinix argues, so Achilles would do best to come in from the cold now whilst the
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Achaians will still honour him for having the generosity of spirit to do so of his own 
free will.
Achilles’ reply to Phoinix is curt. The divine and heroic arguments are simply 
ignored and Phoinix is bluntly told to cut the paternal pathos and choose whose camp he 
would prefer to sleep the night and place his life: Achilles’ or Agamemnon's. It is clear 
the embassy has failed. Aias the third member of the embassy now speaks to formally 
acknowledge the fact, but also to express the normative judgement which the minstrel 
wishes to share with his audience (9:620-644):
'Achilles has turned his heart's high passion to savagery in his breast.
Cruel man, he has no thought for the love of his companions, how we 
honoured him more than any other by the ships. He has no pity - and yet 
a man will accept recompense for his dead brother, or his own son, from 
the man who killed him: the killer pays a great blood-price and stays on 
in his country, and the other's heart and high anger are kept down when
he takes the payment. But the heart the gods have put in your breast is
implacable and perverse, all because of a girl, one girl - but now we are 
offering you seven, the very finest, and much more besides...'
Achilles is nursing his resentment to the point where he is putting his own community at 
risk. He has become savage by placing himself beyond the reach of communal
obligation and ceasing to value the opinion of his comrades. For the sake of the health
of the community as a whole Achaians are expected to accept the dike of appropriate 
reparation even for crimes as grievous as the murder of a son or brother, but Achilles’ 
pride is such that he is not even prepared to accept lavish reparation for an error of 
judgement over the property of a mere slave.
As if to emphasise the bard's message Achilles' reply to Aias (9:645-655) 
contrasts with his tone toward Odysseus and Phoinix in that it is almost apologetic, 'all 
that you have said seems much after my own feeling'. But once a conflict has been 
provoked resolution is not a simple matter. The anger of Achilles represents the 
existential fact that memories of injustice are not easily wiped clean. It is all very well 
for Agamemnon to say he is sorry and then impress everybody with the generosity of his 
offer of reparation, but it is Achilles who is left to deal with the feeling that 
Agamemnon should not have made the mistake in the first place. In order to stress that 
both parties of a communal conflict have a mutual interest in resolution, even if one of 
the parties feels he is innocent with regard to the question of cause, it is imperative that 
Achilles must not give ground until some tragedy has overtaken him and impressed the
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bard's audience with the consequence of this folly. The requirements of oral mnemonics 
mean that the actions of heroes have to carry the argument. The transgression and 
remorse of Agamemnon must be balanced with the transgression and remorse of 
Achilles. And so: Achilles acknowledges the strength of Aias' communitarian reproach 
but confesses that he cannot quench his anger over the memory of how Agamemnon 
‘treated me with contempt in front of the Argives, as i f  I  were some migrant without 
rights'. Achilles is still consumed with a desire for revenge. The embassy returns to the 
Achaian camp with the news that Achilles will not accept Agamemnon's offer of 
reparation and rejoin the war until the Trojans have killed many more Achaians and 'set 
the ships smouldering with fire'.
Achilles' wishes are fulfilled during the protracted fighting of the next day, but 
with tragic consequences, for his beloved friend Patroklos is drawn into the fighting by 
the crisis and is killed. When the news of this is brought to Achilles in book eighteen he 
cries out in pain, whereupon his mother-goddess, Thetis, suddenly appears to ask her 
son:
'Child, why are you crying?...Look, all that you asked has been brought 
about by Zeus, when you held out your hands and prayed that all the 
sons of the Achaians should be penned back by the stems of their ships 
through want of you, and be put to terrible suffering.1 (18:74-77)
It has been the dramatic destiny of Achilles to prove the arguments of Odysseus,
Phoinix and Aias as set out in book nine. He explains to his mother that his failure to
civilize his anger has brought about the death of a friend:
'Oh, that quarrels should vanish from gods and men, and resentment, 
which drives even a man of good sense to anger! It is far sweeter men 
than trickling honey, and swells to fill their hearts like smoke - such is 
the anger that Agamemnon has caused me now. But all this is past and 
we should let it be, for all our pain, forcing down the passion in our 
hearts.'(18:110-114)
As in other moments of crisis where the Homeric hero reaches a turning point in mortal 
volition, it is the gods who administer the shout that terrifies the Trojans by announcing 
the decision that Achilles shall return to war. By book nineteen Achilles is finally ready 
to play a full part in the resolution of the communal conflict (19:39-74). He runs 
amongst all the ships along the beach calling for an agora to formally renounce his 
resentment and declare his intention to resume hostilities toward the Trojans: 'I am 
ending my anger'. Many of the assembled have limped to the agora as if to underline the
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lesson that has been learned: ’I think the Achaians will long remember the quarrel 
between us' (without which) 'many Achaians would not have sunk their teeth in the 
broad earth'.
The agora is still expressing its approval with the return of Achilles as 
Agamemnon stands to speak (19:80-145). Agamemnon expands upon his apology of 
book nine were his transgression of the judgement of Nestor was attributed to the 
mischief of Ate: 'she treads across the heads of men bringing folly to mankind'. Then he 
confirms his former offer of compensation and offers to display it for inspection, but 
quibbles over wealth have lost their previous meaning for Achilles now that they have 
lead to the loss of Patroklas, so he expresses eagerness to dispense with the ceremony of 
resolution and his desire to go straight back to the war. It is left to Odysseus to speak up 
in defence of the formal procedure. It is essential for the resolution to be collectively 
witnessed by as many people as possible:
'And Agamemnon, lord of men, should bring the gifts into the middle of 
our assembly, so that all the Achaians can see them with their own eyes, 
and your heart can have its pleasure'
The resolution is too important to be left to the parties concerned. There is no piece of 
paper that people can sign to prove that an agreement has been made. Therefore the 
agreement has to be sealed with a performance whereby it can become common 
knowledge. The wealth is brought from Agamemnon's camp and handed over before the 
assembly in a public gesture of reparation, and Achilles has to publicly express 
satisfaction with this reparation. A sacrifice is made to commemorate solemn oaths 
made by both Agamemnon and Achilles. The feud is thus formally brought to a close 
and the agora is dissolved. The Achaians prepare to return to war and, united again, 
anticipate a reversal of fortune.
Although the drama unfolds within the context of an Achaian army besieging 
Troy, the behaviour of this army in assembly serves as a paradigm of correct procedure 
in the Homeric polis31. The Iliad thus delineates a form of justice where the power of 
speech is promoted as the legitimate method for resolving disputes. This method 
attempts to replace physical conflict in a given community with negotiation under the
31 For a definition of the Homeric polis as the harbour of ships, the enclosure of city walls, and 
the site of assembly, see Stephen Scully, Homer And The Sacred City.
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aegis of an assembly with an accepted set of rules, or constitution, arrived at by 
precedent32. Placing the paradigmatic agora within the context of an allied effort in war, 
as emphasized by the famous 'catalogue of ships' in book n, enabled the bards to
represent the skills of political assembly as practices common to all Greek basileis.
Simultaneously, the context of war helped to dramatise a Homeric way of thinking 
about the human capacity for folly. With Ate the bards could offer the listener a 
renegade divinity through whom the experience of folly could be acknowledged and 
shared. Lastly, the bards offered a paradigm of bicameral mental deliberation at 
moments of crisis in human volition.
The basileis would also sponsor songs which helped them to reflect about the 
oikos, and about relations between oikoi within and across the boundary lines of the 
poleis. The wartime tale of the Iliad was thus balanced with the peacetime tale of the 
Odyssey:
'Tell me, Muse, the story of that resourceful man who was driven to 
wander far and wide after he had sacked the holy citadel of Troy. He 
saw the cities of many people and he learnt their ways. He suffered great 
anguish on the high seas in his struggles to preserve his life and bring his 
comrades home.' (1:1-5)33
By delaying the return of Odysseus for a further ten years after the close of the Trojan 
war, through a series of shipwrecks and other tribulations, the minstrels were able to 
deliver a normative code to help the basileis juggle with the values of wealth, security, 
freedom and justice in their dealings with each other.
Our journey through the Odyssey shall concentrate on the use of these values 
with particular regard to four major themes. Firstly we consider the way in which the 
crisis within the oikos of Odysseus caused by his prolonged absence promotes the 
authority of the master as a nascent source of consciousness that is beginning to assert 
itself against the will of the gods. Secondly we explore the way in which the wanderings 
of Odysseus promote the international custom of hospitality toward the xenos, or 
stranger-guest. Thirdly we note how the Odyssey maps the related images of the desert 
island, utopia and dystopia for future development by the western imagination.
32 Havelock, The Greek Concept o f Justice, p. 148.
33 All quotations from the Odyssey have been taken from the translation by E.V. Rieu & D.C.H. 
Rieu unless otherwise stated.
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Fourthly, we consider how Odysseus was used as a vehicle for thinking about the ethics 
of deception as a means to an end in political and economic affairs.
The epic opens on Mount Olympus where an Pan Hellenic agora of the gods is 
in session. Immediately, our attention is drawn to a subtle shift in the balance of power 
between the two chambers of the bicameral mind. Ate, whose relationship with Mount 
Olympus was always obscure and seemed to be a god of no fixed abode, has 
disappeared. The gods have started to distance themselves from the decision making 
process of mortals. |Instead, they appear to concentrate more time on the determination 
of consequences. Zeus reflects upon the folly of humans who blame the gods for their 
troubles 'when it is their own transgressions which bring them suffering' (1:32-44). The 
goddess Athena thereby spots an opportunity to petition Zeus on behalf of Odysseus, 
and questions the cosmic justice of him having been shipwrecked 'on a lonely island far 
away in the middle of the seas' for the last seven years (1:45-63). Zeus protests that it is 
not he but his brother, Poseidon god of the seas and waters, who bears a grudge against 
Odysseus because he has blinded Polyphemus of the Cyclopes (1:64-79). Poseidon is 
absent from this particular agora, being 'on a visit to the distant Ethiopians', so the 
decision to release Odysseus from the Isle of Ogygia is passed unopposed. Hermes the 
Olympian messenger is sent to instruct Calypso, goddess of the desert island, to release 
Odysseus and despatch him homeward.
Meanwhile Athena undertakes to visit Ithaca, Odysseus' homeland, to galvanize 
Odysseus' son Telemachus. Upon her arrival she assumes the disguise of a stranger and 
waits at the threshold of the house. This is another subtle change of emphasis from the 
Iliad where the gods can instantly manifest themselves in mind and appear to feel less 
need to hide behind mortal disguise. Through the eyes of the disguised Athena we are 
treated to our first glimpse of the sorry state of affairs which has befallen the oikos of 
Odysseus in the absence of its master. Whilst Odysseus has been away his mother has 
died of worry for her son, his father has retired to the country in grief and his sister has 
been married off to another oikos, leaving his wife Penelope and his son Telemachus 
alone in charge of the family estate. Sensing a power vacuum at the centre of a wealthy 
estate, one hundred and eight eligible basileis from the surrounding oikoi have begun to 
circle around the household of Odysseus, seeking the hand of Penelope in marriage. In 
an effort to pressurise Penelope to marry, the suitors have taken up semi-permanent 
residence on the estate, abusing the ancient tradition of hospitality by eating and
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drinking its wealth away in sumptuous feasts. Other bits and pieces of property are 
beginning to go astray too, such as authority over some of the slaves.
Whilst sitting amongst the Suitors dreaming of how his father might return to 
drive them all away, Telemachus spots the disguised Athena and leaps up to greet her: 
'ashamed that a stranger should be kept standing at the threshold' (1:120-1). Telemachus 
is to be the first character to define the proper code of behaviour toward the visiting 
foreigner. The xenos is welcomed from the threshold into the hall, comfortably seated 
and then offered food and wine. Next he is asked the following questions:
'But tell me honestly who you are and where you come from. What is 
your native town? Who are your parents? And since you certainly cannot 
have come on foot, what kind of vessel brought you here? How did the 
crew come to land you in Ithaca, and who did they claim to be? And tell 
me the truth - I'd like to know - is this your first visit to Ithaca, or has my 
father received you before - he used to entertain in our house just as 
often as he visited abroad' (1:169-178)
Athena assumes the identity of Mentes, son of Anchialus and basileus 'of the sea-faring 
Taphians' (1:179-213). Telemachus is told that Mentes is captain of a ship bound for the 
foreign port of Temesa with a cargo of iron, 'which we mean to exchange for bronze'. 
He is also informed that the ties of guest-friendship between their families 'go a long 
way back', a claim which Telemachus can verify with his grandfather if he so wishes. 
Athena/Mentes thus becomes the first character to deliver the oral equivalent of the 
passport and visa.
If the Iliad can be interpreted as an oral encyclopaedia of intra-city propriety, 
the Odyssey may be seen as a corresponding encyclopaedia for inter-city propriety34. 
Odysseus is the archetypal 'sacker of cities', but his militarist credentials lend him the 
authority for his character to also be the vehicle for the promotion of inter-city relations 
that transcend war. The obligation of hospitality toward the xenos was essential if one 
wanted to participate in trade, as is evident in the testimony of Mentes. His oikos needs 
to exchange a cargo of iron for bronze, but in order to do so he needs to be able to draw 
upon the wealth of other oikoi on the way to sustain him through his voyage, and one of 
these happens to be the household of Odysseus. The relationship is one of reciprocity. 
Mentes claims that Odysseus has previously visited his own oikos too, on a trade 
mission for the procurement of chemical weapons (1:255-264). As we follow the
192
fortunes of Telemachus through books 1 to 4 we begin to perceive other qualities in the 
xenos. When justice within the community breaks down, the basileus who has cultivated 
a xenos in a foreign land has a ready substitute for kinsman, protector and ally35. The 
basileus who has entertained numerous strangers from abroad and thereby established 
ties of guest-friendship with many foreigners has earned both a passport to travel and a 
wide selection of potential bolt-holes when it becomes expedient to flee his own 
community. The inter-city convention of xenos thus provides the basileus and his oikos 
with extra-communitarian access to wealth, security and freedom.
Once the identity of Mentes is established and his status as xenos confirmed, 
Mentes enquires what the Suitors are doing in the oikos and the reason for their boorish 
behaviour (1:221-9). Telemachus explains that the prolonged absence of his father has 
aroused the predatory instincts of the surrounding oikoi (1:230-51). His house has lost 
the protection of its master and its wealth is thus perceived to be there for the taking. 
The stranger-guest expresses his sympathies, notes how important the presence of the 
basileus is for the security of the oikos, and urges Telemachus to call an agora to try to 
oblige the Suitors to back-off and go home. If this fails Telemachus is advised to set sail 
in search for news of his father. In the light of this news Telemachus can then plan his 
next course of action (1:252-306). Before Mentes departs, Telemachus the exemplary 
host carefully observes the custom of offering him a keepsake to leave with: 'the sort of 
present that one gives to a guest who has become a friend' (1:313). The guest-gift was a 
mnemonic device which helped two oikoi from different parts of the Aegean recall 
previous instances of hospitality and thus re-establish international relations of guest- 
friendship. The more fabulous the gift, the more memorable the bond of guest- 
friendship between the two parties. Both the Iliad and the Odyssey furnish instances 
where basileis establish proof of old family ties of guest-friendship through the mutual 
recollection of guest-gifts exchanged. Perhaps the most extraordinary of these is the 
amiable exchange between the Trojan Glaukos and the Achaian Diomedes in the middle 
of a pitched battle in the Iliad (6:120-236).
The following morning Telemachus uses his prerogative as a basileus to 
summon an agora. An elder called Aegyptius formally opens the proceedings and asks 
the summoner to declare his suit. Is there a hostile army approaching, or is there some
34 Havelock, The Greek Concept o f Justice, p. 177.
35 Finley, op cit, p. 102.
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other matter of public concern which needs to be discussed? Telemachus leaves his seat, 
takes the staff and stands to speak in the middle of the assembly:
'Of an army's approach I have heard nothing to tell you. Nor is it some 
other question of public concern that I propose to bring forward, but my 
own private business, the affliction, the double affliction, that has fallen 
on my house.' (2:42-46)
The oikos has lost its father and the Suitors, who 'are actually the sons of those who are 
your leaders here', are pestering his wife and helping themselves to the rest of his 
property. Telemachus argues that without his father the oikos is too weak to rid itself of 
the Suitors, but that what they are doing is an injustice ’which you, gentlemen, should 
resent not only on your own behalf but as a scandal to our neighbours who live round 
about’. Telemachus appeals to the agora in the name of Zeus the god of the polis and 
Themis the goddess of law and order to protect the house of Odysseus. In a finishing 
flourish resonant with the anger of Achilles, Telemachus flings the staff of sovereignty 
to the ground and returns to his seat.
For a moment 'nobody had the heart to give Telemachus a sharp reply’ as a wave 
of pity sweeps across the assembly. Then, on behalf of the Suitors, Antinous rises to 
claim that they are innocent of any injustice and that Penelope, Telemachus' mother, has 
been leading them on. Telemachus is informed that unless Penelope chooses one of 
them for marriage the Suitors will continue to besiege her former husband's estate. 
Telemachus replies that it is impossible for him to force his mother to marry someone 
whilst the fate of his father has still not been ascertained. Then, like Chryses and 
Achilles in the Iliad, Telemachus threatens to pray to Zeus to repay the Suitors for their 
transgressions. The reply of Zeus is swift. He despatches a couple of eagles to swoop 
over the assembly and, rather like Kalchus in the Iliad, an old soothsayer called 
Halitherses rises to interpret this as a warning to the Suitors that Odysseus is not dead 
and that he shall soon return. He appeals to the Suitors to back off before disaster 
overwhelms them. At this another Suitor, Eurymachus, rises to quash this appeal (2:178- 
206). The omen sent by Zeus is dismissed, Odysseus pronounced dead, and Halitherses 
is blatantly threatened with dire consequences if he continues to support the cause of 
Telemachus. An air of latent violence begins to pervade the arguments of the Suitors: 
'we are afraid of no one at all'.
An old ally of the house of Odysseus, Mentor, then rises to speak (2:229-241). 
The behaviour of the Suitors is beneath his contempt. Instead he expresses indignation
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at the timidity of the agora in response to the bullying tactics of the Suitors and its 
abject failure to uphold the ways of justice:
'Kindness, generosity, and justice should no longer be the aims of any 
man who wields the royal staff - in fact he might just as well devote his 
days to tyranny and lawless deeds... They are few and you are many. Yet 
not a word have they had from you in condemnation or restraint!'
A third member of the Suitors, Leocritus, rises to speak (2:242-256). Mentor is ridiculed 
for 'inciting the people to stop us'. He makes an open appeal to the human capacity for 
apathy: 'it is expecting much of men to take up arms over a meal, even with the odds in 
their favour'. The implication is that the abuse of the tradition of hospitality is 
something that a healthy oikos ought to be able to deal with itself. The problem with the 
case for Telemachus seems to be that, by his own admission, he is trying to turn a 
private tragedy into a public concern. Many basileis may feel genuine sadness for the 
fate which has befallen the house of Odysseus, but it is nearly twenty years now since 
he left Ithaca and most doubt he will ever return. Consequently the house of Odysseus 
has become a lame duck and there are limits to the extent to which an agora can be 
expected to intervene. Ithaca is not a rich island, and there is always going to be 
competition for good land. The basileis of Ithaca would normally expect an oikos as rich 
as the house of Odysseus to furnish a basileus who could make a major contribution to 
the security of the polis36. All Telemachus can offer is an oikos that is threatening to 
drag the basileis of Ithaca into a civil conflict. Leocritus argues that even if Odysseus 
himself returned to try and drive the Suitors from his house he would die in the attempt.
The assembly is dissolved having accepted the dismissal of Leocritus. The 
appeal by Telemachus to his own community through the agora has failed. The life of 
Telemachus is now at risk, so his next course of action is to seek extra-communitarian 
assistance by setting sail for Sparta in order to seek sanctuary as a xenos in the 
household of Nestor, ostensibly to search for news of the whereabouts of his father. 
When the ship reaches Pylos the sons of Nestor welcome Telemachus as a stranger- 
guest and he is offered food and drink. After the feast the xenos is asked to reveal his 
identity in the traditional way:
Now that our visitors have eaten well, it is the right moment to put some 
questions to them and enquire who they are. Who are you, friends? From 
what port have you sailed over the highways of the sea? Is yours a
36 For example, see the famous noblesse oblige speech by Sarpedon in the Iliad (12: 310-30).
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trading venture; or are you sailing the seas recklessly, like roving pirates, 
who risk their lives to ruin other people?' (3:70-74)
Telemachus reveals his homeland, his identity and his mission. Nestor wistfully recalls 
the exploits of Odysseus on the Achaian campaigns in the Troad, thus acknowledging 
the mutual ties of friendship between the two houses, and tells of the numerous travails 
of the heroes as they return from war to homes that seem to have changed utterly from 
the ones they left. Life moves on when a soldier leaves for war and home will never be 
the same for him again. Upon his return he shall find himself a stranger in his own land. 
Of Odysseus, Telemachus learns little, but he is advised to visit Menelaus in Sparta in 
the hope that he has more news.
Upon arrival in Sparta the propriety of hospitality toward the stranger-guest is 
observed once again. As Telemachus and his companion approach the house of 
Menelaus a squire spots them and runs to ask his basileus whether the 'strangers at the 
gates' should be welcomed or sent away. The answer of Menelaus is contemptuous:
'you have not always been a fool; but at the moment you are talking 
nonsense like a child. You and I enjoyed much hospitality from strangers 
before we reached our homes and could expect that Zeus might grant us 
a life without suffering in time to come. Unyoke their horses at once, and 
bring our visitors to join us at the feast.' (4:30-37)
We give hospitality to strangers from other poleis without hesitation because this 
custom has saved our own skins in the past and it may have to do so again in the future, 
so the strangers must be ushered in, bathed, fed, watered and only afterwards identified: 
'after you have dined we shall inquire who you may be'.
Once Telemachus is recognised, Menelaus and his wife Helen treat us to our 
first glimpses of the 'resourcefulness' of Odysseus. Helen wistfully recollects how, 
during the Trojan war, Odysseus gained valuable intelligence by dressing himself in 
rags and slipping through the gates of Troy disguised as a beggar. Menelaus fondly 
recalls the deceit of the wooden horse, which finally enabled the Achaians to sack Troy 
after ten years of failure. Menelaus also informs Telemachus that on his travels Proteus, 
the old man of the sea, once told him that Odysseus was marooned on a desert island 
somewhere 'in the vastness of the seas'. Before the departure of Telemachus, Menelaus 
complements his exemplary hospitality by offering as guest-gifts three horses and a 
chariot, which are politely declined. Telemachus explains that the island of Ithaca has 
not enough pasture for horses and the ground is unsuitable for chariots. He would rather
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have treasure. Menelaus, charmed by the youthful directness of Telemachus over the 
subtle diplomacy of gifts, offers an alternative in the form of a mixing bowl of gold and 
silver previously given him as a guest-gift from 'the king of Sidon' (4:615-19).
The role of stranger-guest then switches from Telemachus to his father as we 
watch Hermes fly down to order Calypso to release the shipwrecked Odysseus from the 
desert island of Ogygia. She gives Odysseus a bronze axe, an adze and some drills with 
which to cut down some trees and make a raft. He is also given cloth for a sail and 
provisions for the journey. He sails off, navigating by the stars, until he is hit by a 
terrific storm which destroys his raft. He is tossed about for two nights and two days 
before he catches a glimpse of land. Miraculously escaping the rocks, he lands 
exhausted on the beach, happy to be alive. Odysseus wakes the next day to the sound of 
girls playing by the shore, and wonders:
'What country have I come to this time? What people are there here?
Hostile and uncivilized savages, or kindly and god-fearing people?'
(6:120-1)
The applicability of xenia is about to be extended here. Telemachus was fully clothed in 
the manner of a basileus, captaining a ship to Pylos and Sparta to seek out known family 
xenoi of the house of Odysseus in Nestor and Menelaus. But here Odysseus is naked, 
destitute, and does not know a soul in this city or this land' (6:176-7). He approaches 
one of the girls as a beggar, tells of his misfortune and pleads for help. His life depends 
upon the question of whether the natives are 'uncivilized savages' or members of an 
international society. This time Odysseus is lucky. He has fallen 'into the hands of a 
people favoured by the gods' (5:377). The girl informs Odysseus:
'since you have come to our country and our city here, you shall 
certainly not want for clothing or anything else that an unfortunate 
suppliant has the right to expect from those he meets.' (6:190-194)
In the international society laid down by our minstrel, the shipwrecked have a right to 
expect aid from those in a position to help. The girl calls out to her maids to chide them 
for hiding away from Odysseus in fright:
Don't tell me you take him for an enemy. There is no man on earth, nor 
ever will be, who would dare to set hostile feet on Phaeacian soil. The 
gods are too fond of us for that. Remote, we are at the edge of the world 
and come in contact with no other people. This man is an unfortunate 
wanderer who has strayed here, and we must look after hin^ since all
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strangers and beggars come under the protection of Zeus, and to such 
people a small gift can mean much.' (6:199-209)
The folk utopia of the Odyssey is located near to the desert island in the sense that they 
are both isolated from the rest of humanity, disturbed only by the occasional 
shipwrecked sailor such as Odysseus, and are thus free from the normal insecurities 
wrought by intertheocratic relations. On the other hand the Phaeacians are intimately 
connected with humanity in the sense that they are thoroughly aware of and strictly 
comply with the norms of intertheocratic society. This society is partly regulated 
through the 'fear of the gods', particularly Zeus, who is both Zeus polieus (god of the 
state) and Zeus xenos (protector of stranger-guests). But the society which adheres to 
this norm of hospitality has also carefully weighed up the costs and benefits. A little 
welfare to help the unfortunate stranger-guest on his way does not have to cost the 
community much, but can yield high returns in terms of gratitude accumulated in 
foreign oikoi.
Odysseus is washed and fed and then escorted to the ideal city, replete with 
walls, a harbour, and an agora nestling beneath a communal temple dedicated to 
Poseidon (6:261-272). Guided now by Athena, Odysseus approaches the house of 
Alcinous, the principal oligarch of Phaeacia. Given that Phaeacia is utopia, the oikos of 
Alcinous is naturally blessed with wealth that stretches the Archaic imagination to its 
limit (7:82-134). Its halls are heavy with bronze, silver and gold. The place teems with 
slaves. The womenfolk produce textiles of outstanding quality. The com is 'apple- 
golden'. The ample orchards, olive groves, vineyards and vegetable plots furnish an 
endless supply of produce all year round, winter and summer. Odysseus steps over the 
symbolic threshold of the palace and falls at the knees of the mistress of the house, 
appealing for an escort back to his homeland. The subsequent silence is then broken by 
'the venerable lord Echeneus, a Phaeacian elder, an eloquent speaker, rich in the wisdom 
(sophia) of his forefathers'. He strongly advises Alcinous to welcome the stranger-guest, 
sit him comfortably and offer food and wine. Alcinous complies with this advice and 
also grants Odysseus a free passage back to his homeland.
The following morning a ship is fitted out and a crew picked ready for 
departure. To see the party off in style a day of festivities ensues, with field events and a 
feast complete with Demodocus the minstrel, who is versatile enough with his 'resonant 
lyre' to play both the edifying epic and the popular dance tune. Then, in a repeat of the 
formula which is now becoming familiar, Odysseus is asked to reveal his identity:
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Tell me the name by which you were known at home to your mother and 
father and your friends in the town and country around. No one, after all, 
whether of low or high class, goes nameless once he has come into the 
world; everybody is named by his parents when he is bom. You must 
also tell me where you come from, to what people and to what city you 
belong' (8:549-555)
But Alcinous also wants to know where the stranger has been on his odyssey, what 
cities he has seen and what their peoples were like:
'Did you meet hostile tribes with no sense of right and wrong?, or did 
you fall in with hospitable and god-fearing people?' (8:573-77).
Alcinous thus makes the sophia of the Odyssey explicit. Odysseus is the archetypal 
xenos, the foreigner whose arrival and departure defines what it means for the oikos to 
comply with international standards of civilized behaviour37.
In answer to Alcinous, Odysseus volunteers his name, 'I wish you all to know it 
so that I may always be your friend, though my home is far from here' (9:16-18). Then 
he declares his country, carefully plotting the island of Ithaca within its cluster and 
adding the iconic landmark of 'Mount Neriton1. Odysseus also stresses his 
homesickness. He is the cosmopolitan seafarer who yearns to return to his own 
community (9:27-38). Having revealed his true identity, Odysseus tells of his adventures 
prior to the shipwreck on the Isle of Ogygia. His first stop after the fall of Troy is 
Ismarus, where he sacks the city, kills the men and divides the wealth justly so that 
nobody goes 'short of his proper share' (9:40-45). This is the last gesture of the Trojan 
war, and the fair distribution of the spoils contrasts neatly with the behaviour of 
Agamemnon in the Iliad. The next berth is the land of the Lotus-eaters. Odysseus 
despatches three men ashore to 'find out what sort of human beings might be there'. 
They discover people whose hospitality is a trap in the sense that they offer their guests 
the lotus, a mythical fruit that induces a kind of narcotic paralysis whereby humans lose 
all desire to return to their native community. But Odysseus is made of sterner stuff. His 
desire to return to his native home is unyielding. He goes off in search for his men who 
have succumbed to the fruit, refuses to partake, and forces them against their will back 
on board the ships.
37 Havelock The Greek Concept o f Justice, p. 158.
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The next port of call is the land of the Cyclopes. The desert island is located 
close to utopia, but both lands are also situated nearby to dystopia. Encamped upon an 
island with wild goats, Odysseus and his men notice smoke coming from the nearby 
mainland. Odysseus decides to take his ship and crew there:
'to find out what kind of men are over there, and whether they are 
aggressive savages with no sense of right or wrong or hospitable and 
god-fearing people.1 (9:174-77)
In other words Odysseus does not need to visit the Cyclopes. He approaches them with 
the specific purpose of imposing a test of attitude and behaviour38. On arrival, Odysseus 
and his men discover an otherness against which the basileus can identify some key 
features of his own culture.
Firstly, the Cyclopes 'never lift a hand to sow or plough1 (9:106-7). Their 
productive economy is based upon pastoralism and horticulture. Secondly, the Cyclopes 
Tiave no assemblies for the making of laws, nor any established legal codes'. They are 
free from any sense of community: 'each man is lawgiver to his own children and 
women, and nobody has the slightest interest in what his neighbours decide' (9:111-16). 
Thirdly, the Cyclopes have no ships to give them 'the means of sailing across the sea to 
visit foreign towns and people, as other nations do' (9:125-131). This is presumably the 
primary reason for the fourth point of otherness, which is that the Cyclopes show no 
interest in observing the custom of hospitality toward the xenos.
Odysseus leads some of his crew to the home of one of the Cyclopes with the 
hope of receiving the customary 'gifts from my hosts' (9:228-9). As if to emphasize the 
otherness of beings without agriculture, assemblies and laws of community, the native 
Cyclops turns out to be a one-eyed giant. The Cyclops hails the visitors as stranger- 
guests and asks for their identity. Odysseus replies that he and his men are Achaeans 
making their way back from Troy, and that:
W e find ourselves here as suppliants at your knees, in the hope that you 
may give us hospitality, or even give us the kind of gifts that hosts 
customarily give their guests. Good sir, remember your duty to the gods; 
we are your suppliants, and Zeus is the champion of suppliants and 
guests.’ (9:267-272)
38 Ibid, p. 159.
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In reply the Cyclops declares a complete lack of reverence toward the gods of 
international society. Guests and suppliants can expect no hospitality from the Cyclopes 
unless they feel it is in their interest to do so (9:274-281). The Cyclops then asks 
Odysseus for information as to where his ship is moored, whereupon our hero reveals 
his guile and cunning. Sensing that the Cyclops is up to no good, Odysseus lies, telling 
his host that he and his men have been shipwrecked fon the borders of your land' (9:282- 
87). In the murky other-world that lies beyond the pale of international society, it can 
thus be a virtuous thing for the hero to utilise his human capacity for deception and 
deceit.
Odysseus' suspicion that the one-eyed giant is not going to honour the 
obligation of hospitality is confirmed when he seizes a couple of the crew, dashes their 
heads to the ground and proceeds to gobble them up. Odysseus and his men are trapped 
in a cave and, as the atrocities continue, it becomes clear that they are being kept as 
livestock to be butchered for the table. Their identities are being denied, and as far as 
the Cyclops is concerned the only thing of value is the meat upon their anonymous 
bodies. Then Odysseus, our lodestone for cunning in the world of theocratic relations, 
embraces his loss of identity and uses it for self-preservation. When Cyclops accepts an 
offer of wine from the visitor's knapsack, he asks the talking beefsteak to volunteer his 
name so that he can be offered a guest-gift. Odysseus lies:
'you ask me my name. I'll tell it to you; and in return give me the gift you 
promised me. My name is Nobody. That is what I am called by my 
mother and father and by all my friends.' (9:364-7)
With grisly humour Cyclops declares his guest-gift will be that he shall eat Nobody last, 
'that shall be your gift'. But the tables are turned after Odysseus has blinded the Cyclops. 
The monster calls out to his neighbours that Nobody has injured him, so they assume he 
has fallen sick and that there is nothing they can do for him. Odysseus slips the bonds of 
socialization right down to the name given to him by his mother and father at birth, 
becomes a nobody, and escapes. It is only when Odysseus gives the game away by 
taunting the Cyclops with his true identity when back on his ship that he lands himself 
back in trouble. The Cyclops duly reports Odysseus to Poseidon, who wreaks terrible 
revenge.
The Cyclops episode, where Odysseus slips the clothes of identity to escape, 
reveals the emergence of a conscious ego beneath, defined only by his ‘wiliness’. He
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becomes the archetype of the traveler who leaves his life behind at home and finds 
himself through his anonymity abroad, living on little but his wits and his will. If he gets 
home, his identity will be partly determined by the narration of the odyssey that has 
occupied the majority of his adult life.
Odysseus' fleet then arrives at the island of Aeolia, where the locals are 
hospitable and help the guests on their way, a mnemonic contrast with the Cyclopes. 
Ten more days at sea then brings Odysseus within sight of his native island of Ithaca, 
but the mutinous thoughts of his men brings more misfortune, so they become 
wandering mariners once again. A disastrous encounter follows in Laestrygonia, another 
dystopia, whose inhabitants turn out to be cannibals. The whole fleet is destroyed except 
for the ship of Odysseus and his crew, who flee to the sea once again, until they land on 
the island of Aeaea, home of the goddess Circe who, after some persuasion, treats her 
guests well and entertains them for a year, until the crew grow homesick and persuade 
Odysseus to search for home once more. Circe regretfully informs Odysseus that the 
only way to get home is to travel to the underworld first to seek out the sophia of the 
dead. When they get to hear about it the crew grow understandably despondent at the 
prospect of this detour, but off they go, and upon arrival Odysseus gets some valuable 
advice. One nugget comes from the luckless Agamemnon. He advises Odysseus not to 
'sail openly into port when you reach your home country. Make a secret approach' 
(11:455-6). Another comes from Achilles, who is allowed to express an early flicker of 
doubt from beyond the grave about the noble pursuit of military glory:
'I would rather work the soil as a serf on hire to some landless
impoverished peasant than be King of all these lifeless dead.' (11:487-
91)
Better a live chattel than a dead basileus. After leaving Hades, Odysseus and his crew 
are ready to resume their journey. They use the advice of Circe to negotiate the Sirens' 
isle. The Sirens are sea nymphs, whose voices are so beautiful and whose songs promise 
such wisdom that any sailor who hears them is compelled to stay and listen until they 
die of starvation. The crew confound the Sirens by plugging their ears with beeswax, 
whilst the cunning Odysseus has himself tied to the mast so that he can enjoy the Siren- 
songs without danger. Adorno and Horkheimer used this episode as an allegory of 
instrumental rationality: the rosy fingered dawn of sovereignty by the conscious mind
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over its body39. In order to be the archetypal master of his oikos, Odysseus must first 
master the natural passions within himself, which he does with guile and cunning.
The guile of Odysseus is also apparent where he chooses to be economical with 
the truth when it comes to telling his own crew about the horror of Scylla and 
Charybdis. Circe has advised Odysseus that his ship will have to be steered between the 
rocks of Scylla and Charybdis. It is better to steer closer to Scylla, for she will only eat 
six of his crew, whilst Charybdis will suck the whole ship into a whirlpool. As a 
responsible basileus he chooses the only policy that can save the party as whole, but 
does not tell the crew that his policy means that six of them will die for fear that they 
might not be prepared to sacrifice for the common good (12:101-110 & 208-225). In a 
world where conscious deceit can sometimes have a survival value the noble lies of 
captaincy are a heavy responsibility, but somebody has to do it. Odysseus takes it upon 
himself to deceive his community for the good of his community.
Having survived this ordeal, Odysseus and his remaining crew arrive at the 
desert island of Thrinacia, populated only by sheep and cattle sacred to the sun-god. 
Odysseus has already been warned not to set foot on this island, but by now he is losing 
the trust of the crew and they are getting mutinous. Once on the island, they become 
trapped by bad weather. Food rations run out and hunger undermines the authority of 
Odysseus, who has warned his crew not to eat the sun-god's cattle. Only Odysseus, with 
his sovereign consciousness, manages to suppress his passions as his crew feast on the 
roasted meat. They leave the island, only for the ship to be struck by a thunderbolt from 
Zeus. The crew are thrown overboard: 'there was no homecoming for them, the gods 
saw to that' (12:418). Odysseus is left all alone as a storm breaks up the ship until he is 
finally washed up on Calypso's island of Ogygia, which concludes Odysseus' flashback, 
and we find ourselves once more in the company of Alcinous and his fellow Utopians. It 
is nearly time for Odysseus' voyage home, but first he has to be festooned with parting 
guest-gifts. As is fitting upon a utopian island, Odysseus is given far more wealth than 
the xenos would normally expect to receive. The Phaeacian ship takes him to a lonely 
cove upon Ithaca and the crew lay him down on the shore asleep, together with his 
guest-gifts, and depart.
39 Adomo and Horkheimer, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, p.3-80.
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Odysseus is finally back on his native land, but when he wakes up he finds 
himself alone and confused. After twenty years away he fails to recognise his home 
island, and thinks that the Phaeacians have betrayed him and left him in a foreign 
country. Odysseus is home but he is still homesick, and it dawns on us that there will 
always be a part of him that is still wandering around looking for a land that no longer 
exists. No amount of searching can bring back twenty years. Odysseus has become the 
archetype of alienation. His wanderings have turned him into a stranger who has come 
to test his own country’s compliance with the norms of intertheocratic society:
'Oh no! Whose country have I come to this time? Are they some brutal 
tribe of uncivilized savages, or a kindly and god-fearing people?'
(13:200-2)
Athena now descends, disguised as a shepherd, to let Odysseus know that he really has 
arrived in Ithaca. His heart leaps but, remembering the sophia he received back in 
Hades, he uses his capacity for conscious deceit to assume a false identity, and spins the 
shepherd a likely yam of exile from a community on the island of Crete. Athena is 
amused by the alias of Odysseus, and drops her own disguise:
'Anyone who met you, even a god, would have to be a consummate 
trickster to surpass you in subterfuge. You were always an obstinate, 
cunning and irrepressible intriguer. So you don't propose, even in your 
own country, to drop the tricks and lying tales you love so much!'
(13:291-95)
Athena loves Odysseus because he is a chip off the old block. Like her, he knows how 
to be one thing on the inside and another on the outside. He has an inner self that can 
use the art of deception to get what he wants: 'we both know how to get our own way1. 
Together the two conspirators, the mortal and the immortal, hatch a scheme for the 
repossession of his oikos. Athena will go to the house of Menelaus to fetch Telemachus 
back from his bolt-hole. Meanwhile, Odysseus assumes the disguise of a beggar, with a 
ragged tunic, shabby cloak, a staff and an old wallet to hold alms (13:430-38). 
Following Athena's instructions, he sets off to impose the first test upon Eumaeus the 
swineherd.
As Odysseus approaches the hut of Eumaeus some guard dogs catch sight of 
him and threaten to tear him to pieces on the margin of his own oikos, as if to emphasise 
his alienation. The swineherd calls the dogs off, greets the 'old man' and invites the 
beggar into his hut. The beggar is told he shall be asked for his identity after he has had
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all the bread and wine he wants. The hut is poor, but Eumaeus offers as much 
hospitality as he can possibly manage. Odysseus expresses delight at the kindly 
reception, whereupon Eumaeus repeats the pedagogic formula:
'Stranger, it is not right for me to turn away any stranger, even one in a 
worse state than you are, for strangers and beggars all come in Zeus' 
name, and a gift from folk like us is none the less welcome for being 
small.' (14:55-60)
Eumaeus is passing two tests at the same time. He is not only the good host, but also the 
loyal slave. The Aegean now boasts a traffic in male slaves in addition to the market in 
female booty, as attested by Eumaeus' life story (15:402-85). Odysseus purchased 
Eumaeus from some Phoenician merchants when he was a small boy, but has treated 
him well: 'I shall never find so kind a master again wherever I go' (14:138-40). The 
figure of Eumaeus delineates the proper normative code for relations within the oikos. 
The master is benevolent, the slave is grateful and loyal. The loyal slave mourns the loss 
of his master, whom he believes to be 'dead and gone1, and bitterly resents the behaviour 
of the Suitors. Odysseus is delighted. Eumaeus is passing the test with flying colours.
Then it is time for Eumaeus to ask the beggar to reveal his identity (14:185- 
191). From what city does he come? Who is his family? What ship brought him to 
Ithaca and who did its crew claim to be? Once again, Odysseus uses his worldly 
experience to spin realistic threads into a convincing tissue of lies (14:199-359). He 
narrates yet another self. He is still from Crete, but this time he is the son of 'Castor son 
of Hylax' and one of his concubines. Being the son of master and slave he is crowded 
out of a major share of the wealth by the legitimate sons upon the death of his father. 
But he overcomes this early setback in life by his own efforts. Archaic society does not 
totally slam the door against the bastard. He marries into a rich family 'on my own 
merits'. A big opportunity comes at the outbreak of the Trojan war, which he seizes with 
both hands. He proves to be a fine soldier and the Achaians reward him with large 
quantities of loot: 'In this way my estate {oikos) increased rapidly and my fellow 
countrymen soon learned to both fear and respect me'. He has made it. The bastard son 
of a concubine owns his own concubines now. Unfortunately, he is not content to leave 
it at that and enjoy the fruits of his valour. He goes off on a rash buccaneering 
expedition to Egypt in the hope of accumulating even more, is captured, gets mixed up 
with a rascally Phoenician, and ends up as a slave on a ship which happens to anchor
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just off Ithaca. He slips his chains, swims ashore, and finds himself enjoying the 
hospitality of Eumaeus as a beggar.
Attention shifts to the return of Telemachus from the house of Menelaus. As is 
fitting with the convention of the xenos. Telemachus is given guest-gifts upon his 
departure. On his way home Telemachus gets wind of an ambush laid for him by the 
Suitors. He avoids it, lands on Ithaca and heads for the hut of Eumaeus. As he 
approaches, the barking guard dogs recognise him and start wagging their tails (16:4-7). 
The slave welcomes Telemachus, and introduces him to the beggar. Now it is the turn of 
Telemachus to pass the test of hospitality toward his own father (16:60-89). Eumaeus is 
then sent on an errand, Odysseus drops his disguise and reveals his true identity and 
father and son are reunited. Telemachus is made a party to the strategy for the downfall 
of the Suitors. Telemachus will join their company whilst Odysseus gains access to his 
home disguised once again as a beggar. He wants to find out which of the slaves and 
retainers of the oikos are being loyal and which are disloyal to the rightful master. 
Telemachus then shows how he is mastering the art of deception from his father by 
lying to his own mother Penelope, all in a good cause. Meanwhile, on his way to his old 
abode, Odysseus meets the goatherd Melanthius. The goatherd provides a marked 
contrast with the swineherd Eumaeus. He is a disloyal member of the oikos who thinks 
he has seen which way the wind is blowing and gone over to the side of the Suitors. He 
also fails the test in that he abuses the beggar, calls him a scrounger, warns him that he 
can only expect rough treatment at the hands of the Suitors, and then kicks him for good 
measure (17:214-39).
As the beggar approaches the house of Odysseus a dog lifts his head and pricks 
up his ears. It is Argus, who used to accompany Odysseus on his hunting trips before 
leaving for the Trojan war. As if to emphasize the fate of an oikos without a master, 
Eumaeus the slave explains why Argus the faithful old dog has become so dirty and 
neglected:
T3ut now he's in a bad way; his master has died far away from home and 
the women are too thoughtless to look after him. Servants, when their 
masters are no longer there to order them about, have little will to do 
their duties as they should. All-seeing Zeus takes half the good out of a 
man on the day he becomes a slave.' (17:318-23)
Though he has grown too old and weak to get up, the dog can do what most humans on 
Ithaca cannot do: see through the disguise of Odysseus and recognise his master. He
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wags his tail in welcome, drops his ears and dies. The beggar then sits on the symbolic 
threshold of the house, a stranger-guest upon the margin of his own oikos. Telemachus, 
who is the first to notice him, immediately complies with the tradition of hospitality and 
offers the beggar food. Whilst the beggar is eating this food, Athena appears to urge him 
to go round collecting scraps from the Suitors in order to distinguish 'the good from the 
bad'(17:363).
The ties of obligation toward the beggar are strong. Even most of the Suitors 
seem prepared to give alms, with the important exception of Antinous, who demands to 
know why the scrounger has been led to town. Eumaeus tries to defend himself, 
whereupon Telemachus intervenes, asking Antinous to give alms too. Odysseus 
addresses Antinous once more, asks for food, flatters his vanity and, given that 
Odysseus has become a beggar within his own oikos, ironically reminds the Suitor of 
the ever-present risk of ill-fortune:
'Time was when I too was one of the lucky ones with a rich house to live 
in, and I have often given to such a vagrant as myself, no matter who he 
was or what his needs were. I had hundreds of servants and plenty of all 
that one needs to live in luxury and to be known as a rich man. But Zeus, 
son of Cronos - it must have been his will - wrecked my life...' (17:419- 
26)
The life story of the beggar thus confronts Antinous with a veil of ignorance about his 
own future40. If a rich man can become a beggar, then it is possible that Antinous could 
fall upon hard times too. Hospitality toward the wandering beggar is presented to us as a 
kind of intertheocratic insurance policy. The good basileus gives alms in the expectation 
that he will receive alms if fate should ever decide to make him down and out. But
Antinous is not a good basileus. His destiny is to serve the narrative need for
transgression in order to underline the normative code, so instead of giving alms he 
marvels at the 'audacity and impudence of the beggar', and after further provocation hits 
Odysseus with a stool.
The beggar retreats to the threshold and, in a pattern we have seen before, 
appeals to the avenging spirits of beggars to punish Antinous for his transgression. 
Antinous orders the beggar to keep quiet on pain of death, whilst the other Suitors are 
briefly concerned. The curse of the beggar worries them because of the superstition
40 Compare with Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 136-42.
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(which the minstrel is helping to promote) that gods sometimes visit mortals disguised 
as foreigners to observe and judge their behaviour:
'Antinous, you did wrong to strike the wretched vagrant. You're a 
doomed man if he turns out to be some god from heaven. And the gods 
do disguise themselves as strangers from abroad, and move from town to 
town in every shape, observing the deeds of the just and the unjust.'
(17:483-8)
In the Iliad the gods intervene in mortal decision making. In the Odyssey they observe 
and judge the mortal decision makers. In the Iliad the feud between the two antagonists 
is resolvable because the strengths and weaknesses of character in Agamemnon and 
Achilles are subtly balanced and both are able to own up to errors of judgement. But in 
the Odyssey the conflict can only be resolved by righteous vengeance because it 
progresses toward what Havelock calls a 'moral polarization' whereby as the narrative 
proceeds, one side accumulates a monopoly in goodness whilst the other acquires a 
monopoly in evil, until it becomes a simple case of the characters falling into one 
category or the other41. The choice made by Amphinomus is an interesting case in point. 
Amphinomus is one of the less dastardly Suitors and, after an act of generosity, the 
beggar Odysseus warms to him and advises him to desert his companions before disaster 
overwhelms them (18:124-151). Amphinomus is thus given a chance to redeem himself, 
but fails to grasp it and seals his fate.
The women of the household are also tested. Penelope of course is the loyal 
wife who has been holding out against the Suitors for so long, and who is appropriately 
gracious toward the beggar. Eurycleia is the female counterpart to Eumaeus, loyal 
consort of Penelope who, like the dog Argus, sees through the disguise of her master by 
noticing an old scar whilst washing his feet. The loyalty of the slave toward the master 
can run deep. When she recognises Odysseus she declares him 'my dear child*. Odysseus 
replies that Eurycleia once 'suckled me at your own breast', but he will kill her if she 
blows his disguise. She declares her loyalty to her master and promises to tell him 
which of the maid-slaves have been loyal and disloyal (19:466-503). Melantho is the 
female counterpart of Melanthius. We are informed that Penelope has brought this slave 
up and looked after her as 'tenderly as her own child', but that this good treatment was 
repaid by treachery once the oikos fell into crisis. She has gone over to the side of the 
Suitors and has become the mistress of Eurymachus. Like her brother Melanthius, she
41 The Greek Concept o f Justice, p. 150.
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also abuses the beggar (18:328-36 & 19:65-9). Like Amphinomus, Melantho is warned 
of the possible consequences of her disloyalty, to no avail. As the beggar beds down for 
the night he also hears other disloyal slaves making for the Suitors (20:5-16).
The epic builds to a climax with the Suitors and the disloyal slaves continuing 
to insult the beggar and abuse the property of the oikos with almost monotonous 
regularity until, eventually, the beggar reveals his true identity and a great 'battle in the 
hall' ensues, wherein all the Suitors are slain. Meanwhile Eumaeus and another loyal 
slave, Philoetius, symbolically deal with the disloyal Melanthius (22:170-203). 
Eurycleia is then called to inform Odysseus which of the female slaves Tiave been 
disloyal to me and which are innocent' (22:416-19). Twelve out of a total of fifty are 
then singled out, are made to clean out the hall of bodies and gore, and are then hanged 
by Telemachus: 'for a little while their feet twitched, but not for very long' (22:472-3). 
The consequences of the slaughter of so many basileis from all around Ithaca are then 
dealt with in summary fashion, as if the minstrel has lost interest in the narrative now 
that the major points have been made. Odysseus has returned to hearth and home and 
proved the indispensability of the master whose odyssey has taught him the value of an 
ego that can override the passions of nature in the interests of his oikos. The 
transgressors of the code of hospitality toward the stranger and charity toward the 
beggar have paid for their crimes. The images of the desert island, utopia and dystopia 
have been mapped out for the social imagination. And Odysseus the master-strategist 
has demonstrated the virtue of consciousness for the purposes of deception in a 
communitarian cause.
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5: Philosophia
4.1. Desert Island Story
'...and one nail a week to old Uncle Tod, who's lame and not too well but 
offers to organize a sort of school for the kids so the mothers can fish or 
hunt.'
We have seen how Strange's desert island stories postulate the development of 
three separate communities with distinctive characteristics. We have noted the three 
alternative scenarios Strange offered suggesting how relations between the communites 
might develop once contacts are established. But what about research, thought and 
education? Are these aged traditions of modem society going to survive and prosper in 
the hands of our castaways upon Strange's desert island?
Out of the three communities, Uncle Tod is the only person who suggests that 
the castaways might try to salvage something from the western tradition of formal 
education. He proposes to organize a school. Apart from the fact that he is old, ill, lame 
and rather poorly paid, we know nothing about Uncle Tod. Nor are we given any 
indication of what he intends to salvage.
Let us put ourselves in the position of Uncle Tod. As far as the parents are 
concerned he can provide a convenient childminding service. Indeed this is his opening 
pitch, but as the years slip by with diminishing hope of rescue the importance of Tod's 
school will become increasingly apparent. The first generation of castaways will have 
brought with them an eclectic baggage of twentieth century culture, but the next 
generation will be natives, bom on the island with no spontaneous memory of the world 
before the shipwreck. Moreover, the daily rhythm of subsistence which the three 
communities have become locked into are so discontinuous with the past that their 
cultures are likely to undergo a radical forgetfulness. After a few months of hunting, 
fishing and farming, it is not going to be easy for the castaways to muster much 
enthusiasm for reproducing fragments of knowledge from the lost world of modernity 
that are bound to seem increasingly irrelevant to survival on their desert island paradise. 
It will be left to Uncle Tod to work with the children and try to preserve what he can 
from the world before the shipwreck. What he leaves out of his curriculum is likely to
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be forgotten. What he includes will help shape the future of the island. What is he going 
to teach?
The gravity of the situation will become apparent as soon as Uncle Tod realises 
he has to make a decision on whether it is worth trying to salvage reading and writing, 
because when we re-read Strange's desert island story it becomes apparent that this is 
not going to be easy and that the presence of writing cannot be taken for granted. We 
may assume that many of the characters in the story can read and write. The students for 
example, or Mac the ship's purser, have previous occupations which normally require 
the use of letters and numbers. But it is also clear that writing is not a part of the 
structure of everyday life on this island and could easily peter out within a generation. 
As the characters go about their business, they speak and listen but they do not utilise 
their capacity to read and write. Furthermore, no writing equipment appears to have 
survived the wreck, so time and effort will have to be invested in making writing 
materials out of resources to hand. Consequently, Strange's desert island story Strange 
teeters on the verge of writing writing out of existence. And yet without writing the 
subtle distinctions between Realism, Socialism and Liberalism that she has weaved into 
the story will surely perish, because these differences were generated with texts. They 
are all children of the book. The decision on whether to preserve writing or not will 
have a bearing on how or whether the three communities mediate their differences over 
the values of security, wealth, freedom and justice.
4.2. Hesiod's Scrolls: 'keep your pronouncements straight, you bribe swallowers,
and forget your crooked judgements altogether.'
We have seen how the administrative script known as Linear B disappeared 
from the Aegean during the political and economic collapse in Mycenaean civilization 
that initiated the period known as the T)ark Age', from about 1175 BC. We have also 
seen how, during this Dark Age, an oral tradition evolved whereby minstrels performed 
and taught narrative songs that enabled the basileis of the Aegean to reflect about their 
world. We have also intimated that subtle differences between the Iliad and the Odyssey 
suggest a shift in the balance of power within the bicameral mind of the Hellenic late 
Dark Age. In the Iliad Mount Olympus comes across as the primary legislative chamber 
for human agency. In the Odyssey the mortal chamber of the human ego, represented by 
Odysseus through his odyssey of self-discovery, appears to be appropriating more 
powers of volition, will and agency.
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From about 800 BC there are signs of a new script being taken up and used in 
the Aegean1. This script was the alphabet, which appears to have been disseminated 
through an intensification of trade contacts with the maritime states of the southern 
Levant2. This time though, writing was not reproduced as the exclusive tekhne of a 
cadre of scribes within the palace complex. It was seeded on the ground of the oikos and 
the polis. Borrowing from the already existing practice of education in music, clusters 
of oikoi would pay for their children to be collectively educated in grammar. During the 
eighth century people began to use this alphabet to distill the oral tradition and record 
the songs of Homer. Some scholars have suggested that the song of Homer was first 
recorded to be a teaching aid. The scholarly debate over the question of the historical 
status of Homer as an author, or as the mythical personification of a collective tradition, 
is irrelevant here. Instead of having to listen to or perform the song, the basileus had the 
alternative of reading the text and investigating its words for the sophia contained 
therein. This literary mutation of sophia also meant that the text could eventually fall 
into the hands of people other than the basileus. Furthermore, texts attract 
commentaries. Now that the mnemonic formulas could be permanently inscribed upon 
scrolls, the brain was liberated from the perpetual effort of having to remember them 
and could afford to supplement them instead. In other words, with the dissemination of 
writing it was possible to make an original contribution to knowledge.
During the eighth century a new voice appears in our historical record. The 
voice of Hesiod. Homer bowed down before us as an anonymous professional bard 
sponsored by our local basileis. The closest we can ever get to Homer is through the 
characterization of Phemius employed in the oikos of Odysseus, or Demodocus in the 
utopian polis of Phaeacia. Hesiod is different. Hesiod appears before us as a provincial 
amateur who wants to tell us a little about himself. He has an ‘I’ that wants to narrate 
itself. His father was a merchant seaman, we are told, based from the city of Cyme on 
the Lydian coast of Anatolia, but who fell on hard times and had to flee from his debts 
to the village of Ascra beneath Mount Helicon on the mainland of Greece. Hesiod 
claims to have been brought up there alongside his brother Perses, eking out a living 
from a stretch of poor farmland.
1 This is the current consensus over the dissemination of the alphabet. Dissenting voices are: 
Joseph Naveh, The Early History o f Alphabet; Martin Bemal, Cadmean Letters: The Westward 
Diffusion o f the Semitic Alphabet Before 1400 BC.
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Hesiod cannot resist telling us that he is the proud owner of a trophy won for 
poetry in the 'games at Chalcis'. Hesiod is also an autodidact. He claims his gift for 
singing was not taught by a professional bard, but came down to him through divine 
revelation from the daughters of Zeus whilst tending his flock along the slopes of Mount 
Helicon. Nor is Hesiod sponsored by anyone. When the Muses descend upon Hesiod, 
they legitimise a voice which springs from the margins of the oikos and the polis:
'Shepherds that camp in the wild, disgraces, merest bellies: we know to 
tell many lies that sound like truth, but we know to sing reality, when we 
will' (Theogony:25-Vp
Even the humble shepherd is entitled to sing songs. Moreover, he is free to sing songs 
that challenge values promoted in songs once composed and performed solely for the 
pleasure of the basileus. A fissure has opened up in the formulaic verse of the ancient 
Aegean. Deep down from the depth of his hungry shepherd's belly, Hesiod has rumbled 
that there are bards who sell lies dressed up as truth. It is as if the loose-tounged 
Thersites from the Iliad (2:209-277) has suddenly taken over the narrative to tell how 
things really lie.
Why did the 'daughters of Zeus' choose to 'breathe wondrous voice' into the 
belly of Hesiod? The proud claim of the autodidact is one clue. Being a failed merchant 
from the coast of Anatolia, Hesiod's father came from amongst the ranks of those who 
were the primary agents for the transmission of the alphabet to the Aegean. We may 
speculate how a defeated man, whose legacy was far poorer than may once have been 
hoped, could have tried to pass down to his sons one of the few gifts still left in his 
possession: the tekhne of writing - lading it with a heavy cargo of frustrated ambition:
'And he settled near Helicon in a miserable village, Ascra, bad in winter, 
foul in summer, good at no time.' ( Works And Days:637-9)
2 Susan and Andrew Sherratt, The growth of the Mediterranean economy in the early first 
millenium BC', World Archaeology, volume 24 No.3, p.367.
3 All quotations from Hesiod are from the translation by M.L. West, Theogony & Works And Days 
unless otherwise stated but, as with Homer, may be located through alternative translations via the 
line references given.
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Hesiod is a singer who reads and writes4. He is a practitioner of what Derrida once 
called difference. He uses the hexameter verse of the Homeric epic and he is clearly 
familiar with some version of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but his songs tend to 
systematize and annotate rather than simply reproduce the narrative5. Another indicator 
of incipient literacy is his propensity to assimilate. Somehow the lowly farmer from 
Boetia has managed to finger some scrolls of wisdom literature from the Near East. We 
can begin to imagine the impact this new breed of singer must have had upon what 
would have been a largely illiterate audience as he won his trophy in the games at 
Chalcis.
People have wondered whether it was for a performance of the Theogony that 
Hesiod won his 'tripod with ring handles'. After opening this song with the claim of 
divine revelation upon Mount Helicon, Hesiod proceeds to meditate upon the origin and 
purpose of the Muses and their bards. Havelock argues that this was a novel 
development6. Previously the minstrels would simply invoke the Muses to sing about 
the words and deeds of gods and heroes, but Hesiod argues he has been chosen to sing 
about the Muses 'themselves' (34-5). To reflect upon the function of the minstrel in 
society, Hesiod writes out a divine genealogy. The Muses comprise nine daughters who 
are the fruit of an affair between Mnemosyne, goddess of memory and Zeus, king of the 
gods:
'Lovely is the sound they produce from their mouths as they sing and 
celebrate the nomoi and ethea of all the immortals, making delightful 
utterance.' (64-67)
West translates nomoi and ethea as 'ordinances' and 'good-ways', whilst Havelock 
translates them as 'custom-laws' and 'folk-ways'7. Another alternative for Hesiod’s use 
of the word nomoi would be 'norms': the proceedures of behaviour ordained by Zeus and 
memorized for recall in the songs of the Muses. Meanwhile the word ethea seems to 
have originally signified the 'lairs' or 'haunts' of animals. Hesiod uses this metaphor of
4 This interpretation comes from Eric Havelock, The Greek Concept o f Justice, chapters 11 & 12. 
See also Preface To Plato, chapters 6 & 7, and 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', in 
Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosphy, edited by Kevin Robb.
5 The Theogony and the Works And Days were probably written before the Iliad and the Odyssey 
as we now know them, but Hesiod would have been familiar with ancestor versions of these songs 
on the theme of the siege of Troy and its aftermath. See M.L. West, 'Introduction', in Hesiod, op 
cit, p.viii-ix. Also Havelock, 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', op cit, p.8-9.
6 Preface To Plato, chapter 6.
7 Ibid, p.62-3.
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settlement to refer to the habits within which the good life lives. The nomoi thus cover 
rules that apply across a given community, whilst ethea governs excellence in personal 
behaviour.
Hesiod's song goes on to list the names of the nine daughters of Zeus. The 
names are descriptive, promoting the various attractions the minstrel has on offer. Clio 
offers fame, Euterpe entertainment, Thaleia cheers us up and so on, but chief amongst 
the Muses is Calliope, or 'fair utterance'. It is Calliope who accompanies the august 
basileus:
Upon his tongue they shed sweet dew, and out of his mouth the words 
flow honeyed; and the peoples all look to him as he decides what is to 
prevail with his straight judgements. His word is sure, and expertly he 
makes a quick end of even a great dispute' (83-88)
Through the medium of the minstrel Calliope teaches her basileis the gift of reflection 
and eloquence. These powers of judgement lend an air of authority in communal 
decision making and enables the basileus to negotiate fair settlements in matters of 
serious conflict:
'Such is the Muses' holy gift to men. For while it is from the Muses and 
the far shooting Apollo that men are singers and citharists on earth, and 
from Zeus that they are kings, every man is fortunate whom the Muses 
love; the voice flows sweet from his lips.' (94-7)
The cithara was a large lyre. The basileis are from Zeus because they control the wealth 
and have a monopoly in the means of violence, but they also need to muster power 
through the art of music. The minstrel is important, according to Hesiod, because the 
basileis love to listen to the lyre. Judgement and persuasive speaking is a kind of music 
that comes naturally to people who have been inspired by the Muses. Arete or 
excellence comes not just through wealth and force but also by virtue of the honeyed 
voice.
Hesiod then launches into his grand narrative of the origins of the gods. Armed 
with his genealogical paradigm, Hesiod attempts to build a 'theory of everything'. The 
family tree comprises about three hundred names and takes us through three 
generations. This grand narrative of the matings, births and struggles of gods accounts 
for the ingredients that make up the physical universe: darkness; light; earth; sky; sea; 
mountains; storms; rivers and stars. It also manages to breed the various ingredients
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which comprise the human condition, such as: desire; labour; pain; joy; age; lies; peace; 
conflict; famine and pestilence.
Primordial conflict results from a generational struggle for sovereignty over the 
skies. The creative power of Uranus is castrated by his son Cronos, who is in turn 
overthrown after losing a war against his own son named Zeus. This succession myth 
has antecedants in the wisdom literature of the Near East and may be an archaic relic 
from the 'father-son-brother* paradigm of intertheocratic relations8. When the war ends 
in victory for Zeus he considers whether to replace humanity with something better, but 
Prometheus intervenes by tricking Zeus into accepting waste scraps as offerings after 
the slaughter of an ox. The sacred offering thence ritually appeases the gods and 
consecrates the need to use cunning against the spirits of nature in order to survive 
amidst a potentially hostile cosmic order. For this audacity Zeus decides to deprive 
humanity of fire, but Prometheus steals it back for them. Fire, the primordial tekhne of 
human civilisation, thus becomes stolen knowledge, for which Prometheus is bound and 
has his liver eaten daily by an eagle whilst humanity is punished through the creation of 
Pandora. Meanwhile Zeus manages to arrest the divine cycle of conflict between fathers 
and sons by swallowing his pregnant wife Metis, goddess of good counsel, reflection 
and cunning, thus consuming her powers of wisdom for himself and preventing the birth 
of a usurping heir. Consequently Athena is bom from the head of Zeus. Next Zeus 
marries Themis, the goddess of propriety and order, who bears him Law, Justice, and 
Peace...9
In the Theogony then, Hesiod used the genealogy as a syncretic device to try 
and systematize his readings from a collection of scrolls that recorded a diversity of 
local oral traditions, and then reconciled these readings with those from some of the 
literary traditions emanating from the Near East.
It is tempting to speculate that the success of the Theogony gave Hesiod licence 
to take risks when it came to composing the Works And Days. Having won his prize for 
poetry at the funeral games at Chalcis by singing about the immortals, Hesiod now 
chooses to sing about the temporal world of mortals, and to enframe conflict within the 
temporal world of mortals Hesiod makes a shift in emphasis from ‘father-against-son’
8 Jasper Griffin, 'Greek Myth and Hesiod', in The Oxford History O f The Classical World, edited 
by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray, p.90.
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relationships to one of ‘brother-against-brother’. The opening invocation to the Muses 
gives his audience a warning of what is to come (1-10). The Muses are asked to sing 
about the will of Zeus toward mortals, being the deity who has supreme power to make 
people rise and fall and who 'makes the crooked straight' and 'withers' the arrogant. Zeus 
is asked to help Hesiod muster his indignation whilst he tells his brother Perses a few 
'words of truth'. West has argued that Hesiod was assimilating an established tradition 
of normative literature from the Near East, whereby perceived wisdom is articulated by 
a victim of brotherly injustice who publicly admonishes the alleged perpetrator10.
In the Works And Days Hesiod was also prepared to amend the genealogy set 
out in his Theogony. In the Theogony Hesiod had characterised Eris, or conflict, as an 
accursed child of the Night who in turn gives birth to all manner of social ills (225-32). 
In the Works And Days Hesiod tells Perses that he now percieves there to be two 
goddesses of conflict, one bad and the other good (11-26). The younger sibling bears 
'ugly fighting' and bloodshed, but the elder nurtures a healthy spirit of competitiveness 
which motivates men to work hard and strive to manage their oikoi well, thus producing 
more wealth. This doubling of Eris would have been a high risk experiment under the 
mnemonic constraints of the orally reproduced epic, where energy had to be invested in 
saying over and over again what had been learned arduously over the ages. By providing 
an artificial memory, writing freed Hesiod from the obligation to simply reproduce the 
standard Eris, and enabled him to make an analytical observation about the different 
forms in which conflict can manifest itself.
Having established a creative eris to supplement the destructive Eris, Perses is 
urged to channel his feelings of sibling rivalry toward Hesiod into the former form of 
conflict, and away from the latter. Men who have not got the harvest in yet cannot 
afford to indulge in the destructive form of conflict, Hesiod argues, and appeals to his 
brother to 'let us settle our dispute with straight judgements, the best that Zeus sends' 
(36-7). We then learn that the dispute between the two brothers is over the division of 
their father's estate:
'For we divided our estate before, and you kept grabbing and taking 
much more, paying great tribute to the lords, those bribe-swallowers, 
who see fit to make this their judgement.' (36-40)
9 Or Eunomia, Dike and Eirene.
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There were local basileis around Mount Helicon who were, it seems, capable of 
'crooked judgements' as well as 'straight judgements'. This experience appears to have 
had a profound effect upon Hesiod. He feels a need to return to the question of social 
evil. The first explanation tells how men formerly lived 'remote from ills, without harsh 
toil and the grevious sicknesses that are deadly to men' (92-4). This state of bliss is 
disturbed when Zeus realises he has been duped by the fraud perpetrated by Prometheus 
already mentioned in the Theogony. Zeus takes revenge by devising 'grim cares for 
mankind' in the form of Pandora and her jar of miseries.
A striking thing about Hesiod’s inscription of the Prometheus myth is his 
ingratitude toward Prometheus and his faith in Zeus. First Prometheus has found a way 
of filling bellies and appeasing the spirits by offering waste scraps. Secondly, 
Prometheus saved humanity by stealing fire. Above all, Prometheus pioneered a survival 
tactic for humanity by promoting the possibility of cunning disobedience against the 
sovereign authority of the spirit of nature11. Prometheus has thus inculcated in mortals 
the possibility of human agency, the purposive or reflective act that can take place 
independently of, and even in defiance of, divine agency. Meanwhile Zeus has seriously 
contemplated replacing humanity, then attempted to deprive humanity of fire and 
sustainence, then tricked it into a brutal life of labour, pain and suffering. But still 
Hesiod remains convinced that Prometheus is a trickster and a thief who has got his 
comeuppance and clings adamant to the faith that Zeus is a benevolent deity who 
dispenses justice.
Hesiod's second explanation for social evil is the famous Myth of Ages', where 
he charts the fall of man through a series of metallic phases (105-201). The first phase 
was a golden age when Kronos enjoyed sovereignty over heaven and when men 'lived 
like gods, with carefree heart, remote from toil and misery'. It is a lost paradise, a time 
of abundance in wealth, peace and freedom. The succeeding silver age marks the first 
phase of moral decline, when men lived in suffering for only a short time because they 
'could not restrain themselves from crimes against each other'. In the third phase, the 
bronze-age, these crimes intensify into a state of perpetual war. Some classical scholars 
agree that what Hesiod did here was pick up the motifs of successive metallic world
10 M.L.West, op cit, p.xvi.
11 Max Weber’s thesis was that the shift from appeasing the spirit of nature through sacrifice 
toward mastery through calculated disobedience against nature was a founding moment in the
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ages, the fall from virtue and the loss of paradise from scrolls of wisdom literature from 
the Near East, but then had to reconcile this foreign innovation with his native epic 
tradition. To do this he inserted a rather incongruous fourth ’age of heroes’ into the 
scheme, the demigods celebrated in the minstrel’s ballads 'who are our ancestors on the 
boundless earth'. Most of these demigods were destroyed in war, but a few of them are 
'granted a life and home apart from men, and settled at the ends of the earth’ in the ’Isles 
of the Blessed'. These islands preserve exotic fragments from the lost paradise of the 
golden age, and its inhabitants live with a 'carefree heart' where the 'grain giving soil 
bears its honey-sweet fruits thrice a year'. Meanwhile, the heroic age is followed by an 
iron age, the fifth age in which Hesiod ruefully lives, and which is characterized as an 
age of ceaseless toil and trouble. What is more, Hesiod fears things can only get worse. 
In time all children will cease to respect their elders, society will come to honour the 
criminal and dishonour the virtuous, 'law and decency will be in fists' and 'men in their 
misery will everywhere be dogged by the evil commotions of that Envy who exults in 
misfortune with a face full of hate'.
Having charted the fall of humanity into the depths of evil as far as his 
imagination can carry him, Hesiod changes tack and the song returns to another 
dangerous subject. The singer turns to address the basileis directly ('now I will tell a 
fable to the lords'), and lays down some lines of stunning audacity. A hawk catches a 
nightingale and carries it high into the clouds. The nightingale shrieks in the talons of 
fate whilst the hawk explains about the way of the world:
'Goodness, why are you screaming? You are in the power of one much 
superior, and you will go whichever way I take you, singer though you 
are. I will make you for my dinner if I like, or let you go. He is a fool 
who seeks to compete against the stronger: he both loses the struggle and 
suffers injury on top of the insult.' (207-12)
We begin to fear for Hesiod. Was this the sort of thing likely to go down well with all 
that meat and wine at the symposium? Would it win Hesiod any more prizes at the 
games? Or perhaps a good friend should have quietly taken Hesiod to one side and 
advised him to spend less time amongst his scrolls? According to West, the use of
development of occidental rationality. See ‘Science as a Vocation’ in From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, edited by Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills.
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animal fable is another tell-tale indicator of exposure to the wisdom literature of the 
Near East12.
As if startled by the foolishness of its own courage, the song switches back into 
an address toward the errant sibling. Perses should listen to the voice of dike and forget 
the call of hybris because a small man cannot expect to get away with it. Hesiod 
declares that even the big men with wealth and force at their disposal can be brought 
down by their hubris. Havelock argues that this argument has conjoined the hubris of 
Agamemnon and the Suitors and its consequences13. In other words, Hesiod's 
experience of injustice has prompted him to scan his scrolls of the Iliad and the Odyssey 
for all references to the word dike, and he has come up with a series of cuttings lifted 
from the epic narrative and pasted them into what might be called 'a concentrate of 
dike'14. The next allusion posits justice and hubris competing in a race, where justice 
wins in the end when oath catches up with crooked judgements (216-19). Havelock 
argues this refers to the chariot race in the funeral games for Patroklos, where 
Antilochus is forced to admit under pressure of oath that he cheated Menelaos (Iliad 
23:263-611)15. Then, justice suddenly becomes a woman being dragged away 'wherever 
the bribe swallowers choose to take her as they give judgement with crooked verdicts' 
(219-24). Havelock suggests this recollects scenes from the debates over Chryseis, 
Briseis, and Hektor's fears for Andromache16.
By mistreating justice the crooked ultimately bring disaster upon themselves, 
Hesiod argues, but those who treat justice properly find that their community will 
flourish. War, pestilence and famine all avoid those communities where justice prevails 
(225-38). There the lands are always laden with grain, fruit and honey, and its people 
will enjoy 'a continual sufficiency of good things'. Havelock argues that Hesiod is 
thinking here about the Phaeacian islanders from the Odyssey11. This idyll is then 
contrasted with the land ruled by hubris:
'But for those who occupy themselves with violence and wickedness and 
brutal deeds, Kronos' son, wide seeing Zeus, marks out retribution.
Often a whole community together suffers in consequence of a bad man 
who does wrong and contrives evil. From heaven Kronos' son brings
12 Ibid.
13 Havelock, The Greek Concept o f  Justice, p. 196.
Ibid, p. 194-5.
15 Ibid, p. 196-7.
^  Ibid. p. 197-201.
17 Ibid, p.201-3.
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disaster upon them, famine and with it plague, and the people waste 
away. The womenfolk do not give birth, and households decline, by 
Olympian Zeus' design. At other times again he either destroys its broad 
army or city wall, or punishes their ships at sea.' (238-47)
Wealth and security are both dependent upon the observance of justice, according to 
Hesiod. The primary model for ’those who occupy themselves' with hubris was the 
Suitors, Havelock suggests, whilst the whole community that suffers as a consequence 
of the actions of a single individual recalls the Achaian plague after Agamemnon’s 
treatment of Chryses, or indeed the Trojan war caused by the transgression of Paris. 
According to the Iliad, the Trojans blamed Paris for bringing war to the walls of his 
own city by abusing the hospitality of Menelaos in the abduction of Helen.
Having composed his concentrate of dike, distilled from the oral epics that the 
basileis themselves venerated as their creed, Hesiod now musters courage to address the 
lords directly for a second time: *You too, my lords, attend to this justice doing of yours' 
(248). Hesiod thinks he has proved it is in the interest of the basileus to act justly, 
because the Muses have told us so in the immortal songs of heroes where chickens 
always come home to roost:
'Beware of this, lords, and keep your pronouncements straight, you 
bribe-swallowers, and forget your crooked judgements altogether. For a 
man fashions ill for himself when he fashions ill for another, and the ill 
design is most ill for the designer.' (262-6)
The possibility that injustice may rebound upon the unjust is not, however, just an ironic 
feature of the human condition. It requires the agency of Zeus and his community acting 
from their divine headquarters on Mount Olympus. Some local bosses may be corrupt, 
but Hesiod still reckons Zeus the basileus of the cosmos masters his universe in a just 
and responsible manner. There are about thirty thousand divinities on duty, Hesiod 
sings, patrolling the roads and sea lanes looking out for evidence of crooked judgements 
and corruption. These watchers report back to Justice, now a goddess in her own right, 
who sits by the side of her father Zeus and informs him of any crookedness at large in 
the world of mortals. In this way the all seeing Zeus 'does not fail to percieve what kind 
of justice it is that the community has within it' (268-70).
There follows a discordant note of existential doubt that threatens to undermine 
the tenor of the whole song. Zeus may well receive intelligence about mortal acts of 
justice and injustice, but what does he do about it? As things are, Hesiod declares, he
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could not aspire to be a just man in his dealings with other men, or try to bring up his 
son to be a just man, in a world where injustice pays better dividends than justice. This 
flicker of disillusionment has resonance with the replies made by Achilles to the 
Achaian embassy in Book Nine of the Iliad, plus the indignation of Mentor the elder 
statesman at the agora of the Odyssey (2:229-34), and which is then repeated almost 
word for word by Athena reproachfully to the bosses of the universe in Book Five:
'Father Zeus, and you other blessed gods who live for ever, kindness, 
generosity and justice should no longer be the aims of any man who 
wields a royal sceptre - in fact he might just as well devote his days to 
tyranny and lawless deeds. Look at Odysseus...' (5:7-11)
But unlike Odysseus and his heroes, whose gods often engage in direct conversation 
with mortals, Hesiod’s gods are silent. Unlike Odysseus, Hesiod bears witness that he 
has no Athena to guide him. He is left alone with his scrolls.
Instead, Hesiod endures his fate by counting the days18. The justice of Zeus 
expresses itself now through time. Homer lived in a timeless present. Hesiod lives 
within a world which is gaining a sense of history. Having lost the voices of the gods, 
Hesiod nurses his spirits with the calculated forethought that Zeus shall see to it that 
injustice shall not triumph over justice forever: 'I do not expect Zeus is bringing this to 
pass yet' (273). In time, justice shall overcome. Odysseus has to wait for twenty years 
before he can return from his desert island, but the homecoming is all the sweeter. As 
Hesiod scans his scrolls of Homer, he thinks he can see how injustice may bring short 
term gain, but that justice eventually wins out over the long term. He even suggests that 
divine retribution can skip generations, and that people can suffer the consequences of 
actions taken by their ancestors.
Hesiod’s scrolls were probably part of the estate left by his dead father. He had 
been cheated out of much of the land, but by poring over the beloved scrolls that 
reminded so much of the man who had collected them, Hesiod could resurrect that voice 
which used to chastise his prodigal brother:
'But you, Perses, must take in what I say and hearken to dike, forgetting 
hybris altogether. For this was the nomos for men that Kronos' son laid 
down: wheras fish and beasts and flying birds would eat one another, 
because dike is not among them, to men he gave dike, which is much the
18 Jaynes, op cit, p.280-81. Also Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p.31-4.
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best in practice. For if a man is willing to say what he knows to be just, 
to him wide-seeing Zeus gives prosperity; but whoever deliberately lies 
in his sworn testimony, therin hurting justice, he is blighted past healing; 
his family remains more obscure thereafter, while the true-sworn man's 
line gains in worth.' (274-86)
The hawks can eat the nightingales. That is nature, or physis. But Zeus has saddled 
humanity with the nomos of justice, and Hesiod thinks he can prove this by 
supplementing the very songs of the heroes which his local basileis like to hold up as 
their paragons of virtue {arete). With his Phoenician letters, Hesiod has cut and spliced 
the very meaning of virtue. In the Homeric epic virtue could mean excellence in 
anything from the military prowess of Achilles to the deceitfulness and cunning of 
Odysseus. But Hesiod has begun to erase those traces of virtue which seemed to 
celebrate the capacity for deception. For Hesiod, virtue is excellence in the pursuit of 
justice.
Hesiod is aware that excellence in the pursuit of justice is a difficult thing to 
acheive, but clearly thinks he has come close enough to be able to judge the failings of 
his target. Toolish Perses1 is told that the road to worthlessness is easy, the road is 
smooth and she lives very near', whereas the road to virtue is one of sweat and tears that 
eventually brings reward:
'it is a long and steep path to her, and rough at first. But when one 
reaches the top, then it is easy, for all the difficulty.' (288-92).
The remainder of the song attempts to plot this path to virtue which, for Hesiod, consists 
of honest hard work to sustain the virtually self-sufficient oikos of the farmer. His 
strategy for overcoming 'crooked justice' is to survive it. The bribe swallowers will 
come and go, rising with hubris and falling by hubris. Meanwhile the peasant keeps his 
head down and, by the luck of Zeus, survives, working the land according to the eternal 
rythym of the seasons just as his forefathers did. Security is the deliverance that comes 
with having little or nothing to steal. Wealth is the harvest laid up for the winter, the 
flock of sheep, the ox, the spare plough kept by for emergencies, the home that keeps 
out the cold and the damp. Happiness is listening to the cicada in the late summer, 
together with some food and wine in the shade facing a westerly breeze at the height of 
the day.
4.3. Logos And Kosmos
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We have tried to show how Hesiod used letters to unify all the myths of the 
gods into one great genealogical story, and how he used writing to compile a digest of 
Homeric sophia over the question of crooked justice versus straight justice. In the work 
of Hesiod we have also seen how the winged voices of Olympus fall mute before the 
whispers of a consciousness that was assuming the role of an alternative decision maker 
within the mortal conduct of an everyday life. We have also been introduced to the 
divine personification of this shift within the mind, namely Prometheus, but noted that 
Hesiod has profound doubts about this rebellion against the will of Zeus. In fact he 
believes that this change lies at the root of social evil. We have also intimated that this 
secularisation of reflection, decision-making and agency was becoming possible 
because the Archaic Aegean had witnessed the formation of a novel interface between 
the written word and the oral.
One feature of this new interface was that the reproduction of writing tended to 
be controlled by the master of his oikos rather than any centralised cadre of scribes. 
Another feature of the new interface was that the dissemination of writing did not 
always respect the status quo. That is to say, less powerful households often acquired 
literacy before more powerful households. With Hesiod, for example, we have a curious 
situation where a literate smallholder uses writing to pass judgement upon a local 
nobility who were probably illiterate. Initially, the skill of literacy may have even 
signified inferiority. Phoenician letters carried the odour of trade, and many of the old 
oligarchical families are known to have had a deeply ambivalent attitude towards trade. 
A third feature of the new interface was that literacy in the Aegean coalesced around a 
strong tradition of oral debate, as pioneered in the oligarchical agora. These three 
factors added together enabled the peoples of the Aegean to exploit the potential of 
writing in ways that had previously remained latent, or which had been exploited only 
fitfully.
The next stage in the rebellion of Prometheus and the emancipation of nous 
takes place in Miletus with the reflections of Thales. Miletus was a thriving commercial 
city along the coast of Anatolia, a crucial Aegean link between east and west. According 
to classical lore, Thales personnified this link himself, being a citizen of Miletus from a 
family with Phoenician ancestors19. In many respects the anecdotes surrounding Thales
19 Kirk, Raven & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, p.76-77.
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are similar to those of other legendary mephistos from Imhotep to Daedalus, but there 
was also a crucial difference. He is supposed to have assisted the Lydian king Croesus 
in his military manouvres against the Persians by diverting the river Halys in order to 
assist the movements of his army20. He is also supposed to have predicted a solar 
eclipse in 585 BC, which interrupted a battle between the Lydians and Persians, and 
pointed out to fellow Milesians the navigational utility of the Little Bear in a 'nautical 
star-guide' written in verse. Then there is the story of how he brought geometry back 
from Egypt, and used it to teach the Milesians to calculate the distance of ships out at 
sea by taking observations from two points on land. Unlike previous mephistos, 
however, Thales was also remembered for advancing a cosmology, or a logos about the 
kosmos.
By logos we now mean a statement that presents a thesis for debate or 
contemplation. The word was originally used to denote the speeches made by gods and 
heroes in the Homeric epic. But once the dissemination of writing had begun to relieve 
formulaic verse of its mnemonic function, the habit of debate in the agora, which had 
been promoted by the the epic for communitarian purposes, began to feed back into the 
reproduction of sophia itself. Debate as entertainment began to supplement the songs of 
the minstrel in the symposium, and then became popular around the fringes of the public 
games, festivals and markets. Often the people participating in the debate would be the 
bards themselves. This was a cultural fusion that borrowed elements from both the 
agora and the games. An agon, or contest, would be set up between competitors who 
were expected to argue over an entertaining topic for public speaking. To begin with the 
subjects for debate would have been inspired by the songs that they supplemented, a 
digression on the character of Helen for example, or arguments over the propriety of the 
guile of Odysseus. In this way, logos should be seen as a supplement of mythos rather 
than something that was conceived in opposition to it. Nevertheless, the appetite for 
novelty prompted some speakers to make a name for themselves by advancing 
arguments upon subjects that had previously been marginal as far as the epic repertoire 
was concerned. One dialectic that became popular in Miletus lingered over the nature 
(physis) of the universe.
By kosmos we mean our physical environment considered as an ordered whole. 
The word had customarily been used to refer to an order of military formation adopted
20 Herodotus, The Histories, 1:75
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in hoplite warfare21. Hesiod had tried to unify contemporary descriptions of the universe 
as a world of divine agency through a grand genealogy of the gods. Now certain 
members of Miletus began to make statements about the world in terms of ordered 
relationships between material objects. Thales asserted that water was the primary 
substance out of which all things were made, and upon which the earth floats22. There 
are a number of things we can say about this assertion.
Firstly, it abstracts from a number of mythological themes that Thales is likely 
to have been aware of. For the ancient Egyptians the earth had long been a dish floating 
upon primordial waters. In Mesopotamia the earth was a raft built upon primeval seas23. 
In Homer, there are scattered asides which suggest that many Hellenes thought of the 
earth as a disc surrounded by waters which were the 'begetter of all things'24. We may 
assume that Thales followed Hesiod in the sense that he was working with a set of 
already existing traditions, but Thales supplemented these traditions in a way which 
supplanted them. His redescription of the physical environment strips away the names 
of the gods, together with their attendant verbs of divine agency, and replaces them with 
words that imply impersonal relations between disembodied nouns. His abstraction of 
the natural world thus slips the bonds of narrative performance. The gods no longer 
have to mate with each other and give birth to a genealogical universe. As far as the 
physis is concerned, the gods have ceased to reproduce.
Secondly, with Thales the human subject claims the right to make a 
comprehensive statement that reduces the plurality of the environment into a single 
object, an integral whole25. As far as we know, the Milesians had not yet stretched the 
original meaning of the word kosmos to refer to this whole, but there is fragmentary 
evidence to suggest that they were beginning to use papyrus to compose their
21 Havelock, 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', in Kevin Robb (ed), Language and 
Thought in Early Greek Philsosophy, p.24.
22 Kirk, Raven & Schofield, op cit, p.89. It may be objected that this fragment is an anachronism 
which classical philosophers projected back onto the figure of Thales. See for example: Eric 
Havelock, 'The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics', part 2, in Kevin Robb (ed), Language and 
Thought in Early Greek Philosophy. If the statements attributed to Thales are anachronisms, then 
the nature of their projection is interesting in itself, and the same arguments about the shift from 
mythos to logos may be applied to other thinkers who conventionally fall under the heading of'the 
Presocratics', whose extant fragments are relatively more reliable.
23 Henri Frankfort, H.A. Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen, Irwin, The Intellectual Adventure o f  
Ancient Man, p.45. Kirk, Raven & Schofield, op cit, p.92.
24 Kirk, Raven & Schofield, op cit, p.9-17.
25 Havelock, 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', op cit, p.21 & 23.
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thoughts26. Writing helped to turn their discourse about the world into an artefact, an 
object separate from the consciousness of the subject. As this happened, an opportunity 
arose to inscribe this object as a world order instead of a series of events issuing from 
the mouth of the poet27. In time, a word would have to be displaced to fill the semantic 
vacuum which had been created. Partly because of the immense effort that went into 
training the Aegean citizenry to maintain their military formation in the midst of battle, 
and the importance of this order for the security of the polis as a whole, the word 
kosmos achieved a resonance which made it the primary candidate for displacement. 
The importance of this linguistic innovation for natural philosophy is obvious, but in 
political terms it was also an essential precondition for the development of the notion of 
the unity of mankind.
A third thing we can say about the statement made by Thales is that it was built 
with terms and introduced into a habitat that stimulated contradiction, revision and 
amendment. Myths of divine agency required recognition by the faithful or rejection by 
the unfaithful. Arguments that cultivated a vocabulary of impersonal relations and 
disembodied nouns invited critical appraisal28. To compose his statement Thales 
probably used papyrus, but to publish it he would have taken his voice to the agon and 
participated in the customary rough and tumble of a symposium or festival. To make an 
impact he would have needed a worthy opponent, so contradictory views would have 
been eagerly sought out in order to make a game of it.
The next legendary figure in the formation of logos is Anaximander, a younger 
contemporary of Thales from the same city of Miletus. Later biographies portrayed 
Anaximander as a pupil of Thales, but it is more likely they were fellow contestants 
who competed with each other in a fairly genial manner. Like Thales, Anaximander was 
held to have acquired a reputation as a mephisto with novelties that impressed his fellow 
citizens. He is supposed to have imported the sundial to the Aegean from Mesopotamia 
and used it to calculate times of the day and the seasons. He was also held to have been 
the first man in the Aegean to have drawn a map of the known world on a tablet, 
marking an outline of its lands and seas. Anaximander entered the debate about the 
kosmos with the contradictory logos that the primary substance out of which all things 
were made was not water but aperion, an unspecified matter that surrounds everything
26 Charles Khan, 'Philosophy And The Written Word', in Kevin Robb (ed), op cit, 111-114.
27 Havelock, op cit, p. 15.
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without boundary or limit, and that the earth was a column that did not float but was 
held in place by an equilibrium between the heavens29. Next in the Milesian roll-call 
was Anaximenes, who argued that the primary substance was air, from which 
everything emerged through a process of condensation. Meanwhile, the earth was flat 
and was supported by air30.
Taking the three Milesians together, we can say that a new relationship had 
become possible between the knower and the known. Sophia was no longer just the 
songs sent by the Muse when the bard summoned her for the remembrance of things 
past. It was also something that could be actively sought out through investigation, 
research and contemplation. These activities were combined in the term historia. For a 
while, sophia by revelation happily coexisted with sophia by searching, but as the 
appetite for the fruits of historia spread along the Aegean coastlines during the course 
of the sixth century there were some who began to adopt a more assertive tone toward 
the old way of knowing. Admittedly, they were only a small band of marginal figures. 
The culture was still overwhelmingly dominated by the Homeric tradition, but there was 
an impudence about the way historia had begun to challenge mythos in the symposium 
that must have been disturbing to many contemporaries. Early signs of this impudence 
can be detected in fragments held to be by Xenophanes from Colophon:
'Let us commend that man among men who after drinking puts forth 
goodly matters to view, according to his recollection and his zeal for 
excellence with no mention of battles of Titans or Giants or Centaurs, 
those fictions of men of yore, nor vehement factional strife; these matters 
contain nothing good.'31
Xenophanes himself was a bard who could compose in epic, elegiac and iambic metre, 
yet in this fragment he has already begun to proscribe the archetypal subjects of Homer 
and Hesiod. And in another fragment Xenophanes actually mocks the immortals 
celebrated by Homer and Hesiod for judging mortals according to an ethical code they 
are unable to live up to themselves:
28 Henri Frankfort et al, op cit, p.376.
29 Kirk, et al, op cit, p. 105-121 & 133 & 137.
30 Ibid, p. 144-154.
31 Quoted in Havelock, 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', op cit, p. 15.
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'Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is a shame 
and reproach among men, stealing and committing adultery and 
deceiving each other.'32
Xenophanes judges the judges. But this does not prompt him to lose faith in the gods. It 
prompts him to lose faith in the ability of humanity to render them. He thinks that the 
hypocrisy attributed to the immortals is a human projection that tells us more about 
Homer and Hesiod and their followers than it does about the gods:
But mortals consider that the gods are bom, and that they have clothes 
and speech and bodies like their own.'33
Xenophanes' sensitivity to the human propensity for religious anthropomorphism owed 
something to the expansion of the known world34. By his time the growth in seaborne 
trade had given the cities of the Ionian coast a keener awareness of the diversity of 
human life:
'The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the 
Thracians that theirs have light blue eyes and red hair.'35
Xenophanes knew the value of carrying a little humour in his knapsack for defusing the 
explosive heat that his arguments were liable to generate. He drives his point home with 
satirical analogy:
'But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw with 
their hands and do the works that men do, horses would draw the forms 
of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their 
bodies such as they had themselves.'36
The logic of communitarian worship is thus driven to the point of the absurd. If all 
peoples manufacture different images of the gods then we might as well admit that there 
are no valid grounds to believe that our own images are the correct ones. The claims 
which Homer and Hesiod make to have divine access to the sophia of gods and heroes 
are therefore bogus, just 'fictions of men of yore'. Xenophanes replaces them all with a 
cosmic god, or supreme being, who is 'in no way similar to mortals either in body or 
thought'. And being incommensurable, god is also unknowable:
32 Kirk et al, op cit, p. 168.
33 Ibid, p. 169.
34 Baldry, The Unity o f  Mankind, p. 16-17.
35 Kirk et al, op cit.
36 Ibid.
229
'no man knows, or will ever know, the truth about the gods.'37
Nor does this cosmic god condescend to communicate knowledge to humans through 
the medium of the Muse:
'Yet the gods have not revealed all things to men from the beginning; but
by seeking men find out better in time.'38
Man cannot rely upon divine revelation. He must search and inquire to find out things 
for himself. And even then the truth will probably always be elusive: ’seeming is 
wrought over all things'.
The ability of Xenophanes to identify the communitarian nature of the gods 
assembled on Mount Olympus may be partly explained, as we have noted, by an 
expansion of the known world. But another factor should also be considered. By the 
time of Xenophanes the art of spontaneous oral composition was in decline and being 
superseded by the age of the rhapsode, or the minstrel who possessed a prized text of 
Homer which he memorized for recitation39. Having the epic laid out upon the scroll 
opened up for the reader a new world of cognitive dissonance. In oral knowledge 
structures ’inconsistency, even contradiction, tends to get swallowed up in the flow of 
speech, the spate of words, the flood of argument'40. An oral culture can manage 
dissonances by glossing them over. All sorts of diverse statements can be thrown 
together into a single narrative by the speaker in blissful ignorance that they may be 
inconsistent, and what is more, his listeners are unlikely to notice this either. No such 
luck for the literati. The growth of text enables backward and forward scanning for 
cross-reference, which promotes a more rigorous desire for logical consonance and a 
corresponding intolerance toward contradiction. It is still possible, probably inevitable, 
for an author to contradict himself at various points along the line, but it is more likely 
that his readers will notice them where they occur. If a text begins to accumulate 
readers, sooner or later somebody is going to draw attention to the contradictions that 
exist within it. When that happens, when someone has become conscious of an aporia
37 Ibid, p. 179.
38 Ibid.
39 Kevin Robb, 'The Linguistic Art of Heraclitus', in Kevin Robb (ed), op cit, p.158.
40 Jack Goody, The Domestication o f the Savage Mind, p.49-50.
230
within the text, it is not so easy to gloss over. If desirable enough it is still possible to 
maintain this contradiction, but at a cost, for the innocence of it will have gone.
We can imagine how Xenophanes scanned the Homeric text and noticed how 
the gods failed to act according to the normative code they were supposed to enforce. 
He then began to compose the verse that drew attention to the fact and which became 
notorious enough for fragments of it to survive the ravages of time. At any rate, his 
observation appears to have been widely tolerated. Xenophanes claims to have spent 
'seven and sixty years tossing my thought up and down the coastlines of Hellas'. 
Probably he was just shocking enough to be the lucrative talk of any polis he cared to 
visit, but not so outrageous as to offend the aristocratic households in which he hoped to 
be honourably received: a professional who had found his niche. Heraclitus was rather 
different.
Heraclitus grew up in Ephesus, another Hellenic city lying along the Ionian 
coast about forty kilometres north of Miletus. It seems he had not been dealt a bad hand. 
It was said he was the eldest son of a noble family that could trace its ancestry back to 
the founder of Ephesus. But something happened to Heraclitus. He resigned the largely 
honorific title of 'kingship' and handed it over to his younger brother41. The fragments 
evince someone who has become a misfit. A remark about drunkeness suggests a man 
who feels ill at ease within the male conviviality of the symposium. And when it came 
to the fun of the games, there is the shrill tone of an outsider, a voice that feels either 
unable or unwilling to participate:
'Homer deserves to be expelled from the competitions and beaten with a 
staff - and Archilochus too!'42
The staff was a standard prop for the bards who played in the symposium and competed 
in the games. The fantasy of beating Homer resonates with the beating of Thersites by 
Odysseus in Book II of the Iliad. It seems Heraclitus wanted to expel the bards for the 
claim that they dealt in sophia:
'The teacher of most is Hesiod. It is him they know as knowing most, 
who did not recognize day and night: they are one.143
41 Ibid, p. 1-2.
42 Charles H.Khan, The Art And Thought O f Heraclitus: An edition o f the fragments with 
translation and commentary, p.37.
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Heraclitus seizes upon the wisdom of Hesiod over one of the most basic experiences of 
mankind. Hesiod had seen the opposition between day and night as separate deities who 
visited the world alternately, whereas Heraclitus deduces that the presence of night is 
merely the absence of sunlight44. Like Xenophanes, Heraclitus is keen to draw attention 
to the fact that the recieved wisdom is fallible. But Xenophanes was changing the 
tradition from within the tradition, his existential position invited the employment of 
humour, whereas Heraclitus seems determined to be more confrontational:
'What wit or understanding do they have? They believe the bards of the 
people and take the mob as their teacher, not knowing that 'the many are 
worthless', good men are few.'45
The alienation of Heraclitus is expressed in terms consistent with an oligarchical 
contempt for the demos, but he was taking on the cultural tradition of a whole 
community here, for Homer and Hesiod were revered by noble and commoner alike. 
Doubtless, Heraclitus could afford to be rude because of his wealth and status. But his 
venom is directed as much against his own class as any other. His elitist sensibility has 
projected itself onto an intellectual plane.
Heraclitus claims to have access to a superior alternative to the wisdom of his 
day which he has already tried to communicate to people, but finds it impossible to 
make himself understood. He has searched for soulmates but has not found any. And so 
he makes a virtue out of his fate and becomes Heraclitus the obscure. For a priviliged 
man, brought up to look down on people, the temptation to nurse his cognitive 
alienation with intellectual snobbery must have come easily:
'Of the logos which is as I describe it men always prove to be 
uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they 
have heard it. For although all things happen according to this logos men 
are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words 
and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its 
constitution and declare how it is; but the rest of men fail to notice what 
they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when 
asleep.'46
43 Ibid, p.37.
44 Or: 'If there were no sun it would be night', Ibid, p51.
45 Ibid, p.57.
46 Kirk, et al, op cit, 187.
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The cognitive alienation which Heraclitus testifies to was the alienation of a man who 
has begun to interiorize the written word in a community that was still only 
protoliterate. By protoliterate, we mean a society where the use of script is still mainly 
confined to business, administration, and possibly the codification of law. By 
interiorizing the written word we mean the activity of making the technology of writing 
a part of our humanity, part of our sensory apparatus, thus allowing it to transform the 
way we think47. Any charge of technological determinism would be missing the point 
here. The man picked up the technology and it became his friend. Heraclitus himself 
believed that character was destiny48. It was his fate to be the kind of man who 
happened to prefer the company of letters to the company of his fellow Ephesians.
Heraclitus composed his thoughts on papyrus, but unlike his contemporaries he 
was probably not built for the rough and tumble of the agon. The classical tradition 
holds that Heraclitus wrote his views down on a scroll which he dedicated to and placed 
in the temple of Artemis. Sensing himself marooned outside his time, he stuffed his 
messages into a jar in the hope that one day he would find his audience. The viva voce 
had failed Heraclitus, so he became the first author for whom the written word was the 
primary mode of communication49. This does not mean that he was able to write prose 
as we would understand it today. Working from the surviving fragments attributed to 
Heraclitus, scholars have suggested his book' was not a sustained argument but a series 
of aphorisms or self-contained proverbs50. Today we might call them soundbites, 
designed in such a way that when read aloud they could seed themselves in the 
memories of receptive listeners, using rythym, parallelism and alliteration. With many 
of these sayings he also discovered the charm of using riddles and ambiguity to make 
his curse of obscurity look deliberate, thus triggering a multiplicity of interpretations 
and a sense of profound meaningfulness. The strategy worked. Within a couple of 
generations bis book acquired such fame that it produced partisans of his doctrine who 
were called Heracliteans'51.
His strategy was also a success in the sense that of all the shadowy figures who 
preceeded Socrates, it is his thinking that has arguably best survived the ravages of time.
47 See Walter J.Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing o f the Word, p.83.
48 'Man's character is his fate', Kahn, The Art and Thought o f Heraclitus, p.81.
49 Khan, ^Philosophy And The Written Word', op cit, p.l 18.
50 See Barnes, 'Aphorism And Argument', Khan 'Philosophy And The Written Word', and Robb, 
'The Linguistic Art Of Heraclitus', in Robb (ed), op cit.
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Despite the atomistic structure of aphoristic communication, and the delight Heraclitus 
took in oracular ellipsis, it is still feasible to reconstruct a coherent world view out of 
the extant fragments. Inspired by the inquiries of his Milesian predecessors, Heraclitus 
advanced his own arguments about the question of the physical environment and the 
human condition within it, but he did so in a way that indicates reflection about the 
nature of sophia itself:
'It is sophos, listening not to me but to the logos, to agree that all things 
are one.'52
Wisdom is no longer found by listening to the muse. It is obtained by listening to the 
logos, which is somehow independent of Heraclitus himself. Let us assume that 
Heraclitus was trying to summarize the wisdom of Thales, Anaximander and 
Anaximenes. He hears or reads about their debate, and learns that they have advanced 
different arguments about the nature of the world, but he is more concerned to identify 
the issue upon which all three Milesians were agreed. Taking the debate as a whole, 
which he calls the logos, he observes that it revolves around a consensus. He is 
interested in the unity which lies behind the apparent plurality of opinions, and thinks he 
has found this in the common assumption of a physical environment which can be 
considered as a whole. The search for assimilation within difference is a theme that 
recurs with Heraclitus, but the point we are trying to highlight here is that he has 
identified wisdom as the axioms that emerge within the context of a debate, and logos as 
the totality of arguments which constitute the debate.
Having identified the common assumption which underlies the arguments of 
Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, Heraclitus finds it necessary to give it a name, 
but to do so he has to commit an act of displacement. That is to say, he has to pick out a 
word from the Hellenic vocabulary and help it to slip the bonds of contemporary 
usage53. He chooses the word kosmos:
'The kosmos, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was 
and is and will be: fire everliving, kindled in measures and in measures 
going out.'54
51 Diogenes Laertius, quoted in Khan, The Art and Thought o f Heraclitus, p.3.
52 Ibid, p. 130.
53 Havelock, The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', in Robb (ed), op cit, p.24.
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This is the first recorded entry of the word in its capacity as a referent for the universe 
as a whole. As we have already intimated, it was borrowed from its previous application 
to the orderly array of an army controlled by its ’orderer* (kosmetor). This is why 
Heraclitus has to stress that his kosmos has no maker. It is a work of nature, an order 
without an orderer55. In fact, it even transcends the divine. Not only is it immortal, like 
Zeus. It also has no genesis, unlike Zeus. There is no sovereign intelligence by which 
matter is organized. It is just fire in an eternal process of burning itself out. Human 
agency has extinguished divine agency, on papyrus at least!
Before we leave Heraclitus, we should note that he believed his vision of the 
kosmos was intimately connected with the human condition and its destiny. His love for 
paradox enabled him to cobble together a communitarian-cosmopolitanism that 
managed to anticipate the primary antimony of the classical age. Heraclitus envisaged 
his kosmos as a fiery flux of eternal conflict between opposing forces:
'One must realize that war is shared and conflict is justice, and that all 
things come to pass in accordance with conflict.'56
Heraclitus was lucky enough to live in an Ionian city that was on good terms with the 
Persian kings who were becoming increasingly active in the region during the latter half 
of the sixth century. He could afford to be sanguine about conflict as a universal 
principle. Ephesus was on the up:
Homer was wrong when he said 'would that conflict might vanish from 
among gods and men!' {Iliad 18:107). For there would be no attunement 
without high and low notes nor any animals without male and female, 
both of which are opposites.'57
Conflict was positive for Heraclitus in the sense that he thought its removal would 
remove the foundation stone of life itself. There was a hidden harmony behind conflict 
that made it creative. But any notion that he was thinking about a healthy spirit of 
competitiveness that could sublimate violence in the manner of Hesiod will not wash. 
For Heraclitus, violence was simply what made the world go round:
54 Ibid, p.132.
55 Khan, The Art And Thought O f Heraclitus, p. 134.
56 Ibid, p.67.
57 Ibid.
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'War is father of all and king of all; and some he has shown as gods,
others men; some he has made slaves, others free.'58
Had not Zeus himself assumed divine sovereignty by victory over the Titans? On the 
mortal plane, war creates freedom and slavery, freedom being the fruit of victory and 
slavery the consequence of defeat. To sustain his notion of a humanity eternally divided 
against itself within the overall unity of the kosmos, Heraclitus turned to canis 
familiaris, the creature who guarded the margins of the oikoi and who scavenged around 
the walls of the polis:
'Dogs bark at those they do not recognise.'59
Remember the dogs who bay outside the hut of Eumaeus, balanced by Argus who pricks 
up his ears and wags his tail in the courtyard of Odysseus. Heraclitus uses the dog's bark 
as a signifier for the capacity of communities to engender solidarity through the 
intimacy of presence, and their corresponding ability to foster antipathy through the 
impertinence of absence. Down the millennia the dog's bark heralds the foreigner whom 
we do not know, the other who does not know us.
4.4. Solon's Law: 'Public evil comes home to every man and no security 
gates can hold it back; it leaps high over the courtyard wall and finds its 
man, no matter how well protected the house in which he tries to hide.'
We have seen how Hesiod used letters to unify all the myths of the gods into 
one great genealogical story, and how he used writing to compile a digest of Homeric 
Sophia over the question of justice. We have also seen how knowledge as revelation 
through song was being challenged by human inquiry through prose in the logos of the 
sophists of Miletus and Ephesus. And we have intimated that this secularisation of 
human consciousness and agency was possible because the Archaic Aegean witnessed 
the formation of a novel interface between the written word and the oral. The 
dissemination of writing had begun to release music and song from its obligation to 
serve the collective normative memory.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, p.57.
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An early consequence was that some singers began to use writing to wander 
from the hexameter verse and record other meters such as elegiac, iambic and lyric. The 
traditional canon was still preserved, but was supplemented with other genres that could 
tailor songs for specific targets, promote particular messages, or lighten the mood of an 
audience with the comic or bawdy theme. In such songs the subjective consciousness 
inscribed by Hesiod could develop and explore itself further. Fragments have survived 
which suggest that some of these new songs also challenged established values, or 
heralded new ones.
Archilochus, for example, son of a master and slave from the island of Paros, 
heralds the arrival of the anti-hero. Neither one thing nor the other, Archilochus 
commemorates his life with bastard songs. He courts Neobule, daughter of Lycambes, 
but the father goes back on his word and marries her off to another man of better status, 
so Archilochus gets his own back by visiting the drinking dens to sing a satire about the 
whole affair. Aware of his social impediment, he makes a virtue out of his fate by 
declaring indifference to the values of wealth and power:
'All the gold of Gyges means nothing to me; I've not yet been seized by 
envy, I do not admire what the gods do, and I do not want to be a great 
tyrant. These things are beyond my sight.'60
Gyges was a famous Anatolian king of Lydia, the contemporary Agean epitome of 
wealth and might. As the child of a power relationship between his master father and his 
slave mother, Archilochus contains the primary contradiction of Hellenic society at the 
very core of his being. Archilochus the master-father does take the traditional route of 
advancement for the bastard, participating in an attempt to set up a Parian colony on 
Thasos, but Archilochus the slave-mother still lurks within as a kind of gremlin in his 
tank. Defeat in battle against a local tribe, for example, gives Archilochus an 
opportunity to mock the heroic code of honour and glory:
M y shield delights some Thracian, for I dropped the blameless gear, 
unwilling, in a wood - but saved my skin: what is that shield to me? Fuck 
it! I'll get another just as good.'61
60 Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists, edited by Michael Gagarin and 
Paul Woodruff, p.22.
61 Quoted in Ewen Bowie, 'Lyric and Elegiac Poetry1, Oxford History o f the Classical World, op 
cit.
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The coward declares his courage to flee. In flight and fright the shield was a serious 
handicap, but to suffer it becoming a trophy for the enemy was not the sort of thing an 
Achilles or Hektor would have boasted about. It is the misfortune of heroes, barks 
Archilochus the bastard, to die young. But the fact that Archilochus was able to get 
away with these lyrics suggests that he was singing for laughs to a new breed of warrior 
who, in his lighter moments, did not attatch quite so much reverence to the value of 
individual bravery.
The warriors of the Aegean were indeed changing. Whilst knowledge 
experienced the introduction of a new dialectic between the oral and the written, the 
security structure changed with the evolution of hoplite warfare. A community could 
huddle behind city walls, but warfare often tended to focus upon the agricultural plain, 
because it was here that the bulk of its productive wealth could be destroyed, and the 
narrow margins upon which life subsisted in Greece meant that few communities could 
survive the ruination of a harvest two years running. As far as is known, open warfare 
on the plains emerged from the Dark Age as a rather disorganized melee led by the 
aristocrats, who could afford the best equipment and who had the leisure to learn how to 
use this equipment effectively, followed by a supporting cast of poorly armed troops 
who helped as best they could. The revival of trade during the Archaic Age brought 
increased access to metals, opening up new opportunities for military entrepreneurship. 
Firstly, metalsmiths and soldiers were more free to experiment in the use of heavy 
armoury, furnishing the range that would eventually become the standard hoplite gear: 
the helmet; the breastplate; the shield; greaves; and the thrusting spear. Secondly, more 
arms could gradually trickle down through to the ranks beneath the aristocracy, partly 
through the sponsorship of oligarchs who were in a position to give arms to some of 
their subjects in order to gain an advantage in battle over other poleis, and partly 
through the initiative of the smallholders themselves who were now more likely to be 
able to afford the armour because of the improvement in supply. These two 
developments added together made it feasible to experiment with organized formations, 
culminating in the hoplite phalanx, in which soldiers would move together in a line, 
conventionally about eight deep, thus gaining an advantage in the field through 
combined force and mutual protection62.
62 Raphael Sealey, A History o f the Greek City States, p.29.
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Once the new formation proved successful it spread rapidly throughout the 
Aegean, and its adoption had a number of consequences. Firstly, The phalanx produced 
a shift in the dialectic between military courage and cowardice. Collective courage to 
hold the line was of paramount importance, but once the line was irrecovably broken 
individual courage served no useful purpose. This was because the hoplite shield was of 
such design that the right hand side of its owner went unprotected when out of 
formation and so, as Archilochus observed, the only sensible thing to do when the line 
was broken was flee from what would become a rout. The requirements of the phalanx 
thus demoted the military prowess of the aristocrat, undermined his sense of noblesse 
oblige, and made him just another member of the infantry required to hold the line 
alongside his comrades. Meanwhile, the common peasant was promoted. His military 
contribution to the security of the polls was now more on a par with the aristocrat, who 
no longer held a monopoly in access to the the means of violence63. Archilochus sang it 
thus:
'I don't like the puffed up general, one walking legs astride, nice hair, 
shaved, proud of it. No, give me a scruffy little fellow, legs you can see 
between - that bowlegged! - standing firm on his feet, full of heart.'64
But at the same time the phalanx also helped to forment solidarities across class divides. 
Success in military formation depended upon communitarian discipline, trust, cohesion 
and collaborative effort. These virtues were painstakingly acquired through much 
practice from an early age, and put to the test in war at regular intervals, forging bonds 
between members of the community who would otherwise have lived apart65.
The rise of hoplite warfare was probably linked to a new development in the 
realm of finance in the political economy of the Archaic Aegean. Ever since the Bronze 
Age it had been customary to use precious metals as a currency for exchange, measured 
by standard weight systems. The tradesmans balance had permeated so deeply into 
Aegean culture that Zeus uses a pair of scales in the Iliad to weigh the fates of mortals 
in the administration of divine justice (see 8:67-75 & 22:209-14). During the seventh 
century, however, a state based at Sardis in Western Anatolia began to manufacture 
standard units of electrum, marking them with the stamp of sovereignty to guarantee the
63 James O'Neil, The Origins and Development o f Ancient Greek Democracy, p. 8.
64 Patterson, Freedom in the Making o f Western Culture, p.88.
65 Robert Garland, The Greek Way o f  Life, p. 183-7.
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accuracy of their weight and quality66. This was the state of Lydia under the rule of 
Gyges, the tyrant whom we have already met within a fragment from Archilochus. At 
this time the Lydian state is known to have been involved in a number of conflicts with 
numerous Hellenic city states lying across the coast of Anatolia, and many scholars 
have speculated that these standardised units of electrum were commisioned in order to 
facilitate uniform payments for equipment and soldiers in a portable and durable form. 
Once these early coins were distributed they began to change hands in exchange for 
other goods and services, and the reliability of their standard enabled them to circulate 
as a prototype of money. The utility of the coin as payment in the military muster was 
quickly appreciated, and many Hellenic city states along the Anatolian coast began to 
emulate their innovation. From here, the practice spread westward throughout the 
Aegean. In the process, the Hellenic city states took the manufacture of coinage to new 
levels of sophistication. The advent of coinage was important because military 
payments could be made in a way that bypassed the traditional aristocratic network. It 
also gave leaders a means to persuade their soldiers to exercise more restraint when it 
came to the practice of looting, thus opening up an opportunity to forge norms that 
might stabilise the risks of waging war. Coinage would also become important later in 
that it could be used to pay for other forms of public service, and because the dies cast 
into the pieces of hot metal became major signifiers of communitarian value.
The Archaic Age also witnessed changes in the sphere of production. Firstly, 
there were changes in land use. After the nadir of the Dark Age, say about 1000 BC, the 
demography of the Aegean peoples began to stabilize and then made a gradual recovery. 
By 750 BC this recovery was gathering pace, and many communities could no longer 
support their burgeoning populations from their existing supplies of land. One response 
to this was extensive, the tradition of setting up of colonies abroad, thereby exporting 
excess populations to areas where farming land could be occupied without major 
opposition. In this way Hellenic settlement began to expand and multiply67. Another 
response was intensive, a shift away from pastoralism back toward the trinity of grain, 
grapes and olives. Secondly, there were changes in the possession of land. There had 
always been inequalities between households in terms of wealth in land, but these 
inequalities became more serious when population growth plus the finite supply of land 
combined to threaten the self-sufficiency of the poorer oikoi. A family which had 
numerous sons in one generation, all of whom having sons of their own, would
66 N.K. Rutter, Greek Coinage, p.8-10.
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experience a decline in wealth as the plots of land were divided amongst the greater 
number*8. Hesiod’s answer to land poverty was hard work, but during the seventh 
century the process of immiseration by fragmentation had reached a stage where many 
farms were so small they were no longer viable. Meanwhile, the more fortunate families 
sought to consolidate their wealth and accumulate more, by giving loans to the failing 
oikoi on the security of land, labour and bodies in the event of default. In this way many 
households began to fall into debt and slavery. Thirdly, there was a combined but 
uneven diversification of the productive base, supplementing wealth from agriculture 
with commodity production in activities like mining and craft manufacture. This sector 
of the Archaic political economy was often export orientated, and thus dependent upon 
a revival in Mediterranean trade that was now beginning to surpass the commerce of the 
Bronze Age in terms of reach and scale. Fourthly, there was a growing emphasis upon 
slavery in the production process. Some slave labour was procured locally, as we have 
indicated, through the exploitation of debt. Another type of slave labour came through 
local conquest, as in the Peloponnese, where Spartans adopted the innovation of hoplite 
warfare and used it to turn whole populations into helots. But an increasingly important 
source of labour was chattel slavery, humans as commodities shipped from considerable 
distances69.
Taken together, these changes brought what the Greeks called stasis to many 
parts of the Aegean. This word originally meant 'to stand one's ground', or 'take a 
position', but came to signify the despair of a community that had become locked into a 
seemingly endless cycle of civil conflict70. Many poleis became unstable as power shifts 
in knowledge, security, finance and production corroded aristocratic solidarities to the 
point where the oligarchies began to divide into rival factions. In order to gain the upper 
hand in these oligarchical rivalries, some of the more astute factions began to seek 
support amongst the demos, or the common people71. Such initiatives were invariably 
led by an individual who was in a position to generate sufficient hoplite support to seize 
the polls by force. He would then set about consolidating his position as a tyrant 
(tyrannos) by repressing rival factions in the former oligarchy, whilst promoting his 
own faction through the power of patronage. The loyalty of the hoplites and other
67 Sealy, op cit, p.30-33.
68 O'Neil, op cit, p.7-8.
69 Susan and Andrew Sherrat, 'The Mediterranean economy in the early first millennium BC', 
World Archaeology, p.362-3.
70 J.O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 154. Also Andrew Lintott, Violence, 
Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City, p.34.
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members of the demos would then be secured through innovations that were both 
popular and served to undermine archaic ties of dependence toward rival aristocrats, 
such as the cancellation of debt, the redistribution of confiscated land, the 
encouragement of alternative forms of wealth creation such as mining and craft 
manufacture for export, and regular payments for military service made through the 
innovation of coinage. Many tyrants also acquired a reputation for using coinage to fund 
employment for landless labourers in the construction of public goods such as defensive 
walls or temples. Some tyrants also adopted the Near Eastern practice of using writing 
to draw up some of the first Hellenic law codes. This served both to enhance the 
prestige of the tyrant as sovereign 'lawgiver' and undermine the traditional role of other 
aristocrats as oral remembrancers of legal custom.
Whilst the tyrants often struck bargains with the demos in order to gain the 
ascendancy in rivalries with other aristocrats, tyranny did not, as a rule, challenge the 
notion that it was only aristocrats who were fit to govern the polis. Nor were the 
tyrannies capable of the kind of long term stability that would have enabled them to 
usurp the autonomy of the oikos. The typical pattern was for the tyrant to enjoy an 
initial burst of popularity as opportunism moved him to check the hubris of his fellow 
oligarchs, followed by a variegated process of decline and fall as the tyranny succumbed 
to the various temptations of power, thereby committing its own acts of hubris12.
A striking exception to this took place in Athens at the beginning of the sixth 
century, when conflict between rival factions within its oligarchy provoked a communal 
crisis. The bloody aftermath of a failed coup by the would-be tyrant called Kylon, in 
about 630 BC, left many leading families acutely aware of the costs of civil conflict. 
During this coup Kylon and his followers had moved to seize the Acropolis, but found 
themselves besieged there when further support failed to rally to their cause. When the 
situation became hopeless Kylon negotiated terms for surrender, securing an assurance 
that his followers would not be killed if they came down without a fight. After laying 
down their arms and seeking sanctury at altars around the Acropolis, all captured 
members of the coup were then slaughtered. The ruthlessness of this deed, the depths to 
which civil conflict had tempted some members of the community to sink, haunted the 
Athenian political imagination for generations. The family of a leading protagonist of 
the massacre, the Alkmeonids, was subsequently declared accursed, a curse which
71 P.J. Rhodes, The Greek City States: A Source Book, p.36-44.
72 O'Neil, op cit, p. 10. Sinclair, A History o f  Greek Political Thought, p.21.
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proved to be a factor in later events. The trauma also prompted efforts to purge the 
resort to civil violence with a punitive law code under Drakon in 621 BC.
Oligarchical feuding continued to simmer under the surface, however, and soon 
after 600 BC these conflicts once again threatened to break out into open violence. This 
failure to resolve internal rivalries gave many Athenian oligarchs cause to reconsider 
their contempt for the demos. Many within the aristocracy had grown rich during the 
seventh century by exploiting their financial ability to offer loans to their poorer 
neighbours, thereby trapping them in an vicious spiral of indebtedness. Once the debtors 
were in a position where they could no longer meet the repayments, the creditors would 
make their move. Sometimes the creditor exercised his right to redeem the debt by 
selling the debtor into slavery, along with the inhabitants of his oikos, whilst seizing the 
land to turn it into an estate producing goods for export. Other creditors found it more 
congenial to convert the debt to the status of hektemorage, whereby the bankrupt was 
allowed to remain on his land but was permanently obliged give over a sixth of his 
produce each year to his former creditor. These forms of exploitation were sustainable 
as long as the oligarchy could maintain a semblence of unity, but became unsustainable 
whenever rivalry threatened to deteriorate into open conflict between ruling factions, 
each seeking to recruit elements within the wider populace to their cause73. Being 
appraised of recent events in other parts of the Aegean, the Athenian oligarchy was 
aware that tyranny was a capricious resort. Under tyranny the Athenian aristocracy as a 
whole could expect to lose out because of a beggar-thy-fellow-oligarch dilemma that 
gave victory to the would-be tyrant who was ruthless enough to offer the demos the best 
deal. It was one of those curious moments in history where an oligarchy awakes, 
spooked by the spectre of its own mortality, and feverishly seeks to lower the stakes 
previously raised so high by the hubris of rampant inequality.
They turned to a man called Solon, a musician educated within an old 
aristocratic family 'but by wealth and position of the middle sort' who, partly through his 
performance of epic and his composition in lyric, had acquired a reputation for sophia. 
They made him Chief Archon for the year 594-593 BC, giving him a special brief to 
arbitrate for the resolution of conflict and thereby restore 'good order' within the polis. 
Somehow, maybe because of his middle rank status and a proven record of being either 
unable or unwilling to climb the greasy pole of patronage, Solon was trusted by the
73 This interpretation combines those favoured by Sealey, op cit, p. 114-5, and Lintott, op cit, 
p.44-5.
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oligarchy as the person least likely to be tempted to abuse this position in a bid for 
tyranny. Solon's gift with words and the popularity of his music were possibly also 
valuable assets for bringing restless elements within the demos back into line. What the 
oligarchy probably did not anticipate was the way in which Solon would take the 
traditional lore of oral song and apply its norms to a wider community. It was a 
reflective moment that changed the history of the Aegean74. It would also initiate the 
transformation of the status of Prometheus from that of a trickster as in Hesiod, to that 
of the champion of human freedom as characterised by Aeschylus. Solon the singer 
entered his own ballad and became a leading participant in its narrative. Obviously, we 
have to be careful. Solon's songs may have been about as vainglorious as the average 
modem political autobiography. Nevertheless, the surviving fragments of Solon's verse 
can help us to understand how he thought about his world and the role of the bard 
within it, and see how his way of thinking helped to shape the political and economic 
reforms which he initiated75.
In the fragment known as the Hymm to the Muses ('poem 13'), Solon opens with 
an address to the 'children of memory', thus invoking the epic and lyric tradition. But 
there is a subtle shift in the nature of address. The traditional posture of the minstrel was 
to summon for his audience a song heard directly from the Muses. Solon departs from 
tradition by asking the Muses to 'hear me as I pray'. This move is already anticipated in 
Homer where the bard sings of characters such as Chryses who pray to the gods. But 
here the bard himself sings the prayer and the audience is invited to witness a public 
address to the gods:
'Shining children of memory and of Olympian Zeus, Pierian Muses, hear 
me as I pray. Grant me prosperity and the hands of the blessed gods, and 
always a good reputation at the hands of men.' (13:1-4)76
Traditionally, the singer would invoke the Muses and leave it to his characters to appeal 
to the court of Zeus, but Solon requests an audience with the gods of both knowledge 
and power because fate has brought him to a position of knowledge and power. Being 
both minstrel and Archon at Athens, Solon attempts to traverse the boundary line that 
divides singers from heroes. Solon scans the Homeric canon for the sophia he thinks it
74 I use the word reflective in the sense delineated by Amoore et al, ‘Paths to a historicized 
international political economy’, Review o f  International Political Economy, Vol.7, no.l, 2000, 
pg.57.
75 See Emily Katz Anhalt, Solon The Singer. Ivan Linforth, Solon the Athenian. Kathleen 
Freeman, Work and Life o f Solon.
244
contains. He identifies with the heroic pursuit of wealth but observes, mindful of 
Agamemnon and 'the anger of Achilles', that this pursuit has to be tempered with the 
pursuit of justice:
'I desire to have property, but I do not wish to acquire it unjustly; for 
justice comes inevitably afterward. Wealth which the gods give, comes 
to a man to stay, set firm from lowest base to top. But that which men 
prize by reckless violence {hubris) comes not in due order, but forced by 
unjust deeds, it follows unwillingly, and swiftly it is mingled with ruin 
{ate)\ its beginning is from a little thing, as is the beginning of a fire, 
trivial at first, but in the end grievous; for mortals' works of reckless 
violence {hubris) are not long-lived.1 (13:7-16)
Solon broadly follows Hesiod's supplement to Homer on the question of dike as laid out 
in the Works And Days, but there is a subtle shift in emphasis. Hesiod looked upon 
justice with the reproachful eye of a powerless man, the wronged peasant who patiently 
waits for divine retribution. Solon sees justice as a man of power, a mortal who has
accepted the moral abdication of Zeus offered in the Odyssey (1:32-34) and thereby
seeks to act in a way that will shape his fate through a knowledge of causal connections 
between actions and outcomes.
Solon has a theory about why many of his fellow mortals succumb to hubris and 
fail to act according to the observation that just accumulation results in secure wealth 
whilst unjust accumulation is ultimately self-destructive. Solon acknowledges that the 
ways of the immortals are mysterious and that causal connections between actions and 
outcomes are often obscure. Some people pay for their transgressions straight away, 
some later, whilst others die before the consequences of folly return home to ruin their 
children, or their children's children (13:25-32). This existential zone of aporia between 
action and consequence combines with the human weakness for wishful thinking:
'This is the way we mortals think, both good and bad alike: each man has 
confidence in his own expectation until he suffers something. Then in 
turn he wails aloud; but until this, with gaping mouths we take our 
delight in high hopes.' (13:33-36)
Optimism is always liable to triumph over experience. Humans habitually commit 
injustice because they do not immediately feel the pain of its ultimate consequences, 
and in the meantime are able to fool themselves into thinking that they are getting away
76 All quotations of Solon are from Emily Katz Anhalt, ibid, unless indicated otherwise.
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with it. This brings Solon to a startling discovery, the human capacity for self- 
deception:
'And whoever is oppressed by painful illness, considers that he will be 
healthy; another who is a coward thinks he is a brave man. Another, 
whose form is not charming, considers himself beautiful.' (13:37-40)
And another who is behaving unjustly, considers himself a paragon of virtue. There is 
nothing quite like this in Homer or Hesiod. Wily Odysseus', as we have shown, was 
celebrated for his cunning, but even he was innocent of the possibility of lying to 
himself. And when Agamemnon offers his apology in the Iliad, he explains that 'the 
cruel blindness in my mind' that enabled him to commit his act of injustice was an evil 
goddess planted by the gods (19:79-95). The gods create injustice in order to administer 
justice! Hesiod also circles around this divine paradox. In the Works And Days Hesiod 
is confident that the Olympian world order will bring Perses to book for his injustice, 
but then also tells how all the evils which befall men can ultimately be traced back to 
the smoking finger of Zeus, who created them all in a fit of vengeance after a deception 
by Prometheus over the wealth of an ox.
Solon calls for a halt to all this. Zeus is let off the hook and Prometheus is 
unbound. For Solon the mission of the bard is to cajole the Athenians to take 
responsibility for their fate. Human misfortune can be forestalled by calculated 
forethought, and Solon leaves his audience in no doubt about what the primary cause of 
misfortune for his community is likely to be:
'But of wealth there lies no limit visible for men, for those of us who 
now have the most property, strive with double zeal; who can satisfy 
all?' (13:71-3)
Solon eyes the rich of Athens and observes that their unalloyed pursuit of wealth has 
become folly. Those who have the most wealth are the people least satisfied with the 
wealth they have, and when the desire for wealth becomes insatiable, people resort to 
hubris because production can never meet supply. The major threat to the security of 
Athens thus comes not from outside the city, but from within:
'Our city will never be destroyed by the fate of Zeus or the plans of 
immortal gods, for Pallas Athena our protector, great-spirited daughter 
of a mighty god, holds her hands over us. But the citizens themselves, 
lured by wealth, are willing to destroy this great city by their folly. The 
common people's leaders have a mind to do injustice, and much grief is 
about to come from their great hubris, for they do not know how to
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restrain their greed, nor how to order their present festivities in the 
peacefulness of the banquet. They grow rich yielding to the temptation 
of crooked deeds; sparing neither possessions that are sacred nor those 
belonging to the public, they steal rapaciously from every direction.'
(4:1-13)
The consequence of this, Solon argues, is a communal drift into slavery. By failing to 
respect the value of freedom for others, the rich bring tyranny upon themselves because 
the enslaved shall resort to desperate solutions. Solon sings out his consciousness of the 
interdependency between the individual fortunes of each oikos and the fortunes of the 
polis as a whole. When social cohesion breaks down distinctions between rich and poor, 
public and private, become irrelevant:
'In this way public evil comes home to each man and the outer doors can 
no longer hold it back; it leaps high over the courtyard wall and finds 
you anywhere, even if you hide in your inmost bedroom.' (4:26-29)
Justice within the polis is the means by which the Athenians may achieve security for 
their oikoi. All members of the polis have a mutual interest to construct, observe and 
defend laws that regulate communal limits and responsibilities:
This is what my spirit tells me to teach the Athenians: bad government 
brings the most evils to a city; while good government (eunomia) makes 
everything fine and orderly, and often puts those who are unjust in 
fetters; it makes rough things smooth, stops excess, weakens hubris, and 
withers the growing blooms of folly (ate). It straightens crooked 
judgements, makes arrogant deeds turn gentle, puts a stop to divisive 
factions, brings to an end the misery of angry quarrels.' (4:26-38)
Solon boasts he brought good government to Athens in his time as Archon by adopting 
the stance of an impartial third party, who 'stood like a boundary stone' between 'the two 
armies' of the oligarchy and the people, building alliances from all sides 'like a wolf 
wheeling amongst many dogs'. He claims to have acheived a genuine settlement by 
gaining concessions from all sides, and by resisting the temptation to play people off 
against each other for his own advantage.
One of Solon's acheivements was a consensus over the cancellation of debt, 
including the obligation of hektemorage, won under the slogan: 'the shaking-off of 
burdens'. This would have been a popular measure amongst many debt ridden members 
of the demos, but was not such good news for the creditors. Solon was able to secure 
this concession from the latter by arguing he needed it as a bargaining chip to forestall 
calls for land reform. We have reason to believe that Solon did resist calls for a
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redistribution of land from rich to poor because he tells us so in poem 34. The deal was 
that by agreeing to annul the debts of the poor, the rich could consolidate gains in land 
already made. The cancellation of debt was combined with a law forbidding the practice 
of offering loans on the security of the person. This was also popular amongst the 
demos. It defined them as citizens with inalienable rights. Behind closed doors, Solon 
probably argued that this concession meant a lot to the demos without costing the 
aristocracy too dear. By now, the Meditteranean slave markets were booming and slaves 
from abroad were cheap. Needless to say, for the demos Solon heralded the reform up 
for all it was worth: 'she who was formerly a slave is now free' (36:7). To amplify his 
personae as liberator, Solon arranged for some natively produced slaves to be brought 
back after having been sold abroad, and gave them back freedom amid a fanfare of 
publicity (36:9-10). The importance of the prohibition of debt slavery cannot be 
overestimated. By displacing the fear of slavery beyond the boundary of the polis, Solon 
had created a space for the development of freedom within the polis as a communitarian 
value. From now on the Athenian slave was by definition a foreigner. This displacement 
meant that freedom was conceptually forged upon the back of slavery and consequently 
became equated with mastery77. The dissonance between these two values was 
regulated by enclosure, by the boundary that determined who was inside and who was 
outside, citizen or slave.
Solon also sought to reduce tensions by using writing to widen the scope of 
eligibility for political and judicial service and promote other constitutional reforms. 
Whereas formerly an Athenian could only hold office by virtue of being a member of 
the oligarchy by birth, now eligibility was determined by an annual census which sorted 
people into four classes according to the yearly income of each oikos78. The highest 
officials were recruited from the top two classes, lesser duties could be performed by 
the third class, whilst the lowest class were now entitled to participate in the General 
Assembly. Solon also founded a new deliberative body called the Council of Four 
Hundred, selected by election or lot from the ranks of the top three classes, whose job 
was probably to convene the General Assembly and prepare its agenda79. This was 
important because it meant that the General Assembly was no longer called just on the
77 Orlando Patterson, Freedom: Freedom In The Making Of Western Culture, chapter 4.
78 O'Neil, op cit, p. 16-17. Simon Homblower, 'Creation and Development of Democratic 
Institutions in Ancient Greece', in Democracy The Unfinished Journey, edited by John Dunn, p.4. 
But for a sceptical view of the birth to wealth' narrative see Sealey, op cit, p. 114-9.
79 O'Neil, op cit, p. 19. Homblower, op cit, p.5-6. But once again, see Sealey for a sceptical view, 
op cit, p. 120-21.
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whim of a would-be Agamemnon or Achilles, according to an oligarchical agenda, but 
on a formal basis by a body whose members were sensitive to wider concerns.
Before Solon, the senior council of state and court of law had been the 
aeropagus, traditionally manned by all the oligarchs who were ex-archons. All legal 
casework first came under the jurisdiction of the nine sitting archons (magistrates), and 
appeals would then pass to the areopagus. After Solon’s reforms, the General Assembly 
also gained the right to sit as an appeal court, called the heliaia, and would eventually 
supplant the aeropagus to become the soveriegn court of law. The heliaia (or the 
General Assembly when sitting in its capacity as an appeal court) meant that all citizens 
regardless of wealth and status were entitled to serve as jurors80. By giving all members 
of the General Assembly the right to serve in this appeal court Solon provided, 
theoretically, a check against 'crooked judgements' meted out by the aristocratic 
establishment81. Allied to this was a law which gave all citizens the right to bring a 
prosecution before the courts. The right to exercise judgement over what actions did or 
did not transgress the laws was thus no longer the monopoly of the ruling class.
Looking at Solon's constitutional reforms as a whole, we can discern that they 
aimed to leave the doors of power ajar just enough to co-opt the demos and give them a 
feeling they had a stake in the polis, but not so open as to threaten the status quo and 
provoke an oligarchical backlash:
'I gave to the demos as much privilege as they needed, neither taking 
honour from them nor reaching out for more. But as for those who had 
power and were admired for their wealth, I arranged for them to have 
nothing unseemly. And I set up a strong shield around both parties by 
not allowing either to defeat the other unjustly.' (5:1-6)
Solon was no democrat. He believed in mle by the few, not by the many, but experience 
had taught him that inequalities of power have a propensity to corrupt. He argued that 
the powers he had given to the demos were just enough to keep the oligarchy honest. 
The role of the demos was to make its leaders accountable, rein in oligarchical 
infighting and thus reduce the risk of tyranny:
80 Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty o f Law, p.9-13.
81 Ibid, p. 15.
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'In that way the demos best follow their leaders, neither giving them too 
much freedom or too much force. For excess breeds hubris, when great 
wealth comes to people whose minds are not in order.' (6:6-10)
Solon was thus pursuing the ideal of a benign oligarchy. Nevertheless, his efforts to 
realise this ideal prompted him to enrol the demos into the political process. By using 
the poetic tradition of sophia to resolve the stasis which had gripped the polis of 
Athens, Solon managed to lay the foundations for classical democracy.
Solon acheived this at a time when the mnemonic vehicle for reflection itself 
was changing, a movement in which Solon himself was a participant. Following the 
precedent set by Drakon in 621 BC, Solon the singer had his constitution inscribed in 
stone on a kyrbeis and cajoled his fellow Athenians to swear on oath that they would 
obey the written laws82. The sovereign voice thus ceremoniously delegated powers to its 
written supplement, and this too was an essential ingredient for democracy. Before the 
advent of the kyrbeis the oligarchy had held a mnemonic monopoly over the 
constitution, but once the laws were written down and had gained a separate existence 
outside the head of the oligarch as a public document, it opened up the potential for 
independent judgement:
'Callias stood up and said that there was a traditional law that if any one 
placed a token of supplication in the Eleusinium he should be put to 
death without trial: his father Hipponicus had expounded this to the 
Athenians, and he had heard that it was I who had placed the token of 
supplication. Then Cephalus leaped up and said, 'Callias, you are the 
most wicked of all men. First you are expounding law, though you are 
one of the Heralds, and it is not right for you to expound. Secondly, you 
talk of traditional law; but the kyrbeis beside which you are standing 
prescribes a fine of a thousand drachmae if any one places a token of 
supplication in the Eleusinium.' 83
Written laws, accessible to all those who could read, became the property of those who 
could read, so that judges could be judged and laws followed to the letter. To support 
the drive toward a written constitution over the long term Solon proposed that all boys 
destined for citizenship should learn letters84. This proposal was conceivable because of 
the success of a number of schools founded shortly before the time of Solon85. 
Traditional education in the Archaic age had been the preserve of the aristocracy
82 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, p.48 & 122-3.
83 Andocides, I. On the Mysteries, 115-16. Quoted in P.J. Rhodes, The Greek City States: A 
Source Book, p.36.
84 F.A.G. Beck, Greek Education, p.77 & 92.
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through the commission of private tutors. The new schools, established to employ 
professionals who could teach hundreds of children at a time within a designated 
building, made elementary education cheaper and the demand for literacy and numeracy 
effective for parents from the wider citizenry in a way that the older tutorial method 
could not86.
|These schools, as communal organisations dedicated to the dissemination of 
writing throughout the whole polis, were thus destined to become agents for the 
democratisation of Athenian consciousness. Drawing from both the oral tradition of 
Homer and the writing of Hesiod, and using the reasoning processes propagated by the 
men of logos from Miletus, Solon the singer had initiated an experiment in the 
mediation of the values of security, wealth, freedom and justice by mortals. His poems 
openly address the Athenian populace as a whole. Each citizen is thus invited to assess 
the legitimacy of the judgements of his Archonship for themselves. The mediation of 
security, wealth, freedom and justice was now conceivable as an art, the art of human 
governance. This is where the history of the knowledge structure in the international 
political economy of antiquity really starts to get interesting...
85 J. Bowen, A History o f Western Education, p.74-81.
86 F.A.G. Beck, Greek Education, p.80.
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Chapter 6; Conclusion
In this conclusion I propose to review the journey traveled so far, tie up a few 
loose ends not quite covered in the introduction, and then say one or two things about 
the way ahead.
This thesis was written for those scholars who converge on the following four 
points of consensus. First of all, it is written for those who agree on the inseparability of 
politics, economics and international relations. It is written for those participating in the 
heterodox forum of International Political Economy which has grown out of the 
disenchantment with the intellectual boundary lines that were laid down during the 19th 
and early 20* centuries. Secondly, it is written for those who have read and been 
inspired by the work of Susan Strange. More specifically, it is aimed at those who have 
read States and Markets and who are open to the idea that her structural framework 
therin might be a fruitful method of assimilating politics, economics and international 
relations in an intellectually coherent fashion. Thirdly, this thesis is written for those 
who accept Strange’s argument that knowledge is a source of structural power which is 
of equal importance to security, production and finance. It is intended for those who 
have been struck by the prescience of her conception of ‘knowledge structure’ in a 
world where market and state imperatives under the forces of globalisation have been 
restructuring how world society applies words like science, technology and ideology in 
decision making discourse. Fourthly, this thesis is written for those who have either 
called for, identified with, or elaborated upon, the need to ‘historicise’ international 
political economy.
These four points then, shall be taken as given points of consensus which do not 
need to be defended here to the people by whom I would prefer my work to be judged. 
My theory of contribution is that this thesis might be accepted as one demonstration of 
the heuristic potential of this consensus and take its place alongside others. Chapter 2 
deconstructs States and Markets and thereby highlights aspects on the margins of Susan 
Strange’s text pertinent to her conception of knowledge structure. Chapter 3 narrates the 
origins of human social complexity using Strange’s heuristic framework of primary and 
secondary power structures. Chapter 4 narrates the origins of a western consciousness of 
dissonance between Strange’s basic values of security, wealth, freedom and justice and 
interprets the songs of Homer as a mnemonic database dedicated to the memory of oral
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principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures for their mediation. Chapter 5 
then thrusts the formation of a consciousness of the value of wonder under the spotlight 
of attention, and tries to show how important this value was in the formation of a 
political will that initiated the democratic reforms which would eventually lead to what 
David Held called ‘the classical model of democracy’.
I want to say a few more things about the reasoning behind the decision to go 
rummaging back so far into the rubble of history. IPE has, right from its founding 
articles and meetings back in the early 1970’s, deservedly perceived its greatest strength 
as being its superior ability to understand and explain contemporary processes of 
globalisation relative to many other social sciences. These were the original reasons 
given to justify its existence. What I have tried to suggest in this thesis, however, is that 
in the long term IPE can aspire to become more ambitious than this and should consider 
thinking more strategically about its heuristic appeal. Given that the traditional social 
science disciplines have for some time now been assimilating and developing the 
globalisation thesis for themselves, we could be approaching a stage where it will not be 
enough any longer to claim to be able to understand this aspect of the present better 
than other disciplines. Older social sciences have generally had more universal claims to 
knowledge. Therefore, we should also consider opening up a claim that an IPE approach 
also has the potential to understand the past better. Or rather, to adapt the classic quote 
from E.H. Carr, we should stake a claim that over the past three decades or so IPE has 
generated a unique set of questions which the present badly needs to ask in its dialogue 
with the past. Furthermore, Susan Strange’s analytical framework provides a pretty 
serviceable vehicle for that dialogue.
Now of course I am aware that some IPE theorists who agree on the need to 
address the historical deficit in IPE have found kindred spirits within the Annales school 
of historical scholarship, which consciously saw itself as a unifying force in perpetual 
dialogue with the human sciences1. Another important resource which the historicist 
turn in IPE has sometimes turned to is the comparitive historical sociologists: Michael 
Mann; Theda Skocpol; and Charles Tilly being perhaps the most notable examples2. 
Adam Watson has also applied the insights of the so-called English School of
1 See for example, Braudel, ‘Unity and Diversity in the Human Sciences’ & ‘The History of 
Civilizations: The Past Explains the Present’, in On History.
2 Michael Mann, The Sources o f  Social Power. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. 
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992.
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international relations profitably to the broad sweep of history3. Then of course, there is 
the tradition in Marxist historiography exemplified by the likes of Eric Hobsbawm, 
Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson and Eugene Genovese. And of course IPE has a great 
deal to learn and profit from the study of all of these traditions. Nevertheless, none of 
these are directly conversant with the ontological and epistemological concerns of the 
IPE literature which has been developing over the last three decades or so. Rather, these 
traditions have often had ontological and teleological baggage of their own to consider 
when researching into the past. Consequently, IPE concerns have rarely been addressed 
directly in the construction of historical narrative itself. Generally, we have had to get 
by on a talent for eavesdropping upon historical narratives written for debates generated 
within other disciplines. But it does not have to be like this. IPE is capable of inspiring 
important work on the past in its own right. At some point addressing the historical 
deficit will involve IPE becoming more proactive in the business of generating its own 
historiographical tradition which is fully plugged into and which thus directly seeks to 
address contemporary IPE debate.
Conventionally, where IPE has turned its attention to history, it has done so in 
order to seek out the origins of capitalism, because political economy has traditionally 
seen the development of capitalist relations as the primary roots of the normative 
perspectives that have been characterized as mercantilism, liberalism and marxism. 
More recently, the occasional foray deeper into the Middle Ages may have been 
legitimated by claims that we are moving toward a ‘neo-medieval world order’4. Some 
very valuable work has also been done on various civilizations in the world political 
economy before and after their tragic encounters with the emerging European 
hegemony5. But the idea that IPE should consider straying further back into antiquity 
may seem counter-intuitive to many. One reason for this is that what often strikes us 
about the peoples of antiquity is a profound sense of otherness. The minds of antiquity 
can seem so foreign to us that the very idea of imaginatively reinscribing these worlds 
of the past in a manner advocated by the likes of Vico, Collingwood or Cox may appear 
risible. Concomitant with this comes the view that antiquity stretches so far into the past 
that it has no meaningful purchase on the present. Also, regrettably, we have to
3 Adam Watson, The Evolution o f  International Society.
4 Lipschutz, ‘Reconstructing World Politics: The emergence of global civil society’, Millennium, 
21, no.3. 1992, 398-420.
5 For example: Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The world system 1250-1350, 
Abemethy, The Dynamics o f  Global Dominance: European overseas empires 1415-1980.
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recognize that the study of antiquity and the classics has strong associations for many 
with conservative or even reactionary traditions of thought. These negative associations 
have some basis from the days when the university was seen as a finishing school for 
national ruling elites and the classics an essential grounding in a ‘liberal education’. 
And to this day, in Britain at least, any sort of training in Greek or Latin is still a pretty 
reliable indicator of class. Consequently, anyone who attempts to trespass in this area 
risks simultaneously being seen as a reactionary by the modems and as an imposter by 
the classicists.
My view is that IPE should seriously consider trying to overcome all three of 
these obstacles to understanding the antiquity of modernity, and chapters 3, 4 and 5 
should be seen as modest contributions toward that effort. My reasons for risking the 
attempt are as follows.
First of all, what has been handed down to us as mercantilism, liberalism and 
marxism are all siblings bom of an enlightenment that was steeped in the classics and 
used them in their rebellion against Christian scholasticism6. Hobbes, Machiavelli, 
Hume, Adam Smith, Ricardo, Marx and all the other greats in the intellectual heritage of 
IPE all stood upon the classical western canon manufactured for them using the printing 
press7. Consequently, it makes no intellectual sense whatsoever for the ‘historical turn’ 
in IPE to stop short at the medieval origins of capitalism Also, thanks to a wealth of 
research in archaeology, anthropology and philology during the 20th century, our 
understanding of antiquity today is very different from that upon which the founders of 
political economy built their theories about their present. Our 21st century engagements 
with the thought of mercantilism, liberalism and marxism which we draw from in order 
to interpret our own present should thus be sensitive to the fact that they all rest upon 
these shifting sands.
Secondly, recent talk of a ‘neo-medieval world order’ is an indicator in itself of 
the broader perspective badly needed for a comparitive historical analysis of the present, 
for our post-cold war order is, in many ways, far more neo-classical than neo-medieval. 
If we look at Strange’s ontology of human values of security, wealth, freedom and 
justice for example, our vocabulary for these is far more easily transposable into the
6 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment Volume 1.
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Greek polis than into the Latin discourses of the medieval monastery. Or if we wish to 
seek out historical resonances for contemporary struggles against the exploitation of 
world debt and the associated struggle for cosmopolitan democracy, surely it is classical 
antiquity which provides a stronger echo than feudal Christendom. Or if we want to find 
a historical parallel for a drift in foreign policy from the relatively benign hegemony of 
a democracy to predatory imperialism, and the tragic consequences that this drift will 
bring in its wake, surely it is to ancient Athens we should turn rather than medieval 
Rome. This was the message of Thucydides, and the realists should never have been 
allowed to get away with claiming him as one of their own.
Thirdly, I invoke the authority of Cox and his post cold war interest in the 
concept of civilization. When the final draft on tekhne was being written, the Americans 
and the British were going through an early round of bombing what used to be 
Mesopotamia, and one or two of my students were enthusiastically quoting Huntington, 
whilst their antagonists were citing Edward Said. Yes, of course, the historical study of 
other civilizations caught within the deadly embrace of neo-liberal globalisation is very 
important. But as Edward Said pointed out, the study of the other can sometimes turn 
out to be little more than a projection of the self*. Another counterveiling strategy to the 
new cultural realism, therefore, would be to rekindle the spirits of those others who lie 
restless deep within the lower strata of western civilization itself. As I have tried to 
show in this thesis, the study of antiquity is deeply political because it can challenge the 
very identity of western civilization. Ironically, the conventional focus of critical IPE on 
the medieval origins and subsequent history of capitalism risks reifying capitalism and 
Christianity as the defining features of the west, when in fact western civilization is 
much richer than that and there is a profoundly radical occidental antiquity lying buried 
under our feet (if my interpretation of Homer is anywhere near the mark, the origins of 
western civilization lie partly in the primitive discovery of respect for international law). 
But in order to excavate this radical antiquity and thus undermine the barbarian 
assumptions of people about what western civilization means, we within IPE will also 
have to overcome many of our own preconceived notions about the study of ancient 
history and learn to reaffirm its pertinence. Many neo-liberals and neo-conservatives are 
fond of finding resonances in antiquity to support their theories and fantasies. Critical 
IPE will need to cultivate its own antiquity in order to puncture such pretensions.
7 Eisenstein, The Printing Press As An Agent o f  Change: Communication and cultural 
transformations in early modem Europe, vols 1 & 2.
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Having made such claims for ancient history aimed at debates within IPE, I also 
want to say something about the many historians upon whom I have relied to generate 
this text and, out of profound respect for them, explain exactly what my historical 
narrative does and does not purport to be. This is important because in order to address 
the historical deficit in IPE meaningfully, we shall have to develop some principles, 
norms and rules for cooperation with the professional historian. Like Amoore et al, we 
should be inspired by Collingwood and Carr, but we should also be prepared to listen to 
people like Arthur Marwick, who expresses views shared by many contemporary 
professional historians9. When the historian assesses his peers, an important criteria for 
judgement is the balance between primary and secondary sources. If this were a thesis 
submitted within the discipline of history, for example, it would not pass, because it is 
almost entirely reliant on secondary sources and where it does use primary sources, it 
does so only through the good grace of a translation attempted by the philologist. 
Therefore, it should be made clear that this thesis does not purport to be written by a 
professional historian immersed in the primary sources or with first hand experience of 
the relevant artifacts. Rather, the historical narratives are written by a scholar of IPE 
based upon the most reliable secondary sources he can find. My assumption of the 
licence to do this is based upon the principle that, given the extensive nature of our 
contemporary academic division of labour, pragmatic indulgences should be granted to 
middlemen attempting to defy the problem of opportunity cost. On the one hand we 
have a collection of scholars under the banner of IPE who wish to develop their 
historical awareness further. On the other we have a number of historical scholars who 
presumably have no great desire to repel potential readers outside their own specialism. 
In the short lifespans allotted to mortals, one cannot be an expert in both fields. 
Therefore, theoretically it should be admissable for a scholar from IPE to legitimately 
use secondary sources in order to generate historical narratives according to the 
coordinates of questions that his chosen discipline prompts him to ask.
So I have tried to narrate a history of the structuration of knowledge within a 
context of the mutual structuration of security, production and finance. I have tried to 
eschew an approach which sees history merely as a quarry from which fundamental 
abstract laws of human nature and behaviour can be derived. I have used Strange’s
8 Edward Said, Orientalism.
9 Arthur Marwick, The New Nature o f History.
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heuristic framework to write a narrative based upon the hypothesis that history proceeds 
through a process of multipile determinations. I have developed Strange’s conception of 
knowledge structure to assimilate Amoore et al’s proposal for research upon the 
historicity of knowledge. In States and Markets, Strange’s desert islanders carry the 
weight of conscious human agency within her structuralist framework. In this 
supplement to States and Markets, her desert islanders turn into the peoples of antiquity. 
Because of her emphasis upon the structuration of knowledge, Strange’s framework is 
actually quite well suited to the study of human agency within structure. As Amoore et 
al argue, the purposive act is the key to introducing an emancipatory human dynamic 
between structure and agency. But in order to sidestep the accusations commonly aimed 
at both Croce and Collingwood of an idealist bias, I have tried to contribute toward 
Amoore et al’s project by capturing some of the key transformative moments in the 
materialist history o f consciousness itself. Since Collingwood composed The Idea o f 
History, the idealist versus materialist divide has been returning to haunt us in a 
burgeoning body of literature in science and philosophy clustering around the ‘hard 
problem’ of consciousness10. This thesis aligns itself firmly behind the side of the 
debate championed by people like Daniel Dennet, Julian Jaynes, Eric Havelock and 
Jacques Derrida who, in diverse ways, have argued that consciousness has a material 
basis in our communicative media and arrived late, with the onset of human civilization 
and the structuration of knowledge. This is my final argument why it is important for 
IPE not to forget the antiquity of modernity. If it can be shown that consciousness itself 
has a history then we need to remember that it cannot be taken for granted. We must 
struggle to prevent it from being snuffed out. Far too many important decisions in our 
world political economy seem to get made without it. The Turing Test is equally 
applicable to humans.
I now turn to the first and second points of consensus identified earlier in this 
conclusion, namely the need to integrate politics, economics and international relations 
and the possibility that Strange’s framework for analysis may be a suitable method of so 
doing. One of the things that has struck me very forcibly in my research for this thesis is 
how the disciplinary boundaries between international relations, politics and economics 
are reflected in the work of many historians upon whom we rely for our understanding 
of the past. Professional historians during the 20th century have often tended to divide
10 See Jonathan Shear (ed) Explaining Consciousness: The ‘hard problem ’, also Susan 
Blackmore, Consciousness: an introduction.
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themselves up into international historians, political historians or economic historians. 
This intellectual division of historiographical labour, in turn, inevitably acts as a 
constraint upon the epistemic hunger of scholars within the disciplines of politics, 
economics and international relations, and vice versa. That is to say, when a political 
scientist turns, for whatever reason, to study secondary sources on the past, he will turn 
to the political historians. And when an economist decides, for whatever reason, to 
consult sources on the past, he will consult the economic historians. And when a scholar 
of international relations looks to the past, he will inevitably gravitate toward the 
bookshelves which have been set aside for the international historians. These symbiotic 
intellectual relationships thus mutually reinforce each other. When the scholar of the 
present consults the scholars of the past, there are well beaten paths there which fail to 
challenge him to question the mental enclosure imposed by his disciplinary training. 
And when the scholar of the past looks to draw inspiration from, or find an audience 
amongst, the scholars of the present, he finds little there which challenges him to 
integrate economic history with political and international history. Conversely, when a 
scholar with an interest in IPE consults the most authorative sources on the past that he 
can find, he is immediately confronted with a Herculean task of cross referencing, 
trespassing, beating down overgrown paths and making connections as best he can.
Therefore, by picking up Susan Strange’s structural framework and showing 
how it can be used to actually construct historical narratives right back to the dawn of 
human civilization, I hope I have contributed in helping to sustain the IPE project of 
integrating politics, economics and international relations, simply by undermining some 
of the historiographical props which may have traditionally helped to maintain their 
intellectual separation. Of course my contribution in this regard, and on all the other 
points above, has been limited by my meagre powers of scholarship but hopefully, by 
taking this step and being prepared to expose my nakedness, shortcomings and abject 
failures for all who wish to see, it will encourage others to do better and apply Strange’s 
structural framework to the study of history more fruitfully.
Earlier on, in my introduction to this thesis, I suggested that it was setting out to 
historicise certain questions prompted by Susan Strange’s prescience with regard to the 
retreat of the state in the university. I did not suggest that this thesis would complete the 
task of historicizing my questions prompted by the retreat of the state in the university. 
Such a task is way beyond the wits of any one person. In the event my thesis falls short 
of even its far more modest original objectives for lack of time, space and money.
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Unfortunately the narrative has to stop short before the Athenian democracy initiated by 
Solon began to promote Greek Theatre as the primary means of higher education and 
reflection for the many, whilst the Academy emerged as the dominant means to elite 
higher education, reflection and research for the few. Unfortunately, the narrative has to 
stop short before the Athenian democracy initiated by Solon fell into the trap of an 
imperialist foreign policy. Consequently the narrative stops a very long way short of my 
original intention to conclude chapter 5 with the emergence of Diogenes, who harnessed 
the general disillusionment in the wake of the Peloponnesian war to fuse the Theatre 
and the Academy and project the mediation of the values of security, wealth, freedom 
and justice beyond the walls of the polis, and who thereby became the first 
cosmopolitan. These are the next steps that I would take if given the opportunity to 
pursue the task of historicizing IPE further.
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